THE LOST BRITISH POLICY
THE LOST BRITISH POLICY

Britain and Spain since 1700

BY

BARBARA WERTHEIM

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
PHILIP GUEDALLA

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To A: who will never read it
Introduction

It is a truism (and truisms are often overlooked by busy people) that British interests are not confined to British territory. They do not end, that is to say, where foreign territory begins. If this were only so, the world would be an infinitely simpler place, where we should have no problems beyond our shores and there would be nothing more for us to worry over than the prosperity and happiness of British lands. But that prosperity depends in time of peace on the free flow of trade along the sea-ways of the world; and in time of war the whole existence of Great Britain hangs by the slender chain of those communications. It follows that the circle of her most vital national concerns includes certain regions of the earth which she has not the slightest claim or wish to govern but cannot afford to see controlled by unsympathetic hands. That is the simple reason for her abiding interest in the Narrow Seas and their adjoining lands, for that unchanging sensitiveness to all questions affecting the ownership and control of the Low Countries which is the mainspring of British policy. For it is a British interest of the first order that these should retain their independence, that they should never come within the orbit of a combination hostile to Great Britain; and whatever Power has attempted to deflect their course into subjection encounters an invariable front of British opposition. Alva subjugating the Netherlands in the interest of a Madrid-
Vienna-Brussels axis roused the Elizabethans; Louis XIV threatening the same region with a dangerously expanding France brought King William and Marlborough into the field; Napoleon ensured his downfall by pointing the pistol of Antwerp at the heart of England; and Kaiser Wilhelm went precisely the same way to work and with precisely the same result. For British policy reacts quite instantaneously, when it detects the slightest challenge to free passage through the eastern entry of the Narrow Seas.

But they have other entries; and a similar appreciation of the elementary facts of geography has long imposed on British minds a lively interest in Spain. For that country faces two vital British highways. Its Atlantic and Moroccan ports look out upon the road that leads to Britain from North and South America and the Cape, whilst its Mediterranean shore and islands command the way to Egypt and the East. Those simple facts inspired the British principle once stated by Lord Palmerston that "there should be neither an Austrian Spain nor a French Spain, but a Spain which should be Spanish." It was the guiding motive in a long war against King Louis; it was the originating cause of a war initiated by a British landing on the coast of Portugal to assert the right of the Peninsula to independence, when the people of Madrid rose bare-handed against an imported general. For the Spanish mind, no less conservative, resents attacks on Spanish independence with formidable heroism; and, in the course of history, its efforts have been seconded by British policy inspired by a judicious grasp of solid British interests rather than by a sentimental love of abstract freedom or a distaste for tyranny. Such flights of ideology are far beyond the British range. It was enough for Palmerston that Spain lay at the western
gate of England’s sea-ways; and if that were so, a
Spanish civil war could hardly be a matter of in-
difference to England, since it might install a hostile
gate-keeper. This comprehension underlay the busy
network of diplomacy and active intervention with which
he accompanied the recurrent Carlist struggle, when
British influence was actively employed to help the
Spanish side to victory and non-intervention was, as
Talleyrand remarked with wicked glee, “a metaphysical
and political term that means almost the same thing as
intervention.” There was no failure to observe upon
which side the interests of Britain lay or to instruct his
own ambassador that “it becomes essential that Spain
should be politically independent as well as physically
and morally strong; and that other nations should know
that the foreign policy of Spain is guided by Spanish
feelings and directed with a view to Spanish interests
and is not made subservient to the policy of any other
Power.” This is all that England asks of Spain, as
stated by Lord Palmerston in his most lucid mood.
For Spanish freedom is a British interest, decreed by
the unconquerable facts of physical geography.

That is why the name of Spain recurs so often in the
long roll of British policy. Other nations may permit
themselves the luxury of intellectual crusades in Spanish
causes. But such luxuries are not for us, since only one
result of any war in Spain is tolerable for Great
Britain. Spanish independence is a prime necessity to
England no less than to the Spanish people. It was
so when Wellington ejected foreign troops from the
Peninsula and when Palmerston supported Spanish
Governments with the full weight of British policy; and
it will be so to-morrow.

PHILIP GUEDALLA.

London, April, 1938.
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I

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

In all the wars of the eighteenth century, Spain was England's enemy. England fought Spain, not from personal rivalry, but to prevent a union between that country and either one of the great Continental Powers. Whether it was France or Austria—but it was generally France—which was endeavouring to harness Spain to its chariot, England never failed to combat the attempt, by force of arms, if necessary.

*The War of the Spanish Succession*

The War of the Spanish Succession, at the opening of the eighteenth century, laid the foundations of this policy. The King of Spain, Charles II, was an old man and childless. His nearest heirs were Louis XIV of France and the Emperor Leopold I of Austria. Both these monarchs were grandsons, like Charles II himself, of Philip III of Spain, and both had married sisters of Charles II. Since their claims to the Spanish crown were exactly equal, it was decided to divide up the Spanish dominions between them. But Louis, disregarding the two Treaties
of Partition which had been concluded in 1698 and 1700, prevailed upon Charles to bequeath the entire Spanish inheritance to Louis' grandson and heir, Philip of Anjou. Charles did so, and died the same year, 1700. With the triumphant announcement, "Il n'y a plus de Pyrénées", Louis sent his grandson to Spain, where he was proclaimed King Philip V.

England felt that control of Spain by the dominant Power on the Continent was a direct menace to her safety. France was enough to cope with by herself, but united with Spain, as would be the case when the French crown should pass to Philip, she would be more powerful than was comfortable for England to contemplate. England did not intend to wait until that should happen. In September, 1701, William III formed the Grand Alliance with Holland and Austria against France and the various small States allied with her. What compelled him was the knowledge that French control of Spain would not only completely upset the European balance of power, but would establish French supremacy in the Mediterranean. "These were the interests ultimately at stake," writes Sir A. W. Ward in the Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, "and in its care for them, the policy of William III takes its place within the general course of British foreign policy."

The Declaration of War was read to Queen Anne's first Parliament on May 4, 1702. "Where-
as,” it stated, “our late dear brother, William 3 of glorious memory, had, in pursuance of the repeated advices of the parliament of this kingdom, entered into solemn treaties of alliance with the Emperor of Germany, the States-General of the United Provinces and other princes and potentates for preserving the liberty and balance of Europe and for reducing the power of France; which treaties are grounded upon the unjust usurpations and encroachments of the French King who had taken, and still keeps, possession of the great part of the Spanish dominions, exercising an absolute authority over all that monarchy . . . we find ourselves obliged for maintaining the public faith, for vindicating the honour of our Crown and for preventing the mischiefs which all Europe is threatened with, to declare, and we do hereby accordingly declare war against France and Spain.”

The military history of the war need not be detailed here. Everyone can tell how Marlborough won the Battle of Blenheim. But most of us, if we were asked what he won it for, would be in the same position as the old man in Southey’s poem:

“Why, that I cannot tell,” said he,
“But ’twas a famous victory.”

To-day it is, perhaps, not superfluous to recall that the Battle of Blenheim was fought, among other reasons, to prevent the dominion of Spain
by England's chief Continental rival. We may also have forgotten since our schooldays that the possession of Gibraltar dates from the War of the Spanish Succession. Some years later, in 1708, Minorca too was captured, but, after changing hands more than once during the century, was ultimately given back to Spain in 1802.

Several times during the course of the war, peace negotiations were opened, and each time, although France offered many other concessions, she balked at giving up Spain. Each time when this happened England renewed the struggle. "We ought to give the Queen nineteen shillings in the pound," said the Earl of Peterborough in the House of Lords, "rather than make peace on any other terms." On the same day (December 18, 1707) the Lords passed a resolution to the effect "That no peace can be honourable or safe for Her Majesty and her allies if Spain ... be suffered to continue in the power of the House of Bourbon."

Again, in 1709, when France was nearly beaten to her knees, she proposed peace terms which Lecky, in his History of England in the Eighteenth Century, has called the "most humiliating offers ever made by a French King." Louis was willing to cede Spanish possessions outside the Peninsula to Austria, to give up the Barrier fortresses to the Dutch, make territorial concessions to the Duke of Savoy, expel the Pretender from France,
recognise the titles of the Queen of England, the King of Prussia, the Elector of Hanover, raze Dunkirk, restore Newfoundland. But England refused to accept these terms unless Louis XIV agreed also to expel his grandson from Spain within two months. Although England's answer was, no doubt, as Lecky says, "a scandalous abuse of the right of conquest", it nevertheless illustrates the importance she attached to removing Spain from French dominion.

After ten years of warfare, an event occurred which underlines the basic principle of England's policy toward Spain. Like Louis XIV, the Emperor of Austria had a grandson, the Archduke Charles, in whose name he claimed the Austrian rights to the Spanish throne. The Emperor died in 1705 and his son Joseph succeeded him. But, in 1711, the quite unexpected death of Joseph left the Archduke Charles heir to the whole of the Austrian dominions, including the Spanish inheritance. To have Spain united with Austria suited England no better than to have her united with France. England wanted a Spanish monarch independent of any ties with any other European Power. She could not continue to fight for the sake of Archduke Charles's rights to the Spanish crown. Deserting Austria, England began secret preliminary peace negotiations with France. Nothing illustrates more clearly the fact that the fundamental point of England's Spanish policy was opposition, not to
any particular Power, but to *whichever* Power en-
dangered Spanish independence.

**The Treaty of Utrecht**

England was now willing to let Philip V remain
on the Spanish throne provided he gave up all
claims to the throne of France. At first France
refused to consider the renunciation of the crown
by Philip, on the ground that the law which
made him heir "... is the work of Him who
hath established all Monarchies and we are per-
suaded in France that only God can abolish it"
(*M. de Torcy to Mr. St. John, March 4, 1712*).
St. John, later the Earl of Bolingbroke, the
Minister in charge of foreign affairs, answered,
"We are ready to believe you are persuaded in
France that God alone can abolish that law... but you will give us leave to be persuaded in
Great Britain that a Prince may depart from his
Right by a voluntary cession..." In short,
Sir, the Queen commands me to tell you that the
Article is of so great consequence as well as for
herself as for the rest of Europe, for this present
Age as for Posterity, that she will never again
agree to continue the negotiations for peace unless
the Expedient she has proposed be accepted
or some other equally solid" (*St. John to de
Torcy, March 23, 1712*). A long and heated
correspondence followed, England insisting on
her point and France refusing to give way until
finally St. John put his foot down, saying, that
a union of France and Spain "... would be to betray the common cause of Europe and to expose both the present Age and Posterity to greater Dangers than it is possible to imagine" (St. John to de Torcy, April 29, 1712). France gave way, and under the final terms of the Treaty of Utrecht agreed to the permanent separation of the French and Spanish monarchies. The Treaty also recognised Gibraltar as belonging to England in perpetuity. But Utrecht was really a beginning and not an end. It drew the European battle lines for a hundred years to come. As persistently as France tried to draw Spain back within her orbit, so persistently did England direct all the force of her diplomacy and, when necessary, of her army to keep them separate. Dating from Utrecht, too, a tenacious hold on Gibraltar became the key of England's Mediterranean policy.

*England and the Catalans*

Mention of the War of the Spanish Succession, particularly in connection with a study of Anglo-Spanish relations, demands reference to an episode which one might otherwise prefer to pass over in silence. Catalonia, even then, was avid for autonomy, and it needed very little urging to induce the Catalans to rise against Philip V and fight in the war as allies of England. In the credentials issued to Mitford Crow, who was sent to stir up Catalonia, the British Government
stated, "Whereas we have taken up Arms to vindicate the liberties of Europe against the exorbitant power of France and to this end we make our Efforts to prevent the neighbouring nations from becoming its Slaves; and we being also informed that you have always had a fervent Zeal for liberty and that you seem to disdain the Yoke of the Dominion of France which is laid upon your Necks, and that you design, as becomes brave Men, to shake off the same, we have therefore thought fit to send our Trusty and Well-beloved Mitford Crow, Esquire, towards you . . . to treat with you and to do everything that may conduce to the finishing of this good work" (March 7, 1705). England is on record both as having provoked the Catalanian uprising and as having promised the Catalans her support in their struggle for autonomy. Lord Peterborough and Sir Clowdisley Shovell, the British commanders in Spain, were instructed to assure the Catalans "... that they shall not want Our Support and you may promise them in Our Name that we shall secure them a Confirmation of their Rights and Liberties from the King of Spain that they may be settled upon a lasting foundation to them and their Posterities" (May 1, 1705). But when the war was brought to an end, this promise was forgotten, and the Treaty of Utrecht was silent concerning the Catalans. They, however, refused to submit to Philip V and went on fighting alone. England made a
gesture of inducing Philip V to promise an amnesty, but that was hardly a confirmation of "Rights and Liberties" and the Catalans spurned the offer. For over a year Barcelona withstood a siege by sea and land, and it was only after famine and 14,000 bombs had practically destroyed the city that the attackers were eventually able to take it. During that time and during the subsequent subjugation of the province by the King of Spain, England did not lift a finger to aid her former ally.

Austria and Spain

Meanwhile, although England hoped that the Treaty of Utrecht had cut the ties between Spain and the Continental Powers, it became evident that both France and Austria had signed the Treaty with mental reservations. Austria was the first to start angling once more for the Spanish prize. In 1718 she had joined the Quadruple Alliance against Spain when that country, under the leadership of Cardinal Alberoni, had made an unsuccessful attempt to win back her Mediterranean possessions lost at Utrecht. Having obtained what she wanted from the short war of 1718, Austria decided to end her quarrel with Spain, and, renouncing her own claim, to recognise Philip V as the rightful King. Spain, on her side, was looking around for a new ally. She had been mortally offended by France because Louis XV, who had been betrothed to
the Infanta, "... could never gain upon himself to be tolerably civil to the young Princess and declared his resolution to send her back to Spain" (Cobbett, *Parliamentary History*, vol. 8). Also, after her defeat in 1718, Spain realised she could not hope to regain Gibraltar or anything else without an ally.

So it came about that in 1725 Austria and Spain concluded an alliance (the Treaty of Vienna), by which Austria promised her good offices and, in a secret clause, her armed assistance for the recapture of Gibraltar and Minorca.

The Treaty of Vienna caused the deepest distrust and alarm in England, the more so when it was discovered that a secret clause provided for the marriage of two Spanish princes with two Austrian princesses. Once more the balance of power was threatened by a tie-up between Spain and a leading Continental Power. "The Emperor's views at this juncture," wrote Lord Townshend, the principal secretary of state, "are as extensive and dangerous to Europe in general and to our country in particular as ever those of Lewis the 14th were, and if we do not in time show the world that we are determined to oppose him... a war will be inevitable..." (Lord Townshend to Sir Robert Walpole, December 7, 1725). To offset the danger, a defensive alliance of mutual guarantee was immediately concluded by England, France, and Prussia (the Treaty of Hanover, 1725).
The crisis flared up again, however, when the secret marriage provisions of the Treaty of Vienna became known. In the King’s speech to Parliament on this occasion it was declared that the Austro-Spanish alliance was “. . . directly levelled against the most valuable and darling interests and privileges of this nation” (January 17, 1727). The situation was considered sufficiently critical for Parliament to vote an additional 26,000 troops and 20,000 seamen.

Despite the belligerent feeling of the country, Sir Robert Walpole, the Prime Minister, who was convinced that England had had enough of war, succeeded in holding back the hotheads. By diplomatic means the situation was eventually resolved to England’s advantage. Spain was made to stop the siege of Gibraltar which she had begun, and to break up her alliance with Austria, and a promise was extracted from Philip V never to try to renew it. Finally, Spain’s tacit recognition of English ownership of Gibraltar was secured in 1730 by the Treaty of Seville, described by Cobbett as “the great event which in this year struck all Europe.” It seemed at last as if the prickly problem of Spain had been smoothed out. “You cannot but be sensible,” the King told his “faithful Commons”, “that the measures formally taken and the conclusion of the Treaty of Seville have prevented and disappointed the dangerous consequences that were so justly apprehended from the Treaty
of Vienna, and we do not only see that Union dissolved which had alarmed all Europe but the allies of the Treaty of Hanover strengthened by the additional power of the Crown of Spain" (January 21, 1730). Concrete evidence of the general feeling of relief was the immediate reduction of the land and naval forces, a measure which, as the King's speech noted happily, caused not only "general satisfaction", but a "considerable saving" (January 13, 1730).

