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THE DANEGELD IN FRANCE

BY

EINAR JORANSON, Ph.D.

INSTRUCTOR IN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

PUBLISHED

BY AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
AUGUSTANA COLLEGE AND THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
ROCK ISLAND, ILLINOIS



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All works cited in this dissertation are included in the following list. Certain others that have a more or less general relation to the subject as a whole or to some important part of it have also been included, but many secondary works that were found to be of slight value have been omitted. It is confidently hoped that no printed source supplying information either direct or indirect on the Danegeld in France has been overlooked.

ABBREVIATIONS

AA. SS.	J. Bollandus (<i>ed.</i>), <i>Acta sanctorum.</i>
COLL. DE TEXT.	<i>Collection de textes pour servir à l'étude et à l'enseignement de l'histoire.</i>
FORSCH. Z. D. GESCH.	<i>Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte.</i> Herausgegeben von der historischen Commission bei der königlich bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Göttingen, 1860 ff.
JAHRB. D. D. GESCH.	<i>Jahrbücher der deutschen Geschichte.</i> Published under the auspices of the Munich Academy. Berlin and Leipzig, 1862 ff.
M. G. H., SS.	<i>Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores.</i>
———, SS. RERUM MEROV.	<i>Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores rerum Merovingicarum.</i>
———, LL.	<i>Monumenta Germaniae historica, Leges.</i>
———, EPP.	<i>Monumenta Germaniae historica, Epistolae.</i>
———, POET. LAT.	<i>Monumenta Germaniae historica, Poetae Latini medii aevi.</i>
MON. HIST. BRIT.	<i>Monumenta historica Britannica.</i>
REV. HIST.	<i>Revue Historique.</i> Paris, 1834 ff.
SS. R. G.	<i>Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum ex Monumentis Germaniae historicis re-cusi.</i>

The other abbreviations used in this work will, it is believed, be self-explanatory.

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INTRODUCTION

The political and economic importance of the English Danegeld has long been recognized.¹ Careful studies of its institutional character by competent scholars have yielded a vast amount of information concerning the rates at which the tax was levied, its incidence, how often it was exacted, and the machinery by which it was raised.²

As much can not be said for the Danegeld on the Continent.^{2a} Until recently it has only been very briefly referred to in political, constitutional, and economic histories covering the ninth and early tenth centuries.³ If it is true, that of late there has been a tendency to devote somewhat more attention to the sub-

1 As early as 1756 Mr. P. C. Webb, a member of the London Society of Antiquaries, published a pamphlet entitled *A short account of Danegeld, with some further particulars relating to William the Conqueror's survey*. Considering the time at which it was written, Mr. Webb's treatise must be regarded as a very complete and scholarly piece of work, and probably will long remain the starting point for every detailed study of the English Danegeld (cf. Round's estimate of its value in the work cited in the following note, pp. 77 ff.). Though Mr. Webb's pamphlet is at present very rare, especially in America, arrangements have recently been made for the preparation of several photographic reproductions of the copy owned by Harvard University Library.

2 Perhaps the most notable recent study of the English Danegeld is Round's "Danegeld and the Finance of Domesday," in P. E. Dove's (ed.) *Domesday Studies*, I, 77-142. There is also a wealth of information on the subject in Maitland's *Domesday Book and Beyond* (consult the index s. v. Geld). Freeman, too, has given considerable attention to the Danegeld *passim* in the first two volumes of his *Norman Conquest*.

2a For a discussion of the applicability of the term Danegeld to the tribute paid on the Continent, see *infra*, pp. 23-24.

3 It seems unnecessary to support this statement by specific references to all the older works that deal with the later-Carolingian period. They are all listed in the bibliography and are cited and referred to time and again in the following pages. Suffice it to say here that perhaps Clamageran (*Histoire de l'impôt en France*, I, 179 ff.) and Soetbeer (in one of his articles on Carolingian coinage, *Forsch. z. d. Gesch.*, VI, 53-56 and *passim*) recognized more fully than did any of the other writers of the last century the institutional and economic significance of the Frankish Danegeld. Yet even they devoted only a few pages to the subject. Neither of them furnished a complete statement of all the payments; nor was the information of either very accurate. Soetbeer was concerned almost exclusively with the influence of the Danegeld on the coinage; while Clamageran, in stating the principal provisions of the assessments for the Danegeld, did little more than translate and paraphrase some of the principal sources.

ject,⁴ the fact remains that no complete account has yet appeared; and no attempt has been made, either to bring the Danegeld into relation with the general political and economic development of the later Carolingian period, or to estimate its influence on the institutions of the feudal age. It may be hoped, therefore, that the present work will at least serve to direct attention to an economic and political factor the significance of which has so far been overlooked or underrated by most scholars.

While this dissertation is intended to be primarily a study of the Danegeld in France, with some account of the Danegelds exacted elsewhere on the Continent, it seems desirable, before taking up the discussion of the principal subject, to set forth in broad outline the leading features of the English Danegeld, and to compare it, in a general way with the tribute on the Continent, but more particularly with the Danegeld in France.

The entry in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* for the year 991⁵ which states that Danegeld was then paid for the first time in England is certainly not accurate. Danegeld was promised, if not paid, in England as early as 865, according to the testimony of the same chronicle.⁶ There were two payments in Alfred's time. And Edred (946—55) "left money for this purpose as for a charitable and recognized object."⁷ Probably it is true that from 991 onward the English Danegeld was levied more systematically than before.

Until 1012 the Danegeld in England was paid in the form of tribute, as the purchase price of peace. But in that year the English began to employ the Danes as their mercenaries; and thereafter, down to the dismissal of the mercenary fleet and the abolition of the tax, by Edward the Confessor about the year 1051, Danegeld was paid, not as tribute, but as a stipend to

4 For example by Thompson, Flach, Lot, Vogel, and Dopsch, whose respective contributions to the subject will be noted *infra* in the proper places. To Professor Thompson belongs the credit of having estimated, more fully than anyone else heretofore, the influence of the Danegeld on the commerce and trade of France (cf. *infra*, chap. xviii and nn. 38-41).

5 Ed. Plummer, pp. 126, 127.

6 *Ibid.*, pp. 68, 69.

7 The quotation is from Plummer's *Notes* to his edition of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, p. 174. In the same place will be found full references to practically all the evidence for the early English Danegelds (cf. *infra*, n. 13). See also Round, *op. cit.*, 77 ff.; Maitland, *op. cit.*, 3 ff.; Webb, *A short account of Danegeld*. On the money left by Edred, see also Freeman, *op. cit.*, I, 277, n. 1.

Danish mercenaries in English service. The later Danegeld, from the time of the Conqueror to that of Henry II — who appears to have collected it as such for the last time in 1162 — was not a Danegeld in any proper sense, but simply a royal tax, “an ordinary financial expedient.”⁸

On the Continent the Danegeld appears somewhat earlier than in England. The first recorded payment was secured by the Vikings who swooped down on the Frisian coast in 810, four years prior to the death of Charlemagne. During the reign of Louis the Pious two similar payments (836, 837) were exacted from the Frisians, and there were still others in 846 and in 852. All these Frisian Danegelds, it may be noted, were distinctly local in character, and none of them was authorized by any emperor or king. On the contrary, Charlemagne and Louis the Pious emphatically disapproved of the payments. How the Frisians raised the amounts required of them cannot be determined from the evidence in our possession.