The Line-up of the Eighteenth Century

Under the pacific policy and adroit statesmanship of Walpole, the peace was kept during the next decade. But the enmities of the eighteenth century proved more than even he could cope with. From 1740 until Waterloo, except for three short periods between wars, England was continually fighting someone. She fought for various reasons, with various allies and against various enemies. But one thread held unbroken through three-quarters of a century of changing alliances and shifting fortunes: enmity with France so long as France strove to dominate Spain and, through Spain, the Mediterranean. Innumerable other spheres of conflict from Canada to India kept France and England at war, but the Spanish-Mediterranean issue was never absent. So long as France was her enemy or potential enemy England had to oppose a French alliance with Spain, and so long as France
continued to make alliances with Spain she was regarded by England as an enemy.

The reason for this was partly that with Spain on her side France acquired a dangerous predominance on land, but chiefly that, acting through Spain, France could acquire mastery of the Mediterranean and so achieve her dream of destroying British naval supremacy. "The general course of Mediterranean politics in the eighteenth century," writes Professor J. Holland Rose, "tends to show that that sea is essentially an international area which can belong to no one Power, or even to a combination of riparian Powers. . . . Any attempt, therefore, to impose local control was resisted by nearly the whole of Europe, as happened in 1702 against Louis XIV, in 1718 against Alberoni, in 1746 against Louis XV, in 1798 against Bonaparte. There has been a strong tendency to establish a balance of power among the nations having weighty interests in those waters. All efforts to upset that, as in the years cited above, immediately provoked counterstrokes which aimed at restoring the political equipoise in that sea" (The Indecisiveness of Modern War and Other Essays, London, 1927, p. 80). No words could show better than these how England to-day has broken with her past. In the face of not French but Italian efforts to impose "local control", a British "counterstroke" is remarkable for its absence.

In the eighteenth century this was not so.
France had never reconciled herself to Utrecht, nor had Spain to the loss of Gibraltar and Minorca. Obviously their interests were one, and each time a Franco-Spanish alliance was made or renewed, it contained a promise of French assistance for the recapture of Gibraltar. Each time this happened the result was war with England. In a sense we have here an oversimplification of the problem, because there were countless other points of conflict which kept Europe in a semi-permanent state of warfare. But so far as Anglo-Franco-Spanish relations were concerned, the problem remained clear in its outline all the way through.

The War of the Austrian Succession

Trouble recurred in 1733, when France and Spain secretly signed the Family Compact, so named because the Bourbon House reigned in both countries. Under its terms France promised her aid to regain Gibraltar and to end the British abuses which Spain claimed she was suffering from. England remained in ignorance of this pact for some years, but the French backing made Spain particularly aggressive in her increasing trade and naval disputes with England, and led to war between her and England in 1739 (the War of Jenkins’ Ear). Then, in 1740, the death of the Habsburg Emperor, Charles VI, embroiled all Europe in the War of the Austrian Succession.
Apart from the Austro-Prussian rivalry which brought France in on the side of the King and England on the side of the Empress, there was also the well-worn bone of contention of a too close union between France and Spain. Philip V was laying claim to part of the Austrian succession, and therefore participated in the war on the side of France against the Empress. Moreover, his daughter had recently married the son of Louis XV, and the Family Compact was no longer a secret to England. "The maxims established ever since the Revolution," said Lord Carteret, who was now directing foreign affairs in the Cabinet, "and the maxims upon which both the late heavy wars were founded have been to prevent the increase of the power of France . . . and to prevent, if possible, an union between the kingdoms of France and Spain" (House of Lords, February 13, 1747).

The welter of alliances, battles, separate truces, divisions of territory which made up the fabric of the war on the Continent do not concern us here. The naval theatre of war in the Mediterranean is more relevant. The war at sea began when, after an interval of peace in 1743, France and Spain signed the Treaty of Fontainebleau, otherwise called the Second Family Compact. This was an offensive alliance against England, and provided, as usual, for the recovery of Gibraltar and Minorca. Indeed, it stated that there would be no peace without them. The
pact was signed secretly, but was revealed to the British Government (in a somewhat Hollywood manner) by an agent known only as 101, but who was supposed to be the French envoy, Abbé de Bussy (cf. Coxe, *Life of Walpole*, iii, 456). As a result of this revelation, war against France and Spain was renewed as a part of a general renewal of the struggle on the Continent by all the other participants. Eventually the war on all fronts was brought to an end by the Peace of Aix-La-Chapelle in October, 1748, which confirmed England’s predominance in the Mediterranean, but failed to break up the Franco-Spanish entente.

*The Seven Years’ War*

Europe did not succeed in remaining at peace for long. Six years later the Continental disputes of Frederick the Great of Prussia and Maria Teresa of Austria and the colonial disputes of France and England involved all four Powers in the Seven Years’ War. Actually it was the French seizure of Minorca, a British possession since Utrecht, which precipitated England into the war. This act brought the Mediterranean question immediately to the fore, as Britain could not allow an enemy to remain in possession of so crucial a base as Minorca. At the Peace of Paris in 1763 the island was restored to this country.

Meanwhile, Spain decided to abandon the
neutrality which she had maintained during the first years of the war. A new king, Charles III, had acceded to the throne in 1759, and in 1761 he and Louis XV signed the Third Family Compact, which again included a secret clause for an offensive alliance against England, in return for which France was to give Minorca back to Spain as well as to give the inevitable support for the retaking of Gibraltar. As soon as he learned of this William Pitt, the elder, who was the acting, although not nominal, head of the Government, urged a declaration of war on Spain. But Lord Bute, the Prime Minister, and his faction in the Cabinet, held back, and Pitt, who felt the issue to be crucial, resigned.

_Pitt’s Resignation_

The story of the events leading up to and following the resignation is worth some detailed attention, as an incident which not only brings into sharp relief British policy toward Spain, but which is in many ways curiously similar to Mr. Eden’s resignation in February, 1938. Throughout the summer the plan of union between France and Spain had been under negotiation at Paris. On its completion Pitt had been furnished with a copy of the alliance by Mr. Stanley, an agent he had stationed in the French capital. He communicated its terms to the Cabinet, but refused to reveal the source of his information. “I wish I could give you a more particular account of
that dispatch” [from Mr. Stanley], wrote one of the Cabinet officials, “but, I know not for what reason, Mr. Pitt endeavours to keep from us everything he can, so I have not read this dispatch” (Jenkinson to Grenville, June 16, 1761). Later, however, the same correspondent writes, “Stanley has sent the strangest dispatches ever seen” (Jenkinson to Grenville, June 25, 1761), so it is apparent that some information was reaching the Ministers.

Nevertheless, when Pitt called for action in view of the hostile intentions contained in the Family Compact, the Bute faction pretended to disbelieve that any such pact existed. “The other ministers,” notes Horace Walpole, in his memoirs of the reign of George III, “who desired nothing better than an excuse for their pusillanimity, begged to temporise. . . . But Mr. Pitt had fixed his resolution. It was by one bold stroke to assert the honour of his country or to quit the rudder. He insisted that 12 or 14 men-of-war should be instantly sent to Cádiz, and that Lord Bristol should be ordered to demand a sight of the treaty between France and Spain and, if not accorded, to leave Madrid without delay.” A last effort was made by Lord Temple, Lord Privy Seal and the only man in the Cabinet to stand by Pitt. In a memorandum to the King he said, “The full declaration and avowal at last made by the Spanish Ministry of a total union of councils and
interests between the two Monarchies of the House of Bourbon are matters of so high and urgent a nature as call indispensably on His Majesty to take forth with such necessary and timely measures as God has put into his hands for the defence of the honour of his Crown and of the just and essential interests of His Majesty's people" (Grenville Papers, 1, 387). But nothing was done, and on October 2 "Mr. P. declared his resolution to resign. . . . They [Pitt and Temple] tried to bring the Council to a determination about the Spanish War, but the Council said they would not come to a resolution and did not think affairs ripe for one at present" (Jenkinson to Grenville, October 2, 1761). When the resignations of Pitt and Temple were made public on the 5th, Horace Walpole records that the nation was "thunderstruck, alarmed, and indignant." A general mourning was even proposed, and at a Guildhall dinner a few days later, Pitt was wildly cheered and the King and Bute utterly ignored. But France and Spain "exulted" just as Germany and Italy did on the resignation of Mr. Eden.

In the end Pitt was proved right. The Prime Minister and his group, who had pretended not to believe in the hostile intentions of Spain, had to admit themselves in the wrong. "On the 24th," says Horace Walpole, "a courier arrived from Spain with a refusal of showing us their treaty with France. This treaty was the famous
Family Compact of which Mr. Pitt, by a masterpiece of intelligence, had got notice, and of which our dastardly ministers had hoped to deprecate the effects by pusillanimous palliatives and submission. This was the secret at which Mr. Pitt had so often hinted and which he now had the satisfaction of hearing published by the mouths of his enemies.” A somewhat sheepish Cabinet found itself forced to adopt the very policy which they had refused to let Pitt adopt four months before. On January 4, 1762, England declared war on Spain, although she was now in a weakened position, for the only minister whom the country had confidence in was no longer at the controls. The war was a popular one, but, says Walpole, “the City and the country had so mean an opinion of those who were to direct it that the stocks immediately fell to 66½, though in the rebellion they had never been lower than 72.” The significance of the Pitt episode lies in the attempt of the Government to reject England’s traditional policy with regard to Spain and the subsequent necessity of admitting itself in the wrong.

The terms of the Peace of Paris which ended the war in the following year dealt generally, so far as France, England, and Spain were concerned, with colonial territories in the New World. Spain was forced to give up various of her West Indian possessions to England, and France, who had failed in her promise to get Minorca back for
Spain, was obliged instead to cede to her own ally a large slice of the Louisiana Territory.

_The War of American Independence in Europe_

Like many other peace treaties, the Peace of Paris left more hard feelings than happy ones. France still clung to the hope of destroying British naval supremacy and Spain still yearned after Gibraltar and Minorca. Both were but waiting to reverse the verdict of 1763. The opportunity to take England at a disadvantage came when she was involved in the War of American Independence. France declared war on England in 1778, but, realising that the aid of Spain was essential for a definite defeat of England, set herself to overcome the not unnatural wariness of a French alliance which Spain had been feeling since the last war. Spain succumbed again to the lure of Gibraltar and Minorca. She concluded the alliance with France in May, 1779, and in June declared war on England, specifying once more that she would never make peace until Gibraltar had been won.

In this war the dangerous effects of the domination of Spanish foreign policy by an enemy of England were very apparent. Obviously Spain cared nothing for American independence. If anything she frowned upon it, because of the bad example it might set to the Spanish colonies in the New World, and because, as in an intensely monarchical country, a victory of republicanism
was distasteful to her. But being so greatly under
the influence of France, she became correspond-
ingly hostile to Great Britain, and therefore
supplied the colonies with money and gunpowder
and other assistance. Indeed, the Spanish fleet,
in co-operation with the French, held, for a time,
the mastery of the seas, a fact which was partly
responsible for England’s loss of the colonies,
because she was prevented from sending the
necessary reinforcements to America. At no
other time in the eighteenth century was Eng-
land’s naval position so weak. Not only was
Minorca lost, but a Franco-Spanish fleet, bent on
the invasion of the British Isles, was able to sail
up the Channel unchallenged, and only failed in
its enterprise through its own incompetence.
Gibraltar, too, came very near to being taken.

_Gibraltar_

The famous siege of the fortress lasted on and
off for three years. An initial blockade by the
Spanish in 1779 was broken by Admiral Rodney,
but in 1781 Spain girded herself for a final and
tremendous effort. Ten great floating batteries,
believed to be invincible, were constructed.
Twelve thousand of the best French troops joined
with the Spanish to make an army of 40,000 men
with 186 cannon for the attack by land. Forty-
seven sail-of-the-line, all three-deckers, with 170
cannon were assembled, beside innumerable
smaller frigates and gunboats. So sure were
they of victory that, while the siege was going on, the *Capture of Gibraltar* was played amid cheers on the stage in Paris, and fashionable ladies wore Gibraltar ornaments in their hair. But they were doomed to disappointment, for, with a garri-
sion of only 7,000 men, General Elliot made an heroic defence. For weeks he withstood a daily battering by 6,000 shells. With red-hot cannon ball he destroyed every one of the floating batteries of which the enemy was so proud. Finally, in October, 1782, General Howe ran the blockade and the fortress was relieved.

British public opinion was naturally greatly excited. Recently the problem has been revived by the broadcast of General Queipo de Llano on February 27, 1938, demanding the return of Gibraltar on behalf of Nationalist Spain. It is, therefore, of particular interest to note what has been British feeling on the question in past periods of crisis. Throughout the eighteenth century Gibraltar was a sore point to Spain, but a point of honour to Britain. "You cannot but be sensible", wrote Lord Townshend in the period just after the Treaty of Vienna, "of the violent and almost superstitious zeal which has lately prevailed among all parties in the kingdom against any scheme for the restitution of Gibraltar upon any condition whatsoever. . . . The bare mention of a proposal which carried the most distant appearance of laying England under any obligation of ever parting with that place would
be sufficient to put the whole nation in a flame"
(Townshend to Poyntz, June 3, 1728).
In 1782 feeling was no less warm. After the
relief of the fortress, rumours that the Govern-
ment might yet contemplate giving it up pro-
voked long debates. Said Edmund Burke, "The
fortress of Gibraltar is invaluable . . . as a post
of war, a post of power, a post of commerce, a
post which makes us valuable to our friends and
dreadful to our enemies; that which gives us the
command in the district of the ocean where it
lies, that which is the incontestable evidence of
our pre-eminence and our power, that of all
other places is what we ought, with the most
religious determination, to maintain" (December
5, 1782). Another of the great statesmen of
his time, Charles James Fox, dealt, not only with
Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, but with the
larger question of what should be British policy
in the face of foreign attempts at intimidation.
He spoke in terms which are so apt to-day that
the reader will forgive their being quoted at some
length.
"If in the present war," he said, "the old
ministry had not been as dastardly as they were
mad, perhaps all the calamities of this war might
have been prevented. . . . But the misfortune
of this country was to have ministers at that time
who, while they spoke in the most lordly terms
to America . . . were endeavouring to cajole the
court of Spain; and refrained from sending a
formidable fleet to Gibraltar because they conceived that the King of Spain would take umbrage at seeing a fleet in the Mediterranean; but, had the measure been adopted, there would have been little reason to be apprehensive of bad consequences from this resentment, for then we should have had it in our power to prevent the evil that a union of the fleets of France and Spain must always threaten this country with. To cajole an enemy is surely not the way a powerful and wise nation would seek their security. . . . Give up to Spain the fortress of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean becomes to them a pool, a pond in which they can navigate at pleasure and act without control or check. Deprive yourselves of this station, and the States of Europe who border on the Mediterranean will no longer look to you for the maintenance of the free navigation of that sea, and having it no longer in your power to be useful, you cannot expect alliances. The honourable gentleman talks of the cession of the most important fortress on a principle the most delusive. Because it is a possession dear to the enemy, the object of their ambition and their pride, he would yield it to them as a means of preventing future wars. . . . If you govern yourselves by this maxim, there will be no end to cession, because there will be no end to desire. If you teach them that war induces you to cession, there is not a doubt but they will go to war” (December 5, 1782).
In the following year the Peace of Versailles brought the battles to a close in both hemispheres. England managed to retain Gibraltar, but Spain at last made Minorca her own again. Subsequently England retook it during the early period of the Napoleonic wars, when Spain was for a time an ally of France, but it was ultimately ceded back to Spain at the Peace of Amiens in 1802.

**The Napoleonic Wars**

For a brief ten years Europe enjoyed a breathing space, until the French Revolution set the Powers on the warpath again. Century-old enmities were laid aside as all the old monarchies trembled together before the alarming new Republic of France. In the First Coalition, England and Spain became allies, and by the Treaty of Aranjuez in May, 1793, agreed to join forces against France in the Mediterranean. But the British capture of Toulon and Corsica made Spain jealous of British power in the inland sea, and she signed a separate peace with France at Basle in July, 1795. Meanwhile, Bonaparte, dreaming of the conquest of England, was preparing his Eastern campaign, which he intended to begin with Egypt and end with India. By now the reader will be able to supply for himself what was the inevitable prerequisite to an attack on England. For here Bonaparte followed in the steps of the Bourbons, and the usual alliance
with Spain was signed in October, 1796. As the first step toward what he expected would be his triumphant march to the East, Bonaparte captured Malta from the Knights of St. John in June, 1798. That was the end of his Eastern scheme, however, for Nelson annihilated the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile on August 1.

During the subsequent years of the Napoleonic wars until the Spanish people rose in their War of Independence in 1808, Spain remained as the ally, for a time non-active, of France against England. Meanwhile, the Anglo-French struggle continued in the Mediterranean. British naval predominance, maintained by Nelson, was the only check on Napoleon, who was successful everywhere on land. In 1800 the British defeated the French at Valetta, the capital of Malta, and a British protectorate of the island was established at the request of the Knights. A brief lull was provided by the Peace of Amiens in 1802, which Napoleon used to lay fresh plans for gaining mastery of the Mediterranean and for reviving his Eastern campaign.