Before turning to the West Frankish, or French, Danegeld, it may be well to state that tribute was paid also in the kingdom of Lorraine and in Brittany. Lorraine was forced to contribute on two occasions. In 864 Lothaire II, following the example set by Charles the Bald in 860—61, raised what appears to have been a stipendiary Danegeld, by levying a tax of four *denarii* on all the *mansi* of his kingdom.¹⁰ In 882 Charles the Fat, after having besieged the Northmen at Elsloo for some time, finally came to terms with the invaders and agreed among other things to pay them a large sum of money. The latter he raised, not by taxation, but by drafts on the treasuries of certain churches.¹¹

8 Round, *op. cit.*, 79 ff.; cf. Maitland, *op. cit.*, 3-4. Plummer makes the following significant statement (*Notes*, p. 174): “[The Danegeld], imposed like the income-tax originally as a war measure, was continued, like the income-tax, as an ordinary financial expedient.” This, it will be found, is not true of the French Danegeld considered as a tax levied by the state. On the disappearance of the English Danegeld “as a distinct item of account in the Pipe Rolls,” see Stubbs, *Constitutional History of England*, I, 500, 623. Round has shown (*Feudal England*, p. 500) that “the last occasion on which Danegeld *eo nomine* was levied was in 1162.” However, there can be no doubt that the old tax was continued under a new name (Stubbs, *op. cit.*, 548, 623-24; Maitland, *Constitutional History of England*, 67-68; Neilson, *Customary Rents*, in *Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History*, ed. by P. Vinogradoff, II, no. IV, p. 119).

9 On the whole subject of the Frisian Danegeld, see *infra*, appendix iii.

10 It is true that in 864 the Vikings received not only Danegeld, but also large quantities of food supplies. See *infra*, appendix iv.

11 See *ibid.*

Though it is uncertain whether the Vikings ever secured a general tribute in Brittany, there are some instances of the payment by the Bretons of local Danegeld.¹²

In the West Frankish kingdom Danegeld was paid oftener, and for a longer period of time, than anywhere else on the Continent. The first exaction took place in 845, and the last recorded tax for the Danegeld was levied in 926. Between those dates there were twelve, or possibly thirteen, payments.

Ordinarily the West Frankish Danegeld was tributary. In that form it was paid more often than even the English tribute. If we may trust the records, tributary Danegeld was paid in England not more than nine times;¹³ in France it was paid ten or possibly eleven times. From 1012 to 1051, as we have seen, the English Danegeld was stipendiary rather than tributary. It was then paid, not as the purchase price of peace, but as a compensation to the Danes whose fleet had entered the English service. The West Frankish monarchs never permanently engaged the Vikings as mercenaries. In 860—61, however, Charles the Bald temporarily employed one group of Vikings to expel another; and in 862 Robert the Strong, the vice-regent in Neustria, engaged a Viking army to aid him against the Bretons. The Danegelds paid on those occasions may perhaps be regarded as stipendiary in nature. But they are the only examples we have of this type of Danegeld in France.

The amounts of the Danegeld were in England much higher than in France. Even when exacted in the form of tribute, the English Danegeld ranged from 10,000 to 48,000 pounds;¹⁴ and as a stipend it sometimes exceeded 80,000 pounds.¹⁵ The highest Danegeld in France, that of 884, did not amount to more than 12,000 pounds. It should be noted, however, that we have no

¹² See *infra*, appendix v.

¹³ In 865 (?), 872, 876, 991, 994, 1002, 1007, 1009, and 1011-12. For discussion and bibliography on these payments, see Plummer, *Notes*, pp. 84, 89, 90, 173-75, 178, 181, 185, 189; see also the discussion of Freeman in the places cited *infra*, n. 27. Cf. Hodgkin (*Hist. of England from the Earliest Times to the Norman Conquest*, pp. 381-82), who fails to note the payments before 991 and inaccurately classifies the Danegeld of 1014 as a tribute.

¹⁴ See the references in the preceding note. A local Danegeld of 3,000 pounds was paid in East Kent in the year 1009.

¹⁵ For example in 1018, when Cnut the Great collected a total sum of 83,000 pounds. See Maitland, *Domesday Book and Beyond*, p. 3; Round, "Danegeld and the Finance of Domesday," *loc. cit.*, p. 80; Plummer, *Notes*, pp. 101-2.

Danegeld. 2.

figures for any English Danegeld prior to that of 991, which, according to the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, amounted to only 10,000 pounds.¹⁶ Perhaps, therefore, the earlier English payments — roughly contemporary with the Frankish — were not so large as those of the later tenth or early eleventh century.¹⁷ The high sums of the later period point unmistakably to a larger supply of money, and of silver, the purchasing power of which must in the meantime have decreased somewhat.¹⁸

As regards the methods by which the tributary Danegeld was raised in England, little is known save that usually a tax was levied for the purpose.¹⁹ It may be presumed, however, that the methods employed to raise the Danegeld when it was a stipend and when, still later, it had become one of the regular revenues of the state, represent a development of earlier practices.²⁰ A comparison of these later English methods with what is known of the Frankish methods reveals the fact that they were, if not identical in every detail, at least very similar in their essential features.

Though it is true that on certain occasions the West Frankish Danegeld had to be made up in part by drafts on the treasures of the church, ordinarily it was, like the English Danegeld, raised by taxation. Just as the ordinary tax unit in England was the hide,²¹ so that on the Continent was the *mansus*. In both countries the nobles or great landholders appear to have been held responsible for the taxes levied on the tenures of their dependents as well as for those laid on the demesne lands. Also it is probable that, in England as well as in France, the peasantry were forced to contribute not only what was due from their

16 It may have been higher; cf. Plummer's *Notes*, p. 175.

17 It is interesting to note that the money left by Edred for the purposes of the Danegeld (*supra*, n. 7) did not amount to more than 1,600 pounds. Perhaps this was not intended to be more than *part* of a Danegeld. Charles the Fat, however, was able to buy off the Vikings who were besieging Paris in 886 for only 700 pounds; it is true that he also had to permit them to accumulate plunder in Burgundy during the following winter. See *infra*, chap. ix.

18 The contrary view of Hodgkin (*op. cit.*, p. 332) is based on what in my opinion is a false assumption; namely, that all or most of the money paid as tribute left England. Doubtless a very considerable part of it was used up by the Vikings in trade while they remained in England (cf. *infra*, chap. xviii and nn. 38-41).

19 See Freeman, *op. cit.*, I, 289 and n. 1; Maitland, *op. cit.*, 391.

20 Cf. Plummer, *Notes*, p. 174; Maitland, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

21 Stubbs, *op. cit.*, I, 622; Round, *op. cit.*, 82 ff.; Maitland, *op. cit.*, 5, 120 ff., 357 ff.

own holdings, but also that which was due from the demesnes, and which in justice ought to have been contributed by the lords out of their own resources. Moreover, the lords in both lands seem to have collected from their peasants a total amount which was far in excess of the sum for which they (the lords) were held responsible by the king, or the state.²² In other words, the money collected from time to time as Danegeld was probably never at any time paid over in full either to the officers of the crown or to the Danes. Very probably a considerable portion of it remained with the lords and their officials. In many cases the exaction doubtless came to be regarded, partly as a tax for the benefit of the state, but partly also as a source of seigneurial revenue.²³

The English Danegeld, according to the Domesday Survey, was exclusively a land tax.²⁴ The West Frankish Danegeld, on the other hand, was levied not only on holdings of land and the seigneurial income from land, but also on the personal property of merchants and priests and even, it would seem, on the incomes of priests. Moreover, it was on one occasion exacted from ordinary freemen in the form of *heerbann*. This latter provision leads me to believe that the legal basis of the Danegeld in France was the king's right to demand military service, and that in theory the West Frankish Danegeld was levied, not as a tax, but as a substitute for military service. Whether this holds true of the English Danegeld has been nowhere definitely stated, though certain indications to that effect are not wanting.²⁵

In France the policy of paying Danegeld appears to have been on most occasions the policy of the magnates, seldom that of the king. Ordinarily the king was forced to resort to the Danegeld by reason of the attitude of his magnates. They seem to have preferred paying tribute to offering armed resistance. Probably the chief reasons for this were the following: (1) the military superiority of the Vikings; (2) the desire of the magnates to

²² On the English methods of assessment and collection, see Maitland, *op. cit.*, 24-25, 54-55, 121 ff. 325-26, and *passim*.

²³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 121.

²⁴ See *supra*, n. 21.

²⁵ Cf. the following statement of Round (*op. cit.*, p. 121): "I would even throw out the suggestion that . . . just as it was possible to ascertain from the number of hides at which a town was assessed, the quōtā of military service for which it was liable, so it might be possible from its military service to infer its assessed hidage." See also Maitland, *op. cit.*, 160, 161 and n. 3.

weaken, or at least to prevent the strengthening of, royal power; (3) the heavy drain on the resources of the magnates when they took the field against the enemy; (4) their want of public spirit; and (5) the profits they derived in collecting the Danegeld from their dependents. This, of course, does not wholly relieve Charles the Bald and his successors of all responsibility in the matter of the Danegeld. That the ambition of the French monarchs to annex neighboring territories, or to compel distant vassals to recognize their suzerainty, sometimes induced them to neglect the defense of the realm and to rely on the venality of the Vikings, is undeniable. But it must be insisted that this does not in more than a few cases explain even in part why it became necessary to buy off the invaders. On far the majority of occasions when Danegeld was paid, the attitude of the magnates was the determining factor.

As regards responsibility for the Danegeld, it is obvious that a comparison between France and England can be drawn only if we limit that comparison, so far as the latter country is concerned, to the tributary Danegeld. Even so, it is perhaps best not to attempt too much. Some things are clear, however. Neither the English nor the French monarchs were exclusively responsible for the policy of buying peace from the Vikings. Though Ethelred (II) the Redeless has, inaccurately and very unjustly, been declared the inaugurator of the Danegeld in England, it is certain that he did not on his own initiative enter into negotiations with the Vikings in 991. That was done "by the advice of Archbishop Siric . . . and the two aldermen, Æthelweard and Ælfric, who besought the king that they might purchase peace for their respective districts. . . . Clearly then the lay lords must share with the archbishop the responsibility for the treaty."²⁶ What holds true for the payment of 991, apparently also holds true for the remaining tributary Danegelds in England. They were paid on the advice and with the consent of the magnates assembled in the witan.²⁷ On one occasion it appears that the king was not consulted in the matter at all.²⁸

The West Frankish Danegeld was levied by the king — sometimes, but not always, after consultation with the magnates — in fact as a direct extraordinary tax, but in theory as a substitute

²⁶ Plummer, *Notes*, pp. 173-74. Cf. Freeman, *op. cit.*, I, 277-80.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 289, 313 and n. 5, 333, 344-45, 350-55.

²⁸ In 1012; *ibid.* 353.

for military service. Considered as a tax, and distinguished from such customary taxes as the *annua dona, censum, tributum*, etc., it was virtually the only impost of its kind during the Carolingian period,²⁹ and may be regarded as in most ways an innovation in Carolingian public finance. Similarly, the English Danegeld was perhaps the only true tax of the Anglo-Saxon period. It appears to have been levied "by the king with the counsel of the witan,"³⁰

In England the collection of Danegeld was continued, for various reasons, after the Viking invasions had ceased; and a strong monarchy was able eventually to transform this tax into a regular source of royal revenue. In France Danegeld was not levied by the crown after 926. Locally, however, the West Frankish Danegeld probably survived in its abuses. Undoubtedly the local authorities often raised "Danegeld" on their own account, sometimes perhaps to buy off a group of Vikings, who otherwise would have subjected their district to plunder and devastation, but at other times for purposes of a different nature and having no relation whatever to the Vikings. In other words, the need of buying immunity from the Northmen very probably became one of the various pretexts under which the seigniors levied the illegal and unjust exactions that are so often referred to in the documents of the later ninth century and thereafter. On this basis I have attempted to show in the following pages that the Danegeld must have been an important influence in the establishment of the seigneurial right to tax the unfree peasants at will and in the development of the arbitrary *taille*; indeed, I have even gone so far as to indicate a certain, more or less attenuated, relationship between the Danegeld on the one hand and some of the earlier feudal aids on the other.

The contemporary terminology for the Danegeld varies considerably not only as between England and the continent but also as between different sources for the same country; and even in one and the same document or narrative account there is no strict uniformity in terminology. In the West Frankish sources the tributary Danegeld is usually referred to as *tributum*,³¹ but

²⁹ A single exception to this statement is noted *infra*, chap. xvii and n. 52.

³⁰ Stubbs, *op. cit.*, I, 118, 148; Maitland, *Const. Hist.*, 58, 92. Cf. Dowell, *History of Taxation and Taxes in England*, I, p. 11.

³¹ *Infra*, chap. i, n. 26; chap. v, n. 65; chap. vi, nn. 17, 19, 47, 97; chap.

other names are also applied to it, as *census*,³² *munus*,³³ *pecunia pro pace*,³⁴ *pensum*.³⁵ The stipendiary Danegeld is called *locarium* or *dona*.³⁶ *Exactio* is the ordinary name for the *tax* levied to raise Danegeld in France,³⁷ but often it is called *conjectus*³⁸ and sometimes *conlatio*.³⁹ Nothing like the word "Danegeld" ever occurs in the sources that have to do with the Continent.

Turning to England, we find the curious phenomenon that the term "Danegeld" does not appear in any document or narrative account until long after it had lost what may be presumed to have been its original meaning: tribute paid to the Danes. In the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* the tributary Danegeld is almost always called *gafol* (or *gavol*);⁴⁰ and the equivalent in the Latin chronicles and documents is usually *tributum* or *stipendium*.⁴¹ The stipendiary Danegeld is given several different appellations in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, such as *gyld* (and *strang gyld*),⁴² *gafol*,⁴³ *heregyld* (and *heregyld*):⁴⁴ all of which are rendered in Latin usually as *census* or *tributum*.⁴⁵ The "accepted" or "technical" term for the later royal impost is said to have been *geld*, or, in Latin, *geldum regis*.⁴⁶ As far as Freeman⁴⁷ knew, "the single appearance of the word [Danegeld] in Domesday," was the earliest instance of its use. Plummer,⁴⁸ however, has called attention to an earlier occurrence of the term in a charter of

viii, nn. 39, 76, 82; chap. ix, n. 73; appendix i, nn. 2, 3.