Malta proved to be the key of the renewal of war, "not for its own intrinsic value only", as George Canning said, "but as the defence of Egypt against designs not secretly cherished but openly and impudently avowed, and as the defence through Egypt of our Empire in the East. . . . War would have been just and necessary and
unavoidable if nothing else were in contemplation than to guard these interests of which Malta is the natural outwork" (May 24, 1803).

When Napoleon demanded that the English evacuate Malta, the Cabinet, which had been endeavouring to soothe itself and the country into the belief that Napoleon really harboured no aggressive designs on the Empire, was forced to undeceive itself. It declared war in May, but did not escape a vote of censure from the Opposition, which stated that the Government, "by encouraging throughout the country an unfounded security and confidence . . . have materially increased and aggravated the difficulties of our actual position." "Can any man reflect without indignation", asked Canning, speaking for the Opposition, "on the deception and delusion so long practised upon Parliament and the people? . . . For what purpose could it be that the Ministers had thought this system of deception, this trick upon the nation advisable? Was it design? What possible good could arise from it? Are men better prepared for action when they are aroused out of a sleep? . . . Or was it sheer ignorance? Did they not know what they were about? Is it their excuse for having duped England that they were themselves the dupes of France? Had they in their possession, had they before their eyes and in their minds, those documents which they have now at length put into the hands of Parliament, those
records of insult, injury, and aggression, sufficient, one should think, to awaken the most sluggish suspicion; and did they suspect nothing of the insecurity of their peace? . . . Our stand ought to have been taken, not on the last insult, but upon the first, be what it might. . . . For my country I do complain that its honour has been sacrificed and its interests trifled with in a vain and foolish attempt to propitiate violence by submission and to repel aggression by tameness and indulgence " (June 3, 1803).

For a year and a half the fortunes of war remained in the balance until Napoleon gathered up all his naval forces and determined to attempt the invasion of England. The allied fleets of France and Spain set sail in formation, passed through the Straits of Gibraltar, but reached no farther than Cape Trafalgar, a few miles up the Atlantic coast of Spain. There, on October 21, 1805, they were met and routed by the British fleet under Nelson. Napoleon’s fleet was destroyed, and during the rest of the war England remained supreme at sea.

In Anglo-Spanish relations Trafalgar marks the end of an epoch, for, with the outbreak a few years later of the Spanish War of Independence, an entirely new phase was opened. From that time on the two countries were never again enemies. England’s interest in keeping Spain independent of foreign alliances remained as strong as ever, while a new interest in Spain’s
internal affairs was created. The bond was not an artificial, dynastic, or diplomatic one; it endured because, for strategic, ideological and selfish reasons, it was, from the British point of view, natural and inevitable.
II

THE PENINSULAR WAR, 1808–1814

William Pitt, shortly before he died, predicted that only a war of the people could save Europe from Napoleon and that that war would begin in Spain. On May 2, 1808, the people of Madrid, unarmed save for the sticks and bricks they could find by the way, rose against the French garrison, whose presence was the sign of foreign rule. They were massacred. But the news of the Dos de Mayo brought the people to arms throughout the country. For Spain that day marked the opening of the War of Independence. For England it meant the first real opportunity to bring about the defeat of Napoleon, and England did not hesitate. She joined the Spanish people and made their war her war. Despite defeats, discouragement, and bitter criticism at home, the persistence of three men, Wellington, Castlereagh, and Canning, held England to her purpose until the fight was won.

In the Peninsular War, as in its counterpart to-day, Spain was not united against the foreigner. To a large part of the aristocracy and the landed
classes, crown came first and country afterwards. When their own king fled, they transferred their allegiance easily to the *rey intruso*, Joseph Bonaparte, and in the war fought with the French against their own people. From that day *los afrancesados* has been a term of contempt in Spain.

The background of the war had its focal point in Napoleon’s desire to subjugate England. Having failed at direct invasion, he hoped to succeed through economic pressure. The Continental System was Napoleon’s attempt to lock all the doors of Europe in England’s face. But while the ports of Portugal remained open to British shipping, the System was no more than a sieve. Accordingly, Napoleon made an alliance with Spain (Treaty of Fontainebleau, October 27, 1807), by which Spain and France were to unite in the conquest and division of Portugal. Using this as a pretext, the French army crossed the Pyrenees, ostensibly on their way to Portugal, but actually to occupy Spain. Meanwhile, internal conflict at the Spanish Court between King Charles IV and Ferdinand, the heir apparent, who were both equally worthless, resulted in the abdication of the King in favour of his son. For a brief moment there was hope that the young King would lead his country against the French, whose march southward had left a trail of terror. Instead, Ferdinand went to Bayonne, where his father had
preceded him, to sue for Napoleon's protection. Without loss of time Napoleon forced them both to abdicate, placed them in "honourable" captivity, and installed his brother Joseph as King of Spain. The *Dos de Mayo* was the answer of the Spanish people.

England, in that day, had no doubts that the maintenance of Spanish independence was vital to her own interests and safety. William Cobbett, the greatest political journalist of his time, wrote: "These two countries [Spain and Portugal] once well subdued; once rendered manageable and applicable to all the purposes of war, that war will, that war must, in all its terrors, be levelled against these Islands . . . this is what we should think about" (The Political Register, January 6, 1810).

There were men then, as there are to-day, who shied off from the Spanish issue, anxious only to keep England's skirts clear of the whole affair. But fortunately for England they did not prevail. When Richard Brinsley Sheridan, on June 13, 1808, moved for a debate on the affairs of Spain, Spencer Perceval, Chancellor of the Exchequer, objected, saying that he was "not aware that any good could arise from agitation on such a subject", while a now unknown M.P. tried hard "to dissuade my right honourable friend from stirring any inquiry into the affairs of Spain at so critical and perilous a moment." But Sheridan, resolved not to leave the matter to
what he called "the slow and skulking hesitation of Ministers", was not to be put off. The debate was held on June 15, and in a speech which, were he alive to-day, he could repeat with but the change of one name, Sheridan proposed the alliance with Spain.

"Sir," he said, "if the enthusiasm and animation which now exist in a part of Spain should spread over the whole of that country, I am convinced that . . . there never existed so happy an opportunity for Great Britain to strike a bold stroke for the rescue of the world. . . . The ministers of England have neglected all that is dignified and all that is consonant to the truly understood interests of their country. I wish, therefore, Sir, to let Spain know that the conduct which we have pursued we will not persevere in, but that we are resolved fairly and fully to stand up for the salvation of Europe. . . .

"Bonaparte has hitherto run a most successful race. . . . He has yet to learn what it is to fight against a country in which the people are animated with one spirit to resist him. . . . If there be a disposition in Spain to resent the insults and injuries, too enormous to be described by language, which they have endured from the tyrant of the earth, will not that disposition be aroused to the most sublime exertion by the assurance that their efforts will be cordially aided by a great and powerful nation?

"Sir, I think this is a most important crisis.
Never was anything so brave, so generous, so noble as the conduct of the Asturians. . . . They have no retreat. They are resolved to conquer or perish in the grave of the honour and independence of their country. It is that the British Government may advance to their assistance with a firmer step and a bolder mien that I have been anxious to afford this opportunity to the British Parliament of expressing the feelings which they entertain on this occasion” (June 15, 1808).

However much the Government may have deserved Sheridan’s strictures, they had by now recognised the danger, and did not lack the courage to say so. Canning, as Foreign Secretary, answered on behalf of the Cabinet: “I declare to the House and to the country that His Majesty’s ministers see with as deep and lively an interest as my right honourable friend the noble struggle which a part of the Spanish nation is now making . . . to preserve the independence of their country and that there is the strongest disposition on the part of the British Government to afford every practicable aid in a contest so magnanimous. . . .

“We shall proceed upon the principle that any nation in Europe which starts up to oppose a Power which, whether professing insidious peace or declaring open war, is the common enemy of all nations . . . becomes instantly our essential ally. . . . In this contest in which Spain is
embarked no other interest could be so purely British as Spanish success, no conquest so advantageous to Great Britain as the complete integrity of the dominions of Spain” (June 15, 1808).

Within a few days England had concluded an alliance with the Central Junta which, after the flight of the Royal family, represented the national Government of Spain as against the Government of King Joseph. On July 4 the Lord Chancellor read the King’s Speech at the close of the Parliamentary session. It emphasised, as Canning had done, the essential factor of Spanish independence: “His Majesty views with the liveliest interest the loyal and determined spirit manifested by the Spanish nation in resisting the violence and perfidy with which their dearest rights have been assailed. . . .

“His Majesty commands us to assure you that he will continue to make every exertion in his power for the support of the Spanish cause . . . having no other object than that of preserving unimpaired the integrity and independence of Spain.”

On August 3, 1808, the first British troops landed in Spain. The ally they came to fight with was not well endowed in military strength. The Spanish Government, like its successor to-day, was born out of a national emergency. The flight of the royal family had completely dislocated the governmental machinery. Resis-
tance to the enemy had to be organised in a period of chaos. And that enemy had the most formidable army in Europe. But the spirit of Spanish liberty was a match for it, as some of the leading English figures of the war testify. “The Government are new,” wrote the British Minister to Spain, “but they are resolute, and I believe every man of them determined to perish with their country. They will not, at least, set the example of weakness and timidity which the ruling powers and higher orders in other states of Europe have exhibited” (J. Hookham Frere to Sir John Moore, November 30, 1808).

Sir John Moore, Lieutenant-General of the British forces in Spain, had this to say of the defence of Madrid: “The resistance made by the people of Madrid has occupied the French and has prevented any Corps from being detached against me. This example of enthusiastic patriotism in the Capital, if it holds, may be followed by the most happy effects, if the flame communicates and the example is followed in the provinces... I have neither seen nor heard of such enthusiasm or patriotism elsewhere” (To J. Hookham Frere, December 6, 1808).

According to Canning, the people of Spain were fighting for “... those principles which reconcile loyalty with a spirit of Independence and the desire to maintain their country free,
with a determination to uphold its laws and its legitimate sovereignty” (To Marquis Wellesley, June 27, 1809).

And Canning added that it was “... a matter of undoubted policy to encourage a Government founding itself on such principles, by early acknowledgement and by the offer of an intimate connexion” (Ibid).

The war dragged on for six years. Napoleon himself swept in at the head of 135,000 men, took Madrid, and returned to France confidently expecting his generals to clean up behind him within a few months. But the English and the Spanish went on fighting. Sir John Moore was killed at Corunna. Defeatism in England grew. What was the use? How could those undisciplined Spaniards ever hope to defeat the highly trained French army with all its modern equipment? But Moore's young successor, Sir Arthur Wellesley, doggedly persisted. Before he was through he had won for Great Britain a success that ranks among the greatest glories of her military history—and for himself the title of Duke of Wellington.

It is no part of the present purpose to recapitulate the tortuous history of the Peninsular campaigns. When it came time for the peace negotiations, however, we again see how much importance England attached, in Canning's already quoted words, to "the complete integrity of the dominions of Spain." In the instructions
sent to England's plenipotentiary at the negotiations, Castlereagh, the then Foreign Secretary, wrote: "I am commanded to state to you, first, the points upon which His Royal Highness can under no circumstances relax, the faith of his Government being formally pledged to their inviolable maintenance. . . . First Spain, secondly Portugal, to be respectively secured under their legitimate sovereigns." These were two conditions, Lord Castlereagh concluded, "without which Great Britain cannot be a party to any peace" (To the Earl of Cathcart, July 5, 1813). A third condition specified that Malta must under all circumstances remain in British hands.

Again, in the "Memorandum on a Maritime Peace" which Castlereagh drew up in December as a guide for the final negotiations, he said: "Her [Great Britain's] object is to see a maritime as well as a military balance of power established among the Powers of Europe, and as the basis of this arrangement she desires to see the independence of Spain and Holland effectually provided for."

Actually these negotiations proved premature, as the war was not concluded until Wellington harried all the French out of Spain and inflicted a final defeat on them at Bayonne in April, 1814, a few days after Napoleon himself had been defeated by the Allies in the North.

The last phase of the Peninsular War was a
Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between England and Spain, signed at Madrid on July 5, 1814, by which England took care to ensure, as far as she could, the freedom of Spain from future foreign domination. Article I of the Treaty reads: "There shall be in future a strict and intimate alliance between His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and His Catholic Majesty [Ferdinand VII who had been restored to the Spanish throne] and their Heirs and Successors; and in consequence of this intimate union the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to forward by all possible means their respective interests. . . .

"His Catholic Majesty engages not to enter into any Treaty or engagement with France . . . which may affect the independence of Spain, which may be injurious to the interests of His Britannic Majesty or may be contrary to the strict alliance which is stipulated by the present Treaty."

When Napoleon invaded Spain, he dug his own grave, as he himself later admitted at St. Helena. Professor G. M. Trevelyan has called the invasion "the worst crime and error of his career." The resistance of the Spanish people, with the British help which kept that resistance alive, forced him year after year to keep a major part of his army locked up behind the Pyrenees. The constant drain on his resources weakened
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and finally destroyed him. It was at the Spanish barricades that an even greater dictator than the world knows to-day met a force he could not conquer.

England can never fail to be proud of the part she once played in the fight for Spanish freedom. For the cause of liberty and for her own protection she never fought a more honourable war. In the words of the greatest Foreign Secretary of his generation, if not of all succeeding ones, the English policy of that day is best described. Reviewing the war at a time when ultimate victory was assured, Canning said in the House of Commons: “England did not hesitate one moment in becoming the friend of those whose only claim to her friendship was their being the victims of tyranny and oppression. This choice has been crowned with success; but it was a choice which we would not have had cause to regret even had the struggle ended in hopelessness and disappointment. Thank Heaven, the result has been of another character, and proves that generosity and justice, while they are the most liberal, are also the wisest system of policy and that honourable feeling for others is nearly connected with our own national safety.

“The enterprise, which many believed hopeless, has ended in a blaze of glory that will live recorded on the glowing pages of history, even if glory should be its only result; but I do not
despair to see added to it other pages of political arrangement and final settlement calculated to promote the happiness and secure the liberties of mankind” (July 7, 1813).
III

THE CONGRESS OF VERONA AND THE FRENCH INVASION, 1820–1823

After Waterloo and the reconstruction of Europe at the Congress of Vienna, the nations settled down, rather nervously, to a peace they had not known for a quarter of a century. But despite appearances, everything was not as it had been before. A Bourbon was once more King of France and the monarchs of Russia, Prussia and Austria were again firmly seated on their several thrones. But the French Revolution had not been in vain. A dangerous new political principle was abroad. Call it democracy or liberalism or republicanism or representative government. Whatever its name, it threatened the security of the crowned heads of the four great Powers on the Continent and of their lesser brothers in the Italian kingdoms, Portugal and Spain. England, having to some extent already reconciled the monarchical and the democratic principles, had less cause to fear the new spirit.

But the Continental Powers were apprehensive and on the watch. At Vienna they had already agreed in advance to stamp out the first sign
anywhere of a democratic uprising, lest it spread and bring them all tumbling down together. Russia, Prussia and Austria had formed the Holy Alliance in 1815 for this purpose. Behind its pseudo-religious façade, it was an arrangement for common action against the democratic principle and in defence of autocratic government.

Its authors had not long to wait. The dreaded event took place in Spain in 1820. After the defeat of Napoleon, the restoration of Ferdinand VII had only aggravated Spain's domestic troubles. In order to regain his throne, Ferdinand had sworn to govern according to the Constitution of 1812, which had been drawn up by the Cortes during the Peninsular War. But Ferdinand was by temperament and tradition as despotic as the monarchs of the Holy Alliance. He had no intention of submitting to limitations on his power laid down by a representative Government, even though it was that Government which had given him back his throne. No sooner was he back in power than he instituted a reign of terror against the Liberals, and by accumulative floutings of the Constitution, and with the support of the reactionaries, soon succeeded in restoring himself to the exercise of absolute monarchy. To this the Liberals offered more than passive resistance. The years following 1814 saw a continual struggle between the Cortes and the King, until in 1820 there was a revolt of the constitutional groups against his
repressive measures. Forced to submit, Ferdinand was ready to promise anything for the sake of his crown. Once again he took a solemn oath to abide by the Constitution, which, with somewhat over-ready credulity, was accepted by his opponents. There followed a grand reconciliation scene, with the King bowing from a balcony to cheering crowds, and Spain looked forward happily to a new start.

But across the Pyrenees the great Powers had heard the warning. Their apprehension was deepened when, following the victory of the Liberals in Spain, revolts broke out in Naples, Piedmont and Portugal. Constitutional government must not be allowed to establish itself in so important a country as Spain. As the Constitution was the source of the danger, the Constitution must be eradicated. In October, 1822, the Congress of Verona was convened to decide on the measures which should be taken to combat the danger in Spain. Already at Vienna in 1815, the Powers had agreed in advance to participate in such a conference should the necessity arise. Because of this promise England agreed to be represented at Verona, although she was strongly opposed to any intervention in Spain the object of which was the restoration of autocratic government.

The Holy Alliance Powers and France, however, agreed at Verona to send notes to Spain, warning her to change her Constitution or to
prepare to suffer armed intervention. In concert they withdrew their ministers from Madrid, formally breaking off diplomatic relations. This "hateful conspiracy" was denounced in a famous speech by Henry Brougham (later Lord Brougham and Lord Chancellor of England). When he held up to scorn the Holy Alliance Powers, "who with a pretended respect, but a vile mockery of religion and morality, make war upon liberty in the abstract and endeavour to crush national independence wherever it is to be found ", he sounded echoes which can be heard to-day. "I would ask," he continued, "in the name of common sense, could anything be more absurd, more inconsistent, than that Spain should now be repudiated as illegitimate by those, some of whom had, in Treaties with her, described her government in its present shape by the very term 'legitimate government'? . . .

"If they [the Spanish Government] find leagued against them the tyrants by whom the world is infested, they may console themselves with this reflection . . . that wherever there breathes an Englishman, wherever there exists a free heart and a virtuous mind, there Spain has a natural ally and an inalienable friend. . . .

"When the allied Monarchs were pleased to adopt a system of interference with the internal policy of Spain . . . it would not have surprised me if, in the replies of the Spanish Government, some allusion had been made to the domestic
policy of the allied Sovereigns; or if some of the allegations which have been so lavishly cast upon it had been scornfully retorted upon those who have so falsely and so insolently called them forth. What could be more pardonable, nay, more natural, than for the Spanish Government to have besought His Prussian Majesty who was so extremely anxious for the welfare and for the good government of Spain, who had shown himself so minute a critic on its laws and institutions, and who seemed so well versed in its recent history—to remember the promises which he had made some years ago to his own people? . . . What would have been more natural than to have suggested that it would be better, aye, and safer too, in the end to keep those promises than to maintain at his people's cost and almost to their ruin a prodigious army only safely employed when in the act of ravaging the territories or putting down the liberties of his neighbours? " (February 11, 1823).

England firmly refused to join in either of the measures taken by the four other great Powers. Her sympathy with the cause of the Spanish constitutionalists did not, it is true, lead her to intervene directly on their behalf. England's position then was very different from what it is now. If England were to sympathise officially with the Spanish Government to-day, she would have France and Russia on her side. But in the eighteen-twenties France and Russia were both
among the reactionary Powers. Nevertheless, England did not hesitate to break with all four of the other great Powers on the Spanish issue.

Lord Castlereagh, the Foreign Secretary, emphatically denied the right of foreign Powers to intervene against the constitutionalists who, by their control of the Cortes, represented the rightful Government of Spain. Castlereagh was a high Tory and personally pro-Ferdinand, yet he said, "The notion of revising, limiting, or regulating the course of such experiments [in democratic government] either by Foreign Council or Foreign Force would be as dangerous to avow as it would be impossible to execute" (Confidential Minute communicated to the Courts of France, Austria, Prussia and Russia, May, 1820).

Again in spite of his own political leanings, Castlereagh, in words that might well be applied to the "Axis" of to-day, refused to admit the pretensions of the Holy Alliance to act "... as a Union for the Government of the World or for the Superintendence of the Affairs of other States" (Ibid).

But the four Continental Powers at Verona disregarded British protests. France, as the most closely affected by Spanish affairs, prepared for armed intervention to free Ferdinand, who, having speedily broken all his promises, was now held in semi-captivity by his ministers. Canning, who had become Foreign Secretary on the
death of Castlereagh, worked furiously, but failed

to prevent the French invasion. When it is
remembered that France was then playing the
rôle in Spain that Italy plays to-day, Canning's
words become of special interest. The French
policy, he said, was "vicious in principle"
(To Sir William A'Court, Minister at Madrid, De-
cember 29, 1822). Of the French demand that
Spain change her Constitution, "... There is
not a man in the House who thinks with more
disgust and abhorrence than I do. ... No
British statesman who values his character as a
member of a free State could either think or hear
of his country being made a party to negotiations
for the purpose of discussing such monstrous
proposals" (April 14, 1823).

France, in the words of her Foreign Minister,
the Comte de Chateaubriand, justified her inter-
vention on her right "to defend herself against
moral contagion." Canning answered, "We
disclaim for Ourselves and deny for other Powers
the right of requiring any changes in the internal
Institutions of Independent States" (Instructions to
Sir Charles Stuart, Ambassador in Paris, January 28,
1823). "The British Government does not pre-
sume to hold out its own Political Institutions as
the only practical system of National Happiness
and Freedom. It does not presume to question
the freedom and happiness which France enjoys
under her institutions. ... But it cannot coun-
tenance a pretence on the part of France to make
her example a rule for other nations; and still less could it admit a peculiar right in France to force that example specifically on Spain” (To Sir Charles Stuart, February 3, 1823).

The forceful language of Canning’s famous “Come what may” note to the Duke of Wellington, England’s plenipotentiary at Verona, leaves in no doubt the attitude of the British Government on foreign intervention against the legal Government of Spain. Canning wrote, “If there be a determined project to interfere by force or by menace in the present struggle in Spain, I am to instruct Your Grace at once frankly and peremptorily to declare that to any such interference, come what may, His Majesty will not be a party” (September 27, 1822).

The French Government, however, was determined, not the least because Spain owed France several million francs, to see a “stable” government established across the Pyrenees. In April, 1823, a French army under the Duc d’Angoulême invaded Spain.

Opinion in England sympathetic to the fight of the Spanish people for their freedom was by no means found only, to use a contemporary term, on the Left. Nowhere was such opinion more warmly expressed than in the House of Lords. In words that are as applicable to-day as they were one hundred and fifteen years ago, the Marquess of Lansdowne said, “It should be remembered that those sovereigns who are now
conducting an attack upon the independent government of Spain, founding their aggression upon the principle of putting down theories and experiments in governments, were themselves great theorists and experimentalists. . . . It will be found that in every part of the history of the world the greatest instances of human perfidy have been brought into action for the purpose of supporting governments founded on foreign interference” (February 4, 1823).

Lord Ellenborough, a minister in almost every Tory Cabinet of his day, said in the same debate, “Feeling that the principles upon which they [France and the Holy Alliance] now attack Spain might in effect apply to this country . . . and feeling that it is highly desirable for this country to maintain its ancient union with States governed not by absolute monarchy but by wholesome laws and happy institutions, I protest that I look upon the event of success on the part of France with infinite dismay.”

Brougham rose in the Commons to say, with his customary vigour, “Most heartily do I and all my friends pray for the success of the Spanish people in this war. . . . The Spaniards are to be punished because they wish to be free. I hope in God, however, they will succeed against their enemies. . . . Should the war end (as I sincerely hope it may) in the discomfiture of the Bourbons . . . they will perish amidst the delight of every man in Europe” (April 14, 1823).
The reader may translate for himself the word Bourbons into its contemporary equivalent.

More important to the average Englishman than the cause of Spanish democracy was the danger to British interests of a foreign invasion of Spain. The England of 1823 had no doubts about that subject. Said the Marquess of Lansdowne in the House of Lords, "The projected invasion of Spain may be successful. If so, by what means can the government of a despotic King be maintained in that country except by the military occupation of France? In that case what will be the situation of our own country... with every province in Spain occupied by foreign troops ready to be directed against our own maritime interests and domestic peace?" (February 4, 1823).

A large section of public opinion was eager for war with France, and for three nights a debate raged in the House of Commons. "I would be glad to know," asked Mr. James Macdonald, "whether England will consent that France shall maintain military possession of the kingdom of Spain; and if she will consent to such occupation, for what period will she permit it to continue? Again, will she, with her naval fame and greatness, consent that the fleets of France... shall blockade the ports of Spain to the injury of British merchants, in order that France might more successfully achieve her own objects—objects that are so wicked and atrocious that
no Englishman even attempts to disguise the abhorrence he feels for them?" (March 27, 1823). Canning had an answer to that question. He did not rest content with protesting against the French invasion of Spain. He did not wait until French troops were deep in Spanish territory, and then, with pomp and protocol, set up a paper machinery of "non-intervention". He acted. He acted before French troops had crossed the Pyrenees. On March 31 he sent a note to the French Government warning them in unmistakable terms that England would not permit France to force the King of Spain "... into any measures derogatory to the independence of his Crown or to his existing relations with other Powers." And Canning explicitly included the permanent military occupation of Spain and the annexation of any part of the Spanish colonies as measures derogatory to Spanish independence.

The importance of the Note of March 31 cannot be overlooked. Professor Harold Temperley has called it "practically an ultimatum, or a declaration that war with England would follow" if France violated the political or territorial integrity of Spain (The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822–1827, London, 1925, p. 83).

France did succeed in restoring Ferdinand to absolute power. But she withdrew her army after her primary object was completed. Canning's prompt action had had its effect.

What was the result of the French adventure?
Back on the throne, Ferdinand banished, imprisoned, or executed everyone he could lay his hands on who belonged to the constitutional party or who had been guilty of fighting in the defence of Spain against the French. So ferocious were his measures of revenge on the Liberals, that even the Governments of France and Russia were moved to protest.

Instead of establishing a strong, autocratic government in Spain, France merely succeeded in sowing the seeds of further civil conflict. The spirit of Spanish liberty could not be and was not destroyed. Within a decade Spain was once more at civil war.

As for France, in seven years' time she herself suffered revolution, the Bourbons were expelled, never to return, and a constitutional monarchy, the same regime of which France had tried to deprive her neighbour, was established in their stead.

But the moral for England of this episode in Spanish history lies in Canning's ultimatum.
IV

THE CARLIST WAR, 1833–1839

Exactly one hundred years ago Spain was engaged in a civil war in which the opposing principles, though called by different names, were the same as they are to-day. In the eighteen-thirties, as in the nineteen-thirties, the other European Powers were at odds over the Spanish issue—the nations under autocratic rule favouring the Rebels and the nations under democratic rule favouring the Government. But the rôle of England was then a very different one. She not only willingly supplied all the arms the Spanish Government could pay for, she not only sent her Navy to blockade rebel ports, but she sent also a Volunteer army of 10,000 men with the official blessing of Whitehall to fight in Spain itself side by side with the Government troops. She did this for two reasons: first, because a victory for the rebel leader, Don Carlos, would mean a Spanish Government “swayed by foreign Powers and influences coming from afar” (Lord Palmerston); second, because “it is to Spain under liberal institutions and not under an absolutist form of government that we must look for a
useful ally” (Lord Clarendon). A third, but not openly avowed, reason was the desire to prevent French predominance in Spain which might have resulted had France been the sole ally of the Spanish Government.

The immediate cause of the civil war, which broke out on the death of Ferdinand VII on September 29, 1833, was the question of succession to the throne. Queen Cristina, Ferdinand’s wife, claimed the crown on behalf of her infant daughter, Isabella, whom Ferdinand had named as his heir. Don Carlos, Ferdinand’s brother, claimed the crown for himself on the ground that the Pragmatic Sanction, permitting the succession of a female, had never been legally promulgated in Spain. The legal basis of the dispute, involving a long and complicated history of the Salic Law and the Pragmatic Sanction, is unimportant. Fundamentally, the struggle was the same old one between the autocratic and democratic principles. As the exponent of absolute monarchy, Don Carlos, who had proclaimed himself as the rightful heir long before his brother’s death, had rallied round him the reactionary and clerical groups in Spain. On the other hand, the Revolution of 1830 in France had given new life and power to the constitutional groups, after their setback in 1823, with the result that the struggle between the absolutists and the constitutionalists had become every day more bitter and violent. That the constitutionalist and
the Cristinist cause became one was an historical irony forced by the circumstance that the Carlists were the natural enemies of both. Left to herself, the Queen Regent would have been a no less reactionary ruler than her husband. She had to become a constitutional monarch in spite of herself, just as the Liberals had to fight for the heir of the man who had persecuted them without mercy. And it could therefore be said in the House of Commons that the Spanish civil war “. . . was not merely a struggle between Don Carlos and Isabella, but a struggle between two opposite principles—between the principle of despotism and the principle of freedom” (Mr. Gally Knight, March 10, 1837).

Not the cause of the war, but the signal for its outbreak, was the death of Ferdinand. Four days later the Carlists raised the standard of rebellion at Talavera, and revolts swiftly followed in other provinces. Immediately the other Powers took sides. The Holy Alliance Powers—Russia, Prussia and Austria—and the Holy See gave recognition to Don Carlos, while England and France (as well as the United States, Sweden, and Denmark) recognised the government of the Queen Regent at Madrid in the name of Isabella.

Like Canning before him, Lord Palmerston, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, never questioned where English interests lay on the Spanish issue. “If any man were to tell me”, he said, “that in the event of Don Carlos succeeding in what I
hold to be impossible—establishing himself on the throne of Spain and restoring all those principles of internal government and foreign policy which would inevitably accompany his establishment—if any man were to tell me that such a change in the state of Spain would leave her as efficient an ally for England as she would continue to be if the cause of the Queen triumphed—I would tell that individual that he did not understand the interests of England” (June 24, 1835).

It was obvious to Palmerston that a victory for Don Carlos would attach Spain to the bloc of autocratic Powers, a most regrettable result from the point of view of England. He explained to Parliament the significance of the Spanish issue in international relations: “It is a fact that the question of who should be sovereign in Spain is one seriously involving European interests as determining what will be the foreign tendencies and who the foreign allies of Spain. There was a time when Spanish destinies were controlled by Austria and a time when they were controlled by France. The object now is that in future there should be neither an Austrian Spain nor a French Spain, but a Spain which should be Spanish; and it appears to me that those who do not regard this object as one of the highest importance take but a very shortsighted view of the true interests of Europe” (March 10, 1837).

“If Don Carlos could succeed in establishing his power in Spain, peace might indeed exist
there, for the iron tyranny that would ensue might secure a species of tranquillity; but even if this tranquillity of death were to prevail in Spain, peace would be destroyed in the rest of Europe. Look to the condition of France if Don Carlos should succeed; if, instead of having on the other side of the Pyrenees a friendly Power with whom she has common interests, she should see established in Spain a Government similar to that when Ferdinand ruled . . . swayed by foreign Powers and influences coming from afar. I say that the establishment of Don Carlos on the throne of Spain would be incompatible with the independence, the security and the tranquillity of France" (April 19, 1837).

To Palmerston only one conclusion was possible. It was this: "If Spain should establish herself as a free and constitutional government, and if she should be independent, then we should find her useful to the great interests of Europe in maintaining the balance of power and a valuable friend to England with respect to our commercial relations" (March 10, 1837).

Lord Palmerston was not the man, nor was England the country, in the eighteen-thirties, to recognise a fact and not to act on it. Negotiations with the Government of Spain and with those of France and Portugal were opened shortly after the outbreak of the civil war, and on April 22, 1834, the Quadruple Alliance was signed by those four countries. Under its terms England
undertook to give naval, and France military, assistance to the Governments of Spain and Portugal, the latter country being also at civil war. In the meantime Don Carlos was receiving financial assistance from Russia and Prussia.

It was in the following year that the British Legion went to fight in Spain. Since, according to the provisions of the Quadruple Alliance, England was officially giving only naval help, the Legion had necessarily to be a volunteer corps. Permission to raise 10,000 British troops was asked of the British Government by the Spanish Minister in London, General Alava. He did not doubt, the General wrote to Palmerston, that “... His Britannic Majesty will agree that it is of the greatest importance to achieve this object, even if it is only for the purpose of getting rid of an example so highly pernicious to all Nations, namely, that of open resistance to the legitimate government” (June 8, 1835).

It took Lord Palmerston only three days to comply with the request. On June 11 he issued an Order in Council suspending the Foreign Enlistment Act, and permitting the recruiting of volunteers. In the parliamentary debates over this measure—for there were many among the Tories who objected to it—are to be found statements which are of particular interest at the present time. On June 24 the Foreign Secretary said in Parliament, “The Government of this country is perfectly justified, not only by law, as
the Noble Lord admits, but by policy, by prudence and by a due regard for its interests in taking this step. For my part I must say that I admire these brave men who are embarking in the cause of the Government of Spain, and I cordially wish them that success which I confidently believe will attend their efforts."