32 *Infra*, chap. i, n. 45; chap. iii, nn. 36, 39; chap. v, n. 163.

33 *Infra*, chap. i, n. 45. For the expression, "Dani munerati," see chap. vi, n. 15; chap. x, n. 16.

34 *Infra*, chap. i, n. 45.

35 *Infra*, chap. v, n. 136.

36 *Infra*, chap. iii, n. 54; cf. appendix iv, n. 1.

37 *Infra*, chap. iii, n. 32; chap. vi, n. 114; appendix 1, n. 2. In the tenth century we have the phrase, "exactio pecuniae collaticiae"; see chap. xii, n. 18; chap. xiii, n. 17.

38 *Infra*, chap. v, nn. 62, 136; chap. vi, nn. 44, 74.

39 *Infra*, chap. v, n. 65; cf. *supra*, n. 37. In one place the word *expensis* also seems to refer to such taxes or contributions; see *infra*, chap. i, n. 46.

40 See ed. Plummer, pp. 127, 128, 133, 138, 142. In Wulfstan's *Homilies* (ed. Napier, p. 162) it is referred to as "scandlice nydgyld." Cf. Hodgkin, *op. cit.*, 381, n. 1.

41 See for example Florentius Wigorniensis, *Chronicon ex chronicis*, *Mon. Hist. Britannica*, I, pp. 580, 581, 583, 585, 587; Plummer, *Notes*, p. 89; Kemble, *Codex Diplomaticus Aevi Saxonici*, No. 303.

42 Ed. Plummer, pp. 145, 160, 162.

43 *Ibid.*, pp. 154, 155.

44 *Ibid.*, pp. 161, 173.

45 See for example Henry of Huntingdon, *Historia Anglorum*, IV, *Mon. Hist. Brit.*, I, pp. 757, 758; Florentius Wigorn., *Chron.*, *ibid.*, p. 589.

46 Round, *op. cit.*, p. 86; Plummer, *Notes*, p. 219.

47 *Op. cit.*, II, 615.

48 *Notes*, p. 219.

Edward the Confessor giving exemption "of daenegelde." There it must have been applied to the stipendiary Danegeld. Even so, it will be agreed, our only evidence that "Danegeld" originally meant "tribute paid to the Danes," is the word itself. In the sources of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, documentary as well as narrative, the word is used sometimes to describe the stipends paid the Danes during the first half of the eleventh century, but more often to designate the tax levied for the support of the English government from the time of the Conqueror to that of Henry Plantagenet. The fact is that the word "Danegeld" does not appear in any of the sources that are contemporary with the period in which Danegeld was paid as a *tribute*. In spite of that fact, however, historians have not used the word "Danegeld" exclusively for the stipends and the royal tax. They have also referred to the *tributes* as "Danegeld." The result is that the word Danegeld has acquired three meanings: tribute, stipend, tax.⁴⁹ Whether this is fortunate or unfortunate, it would now be useless to quarrel with what has become settled usage. Furthermore, this usage serves a very useful purpose; it indicates the relationship between one of the regular English taxes of the twelfth century and the original tribute to the Danes.

But can the term "Danegeld" properly be applied to the *Frankish* tribute? Obviously, there is nothing about the word itself which would preclude its being used to designate tribute paid to the Danes elsewhere than in England. On the other hand, it might be misleading to apply a different name to the tribute in each of the various countries in which it was exacted. From what has been said above it is clear that on the Continent and in England tributes were paid under similar circumstances, and with a similar object in view, to the same race of invaders;⁵⁰

49 One might go a step farther and say that in the general sense of a tax, "Danegeld" may mean an impost for any one of three different purposes: (1) to raise tribute; (2) to raise a stipend for mercenaries; and (3) to raise revenue for the state. Hogdkin's view (*op. cit.*, p. 381), that the term Danegeld ought to be used only in the sense of the tax, but not as referring to the payment of the tribute itself, is probably correct in strict theory, but it would be hopeless to attempt to follow it out in practice.

50 It seems hardly necessary for the purposes of the present discussion to enter upon the much debated question as to the relative numbers of Danes, Swedes, and Norwegians, respectively, in the Viking armies that operated in western Europe during the ninth and tenth centuries. Steenstrup's view (*Normannerne*. I, 128-63; II, 319-26), that the leading element and by far the majority of the Vikings in both France and England were Danes, seems

and that these tributes were raised by similar methods. They are examples of what may be regarded as practically the same thing in different places. Why, then, should they not be designated by the same name?⁵¹ I may add that this terminology has already been to some extent sanctioned by usage. Freeman used it over a generation ago;⁵² and it has been followed more than once in recent publications.⁵³

In this dissertation a distinction has been made between *general* and *local* Danegeld. By the first is meant the tribute or stipend that was raised throughout considerable portions of the West Frankish realm by, or with the consent of, the central authority — the king. The object aimed at, though not always attained, by the payment of general Danegeld was either the complete removal from the realm of one or more groups of Vikings or, in the tenth century, the cessation of hostilities on the part of the Normans. Local Danegeld, as the name implies, was paid by the local authorities, to save towns, churches, and monasteries from destruction, or to ransom prisoners from captivity.

The treatment in the following pages of the general Danegeld is intended to be exhaustive. Each payment has been studied in detail with a view to determining (1) the reasons for it, (2) the methods by which it was raised, and (3) the effect it may have produced. Summaries of the causes that led to the payment of Danegeld in France are given, for the reign of Charles the Bald in chapter vii, and for the subsequent period in chapter xiv. The

now to be quite generally accepted even by Norwegian scholars (see *e. g.* Bugge, *Vikingerne*, I, pp. 28–29), though there is still considerable difference of opinion as regards the nationality of individual Viking leaders, for example Rollo. Also, it is practically settled that none of the various Viking expeditions were undertaken exclusively by men of the same nationality; that probably in every expedition all three Scandinavian countries were represented to a greater or lesser extent (*ibid.*; see also Roos, "The Swedish Part in the Viking Expeditions," *English Hist. Review*, 1892, VII, 209–23). On the other hand, the Frankish and English chroniclers in most cases could not, or at least did not, distinguish between Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes. To them, all the Scandinavians were *Nordmanni* or, in England, *Dani*. Cf. Vogel, *Die Normannen und das fränkische Reich*, pp. 20–24.

51 Though Maitland (*op. cit.*, p. 518) refrained from applying the term "Danegeld" to the Frankish tax, he suggested that the latter may have been the model of the English Danegeld. If that is true, it furnishes an additional reason for referring to both taxes by the same name.

52 See for example *op. cit.*, I, p. 176; and "The Early Sieges of Paris," in his *Historical Essays*, First Series, p. 243.

53 See Vogel, p. 255; Thompson, "The Commerce of France in the Ninth Century," *Journal of Political Economy*, 1915, XXIII, pp. 867, 874.

information we have on the methods used to raise the tribute, and on its institutional character, is brought together in chapter xvii. In chapter xviii is presented an estimate of the general effect of the Danegeld on the political and economic development of France. The two chapters on local Danegeld (xv, xvi) are intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive; and what is said in the appendices concerning the Danegeld in Frisia, Lorraine, the East Frankish kingdom, and Brittany, is little more than a brief statement of the established facts in each case. In appendix i, I seek to prove that the Danegeld of 877 was assessed at the Assembly of Kiersy on June 14, 877, and not at Compiègne on May 7 of that year, as heretofore believed; and in appendix ii an attempt has been made to establish the relation of the two tax documents of the year 877 to the famous *Capitulary of Kiersy*.