To some of his more cautious contemporaries Lord Palmerston seemed too bold for the ideal Foreign Secretary. But England's prestige has never been higher than when the direction of her foreign relations was in his hands. His own words tell why. Defending his policy in Spain, he said, "The Government is accused of meddling too much in the affairs of other nations. I would be glad to know from the honourable and learned gentleman at what period in English history the Government of this country has not interfered in the affairs of other nations? England must do so as long as she has commerce to protect and shores to defend. If we do not show a determination to guard our own interests, to preserve our own honour, and to uphold our own character, the time will very soon come when other countries will interfere in our affairs" (February 26, 1836).

Not only policy but precedent justified the Volunteer Army, as the Foreign Secretary pointed out: "Examples of the same kind are to be found in the most brilliant and distinguished periods in the history of England. The age of Elizabeth,
which Englishmen can hardly make light of, was full of instances of the precise kind of proceeding which the Noble Lord complains of. That great and enlightened sovereign frequently allowed her subjects to volunteer in support of the Huguenots in France and of the Protestants of the Low Countries, and she acted wisely in so doing. I wish to repeat that in my decided conviction the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act is a proceeding most wise and most honourable to this country” (March 10, 1837).

Let the last word be with the Prime Minister, Lord Melbourne, a man as cautious as Palmerston was bold, but who saw eye to eye with him on Spain. It is interesting to read his first sentence, imagining him to have been Prime Minister a hundred years later. “I must say it is rather a strange and curious argument to come from the opposite side of the House, that the supporting of an established, legal, and constitutional government against rebels is an improper interference in the internal affairs of other countries. . . .

“But passing that by, I ask, is there nothing in the state of the Peninsula affecting important interests in this country? and which would justify us in interfering? . . . I ask also, is the tranquillity of the world nothing? Is the peace of Europe nothing? . . . That, I confess, is one of the great objects for interfering in the affairs of Spain” (April 21, 1837).

Despite the attitude of a certain portion of the
Tory Party, public opinion in England was distinctly in favour of the Government in Spain. To sample it at the top we may quote a letter written on September 22, 1836:

"My Dearest Uncle:"

"... The state of Spain is most alarming and unfortunate. I do hope something will be done. The news were rather better yesterday than the day before. The Cristinists had gained a victory over the Carlists. I take a great interest in the whole of this unfortunate affair."

That was written by the Princess Victoria to King Leopold I of Belgium. A year later, as Queen, she wrote to the same correspondent:

"They have got a constitution in Spain at length and the Cortes have done very well. . . . If you could get my kind and dear friend, Louis-Philippe, whom I do so respect and for whom I have a great affection, to do something about poor Spain, it would be of great use" (July 3, 1837).

For those Englishmen who favoured the cause of Don Carlos, Lord Palmerston had an answer which, after a century, has lost none of its cogency. "When", he said, "I see the Gentlemen on the other side of the House espousing the cause of a man who is endeavouring to withhold the benefit of free institutions in Spain, I must say that I look with a little distrust and caution at the assurances they give of their extreme
readiness to contribute towards doing away with every proved abuse that exists in their own country” (*March 10, 1837*).

Civil wars, no matter in what century they occur, often give rise to identical problems. During the Carlist War the question of the status of the rebel leader in international law, the question of a possible compromise solution and the question of atrocities concerned Spain’s neighbours as they do to-day. England’s policy with respect to these three questions was quite different, in each case, from her current one.

When the war had been in progress almost four years, certain members of the Tory Opposition suggested treating with Don Carlos to effect a compromise arrangement between him and the Queen. The British Government answered merely that it was impossible. As a sovereign State, Great Britain could not negotiate with a man who was in rebellion against the legitimate government of his country. Don Carlos, as it was said in the House of Commons, “is either the sovereign of Spain or he is nobody. He is *aut Caesar aut nullus*” (*Mr. Poulter, March 10, 1837*). The Spanish civil war had then been going on more than twice as long as the current war in Spain had at the time when Great Britain exchanged commercial representatives with General Franco. As for a compromise solution, the British Government gave it no more serious consideration than did the Spanish Government.
In the words of Lord Clarendon, just returned from six years as Ambassador in Madrid, "A plan . . . for ensuring the existence of two rival and exasperated parties incapable of compromising their difficulties can only be considered a plan for sowing the seeds of an eternal civil war" (July 23, 1839).

The horrors of warfare in Spain disturbed public opinion in England no less then than they do now. To-day private charity has done a great deal, in the limited way open to it, to mitigate suffering in Spain. But during the Carlist War it was the British Government itself which officially intervened. Don Carlos was in the habit of executing all his prisoners immediately upon capture. England sent a special envoy, Lord Eliot, to Spain who succeeded in obtaining the agreement of the Carlists to a convention putting an end to this practice. The Eliot Convention (July 27, 1835) remained in force throughout the war, but other atrocities continued. It may be something in the psychology of rebellion which demands a show of power in the form of extreme violence. Whatever the cause, unnecessary killing in the Carlist War was largely the work of the rebels. Lord Palmerston did not hesitate to say of General Cabrera, the leading Carlist commander, that "... by the

1 Mr., and later Sir George Villiers during his ambassadorship. By this name he will be familiar to readers of The Bible in Spain as the friend and helper of George Borrow.
unparalleled atrocities which he has perpetrated, he casts a stain not merely upon the party to which he belongs and the country which gave him birth, but upon the age in which he lives” (November 27, 1838).

In the hope of putting a stop to Carlist atrocities, Lord Palmerston protested to the Holy Alliance Powers, asking them to exert what influence they could upon their protégé. Writing to the British Ambassadors in Berlin, Vienna and St. Petersburg, he enclosed dispatches describing the atrocities and instructed the Ambassadors to “. . . draw the serious attention of the Government to which you are accredited to the melancholy and afflicting details which these papers contain. . . .

“Now it is well known that the cause of Don Carlos derives great assistance from the moral support of the Prussian [Austrian, Russian] Government and it cannot be doubted that a salutary effect would be produced upon the Prince by the knowledge of the indignant disgust with which the atrocities perpetrated by his commanders must necessarily inspire the Cabinet of Berlin [Vienna, St. Petersburg]” (November 27, 1838).

Concerning the question of which side was the more culpable, the word of the man who was British Ambassador in Spain throughout all but the last few months of the war may be taken as authoritative. In a debate in the House of
Lords, Lord Clarendon said, "I am bound in justice to say that the Spanish Government... manifested a desire (of which they omitted no occasion to prove the sincerity) that the war should be carried on according to the usages of civilised nations. And here, My Lords, I must beg, in answer to the unwarranted remarks of the noble Marquess [Lord Londonderry, who had said that the Government soldiers were as guilty as the Carlists] that it is most hard, it is most unjust, to confound such men and their intentions and their acts with the soldiers of Don Carlos.... The outrage is deeply felt by them, and they cannot but be indignant that such opinions should be current in England and more particularly among the foreign Powers and their representatives at the different courts of Europe, who have doubtless their own good purposes to serve in representing the two parties now contending in Spain as... rivals in barbarity" (July 23, 1839).

On August 31, 1839, after five years and eleven months of war, the main body of the Carlists gave up. Don Carlos himself, personally a not un gallant figure, escaped to France. England's policy was vindicated by victory.

The meaning of the Carlist War, for Spain and for England, is best expressed in the words of one who saw it at first hand. In a long speech, but one in which every word is of value for to-day, Lord Clarendon said, a few days before the war ended:
"My Lords, there is no greater error than to suppose that the Spaniards are unfit for freedom or averse to a liberal form of Government. Their own municipal institutions are the freest and most popular in the world. . . . It is certainly true that for centuries Spain has been under the double yoke of a Kingly and priestly despotism with all the train of degradation and corruption that they bring with them; but it is true that she has seized the first opportunity of emancipating herself, and the sacrifices to which the nation now submits and all the horrors of civil war which Spaniards now endure are proofs of their conviction that the objects which they have in view more than outweigh the difficulties with which their attainment is surrounded. But the contest they are engaged in is not sterile. They have already gained and gained much. They have made such despotism as they before endured impossible in the future. Were Don Carlos on the throne he could not restore it. He would try. The bloody and fanatical party in whose hands he must always be a blind and wretched, though not unwilling instrument, would try it; they would confiscate and banish and gibbet but they would fail. . . .

"I think it requires no extraordinary degree of intelligence to discover how Spain under liberal institutions is likely to be advantageous to us, and whether it is not probable that we shall gain more from Spain liberalised than under an absolutist form of government. My Lords, I say
it is natural that our sympathies and good wishes should be enlisted on the side of a country struggling to rescue itself from oppression and degradation and to recover its lost place among the nations of Europe.

"It is not only our sympathies that should be enlisted on behalf of Spain, for I believe that a nation should not have sympathies but be guided by its interests; and I say we have an enormous interest in the triumph of the Queen's cause. First, because it is by that triumph alone that the Peninsula can ever be tranquil—next because it is to Spain under liberal institutions and not under an absolutist form of government that we must look for a useful ally—that we expect to find a wealthy customer for our productions and a new market for our manufacturers and a friend instead of an enemy in our political relations with the rest of Europe—and in the present state of those relations, neither friends nor enemies are to be despised. . . . I am sure that, whoever has read the history of Europe rightly as connected with Spain, must acknowledge that in the power, prosperity, and above all in the independence of Spain we are deeply interested" (July 23, 1839).
V

THE SPANISH MARRIAGES; THE
PROGRESISTAS, 1840–1848

Although they had been on the same side of the Spanish issue during the Carlist War, England and France continued to be mutually suspicious of each other’s influence at Madrid. Now that Don Carlos was gone, England had no longer to worry about the hand of the Holy Alliance in Spanish affairs. But she had most decidedly to worry about the hand of France. As we have seen before, it was consistently England’s policy to combat not any particular Power, but whatever Power interfered in Spain. Now once again it was France who was showing signs of an over-active interest in the affairs of her neighbour.

No sooner had peace been signed with Don Carlos and the clamp of a common enmity removed, than the alliance of the various parties under the Cristinist banner split up into its several elements. The Moderates and Conservatives had a majority in the Cortes and in the Cabinet. But their refusal to pass Church and land reforms and their attempt to repeal powers delegated to the municipalities brought about a
bloodless revolution in 1840, which swept them from office and carried in the Progressives and Radicals. It carried in, too, a new Regent, for Queen Cristina, who had taken sides with the Moderados, was forced to abdicate and to leave the country. She took refuge at the court of Louis-Philippe to whom she was related. Her noble kinsman proved ready and eager to intrigue with the Conservatives in Spain for her return. He had reasons.

England was the only country which had sympathised with the Progresistas both before and after they came to power, and her influence was therefore paramount with Espartero, the new Regent. In the circumstances it was axiomatic that Louis-Philippe should plot for the return of Cristina and her party, and, by earning their gratitude, restore France to her favoured position in Spain. A further reason was that the King of the French was now himself living in fear of revolution. The democracy of the "bourgeois King" had never been more than skin deep. By 1840 his rule had become reactionary enough to prepare the ground for the revolution that was to chase him out of the back door of the palace eight years later. Meanwhile, he was anxious to remove the Radical spectre at his borders.

The plots, counter-plots, riots and party clashes which troubled the new régime in Spain were no doubt due largely to natural antipathies. But Louis-Philippe, Cristina, and Guizot, the
French Minister for Foreign Affairs, had their share of responsibility. Referring to Spanish disturbances Queen Victoria wrote to her Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen: "The Queen must say that she fears the French are at the bottom of it for their jealousy of our influence in Spain is such, that the Queen fears that they would not be indisposed to see civil war to a certain degree restored rather than that Spain should go on quietly supported by us" (October 16, 1841).

"The Queen is certain that Lord Aberdeen will feel with her what importance it is to England that Spain should not become subject to French interests as it is evident France wishes to make it" (October 17, 1841).

Louis-Philippe had another scheme by which he hoped firmly to establish French influence in Spain. He wished to marry his son to Cristina's daughter, Isabella II, the Queen of Spain. It is indicative of the interest which all the Powers took in Spanish affairs that the question of whom Isabella and her sister, the Infanta Maria Louisa, were to marry kept the diplomats of Europe in a turmoil for five years. Each nation, hoping to gain the alliance of Spain, had its own candidate for the Queen's husband. Austria and Prussia favoured Don Carlos II who, on the retirement of his father, had become the Pretender to the Spanish throne. England favoured Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, a cousin of Queen Victoria and of Prince Albert. France offered both her King's
sons, the Duc d’Aumâle and the Duc de Montpensier, one for the Queen and one for the Infanta. Spain, whose voice in the matter carried little weight, proposed either one of the Queen’s two royal cousins and countrymen, the Dukes of Cádiz and of Seville.

Whatever happened England was determined that marriage with a French prince must at all costs be avoided. The possibility that the heir to the Spanish throne might also be heir to the French throne would mean a revival of the Franco-Spanish Family Compact, the bête noire of British foreign policy since the days of Louis XIV. “The independence of Spain”, said Lord Palmerston, who was now back in the Foreign Office, “would be endangered if not destroyed by the marriage of a French Prince into the Royal Family of Spain” (To Sir Henry Bulwer, August 16, 1846). He further formulated England’s objections in terms which set forth the basic, and until to-day, un-deviating principle on which her policy has rested. His words make clear that it was not France, but any foreign Power attempting the domination of Spain which England must oppose. “The Spanish Monarchy is too great and important not to form an essential element in the balance of power in Europe. . . . It becomes essential that Spain should be politically independent as well as physically and morally strong; and that other nations should know that the foreign policy of Spain is guided by Spanish
feelings and directed with a view to Spanish interests and is not made subservient to the policy of any other power. . . .

"If Spain should ever submit to the overruling political influence of any foreign Power, then other nations . . . might find themselves involved in a rupture with Spain on account of difference with another Power and the restoration of their friendly relations with Spain might be made to depend upon their satisfying what might be the unjust and unreasonable pretensions of some other foreign State" (Palmerston to Bulwer, September 14, 1846).

At the famous meeting of Queen Victoria and Louis-Philippe at Château d'Eu in 1843, a compromise had been agreed upon to the effect that, as soon as she was of marriageable age, Isabella should be allowed to marry one of her Spanish cousins and only after she should have had an heir would her sister be allowed to marry one of the French princes. But the arrangement did not really satisfy Louis-Philippe. Through his efforts Cristina had now been restored as her daughter's guardian. Her gratitude to her French protector was evidently greater than her maternal feelings for she agreed to a plan which was expected to realise Louis-Philippe's dream of a French heir to the Spanish throne, but which can hardly have been expected to contribute to her daughter's happiness. Isabella was to marry her cousin, the Duke of Cádiz, who was not capable
of giving her children, and simultaneously the Infanta was to marry the Duc de Montpensier. On October 10, 1846, Isabella’s sixteenth birthday, the double wedding took place.

When he became aware of the scheme Palmerston was furious. What he may have said in private is not recorded, but he claimed for the British Government “the indisputable right of urging the strongest remonstrance.” In the official protest to the French Government he wrote, “All attempts on her [France’s] part to establish by indirect methods an illegitimate influence over other States, which though not as powerful as herself, are equally entitled to perfect national independence, must from the very nature of things end at last in disappointment and failure. But the struggle through which that failure will be brought about must be productive of evil to France as well as to all the other States that may be involved in them” (Instructions to the Marquis of Normanby, British Ambassador in Paris, September 22, 1846).

Palmerston was right when he predicted failure. Two years later Louis-Philippe lost his throne, and his family have been exiles from their country ever since. Moreover, Isabella had a son in spite of everything, who became Alfonso XII of Spain. But Palmerston’s words are relevant to more than the single incident which inspired them. When he said that all attempts to establish “an illegitimate influence over other
States . . . must be productive of evil” he stated a universal truth.

The occasion also led him to formulate in incontrovertible terms the essence of Britain’s policy toward Spain. Englishmen, keeping in mind the policy of the present British Government, cannot read the following sentences without a sense of disquiet.

“It has been the wish of England that Spain should be prosperous and strong; but on the express condition that she should be independent also. So great has been the importance which Great Britain has always attached to the attainment of this end, that to arrive at it she has expended freely of her treasure and poured forth the blood of her bravest subjects.

“It was for this end that in the last century and in the early years of the present the soldiers of England have fought side by side with Spanish comrades in many a battlefield of Spain. . . .

“But if Great Britain has, during so long a period of time, been willing to make such great exertions and submit to such great sacrifices to establish and secure the political independence of the Spanish Monarchy, can it be supposed that she can regard with indifference the prospect of an arrangement which tends to place the political independence of Spain in a danger as great as any with which in former periods it has been threatened by the open force of arms?
"The British Government would not be true to its duty if it were to remain silent and passive on this occasion. Indifference on such a subject would be a sorry proof of the interest which it feels in the welfare of the Spanish people" (Palmerston to Bulwer, September 14, 1846).

We have seen how England’s sympathy was at all times, and her active support at certain times, on the side of the progressive as against the reactionary elements in Spain. In the Peninsular War she fought with the Spanish people, not only against the French, but against the Spanish aristocracy who betrayed their own country. At the Congress of Verona she disassociated herself from all the other great Powers rather than join in the effort to restore reactionary government in Spain. In the Carlist War she gave armed assistance to the constitutional forces in their fight against the exponents of autocracy. In 1840 she supported the Radicals and Progressives in what was a revolutionary seizure of power from the Conservatives. That on each of these occasions it was the progressive element which stood for a national Spain as opposed to a Spain dominated from abroad was not a coincidence.

In 1848 England’s traditional support of the Spanish progressives, provoked an incident which led to the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the then reactionary Government at Madrid. Throughout the Continent, the year 1848 was
a revolutionary one. The successful revolt which overthrew the King in France gave an impetus to the Spanish Progresistas, or Radical Party, to rise against the government of Queen Isabella, which had by now become the least Liberal in all Europe. To prevent the threatened revolt, the Spanish Prime Minister, General Narvaez, dissolved the Cortes and instituted martial law. Lord Palmerston thereupon instructed his Ambassador at Madrid, Sir Henry Bulwer, "to recommend earnestly to the Spanish Government . . . the adoption of a legal and constitutional course of government in Spain" (March 16, 1848). Because of his decided sympathy with the Radicals and his disgust at the repressive policy of the Government, Bulwer carried out his instructions with somewhat more enthusiasm than his position as a diplomat warranted. The Duke of Sotomayor, Spain's Foreign Minister, charged him with fomenting revolutionary feeling. Bulwer answered: "Her Majesty's Government can never further or authorise revolutionary schemes in any part of the world. But there are certain notions of political right and wrong which form part of our national moral character, and indeed part of our national power. Our opinion is of itself a diplomatic arm; this opinion we may consider ourselves called upon to express in certain cases, and particularly in those cases where, in consequence of such opinion, we have taken in public matters an active part, as in the
civil contest of this country” (Letter to Lord Palmerston, quoting conversation with the Duke of Sotomayor, May 3, 1848).

But the Government’s terroristic activities continued, and Bulwer continued to urge moderation. In a written protest to the Duke of Sotomayor, he stated the basic principle which had always drawn England to one side in Spanish civil conflicts. “Her Majesty’s Government wish to see the Spanish people enjoying the benefits of constitutional liberty. This wish engaged us originally to take part in the internal affairs of this country; there being a strong party in the nation that professed constitutional principles and it being the universal belief that Spaniards merited institutions which a large portion of them were seeking to obtain.”

And he reminded the Duke that “What we did at the time I refer to was done in the most open and avowed manner, not to overthrow a government but to support a government which was already established” (May 8, 1848).

Throughout the controversy Bulwer kept the Foreign Secretary fully informed of the steps he felt it necessary to take, and on each occasion Palmerston wrote him that the British Government entirely approved the course he had adopted. It was otherwise with the Spanish Government. On May 17 Bulwer was handed his passport, and requested to leave Spain within forty-eight hours. Immediately Palmer-
ston asked the Spanish Ambassador to leave London, and at the same time officially broke off diplomatic relations with Spain.

A highly significant aspect of the incident was the reaction to it in the rest of Europe. No sooner was it known that Spain had quarrelled with England than she was drawn into the orbit of the autocratic Powers. The Pope and the monarchs of Russia, Prussia and Austria who had until then persisted in their recognition of Don Carlos rather than Isabella as the rightful ruler of Spain, at once restored diplomatic relations with the Government of the Queen.

That British policy in this incident was the result, not of momentary pique, but of unalterable principle does not need to be emphasised. But in a letter of Bulwer’s to Palmerston is a passage which makes the fact doubly clear: “It is honourable at all times, and politic also in countries where there is any public opinion at all, not to show an equal indifference to right and wrong. There should be no meddling in personal affairs, no carrying on of intrigues, but there should be no difficulty in avowing great principles. In this manner the character of a State is made and the character of a State is that part of its power which is the most pervading and the most enduring.

“But if this is wise, when and where can it be so wise as in Spain at this moment? In Spain, where we assisted to plant a constitution, in
Spain which we wish to keep as an ally, and which we can never count upon as an ally if it has to exhaust all its resources in maintaining a despotism which cannot have our sympathies” (May 14, 1848).
VI

SPAIN AND MOROCCO AND THE ORIGINS OF THE WORLD WAR, 1870–1914

Prelude: The Franco-Prussian War, 1870

From 1870 onward, no longer France but Germany was the country most covetously inclined toward Spain. After her defeat at Sedan the French star declined in Europe as the German star rose. France, as the threatened rather than the threatening power, ceased to be a danger to Spain and Germany took her place. Modern German efforts to penetrate Spain began, as did modern Germany itself, with Bismarck. It was he who was behind the Hohenzollern candidature to the Spanish throne which proved to be the cause of the Franco-Prussian War.

In 1868 Queen Isabella, whose dissolute life had become a scandal at court and whose unconstitutional behaviour a scandal in the country, was forced to abdicate. She left behind her ten-year-old son Alfonso, but Spain, after a century of long-suffering, had at last grown tired of the Bourbon family. Nor did Spain want to risk another regency with the opportunity it would
give for increased civil strife. She set about searching for a new king, in whose hands she hoped constitutional monarchy could at last be trusted. Since the time when the first Bourbon in the person of Philip V, grandson of Louis XIV, ruled at Madrid, Spain had too often been betrayed to France. A German candidate seemed to offer less danger to Spanish independence.

Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was a cousin of Wilhelm I, and came from a family which had always shown particular devotion to the interests of the Prussian monarch. His brother Charles had, at the instance of Bismarck, been offered, and had accepted the throne of Rumania in 1866. With admirable promptitude he had made Rumania into a "Prussian arsenal" which served Bismarck very well during the Austro-Prussian War. Who could be better than Charles's brother to play the same game in Spain in preparation for Bismarck's contemplated war on France? On July 3, 1870, Prince Leopold made known his acceptance of the Spanish crown.

The British Government at once declared that Spain, under Prussian influence, "would be sure to lead to great and dangerous irritation" (Instructions of Lord Granville, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Lord Loftus, Ambassador in Berlin, July 6, 1870). France, more directly affected, went wild with anger. The Duc de Gramont, Minister for Foreign Affairs, said to the British
Ambassador in the course of one conversation that France "would not permit it . . . would use her whole strength to prevent it . . . would not tolerate it . . . would not endure it" (Lord Lyons to Lord Granville, July 5, 1870). The military power of France, said Gramont, was at stake. What, he asked the British Ambassador, had been the result of placing the brother of Prince Leopold at the head of the Government of Rumania? "This petty ruler had immediately begun to collect arms, to form an army, and obeying in all points the instructions he had received from Berlin, to prepare a Prussian arsenal. What had been done on a small scale in Rumania would be done on a great scale in Spain. The Prince of Hohenzollern would make himself a military sovereign, and would get ready the means of paralysing 200,000 French troops, if France should be engaged in a war in Europe. It would be madness to wait until this had been accomplished" (Lyons to Granville, July 7, 1870).

France, backed by Great Britain, proved so intractable that Prince Leopold was forced to withdraw his candidature. By that time, as the world knows, the Franco-German crisis had gone too far for war to be averted. But those subsequent events are no part of this story.¹

¹ The Spanish crown was finally accepted by Amadeo of Savoy, son of the King of Italy. He lasted for only three years and was succeeded by the short-lived Republic of 1873. In December, 1874, the monarchy was restored in the person of Isabella’s son, Alfonso XII.
The problem crystallised by the Hohenzollern candidature has remained the same from that time to this. Germany became the third Power against whose possible control of Spain England had to be on her guard. Since for France the prevention of German control was absolutely vital, it naturally resulted that French and English policies with respect to Spain ceased to be inimical and became one. Both realised what German penetration of Spain implied. And as the Duc de Gramont said, "It would be madness to wait until this had been accomplished."

The Background of the World War

Wilhelm II inherited from Bismarck the dream of acquiring a port on the Mediterranean. Turkey at the eastern, and Spain and Morocco at the western end were the regions on which Germany's eyes were fixed. On one or the other, or preferably both, she hoped to secure a foothold either by the establishment of a "sphere of influence" or by direct annexation. In Turkey she succeeded, as the World War was to show. In Spain and Morocco, in spite of persistent efforts, she failed, because of the determined opposition of England and France.

As the rivalries of the European Powers in the pre-war years began to take the shape of an eventual Anglo-French alliance against Germany, England recognised the necessity of consolidating
her position in the Western Mediterranean. Maintenance of Spanish independence and neutrality was one essential, establishment of a strong and friendly Government of Morocco was the other. The goal of French policy was identical. Laying aside their enmities in other parts of the world, the two countries bent their efforts toward carrying out a common policy: the prevention of any potential enemy from gaining a hold on Spain or Morocco.

The Proposed Anglo-Spanish Treaty, 1898

In the attempt to secure the benevolent neutrality of Spain in case of a possible European war, England proposed an alliance to the Spanish Government. A draft treaty, approved by Lord Salisbury, who was then Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, was drawn up by Sir Henry Drummond-Wolff, the British Ambassador at Madrid. Although the treaty was never signed, due to Spain's feeling that it involved obligations which she might not be able to fulfil, the draft has survived in British archives. It shows the importance England attached to the acquisition of Spain as a friend and ally, and it shows what were English strategic interests in Spain and what obligations Lord Salisbury's Government was willing to undertake to guarantee their security. The provisions of the draft treaty were:

"1. To secure peace in the Mediterranean
there shall be perpetual peace between England and Spain.

"2. In case of war Spain will not side with England’s enemies, but will give aid to England to the best of her ability and resources.

"3. In pursuance of the Treaty of Utrecht (ceding Gibraltar without any exception or impediment whatever) Spain will defend Gibraltar against all land attack, undertaking not to construct any works of fortification or batteries or mount any guns within gunshot of Gibraltar.

"4. England may enlist Spanish soldiers in time of war.

"5. If Spain becomes involved in war, England will assist her in preventing any hostile landing in the Bay of Algeciras, or on the coast within gunshot of Gibraltar, and by undertaking the defence on the part of Spain of the Balearic and Canary Islands." ¹

It is self-evident that the safeguards and advantages which England hoped to secure, as contained in the first four articles, would be unrealisable if Spanish foreign policy were to be under the influence of any foreign Power or Powers whose interests did not coincide with those of England.

¹ Some years later when England was negotiating the Mediterranean Pact (q.v.) with Spain, the draft treaty was revived by the then Ambassador to Madrid, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, for the information of the new Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. The text is contained in the Annual Report on Spain for 1906 (Bunsen to Grey, April 27, 1907).
Meanwhile, England turned her attention to Morocco. The gradual disintegration of the Sultan's power had made it imperative to erect a strong barrier against possible penetration of his dominions by a third Power. The fear of a possibly hostile control of the North African coast had always been the determining factor in British policy regarding Morocco. Originally it had led her to support the independence of the Sultan against whatever Power, Spain included, might threaten it. At the time of Spain's war with Morocco in 1859–1860, Lord John Russell, the Foreign Secretary, warned Spain that England could not allow a war of conquest on the coast opposite Gibraltar, nor the permanent occupation of Tangiers nor the dismemberment of the Moorish Empire. "Her Majesty's Government," he wrote, "earnestly desire that there may be no change of possession on the Moorish coast of the Straits. The importance they attach to this object cannot be overrated; and it would be impossible for them, or indeed for any other Maritime Power, to see with indifference the permanent occupation by Spain of such a position on that coast as would enable her to impede the passage of the straits to ships frequenting the Mediterranean for commercial or any other purpose" (Lord John Russell to Andrew Buchanan, October 15, 1859).
SPAIN AND MOROCCO

By the pre-war period, however, the situation had changed in its externals, although not in fundamental principles. No longer Spain, but Germany was knocking on the Moroccan door. No longer the Sultan, but France was to be charged with keeping that door barred. In 1899 began the shifting of policy which led five years later to the Moroccan provisions of the Anglo-French Entente. In June Lord Salisbury wrote to the Ambassador in Madrid reporting a conversation with the Spanish Ambassador. “His Excellency has asked me what my views were with respect to Morocco, as to which his Government was becoming somewhat nervous. . . . I said that we were earnestly in favour of maintaining the status quo. . . . We were aware that several countries nourished designs with respect to the territory of Morocco. . . . We could not see points on the Atlantic littoral pass under the dominion of any other Power [than that of the Sultan]. . . . But if that dominion should cease the interest of Her Majesty’s Government in the ownership of such places would become acute” (Salisbury to Drummond-Wolff, June 7, 1899).

On the same date Salisbury had had a similar conversation with the German Ambassador in which “His Excellency spoke especially about Morocco”. Lord Salisbury told him that “if by any untoward event” the Moroccan seaboard “ceased to belong to the Sultan of
Morocco, Great Britain could not with indiffer-
ence see it pass under any other dominion” (Lord
Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles, June 7, 1899). Italy
too was beginning to be interested. As she was
not yet strong enough to go colony-hunting on
her own, she hoped to prevent anyone else from
acquiring Moorish territory and was therefore
“strongly in favour of maintaining the status
quo in Morocco” (Lord Currie to Lord Salisbury,
August 22, 1899).

Slowly the Moroccan question became more
pressing as the interests of the Powers began to
assume a clearer outline. In a firm declaration
Lord Lansdowne, the new Foreign Secretary,
laid down British policy. “Germany had no
concern with Morocco, although she had on one
or two occasions unsuccessfully tried to obtain a
footing there. The only Powers really interested
were Great Britain and France and Spain, and
it would be most desirable that if Germany were
at any time to come forward and attempt to
assume a conspicuous rôle, it should be intimated
to her that she had no locus standi” (Lord Lans-
downe to Sir E. Monson, December 31, 1902).

When the French Foreign Minister, M. Del-
cassé, visited London, Lord Lansdowne had an
opportunity further to clarify England’s aims.
“I said that . . . we could not be indifferent to
the fate of Morocco. We were in the first place,
largely interested in the Mediterranean seaboard
and particularly in Tangiers and the neighbouring
coast. ... It would be impossible for us to agree to any settlement which might have an injurious effect on British commerce or British enterprise in that part of Africa” (Lansdowne to Monson, July 7, 1903).

"M. Delcassé considered that the two Governments, holding as they did, that the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar should be secured, might undertake to act together with the object of preventing the erection of any fortifications on the Moorish coast of the Straits. I observed to His Excellency that it would scarcely be correct to represent Great Britain as being interested only in that part of the Moroccan coastline which abutted on the Straits of Gibraltar. There were other parts of the Moorish coastline to which we could not afford to be indifferent. His Excellency observed ... that France was indeed interested in preventing any other Power from establishing itself, not only in the neighbourhood of the Straits, but at other points on the Moorish coast which could be used for effect for strategical purposes” (Lansdowne to Monson, July 29, 1903).

From these conversations, which were the foundation of the Treaty that was to follow, a basic principle emerged. Both Governments, wrote Lord Lansdowne, regard it as "essential" that on the Moroccan coast "no Power shall be allowed to establish itself or erect fortifications or strategical works of any kind" (Lansdowne to Monson, April 8, 1904). Great Britain's out-
standing interest in Morocco was to see this condition carried out. She knew that the Sultan, who was becoming less and less able to control his own subjects, would not be able, unaided, to withstand a determined German push if and when it should come. Someone had to do it for him. France had a more direct interest in Morocco than Britain and Britain had her hands full with Egypt. Accordingly it was decided to recognise the "special position" of France in Morocco.\(^1\) With that established, England and France agreed, by the Treaty of 1904, to certain specific undertakings. They are included in the Declaration on Egypt and Morocco which formed a separate part of the Treaty, as follows:

"\(\text{Article VII.}\) — In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortification or strategic works on the coast of Morocco between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the river Sebu. This condition does not apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain.

"\(\text{Article VIII.}\) — The two Governments, inspired by their sincere feeling of friendship for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which that country derives from her geographical position and her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast. In regard to these interests the

\(^1\) In return, France recognised the "special position" of England in Egypt.
French Government will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government which shall be communicated to the British Government."