PART I.

THE DANEGELD DURING THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE BALD (840—877).

CHAPTER I.

THE DANEGELD OF 845.

In March, 845,¹ a Viking fleet of 120 ships,² under the Danish chief Ragnar,³ entered the Seine and began slowly to ascend that river toward Paris. Probably several stops were made on the way, and the surrounding districts with their churches, monasteries, and *villae*, were thoroughly plundered and devastated.⁴ Taken completely by surprise, the population of the invaded regions utterly abandoned every thought of resistance.⁵ Even the military leaders, counts and seigniors, did not so much as

1 *Annales Bertiniani*, 845, ed. Waitz, p. 32: "mense Martio." Cf. *Miracula sancti Germani in Normannorum adventu facta*, c. 2, *M. G. H.*, SS., XV, 10. Aimoin (*Miracula sancti Germani*, I, c. 1, *AA. SS.*, May, VI, 787) must be in error when he places the expedition in 846. All the other sources agree that it was in 845.

2 *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*: "naves centum viginti." *Mirac. s. Germani*, *loc. cit.*: "copiosus exercitus Normannorum . . . cum valido navium apparatu."

3 *Annales Xantenses*, 845, *M. G. H.*, SS., II, 228; *Chronicon Fontanellense*, 845, *ibid.*, p. 302; *Miracula sancti Richarii*, I, c. 11, *ibid.*, XV, 917; *Miracula s. Germani*, c. 20, *ibid.*, p. 14. This may have been the famous Ragnar Lodbrok of the Norse sagas. See Vogel, *Die Normannen und das fränkische Reich*, 105; Steenstrup, *Normannerne*, I, 81, ff.

4 *Mirac. s. Germani*, c. 3, p. 10; *Mirac. s. Richarii*, *loc. cit.*; *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*

5 *Mirac. s. Germani*, *loc. cit.*: "Ubi [i. e. at the mouth and along the lower course of the Seine] non invento populo ut antiquitus moris erat, qui eis bellando resisteret." This seems to be a reference to the coast guard formerly maintained by Charlemagne and to some extent by Louis the Pious, but neglected by Charles the Bald, whose attention during the early years of his reign was fully occupied by other matters. Aimoin, *loc. cit.*: "nemine sibi resistente." Cf. Vogel, 54-57, 61, 71, 80-87, 95, 96. On the coast guard, see also Thompson, "The Commerce of France in the Ninth Century," *Journal of Political Economy*, 1915, XXIII, 860, n. 1.

attempt to make a stand against the enemy.⁶ Seized with unreasoning fear, they prepared only for flight.

The Vikings may have halted long enough in Rouen⁷ to become convinced of the inability of the Franks effectively to oppose them and of their own superiority over the Christians in the matter of military tactics and prowess.⁸ Thus encouraged, the marauders continued and extended their depredations, meanwhile advancing slowly and cautiously in the direction of Paris.⁹ At the news of their approach¹⁰ the population of the city and its environs, laymen and ecclesiastics, fled to safety, taking with them their treasures and the bodies of their saints.¹¹ The king, Charles the Bald, was not at hand, and it was felt that there was no one who might be depended upon to give protection against the invaders.¹² Not until the Northmen had reached a certain place known as Karoli-venna (Charlevanne),¹³ did Charles take

6 *Mirac. s. Germani*, c. 3, pp. 10-11: "Ibique [i. e. at Rouen] similiter non reperto exercitu qui contra eos bella committeret. . . . Omnes enim principes bellatorum qui ipsam incolebant terram . . . magis se ad fugiendum quam resistendum, nimia percursi formidine, preparabant." *Vita Faronis*, c. 122, Bouquet, VII, 357: "nullo resistente." *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*: "nullo penitus obsistente." Aimoin, *loc. cit.*: "regionis Principes . . . ad bellandum pigros timidosque." *Miracula sancti Bertini*, Bouquet, VII, 381: "omnis pene nobilitas istius terrae praeter paucos quos opum ac fundorum copia et castellorum vel munitionum fiducia detinuerat post dominos suos vel quocumque tutius eis videbatur discedebant."

7 Cf. Vogel, 84, 105. A sojourn of at least several days in Rouen is indicated by the author of the *Mirac. s. Germani*, c. 4, p. 11, and by Aimoin, *loc. cit.*; cf. *Chronicon Britannicum*, 846, Bouquet, VII, 221. It is not impossible that the hagiographical writers in describing this and the immediately preceding events have confused them with the events of 841. The same may be said of the *Chron. Britannicum*, the chronology of which is confused.

8 *Mirac. s. Germani*, *loc. cit.*: "Normanni . . . christianum populum ad bellandum pigrum atque inertem fore putantes . . . nemine resistente. . . . Cumque cerneret quoniam pugnando nullus eis resisteret, etc."

9 *Ibid.*: "Parisyus pedetentim propinquare coeperunt."

10 *Ibid.*, c. 5: "Nos vero cum iam certi essemus, missis nostris sepius nuntiantibus, quod nostras devenirent in partes, etc."

11 The bodies of St. Denis and other saints interred in the monastery of St. Denis were exhumed like the rest, but Charles the Bald, when he came up, forbade their translation (*ibid.*, c. 8, p. 12). According to one account (*ibid.*, cc. 5, 7, pp. 11, 12), a goodly part of the wealth of the churches and monasteries was rescued from the hands of the Vikings. Cf. *Mirac. s. Richarii*, *loc. cit.*

12 Charles the Bald was sojourning at Compiègne and St. Quentin just then (Lot and Halphen, *Le règne de Charles le Chauve*, 131 and n. 1). Ebroin, the abbot of St. Germain-des-Prés, at this time was absent from his monastery, having gone to Aquitaine for the purpose of aiding Charles in pacifying that country (*Mirac. s. Germani*, c. 5, p. 11). The population of Paris, especially the ecclesiastics, appears not to have expected help from any quarter under those circumstances and, hence, prepared to seek safety in flight.

13 For the location of Karoli-venna, see Vogel, 105; Lot and Halphen, *op. cit.*, 134, n. 2.

any measures to check their advance, but then, it is alleged, the entire military force of his kingdom was summoned to arms.¹⁴

This resort to what may be termed a *levée en masse* was not altogether successful. A large number of Franks obeyed the royal command, but not all.¹⁵ The fact that part of those summoned failed to come, is to be explained, partly by the suddenness of the Viking raid, which precluded the bringing up of troops from any distance, and partly perhaps by the unwillingness of some Franks to fight against the Northmen.¹⁶ The troops collected by Charles seem, however, to have outnumbered the army of the Vikings, and their military equipment is said to have been better than that of their opponents.¹⁷ Charles himself appears to have been fully determined to engage the enemy, and he is reported to have declared himself willing to risk his life, if need be, in the defense of the church.¹⁸ He divided his army into two

14 *Mirac. s. Germani*, c. 12, p. 12: "Contra quos [Normannos] . . . Karolus adveniēns, iussit, ut omnis exercitus regni sui ad bellandum eductus illuc conflueret." This can hardly be interpreted to mean the military strength of the entire western realm; *regni sui* in this case probably includes only the territories directly subject to Charles, i. e. Francia, Neustria, and Burgundy. Cf. *infra*, n. 47; Lot and Halphen, *op. cit.*, 134, n. 2.

15 *Mirac. s. Germani*, *loc. cit.*: "Multus quidem et innumerabilis populus venit, sed non totus, ut iusserat, affuit." See the following note.

16 *Ibid.*: "copiosum exercitum sed non omnem ad pugnandum voluntarium, etc." Aimoin, *loc. cit.*: "Karolus quia propter subitaneum eorum ascensum ex toto non poterat, convocata aliqua sui exercitus parte, etc."

17 In the *Mirac. s. Germani*, c. 2, p. 10, the army of the Vikings is referred to as "copiosus exercitus Normannorum"; but that group of Vikings which attacked the Frankish division on the south bank of the Seine, is described (*ibid.*, c. 12, p. 12) as "nudos ac pene inermes atque paucissimos homines." Since the Danish fleet numbered 120 ships, and each vessel carried anywhere from forty to seventy men, the army of the Vikings probably consisted of not less than 4,800, nor more than 8,400, men (cf. Vogel, 37-39). For the size of the Frankish army, see the two preceding notes. The author of the *Mirac. s. Germani*, *loc. cit.*, calls one division of the Frankish army "infinite exercitus"—a hyperbole, of course. This writer, *ibid.*, also refers to the military equipment of the Franks: "Christianus populus galeatus et loricatedus, scutorum ac lancearum munimine tectus." The *Vita Faronis*, *loc. cit.*, is somewhat obscure: "Quantum ibi attraxerit hoc regnum populum cum rege Karolo suo nequicquam, terra eum vix sustinente, coelumque sub pelle sua obumbrante, incertum nobis scire miramur numerum." *Chronica Albrici*, *M. G. H.*, 88., XXIII, 734: "occurreret eis [Nortmannis] Karolus rex cum exercitu equitum et peditum." Thus there were knights as well as footsoldiers in the army of Charles. That the Frankish power of defense had been very much weakened by the civil wars which culminated at Fontenay, and that the Danes knew this and intended to make use of the opportunity, is indicated by the *Chronicon Sithense*, Bouquet, VII, 267: "Nortmanni . . . in Franciam veniunt quam sciebant debilitatem per illum bellum cruentissimum inter fratres, etc." Lot and Halphen, *op. cit.*, 134, n. 2, doubt the possibility of collecting an "innumerable people" in so short time, unless indeed this "people" consisted of inexperienced footsoldiers.

18 *Mirac. s. Germani*, c. 12, p. 12: "Karolus . . . qui pro defensione s. Dei ecclesiae mori paratus erat, etc." Aimoin, *loc. cit.*: "[Karolus] erat, uti

divisions, the larger of which was to remain with him to defend the monastery of St. Denis, while the other, and smaller, division was ordered to cross the Seine and hold the south bank of the river. But all those who had been ordered to go across did not obey the command, perhaps by reason of disloyalty to the king.¹⁹

About this time the Danes terrified the Christians by executing a number of captives under their very eyes; and when some of the Vikings a few days later leaped out of their ships to engage that division of the Frankish army which was stationed on the south bank of the river, the Franks fled before them precipitately and in utter confusion, without so much as striking a blow.²⁰

This poor performance of one of his divisions seems to have convinced Charles that the Frankish levies were inferior to the Northmen, and that it would be unwise to risk a further engagement.²¹ He therefore retreated with what remained of his hastily collected army toward the monastery of St. Denis, which he determined to defend and protect at all costs.²²

The Vikings, more confident than ever of their military superiority, hastened on to Paris, before which they anchored on

adolescens, animo armisque strenuus . . . pugnaturus accessit." *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*: "Quibus [Normannis] cum Karolus occurrere moliretur." Vogel's picture, p. 106, of a monarch on his knees before the altar of St. Denis, trembling with fear, etc., seems out of harmony with the statements just quoted. We may also note, in passing, that if Charles made a vow at this time, it was at the suggestion of Hincmar the *priest*, for the latter was not elected archbishop of Rheims until in April. Cf. Lot and Halphen, *op. cit.*, 135 and n. 2, 143; Dümmler, *Geschichte des ostfränkischen Reiches*, second ed., I, 282.

19 *Mirac. s. Germani*, *loc. cit.*: "non omnes quibus iussum fuerat abierunt, non plenam, ut putamus seu credimus, circa eum fidem servantes." Since Aimoin, *loc. cit.*, indicates that the division on the south bank of the Seine was smaller than the other, Dümmler's statement (*op. cit.*, I, 282), that Charles divided his army into two halves, is not quite accurate; at least they were not equal halves. *Vita Faronis*, *loc. cit.*: "Cumque non tantam audaciam in pectore concepissent Franci, ut utraque partes fluminis bello obediassent, etc."

20 *Mirac. s. Germani*, *loc. cit.* According to Aimoin, *loc. cit.*, the attack of the Danes preceded the execution of the captives. Cf. Lot and Halphen, *op. cit.*, 135, n. 4; Vogel, 107.

21 *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*: "Karolus . . . praevalere suos nullatenus posse prospiceret."

22 *Mirac. s. Germani*, *loc. cit.*: "Karolus . . . cernens quod gestum erat, qui pro defensione s. Dei ecclesiae mori paratus erat, tristis et merens ac delicata pectora tundens recessit." *Chronica Albrici*, *loc. cit.*: "Karolus cum exercitu . . . non potuerunt prohibere eos, quin Parisius . . . intrarent . . . et Karolus apud monasterium s. Dionysii resedit." Aimoin says, I, c. 1, p. 788, that when the people were slipping away from him, Charles decided to defend St. Denis because he had been specially commended by his father to this saint. Cf. Lot and Halphen, *op. cit.*, 135, n. 3, 136, n. 1.

Saturday, March 28, 845.²³ The next morning, which happened to be Easter, they entered and occupied the now deserted city together with the neighboring monastery of St. Germain-des-Prés on the south bank of the Seine.²⁴

Having reached their goal,²⁵ the Danes soon gave evidence of a willingness to come to terms with the Franks. They dispatched envoys to Charles the Bald at St. Denis, offering to quit Paris and the kingdom of Charles in return for the payment of tribute.²⁶

The reasons for this policy on the part of the Danes are not far to seek. Their object at this time was to secure plunder

23 *Mirac. s. Germani*, c. 14, p. 13: "[Normanni] cursu prepropero sabbato sancto paschalis solemnitatis Parisius venerunt." *Chron. Fontanellense*, loc. cit.: "Ragneri . . . cum classe sua . . . usque Parisiis accessit, ac in vigilia s. paschae, i. e. 5. Kalend. Aprilis, eandem urbem intravit." *Ann. Bert.*, loc. cit.: "Loticiam Parisiorum, nullo penitus obsistente, pervadunt." Cf. *Annales Fuldenses*, 845, ed. Kurze, p. 35; *Chronicon Sigeberti*, Bouquet, VII, 249.