Secret Article III dealt more specifically with Spanish interests, providing that "... a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other Présides should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain", and that the administration of the coastal territory specified in Article VII "should be entrusted to Spain." The most important part of this secret Article, however, was the provision that "Spain would ... have to undertake not to alienate the whole or a part of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence."
The Algeciras Crisis, 1905–1906

The curtain on the next act of the Moroccan drama was soon rung up. On March 31, 1905, the German Emperor landed at Tangiers with the announcement, "I do not acknowledge any agreement that has been come to" (Mr. H. F. White to Lord Lansdowne, April 1, 1905). Whether by accident or design, the German Government had never been officially informed of the terms of the Declaration on Egypt and Morocco. The Kaiser thus had a certain hollow justification for his statement. Actually, a full year previously Germany had known enough about the Declaration to make her knowledge the basis of a veiled threat to England. She had taken it upon herself to inform England that Spain was exceedingly disturbed by the Treaty, and that it "might become necessary for Germany to give Spain diplomatic support" (Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 1, 1904). One is better able to give its full value to the euphemism, "diplomatic support", in the light of German activities previous and subsequent to July 18, 1936.

The Kaiser's visit to Tangiers precipitated a full-blooded international crisis. It was supposed that his intention was to demand the cession of a Moorish port or else the acknowledgement of a German sphere of influence; to either or both of these England and France were unalterably opposed. But the German
voice was loud and persistent. She refused to be pacified without at least the satisfaction of an international conference. For nearly a year the diplomatic battle continued. Telegraph wires between London, Paris and Berlin sizzled with instructions. War was in the air. The French Premier resigned. Even Washington felt the repercussions, and President Roosevelt was obliged to take a stand. "I desired to do anything I could for France", he said, "because I thought her in the right." Eventually, however, a conference was held at Algeciras early in 1906. What Germany hoped to obtain from the conference was an "amendment" of the Treaty of 1904. Or, as Edward VII remarked, "In plain English—Germany ousts France from Morocco and puts herself in her place!" (Marginal comment on a letter from Mr. G. Lowther, British Minister at Tangiers, to Lord Lansdowne, June 8, 1905). But although Germany had gained a diplomatic victory in the fact that the Conference was held at all, she found, when it was all over, that she had come away with nothing but a few commercial concessions. "The Entente Cordiale," reluctantly concluded the German Ambassador in London, "has stood its diplomatic baptism of fire and emerged strengthened" (Metternich to Bülow, May, 1906). England and France had held Germany out of Morocco for a few more years—but for a few years only, for Germany had not given up.
The Algeciras Crisis, though it left the Moroccan question where it was, resulted in a decision of the utmost importance. The General Staffs of France and Britain decided, from that moment, to co-operate on military strategy. A series of secret conversations between the two High Commands was inaugurated which lasted until 1914 and but for which the history of the World War might have been quite different. As early as May, 1905, only a few weeks after the Kaiser disembarked at Tangiers, the first hint of what was to develop into the military conversations occurred in a talk between Lord Lansdowne and M. Cambon, the French Ambassador. "I observed," wrote Lansdowne, "that the moral of all these incidents seemed to me to be that our two Governments should continue to treat one another with the most absolute confidence, should keep one another fully informed of everything which came to their knowledge, and should, as far as possible, discuss in advance any contingencies by which they might, in the course of events, find themselves confronted" (Lord Lansdowne to Sir F. Bertie, May 17, 1905).

Other people in authority were coming to the same conclusion, and toward the end of 1905 the conversations were begun. Because of the necessity of absolute secrecy and because of the commitments more or less involved in the agreement to co-operate, the Cabinet preferred to have no official knowledge of the General Staff talks.
But the leading ministers of the new Liberal Government—Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister, Lord Haldane, the Secretary for War, Mr. Asquith, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary—had consulted among themselves and had authorised the conversations, naval as well as military, to take place. In the history of the origins of the World War the decision to hold these talks represents perhaps the most important single event. Great Britain did not wait for German guns to be placed opposite Gibraltar, nor for German military missions to make surveys of the country, nor for German staff officers to take charge at strategic points. She was ready to take direct action to prevent anything of the kind. Referring in the House of Commons to the Algeciras crisis some years later, Sir Edward Grey stated: “I said that, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France on the question of Morocco, public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France” (November 27, 1911).

**Germany and Spain, 1905–1906**

In the meantime, the policy of Bismarck, which had been responsible for the Hohenzollern candidature in 1870, was still in operation. “It would be useless to disguise the fact”, wrote Sir Arthur Nicolson, the Ambassador in Madrid, “that Germany has of late been making per-
sistent efforts to detach Spain from France and Great Britain and cause her to revolve in the orbit of Berlin” (To Grey, December 25, 1905). Nicolson also reported to Grey that his German colleague in Madrid had strenuously objected to the appointment of Señor de Villa Urrutia as Spanish delegate to the Algeciras conference on the ground that when he had held the post of Foreign Minister he had been too friendly (in the opinion of Germany) with M. Delcassé, the Foreign Minister of France (Nicolson to Grey, December 14, 1905). On the margin of this letter King Edward noted, “A case of bullying, as usual!”

Spain was not the country to be bullied into an alliance, but the greater international tension grew, the more anxious Germany became to make Spain “revolve in the orbit of Berlin.” No fact is of more significance, in relation to current events, than the importance which Germany gave, in the years during which she was preparing for the World War, to winning Spain to her side. In 1905 King Alfonso was invited to pay a visit to the Kaiser, but not for social reasons alone. “When the King of Spain was in Berlin”, wrote Sir Edward Grey, “the German Emperor suggested to him that, in the event of a Franco-German conflict, Spain should assume an attitude benevolent to Germany by mobilising part of her Army toward the Pyre- nean frontier” (Grey to Bertie, December 20, 1905).
More specific information was obtained by Nicolson, who reported that the Kaiser had "intimated" to King Alfonso, "... that it would be good policy on the part of His Majesty if he were to revive a secret agreement which his father had made, by which Spain had undertaken to furnish military assistance to Germany in certain eventualities" (Nicolson to Grey, December 27, 1905).

Alfonso refused the offer, saying that changes in the international situation made it no longer necessary, as it had been in his father's time, for Spain to seek outside support. In any case, as a constitutional monarch, he would refuse any proposal which could not be brought before the Cortes.

Despite this setback, Germany persisted in her efforts. In his annual report on Spain for the year 1906, the British Ambassador at Madrid informed the Foreign Office that "Germany ... has not abandoned her endeavour to detach Spain from the French connection. She is extending her commercial penetration into Spain, notwithstanding the failure to conclude a commercial treaty" (Sir Maurice de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, April 27, 1907).

Watching these activities, England did not feel inclined to remain passive while the German grass grew under her feet. "A great deal turns on Spain just now", wrote Grey. "It would be very awkward if she turned to Germany and
away from France and ourselves. The Mediterranean question would then become more embroiled than ever” (Grey to Knollys, March, 1907).

The Cabinet consulted, and decided that the situation called for a gesture of real importance. It was agreed that King Edward should pay a personal visit to King Alfonso in Spain and, by emphasising Anglo-Spanish friendship, offset the effects of German propaganda. Confirmation of the motive of the visit is to be found in a letter from M. Cartier, the Belgian Chargé d’Affaires in London, to his Foreign Minister in Brussels. “King Edward’s visit”, he wrote, “to his royal nephew at Cartagena was no doubt specially inspired by the desire to strengthen the ties that unite Spain to Great Britain and as much as possible to weaken German influence at Madrid” (April 12, 1907).

Its effect, so far as Germany was concerned, was immediate. Public opinion became greatly excited, the Wilhelmstrasse was furious, and the German Press accused England of scheming for a naval agreement to keep Germany out of the Mediterranean. As a matter of fact the Press was right.

**The Mediterranean Agreement, 1907**

In the increasing European tension, one of the first thoughts of the British Foreign Office was to ensure the neutrality of Spain and of the Spanish
possessions in the Western Mediterranean. Feelers were put out to France and Spain which gradually broadened into negotiations for a mutual guarantee of the Mediterranean status quo. The agreement was signed on May 16, 1907, approximately a month after King Edward’s visit to Cartagena. It was first broached, however, two years earlier.

In June, 1905, Lord Lansdowne asked his Chargé d’Affaires in Madrid to sound the Spanish Government on a certain proposal: “It had occurred to me of late that a mutually advantageous agreement might be made between Spain and Great Britain under which Spain might undertake that she would not alienate to a third Power some of the important strategic points included in her possessions. I referred in particular to the places owned by Spain on the Moorish seaboard, the Balearic Islands, the Canaries, and Fernando Po. The kind of arrangement I had in my mind was that Spain might agree not to alienate any of these and that we should undertake to support her in denying them to any other Power” (Lord Lansdowne to Mr. Cartwright, June 8, 1905).

For the time being, the proposal was allowed to lapse, because both the Spanish and British Governments were in the throes of an electoral struggle, and both subsequently gave way to Governments of the Opposition. In the following year, however, it was revived at the suggestion
of Sir Francis Bertie, the Ambassador in Paris, who had reason to believe that the circumstances were pressing. "The French Government suspect the German Government of designs on the Balearic Islands as well as on the Canaries", he wrote to Grey, the new Foreign Secretary. He was authorised to say that France was ready to join in any agreement which would assure "that Germany would be precluded from using the Balearics as a naval base in a war with France" (December 26, 1906). He added that, "It is as much a British as a French interest to keep the Germans out of the Spanish Islands" (To Grey, January 3, 1907).

Grey needed no urging. In a letter to the Prime Minister, he had already suggested some such agreement himself. "It would be a distinct advantage to be assured that the part of the Morocco coast which belongs to the Spanish sphere should not pass into hands likely or able to use it to our disadvantage" (Grey to Campbell-Bannerman, December 2, 1906). Later he amplified this into an agreement "which would prevent Spain from yielding to German pressure which was constantly being exercised with the object of securing some footing in the Mediterranean" (Grey to Bertie, January 9, 1907). Were England to let the present opportunity go unseized she might one day find "... that Spain has ceded something on the coast of Morocco to another Power that would impair or destroy the value of
Gibraltar to us” (Grey; Memorandum to the Cabinet, April 26, 1907).

England did not intend to wait until this should happen. Thirty years ago the Foreign Office believed in acting before rather than after the fact. In a direct line with its traditional Spanish policy it proposed immediately, “. . . to strengthen Spain in refusing inconvenient demands for concessions within Spanish territory, to attach her more firmly to France and England and to prevent her from seeking other alliances” (Sir Charles Hardinge, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Memorandum to the Cabinet, March 25, 1907).

The importance of the Spanish question was emphasised when the Foreign Office asked for the opinion of the Committee for Imperial Defence. “It would be an advantage”, the Committee reported, “from the naval and military point of view if Spain would undertake . . . not to alienate any of her external possessions to any other Power, Great Britain, on her side, undertaking to guarantee those possessions against foreign occupation. It is desirable that France should be a party to this agreement” (96th Session, February 28, 1907).

The agreement, or mutual guarantee, finally took the form of an exchange of notes between the British and Spanish, the British and French and the Spanish and French Governments. Its appropriateness to current events in the Mediter-
The general policy of His Majesty’s Government in the regions above defined is directed to the maintenance of the status quo and in pursuance of this policy they are firmly resolved to preserve intact the rights of the British Crown over its insular and maritime possessions in those regions.

"Should circumstances arise which would alter or tend to alter the existing status quo in the said regions, His Majesty’s Government will communicate with the Government of His Catholic Majesty in order to afford them the opportunity to concert by mutual agreement the course of action which the two Powers shall take in common" (Text of the English note to Spain signed by Sir Edward Grey and Señor de Villa Urrutia, London, May 16, 1907). Except for the change in the names of the Governments, the French and Spanish notes were identical with this.
This agreement is still in force. No date of expiration was included in the agreement, no repudiation has since been recorded, and although the nature of the Spanish Government has changed in the meantime, the Republic inherited by international law the rights and obligations of the Monarchy.

Germany’s reaction to the agreement was prophetic. On being presented with a copy of the text, Herr von Mühlberg, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, read it over carefully. “Then, assuming a joking expression, His Excellency said that the course of history would not be altered by a little paper like this” (Lascelles to Grey, June 16, 1907).

**The Agadir Crisis, 1911**

Germany was not deterred for long by the explicit determination of England, France and Spain to maintain the status quo intact. Morocco was an idée fixe which she had not (and has not) abandoned. It is curious to note how closely the German demand for colonies in the years immediately preceding the World War resembles that demand to-day. Germany under the Emperor was no less insistent than Germany under the Führer on her “right” to expand. An excerpt from a pamphlet entitled *Morocco Lost? A Cry of Warning at the Eleventh Hour*, published in 1906 by the Allddeutscher Verband (Pan-German Union) is an example. At a time when Germany
possessed not one square inch of Moroccan territory, this pamphlet made the following claim: "One or two harbours on the Morocco coast will not suffice for us; we must have the entire Atlantic coast, as we cannot develop our interests unless we are independent of other Powers possessing rights on the littoral."

Concerning the same subject, the British Minister Resident at Munich describes a lecture he heard on "Morocco and German Interests in that Country." "After describing in minute detail the action of the principal Germans who have been in that country, the lecturer produced photographs on the screen of the Emperor's visit to Tangiers.... The impression left on the audience, doubtless intentionally, though not expressed in so many words, was that Germany was justified in looking for compensation in return for all she had done for Morocco in the past. The enthusiasm of the large audience on this occasion was a remarkable testimony to the popularity of the subject" (Mr. Tower to Sir Edward Grey, January 24, 1906).

Opportunity for direct action came in 1911. In April an uprising of Moroccan tribes had led the French troops to occupy Fez. On the ground that this move menaced her commercial interests in West Africa, Germany sent the gunboat, Panther, to Agadir, a port on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. When the news of the Panthersprung reached Europe, the international temperature
immediately shot up to boiling-point. France and England assumed that Germany was once again trying to claim a port which she could convert into a naval base. Reviewing the crisis later in the House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey said that the incident gave the British Government cause to "apprehend that the settlement contemplated by the German Government might be the partition of Morocco. . . . The Germans were in the closed port of Agadir. . . . For all we knew they might be acquiring concessions there, and it might even be that the German flag had been hoisted at Agadir, which was the most suitable port on that coast for a naval base. The longer the Germans remained at Agadir the greater the risk of a state of affairs which would make it more difficult for them to withdraw and more necessary for us to take some steps to protect British interests" (November 27, 1911).

With raised eyebrows the Kaiser said he could not understand why England should become so excited over "a little ship with only two or three little pop-guns on board" (Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, August 16, 1911). At the same time he declared the Algeciras settlement to be dead, demanded a revision, and insisted that it be arrived at through direct conversations between Germany and France to the exclusion of England. Actually the German Government later denied that it had ever been their intention to demand a port. Whether it had been or had not is irrelevant.
The Foreign Office thought it had, and in the face of this danger, as it was so considered, the policy which it adopted was unequivocal. "I told M. Cambon", wrote Grey, "that we had both commercial and strategic interests to consider. As long as only France and Spain were there [in Morocco], there was no need for us to take any step. But now that Germany had taken special steps on her own account, it would be natural that we should take special steps to protect our interests" (Grey to Bertie, July 3, 1911). Such a suggestion, which seemed "natural" to Grey, would doubtless to-day be described by the Government as "war-mongering."

Summing up British policy, Grey wrote, "As regards Morocco, we should think that anything that gave Germany a footing on the Mediterranean absolutely irreconcilable with British interests" (Grey to Bertie, July 13, 1911). A more detailed definition of policy was made by Sir Arthur Nicolson, the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. "I think we might lay down—and here Grey entirely agrees with me—a set of conditions: (1) The internationalisation of Tangiers and its neighbourhood. (2) A treaty pledge that no ports on the Morocco coast, either Atlantic or Mediterranean, should be fortified. (3) That Germany should not endeavour to acquire a port on the Mediterranean coast. (4) The maintenance of the status quo. The above conditions are, I think, the very minimum
which we could demand and on which we ought certainly to insist" (To Sir Charles Hardinge, July 5, 1911).

As the crisis developed in intensity it grew out of the purely Moroccan stage and became a question of international prestige: whether or not Germany was going to be able successfully to bluff France and England into making concessions. It was at this point that Mr. Lloyd George made the famous Mansion House speech.

"I am bound to say this—that I believe it is essential in the higher interests, not merely of this country, but of the world, that Britain should at all hazards maintain her place and her prestige among the great Powers of the world. If a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her vital interests are affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure. National honour is no party question, the security of our international trade is no party question; the peace of the world is much more likely to be secured if the nations realise fairly what the conditions of peace must be" (July 21, 1911).

The strong attitude unhesitatingly taken by Mr. Lloyd George, while it infuriated the
Germans, also caused them to tone down their demands. "Yesterday's conversation", reported M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador in Berlin, "was very different than the last."