24 Just how long the Vikings remained in Paris cannot be accurately determined; according to the *Mirac. s. Germani*, c. 20, p. 14, it was only a short time—"paucis diebus." The various miraculous events which they are said to have experienced during their sojourn in the monastery of St. Germain-des-Prés, and elsewhere, need not be described or discussed here. They are related in full by the author of the *Mirac. s. Germani*, loc. cit., pp. 13-16.

25 Cf. Lot and Halphen, *op cit.*, 133, 134, n. 1.

26 *Mirac. s. Germani*, c. 20, p. 14: "[Normanni] legationis causa missos suos ad regem . . . dirigunt Karolum, ut eos cum pace et absque internectione sui ad propriam unde venerant redire permitteret patriam." Aimoin, 1, c. 10, p. 789: "Interea simulato languore, [Normanni] legationis causa dirigunt ad . . . Karolum, ut eos cum pace fideles suscipiens, ad propriam dato Regni tributo redire permitteret patriam." Vogel, 110, n. 3, claims that in the passages just quoted the hagiographical writers wilfully misrepresented the true course of events in the interests of their patron saint, to whose intervention they wished to ascribe the deliverance of the realm from further devastation. He insists that "nicht von den Normannen, sondern von Karl ging das Anerbieten zu Verhandlungen aus," and bases his opinion on the statements in the *Annales Bertiniani*, the *Annales Xantenses*, the *Vita s. Faronis*, and the *Chronica Albrici*. I shall quote here the pertinent passages in these sources in the order indicated. "Karolus . . . praevalere suos nullatenus posse prospiceret, quibusdam pactionibus et munere septem milium librarum eis exhibito, a progrediendo conspescuit ac redire persuasit."—"Alia pars eorum Normannorum Galliam petierunt, ibique ceciderunt ex eis plus quam sexcenti viri. Sed tamen propter desidium Karoli dedit eis multa milia ponderum auri et argenti ut irent extra Galliam; quod et fecerunt."—"Cumque non tantam audaciam in pectore concepissent Franci, ut utrasque partes fluminis bello obsedissent, consilium inierunt ad ruinam et ad interitum per omnia labentia saecula, dato tributo copiosissimo terrae."—"dederunt rex Karolus et populus Normannis pecuniam multam, et reversi sunt in terram suam."—So far as I can see, the last three of these statements throw no light whatever on the question as to who first suggested the payment of tribute. The words "a progrediendo conspescuit ac redire persuasit," in the *Annales Bertiniani*, at first sight do give the impression that Charles the Bald took the initiative. But it must

rather than to conquer territory.²⁷ But in point of fact Paris had not proved as fruitful a field of plunder as the Vikings had anticipated. The inhabitants of the city and its environs, particularly the ecclesiastics, had been forewarned of the impending danger, and had been able to remove to places of safety at least a very large part of their money and valuables before the arrival of the Northmen.²⁸ It is clear, that the latter were not satisfied with the amount of booty thus far secured, and that they were determined to have more if that were possible.²⁹ To attempt plundering operations in the vicinity of Paris was not advisable, owing to the presence of the king's army at the monastery of

be remembered that they are a very compressed form of statement, and as such they really do not contradict the much more detailed accounts of the hagiographical writers. It is certainly true that Charles by *accepting* the terms of the Northmen did restrain the latter from advancing and did persuade them to return, even if the Northmen had taken the first step on the path of negotiation. As will be pointed out in the text, it is not probable that the Vikings really intended to make any further advance; but, of course, they did not reveal their actual plans to the Franks. They simply exploited the existing situation to the full. Vogel is doubtless right when he says that the hagiographical accounts were written for the express purpose of glorifying the miraculous powers of St. Germain. But it does not necessarily follow that the writers of those accounts have given a totally false presentation of the course of events. They may have mistaken or falsified the *motives* of the Northmen—and this may explain why the first author of the *Miracula* failed to mention the tribute—while giving a substantially correct and truthful account of their acts. It probably was more or less of a mystery to the Franks, why the Vikings had not continued farther up the Seine, why they had changed their plans so soon and offered to retire in return for the payment of tribute. Cf. *Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit.*: "quatinus a finibus christianorum tam cito discedere vellent [Normanni]." The hagiographical writer himself admits that he was not aware of what he regards as the real reason for the changed policy of the Vikings (the pestilence, etc., sent by St. Germain) until it was revealed to him more than four years after the event by Count Cobbo. Only with the aid of Cobbo's story was he able to clear up the mystery as to the motives of the Vikings and to exalt the powers of his patron saint. There is, then, in the opinion of the present writer, no sufficient reason for rejecting the hagiographical account of the course of events, the details of which are, not contradicted, but passed over in silence by all the other sources. Cf. Lot and Halphen, *op. cit.*, 138, whose view is similar to that of Vogel. The latter's faith in the accuracy of the *Annales Bertiniani*, by the way, is not unswerving; see *infra*, chap. ii, n. 11.

²⁷ It was not until after the middle of the ninth century that the Vikings began to establish themselves in fortified camps, where they sojourned at first only during the summer, but later throughout the winter also. Cf. Vogel, 38, 39, 127, 260, 261. The fact that the Vikings on this occasion were willing to depart on the payment of tribute proves, of course, that they had no territorial ambitions as yet; or, in any case, that their principal object was the acquisition of money and treasure. After the Vikings under Oscar had sacked Rouen, in 841, and had secured the desired amount of booty, they put to sea in order to avoid an encounter with the Frankish levies moving against them. Cf. Vogel, 83-85.

²⁸ See *supra*, n. 11.

²⁹ *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*: "a progrediendo compeescuit."

St. Denis.³⁰ They might, indeed, have ascended to some other point on the Seine and continued operations from there; but at best this would have been a perilous adventure with an undefeated Frankish army left in the rear.³¹ Neither of these courses would be necessary, if instead the Franks could be induced to pay tribute. Accordingly, the Vikings chose what they must have regarded as the wiser policy.

It is not unlikely that the demand for tribute had been accompanied by a threat to proceed farther inland in case of refusal.³² What the Vikings would have done if their demand had been refused, remains problematical. It is improbable that they had any serious intention of carrying out their threat, for that would have permitted the Franks in the meantime to bring up reënforcements and to take various measures to cut off the retreat of the Vikings.³³ However that may be, it is certain that the threat of Ragnar and his associates was effective, and that their offer was accepted by the Franks.

These considerations seem a sufficient explanation of the policy adopted by the Northmen, even though they are not mentioned as such by the contemporary writers. According to the hagiographical account, a mortal disease, to which the Vikings fell prey while they were sojourning in Paris, and which seriously depleted their ranks, was the real reason why they entered into

30 See *supra*, n. 22. When plundering operations were to be undertaken, the Vikings would scatter in all directions and leave only a small guard at their ships (Vogel, 38, 39). This, of course, could not be done with a hostile army in the vicinity, which, while the Vikings were absent from their ships, might have seized or destroyed the latter, thereby cutting off the possibility of retreat.

31 Vogel admits, p. 105, that even the ascent to Karoli-venna was a daring exploit fraught with many dangers. Yet up to that time there had been no resistance whatever.