Ultimately Germany was forced to content herself (temporarily) with certain concessions which France made to her in West Africa. She still had not managed to wedge open the Moroccan door.
VII

SPAIN IN THE WORLD WAR

With the World War we reach a period which is still fresh enough in everyone's mind as to make any accompanying explanation of events unnecessary. We can rely here entirely on original sources. To give a picture of Spain in her relation with the Allies and with the Central Powers, the author has chosen to depend on a single authority which most readers will be ready to accept: that is, The Times. Its version of the situation, while not entirely objective (for who expects objectivity in time of war?), is probably as reliable as any other contemporary version in English.

The following quotations, all of which are from The Times, show, first, that Spain was divided in the same way as she is to-day. The Church, the Army, the landlords, the Conservative Parties and the upper classes were on one side and pro-German. The proletariat, part of the middle class, and the Left Parties—Radicals, Socialists, Republicans, Reformists—were on the other side and pro-Ally. Secondly, the dispatches to The Times show how the war caused Germany's
need of Spain, first recognised by Bismarck, to be felt more acutely than ever, and how it intensified German efforts to bring Spain within the orbit of Berlin.

The Division of Opinion in Spain

A Conflict of Ideals

October 10, 1914. “The war is regarded as a conflict between two ideals: the German, represented by the concept of divine right, authority, and a severe ideal of life and conduct, and the French, representing that of Socialism and free thought, tending to corruption and anarchy. These ideas . . . become strong and articulate in the classes composing what is called Society, and the higher and more ancient the Society, the more definite they become. . . . Against this dull background of prejudice and sentiment there may be discerned a more vital current of opinion. The whole band of liberal spirits . . . who may be described as European in outlook, and who draw their inspiration from Paris and London rather than from Rome, are beginning to perceive that this is a war between freedom and tyranny, and their sympathies are developing accordingly.”

Feeling in the Working Class

February 6, 1915. “As the evidence of German intrigue in Spain increases, popular feeling runs steadily higher. . . . The working men are pro-
testing in vigorous language against the abuse of Spanish hospitality, and are expressing the desire to convey to Germany the hopelessness of the attempt to induce the nation to take her side in the conflict."

_The Reformist Party and the Allies_

*May 3, 1915.* "The leader of the Reformist Party, in a speech at Granada yesterday, said that he was convinced that the interests of Spain drew her towards the Allies. . . . In conclusion, Señor Alvarez frankly said that he would rather be on the side of a defeated France and Great Britain than on that of a victorious Germany. . . . Commenting on the speech . . . the Liberal organs in particular say that Señor Alvarez showed with undeniable logic that Spain can only live if united to France and England and by following the fortunes of these two countries."

_The Reactionaries and the Enemy_

*September 8, 1915.* "Generally speaking, many Spanish Liberals are Francophile, as indeed are all the Republicans. . . . Many members of the Conservative Party, on the other hand, take the side of Germany. . . . Those reactionaries in Spain who are opposed to the ideas for which France stands, make common cause with our enemies."

"*A Liberal Cannot be Germanophile*

*September 22, 1915.* "Such sensational revelations of German plans for Spain are being made
by Señor Lozano in a series of articles entitled, ‘A Liberal Cannot be Germanophile’ now appearing in *El Pais*, that it was expected that the newspaper would be confiscated. . . . The popular Republican writer states that Liberals of every shade of opinion are . . . united together in their heartfelt sympathy with the Allies and above all with France and England. But, says Señor Lozano, and he brings an overwhelming array of historical facts and figures in support of his assertion, the Spanish reactionaries have never ceased to intrigue with Germany and Austria to restore the Carlisl branch of the Bourbons known to Europe at large as that of Don Carlos, the Old Pretender, and now that it is the Kaiser who stands for absolutism all the world over, the Reactionary Spanish Clericals, notwithstanding that the Kaiser is ‘the Pope of Lutheranism and has swept Catholic Belgium with a sea of fire’, have placed themselves en masse on the side of Germany. William II, in his hatred of Spanish liberty—the gift to Spain of France and England—is ready to move heaven and earth to aid the reactionaries to bring about civil war in Spain for the third time.

“These articles are creating an extraordinary sensation in the country. Groups of working men may be seen tearing copies of *El Pais* from the vendors’ hands in their eagerness to read fresh chapters of Lozano’s bitter indictment of the hated Jesuit-Germanophil policy.
"There is unfortunately no room for doubt that the Reactionaries, led and financed by Germany, were organised for action long before the war began, although Germany grossly over-estimated the strength of the absolutist minority in Spain. But even if the Government of Señor Dato had not proved perfectly competent to deal with the critical situation thus established, Germany would soon have discovered that . . . [the Government] cannot be overthrown by the intrigues of an unpopular class supported by a foreign ruler whose object is to repeal the Constitution of which Spain is so proud in favour of a detested Absolutism worthy only of the Dark Ages."

Spanish Opinion. By John Walter

October 5, 1916. "In every important town in Spain there will usually be found three principal newspapers corresponding to the three chief strata of public opinion: one representing the Church, Carlism, and the forces of reaction, another the Liberal-Conservative upper middle-class interest, and another the ideals of the Radical Parties. The first, naturally inclined to sympathise with the German cause, made but little difficulty about accepting German patronage and co-operation, and under German protection it grew in violence and resources. The second, true to the official label of ‘strict neutrality’, but not without an eye

1 Part owner of The Times.
to the prejudices of its readers, fluctuated uneasily between the conflicting opinions and tended to be drawn by the pressure of the surrounding atmosphere into the Germanophile current. The third, as a rule frankly in favour of France and England as representing kindred political ideas, but receiving neither support nor encouragement from them, was gradually impoverished and undermined by German blackmail and intrigue. . . .

"In discussing Spanish opinion on the war, it is often remarked that the strongest sympathisers with the Allies are to be found among the advanced Liberals, Republicans, and Socialists and such-like enemies of constituted authority. . . . Our best friends are to be found among those who are profoundly dissatisfied with the present state of things in Spain. They desire the triumph of England and France as the only chance of a thorough-going reform of Spanish life. They dread a German victory as likely to strengthen the forces of reaction and to perpetuate the present political corruption and economic stagnation. . . . Their precept and example are forming the rising generation of Spanish Liberals and intellectuals. . . . They are the men who have prevented the truth from suffering an eclipse. Politically they are represented by the small party of the Reformists, led by Señor Azcarate,\(^1\) the veteran Republican, whose long and honour-

\(^1\) Uncle of the present Ambassador to the Court of St. James.
able parliamentary career closed with the loss of his seat at the last election. . . . Fortunately for the Allies, this school of thought has found a few powerful exponents in the Press. The most effective of them has been and still is Luis Araquistain.¹ . . . An attractive and pungent style, a serene temper and a rare independence of thought have led him time after time to lead opinion right, especially in regard to England, when it had every chance of going wrong.”

*The Spanish Clergy and Germany.* By John Walter

*December 27, 1916.* “It is a regrettable fact that those newspapers which enjoy the protection and submit to the censorship of the Church are nearly all passionate and unscrupulous partisans of Germany. . . . The alliance between the reactionary Spanish clergy and the Germans, cemented by the joint control and unscrupulous use of the Catholic Press, acts as an effectual muzzle on the free expression of Spanish Catholic opinion with regard to the war.”

“*The Native Chivalry of the Spanish Masses*”

*April 14, 1917.* “If, instead of taking refuge in a depressing silence, Ministers had attempted to educate the popular mind upon the momentous issues of the day, if they had allowed the native chivalry of the Spanish masses to supply their

¹ Appointed by the Spanish Government as Ambassador in Paris for the first eight months of the present war in Spain.
own lack of confidence . . . if they had acted thus, International Law would be now a thing of greater substance and authority and the world would have been spared much misery.

"The whole of that part of the Spanish nation which represents authority, inherited wealth, and privilege—the greater part of the clergy, the Conservatives and the Carlists, the Army, the leisured classes—all these combined to prevent the Government from uttering or allowing to be uttered any effective criticism of German action, however outrageous. . . . The whole of the Republican, Socialist, and advanced Liberal Parties are seen to be coming into line in defence of the national ideal. . . . They have brains, courage, and intellectual honesty, and having these, will probably attract to themselves the professional and commercial classes as well as the great mass of the workers."

The Meeting in the Madrid Bull Ring

May 28, 1917. "Public interest has centred in the last few days in the meeting to be held in the Bull Ring by the parties of the Left to discuss their position with regard to the international situation. . . . The Clerical and Reactionary Press soon took fright, and urged the Government to prohibit the meeting, but the Ministers refused to interfere, holding that Señor Alvarez and the Radicals were entitled to the same respectful hearing as Señor Maura and the Tories. The
Press campaign, therefore, has redoubled its violence, and is threatening riot, outrage, and summary vengeance upon the promoters and sponsors of the demonstration. Even the highly respectable *Universo* joins in the general panic at the possible consequences of this free expression of Liberal opinion. Yet, in spite of all this, enthusiasm is gradually increasing. The provocative language of the reactionary Press against the meeting has united the whole of the Liberal Press strongly in its favour."

*May 29, 1917.* "To-day’s meeting in the Bull Ring was successful beyond all estimation. Despite the bitterness of the Germanophile Press, there was no serious attempt to make a disturbance. The audience must have numbered some 20,000, mostly of the middle and professional classes and the better class of working men, with a fair sprinkling of women. A strong revolutionary tone rang through all the speeches alike. Their effect briefly was this, that the present war is a conflict between absolutism and democracy, and therefore the speakers were heart and soul for the Allies."

*German Propaganda in Spain*

*The German Secret Service*

*September 1, 1915.* "German agents are busier than ever in Spain now, propagating announcements of German victories. Their organisation spreads over the whole country, and even in quite
insignificant villages where the majority of the labourers cannot read, individuals in the pay of the German secret service are to be found reading aloud to working men from pro-German newspapers which no Spaniard of the wage-earning class ever dreams of buying for himself or even of reading as a gift.”

*Why Germany wants Spain.*  *By Lord Northcliffe*

(N.B.—Allowing for the passions of the war period, the more violent parts of Lord Northcliffe’s indictment of German activities in Spain have been omitted from the following quotation.)

*September 9, 1916.* “Since that time [the Franco-Prussian War] the Germans have never ceased to agitate for the political and commercial control of Spain. . . . When one surveys the rich valleys, in which everything, including olives, bright red cripiscums, vines, peaches, beets, tomatoes, all seem to luxuriate together in wild profusion, it is not difficult to understand why the men from the sandy plains of Prussia are covetous. There are other reasons of which I shall speak. A glance at the map of Europe should be sufficiently suggestive of Bismarck’s anxieties about the Iberian peninsula. . . . The Germans in Spain have constituted themselves into a well-drilled army obviously acting on definite instructions. . . . They realise that if to a victorious Germany Spain is very useful, to a defeated Germany Spain is almost essential.
“In the likely event of the development of overland transport by airplane, the coasts and harbours of friendly Spain would be invaluable to Germany. The mineral wealth of the Peninsula, only now being scientifically developed, would afford her several sorts of raw materials of which Germany has little or none. And as an outlet for German goods, as the main point of departure for the wealthy Republics of South America, as the bulwark against English control of Gibraltar, Spain is, from the German point of view, distinctly Germany's 'pidgin.'

“The Germans know that, with Spain as a point d'appui and with the backing of Spanish opinion and above all with that of the Church, their cause is likely to be better appreciated in the New World than if mother Spain were hostile. From Spain, therefore, proceeds to the New World a great deal of German propaganda in the Spanish language.”

The Kaiser’s Gifts. By John Walter

October 5, 1917. “The active and plausible gentry who operate from the German Embassy in Madrid and from the office in Barcelona soon had it firmly established in the minds of the Spanish clerics that the Kaiser was coming to increase the power of the Church, suppress free thought, and restore the temporal power of the Pope; in the heads of the officers of the Army and the Navy that the German hosts were invincible and that
their triumph would inaugurate a golden era of smart uniforms for officers and discipline for everybody else; and in the minds of the upper classes generally that the Kaiser’s dearest wish upon the attainment of victory was to restore Gibraltar to Spain, allow her a free hand in Portugal, and make her the chief Power in Morocco, that he would put a muzzle on democracy and inculcate a wholesome respect for authority and a proper reverence for privilege. These ideas were busily put about by the Embassy and the Consulates and by the thousands of industrious Germans who were residing in Spain at the time.”

Spain—A “Western Turkey.” Leading Article

January 10, 1917. “Were Spain under military German occupation, German activity could hardly be more audacious and less respectful to the dignity and neutrality of a proud nation. . . . The purpose of German propaganda in Spain is clear. It is to influence Spanish opinion and feeling so that if the moment ever comes for a decision, the option may not be exercised to the disadvantage of Germany. The Germans in Spain, who number some 80,000, have worked indefatigably and with a considerable measure of success. They have had the great bulk of ecclesiastical and military opinion on their side. They have expended large sums upon the Press, and in flooding it with a constant stream of
German and Austrian 'news.' . . . In their hearts Spanish statesmen doubtless understand that the real object of Germany is, as an eminent Spanish writer recently put it, to make of Spain a 'Western Turkey.' It behoves the Allied Governments, and especially those of France and England, to face the situation frankly. The action of our diplomacy and our efforts to make the Allied position plain to the Spanish people need to be more resolute and vigorous."

_Perfidious Albion_

_October 3, 1917._ "As the German cause gradually wanes in the eyes of statesmen and politicians, the Germans are trying desperately to poison the business relations between the great Spanish exporting houses and their English customers . . . and to persuade the fruit-growers and exporters and the hundreds of thousands of wage earners dependent on them that England is perfidious and selfish, and that Germany is their true friend. In all the chief towns of the south-eastern provinces are to be found little newspapers whose chief function it is to further this strange idea. Some of them are in German hands entirely, while others are directed by priests under high ecclesiastical patronage. All alike traduce England and the English with a unanimity and a persistent animosity which betray a remarkable unity of purpose and control."
Spain's Raw Materials

May 4, 1918. "The Germans here are growing daily more aware of the vital importance to them of Spain after the war. She has the minerals and metals which Germany wants for her industries and for her next war, and also large accumulations of capital only wanting banking and industrial organisation to develop the industries which can serve Germany and distribute among the Spanish proletariat a stream of wages with which to purchase German manufactured goods."

British Interest in Spain

(A final dispatch from Spain near the end of the war makes an interesting conclusion to the story unfolded above. It begins with complaints, typical of all The Times correspondence from Spain during the war, that the British Government makes no efforts to counteract German propaganda, to help the Spanish pro-Allies, or to prevent Spain from drifting into the orbit of Berlin. It concludes with a prediction, tragic in its accuracy.)

August 1, 1918. "Is it in the least realised how important our interests are here, both now and after the war? ... It is not the Spanish Government which is to blame; it is our own Government. ... Spain gets little help from us, even that help afforded by a strict regard for our own interests. There are elements in the
situation here which it would be mischievous to discuss publicly, but which are present in one's mind as one writes and add to the gravity with which any well-informed person must contemplate the tale of the ineptitude of British policy in Spain since the beginning of the war. . . . If we do not awake in time, we shall not only sacrifice infinitely great interests of our own here, interests which are common to us and Spain, but we may not improbably involve Spain in ruinous calamity and disturb the equipoise of the groups of Powers in whose hands the resettlement of half the world will lie. No miracle is required to avoid that catastrophe; only that we should awake and put a little heart and brains into the doing of our work here."
A NOTE ON SOURCES

The following list is confined to those primary sources from which quotations appearing in the text have been taken. It is offered merely as a means of reference to the debates and diplomatic correspondence, and is in no sense intended as a bibliography of the subject.

All quotations from speeches in Parliament have been taken from the following volumes:

Cobbett's Parliamentary History; from the Norman Conquest to 1803.

Hansard's Parliamentary Debates; 1803–1892.

Parliamentary Debates; Authorised Edition, 1892–

The correspondence between Mr. St. John and M. de Torcy in 1712 and the correspondence relating to the Catalans in 1705 are to be found in the Report of the Committee of Secrecy, appointed to examine the several Books and Papers relating to the Negotiations of Peace and Commerce between England and France, June 9, 1715. This Report is contained in Volume I of Reports of the Committees of the House of Commons, 14 vols., London, 1803.

The remaining diplomatic correspondence up to 1742 is to be found in the Memoirs of the Life and

The diplomatic correspondence in the remainder of Chapter I, is to be found in the Grenville Papers; Being the Correspondence of Richard Grenville, Earl Temple, and the Right Honourable George Grenville, their friends and contemporaries. Edited with notes by W. J. Smith, 4 vols., London, 1852–53.

The diplomatic correspondence in Chapters II–V is, with one exception, to be found in British and Foreign State Papers, London, 1812–%

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