32 Cf. *supra*, n. 29.

33 In my opinion, no small part of the success of the Vikings on this occasion must be ascribed to their capacity for bluffing the Franks, who doubtless believed that the freebooters would have ascended farther up the Seine to plunder and devastate, if their offer had been refused. It would have been practically impossible for the Franks to prevent them from so doing. The real strength of the Vikings lay in their superior mobility. In their ships they could easily outdistance their pursuers, especially if, as has been asserted, the majority of the latter were footsoldiers (Lot and Halphen, *op. cit.*, 134, n. 2). It is true, as pointed out above in the text, that the Franks might have opposed the Vikings on their return—they might conceivably have been able to cut off their retreat—but in the meantime other places would have been plundered or destroyed. The latter consideration must have been one of the chief reasons why the Franks accepted the offer of the Vikings; it was better to pay tribute than to expose the country to the possibility of further devastation.

negotiations with Charles the Bald.³⁴ If there is any element of truth in this story, all that can be said of it is that it gives a supplemental reason for the offer of the Northmen. There can be little doubt that the Vikings would have acted as they did, even if their ranks had not been thinned by the ravages of a disease.³⁵

Charles the Bald, though at first unwilling, was finally induced by certain of his magnates to accept the offer of the Northmen. The magnates in question are accused of having accepted bribes, which may or may not be true.³⁶ In any case, the magnates probably were not anxious to engage in battle with the Vikings after what they had already seen of the outcome of such warfare.³⁷ It is generally admitted that the West Frankish nobles and seigniors of this period were narrow, selfish, and unpatriotic.³⁸ To them, the payment of tribute must have seemed the most convenient method of securing the removal of the Vikings. The magnates well knew that if the king, in order to raise the tribute, should find it necessary to resort to taxation, it would be easy for them to evade the impost by shifting its burden on the peasantry.³⁹

³⁴ *Mirac. s. Germani*, cc. 19, 20, p. 14.

³⁵ These words of Aimoin, I, c. 10, p. 789, help to explain the "contradiction" referred to by Vogel (p. 110, n. 3): "Interea *simulato* languore, legationis causa dirigunt ad . . . Karolum, etc." The Vikings were past masters in the art of deception. Cf. Steenstrup, *Normannerne*, I, 22-28, 366-67; Vogel, 175-77.

³⁶ Aimoin, *loc. cit.*: "Rege quidem nolente, Principibus tamen quibusdam (ut fatebatur) muneribus laesis, etc." *Vita Faronis*, *loc. cit.*: "Cumque non tantam audaciam in pectore concepissent Franci, ut utrasque partes fluminis bello obsedissent, consilium inierunt ad ruinam et ad interitum per omnia labentia saecula, dato tributo copiosissimo terrae." Vogel, 110, n. 3, seems to believe that it was Charles, and Charles only, who wished to pay tribute, and that the magnates exercised no influence on him at all in this matter. He asserts, but of course cannot prove, that the story of the bribing of the magnates was invented by Aimoin solely for the purpose of white-washing Charles. The author of the *Vita Faronis*, however, does not agree with Vogel. A few lines before the passage quoted above, he says: "terra eum [Karolum] vix sustinente"; and, according to the same writer, it was the *Franci*—which certainly does not mean only the king—who chose the disastrous policy of paying tribute. Lot and Halphen, *op. cit.*, 138, n. 3, accept with some modifications the statement of Aimoin.

³⁷ See *supra*, nn. 6 and 16. Ragnar is reported to have described the Franks to King Horich of Denmark in the following manner (*Mirac. s. Germani*, c. 30, p. 16): "populum . . . plus omnibus aliis ad dimicandum tremmentem ac pavidum."

³⁸ Cf. Dümmler, I, 213-15, 221-23; Vogel, 82-83, 90-91, 95-97; *supra*, nn. 6, 8, 19.

³⁹ According to Sée (*Les classes rurales et le régime domanial en France au moyen âge*, 92, 116) and Flach (*Les origines de l'ancienne France*, I, 341-43), the burden of taxation in this period always fell ultimately on the lower classes of the population, i. e. poor freemen, *coloni*, and serfs.

As for Charles the Bald, he probably came to realize that the army which had been collected, nobles and freemen alike, was not to be depended upon and that, in any case, it was not large enough to inflict a decisive defeat on the Danes.⁴⁰ And even if it had been possible, there would have been no time to collect and bring up more troops; for in the meantime the Vikings might have proceeded to plunder and devastate other places farther up the Seine and its tributaries.⁴¹ On the whole, therefore, it was safer and more prudent to agree to the payment of tribute than to expose the country to further devastation or to build any hopes on the very doubtful issue of an engagement with the doughty Vikings.⁴²

A preliminary understanding having been reached and the tribute agreed upon in principle, Ragnar and the other Viking chiefs were conducted to the headquarters of Charles the Bald in the monastery of St. Denis,⁴³ where a formal and definitive treaty was concluded.

According to the terms of this treaty, the Northmen agreed to evacuate the kingdom of Charles and never to enter it again, unless perchance as friends and allies;⁴⁴ in return for which Charles agreed (1) to allow the Vikings to depart in peace, i. e. without molesting them in any way on the return journey, and (2) to pay them as tribute the sum of 7,000 pounds in silver

40 Vogel's statement, p. 110, "König Karls Heer hatte sich inzwischen noch bedeutend verstärkt" is purely gratuitous and contrary to the facts as indicated by the sources. Aimoin, I, c. 1, p. 788, claims that the people were slipping away from Charles: "populo . . . a se labente." That part of Charles's army which was to have defended the south bank of the Seine had been routed and scattered, and it is very unlikely that this loss had been compensated for by the arrival of reinforcements. There is certainly nothing which proves their arrival. Just how large the Viking army was cannot be accurately determined, but it probably numbered not less than 4,800 men (cf. *supra*, n. 17). The statement in the *Annales Xantenses*, *loc. cit.*, that more than 600 Vikings fell at this time, is not corroborated by any other source, and, like several other statements in these annals, is at least inaccurate. The writer's information on the events in the West Frankish kingdom was probably scant and of the hearsay variety. This also explains why he attributes the payment of the tribute to Charles's "sloth."

41 That Charles did not have sufficient time to collect an army equal to the occasion, is asserted by Aimoin; see *supra*, n. 16.

42 According to the *Annales Bertiniani*, Charles perceived that his men would not be able to prevail over the Northmen; see *supra*, n. 26.

43 *Miracula s. Germani*, c. 20, pp. 14-15; Aimoin, I, c. 10, p. 789.

44 Aimoin, *loc. cit.*: "nequaquam ulterius vel fines sui regni, nisi fortasse auxiliatores, intrarent aut contingerent." Cf. the similar statement in the *Mirac. s. Germani*, c. 20, p. 14. *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*: "Karolus [Normannos] . . . a progrediendo compescuit ac redire persuasit." *Ann. Xantenses*, *loc. cit.*: "ut irent [Normanni] extra Galliam."

(and gold?).⁴⁵ Nothing being stipulated as regards the booty already in the possession of the Vikings, it follows that they were permitted to keep that.

The evidence as to how this first Danegeld in the West Frankish kingdom was raised is very incomplete. There are, however, strong indications that it was obtained by means of a general tax⁴⁶ levied especially in Francia, which was the invaded region, and probably also in Neustria and Burgundy.⁴⁷ The mag-nates, or perhaps the *missi*, appear to have collected sums of

45 Aimoin, *loc. cit.*: "ut Karolus eos [Normannos] cum pace fideles suscipiens, ad propriam dato Regni tributo redire permetteret patriam." *Mirac. s. Germani, loc. cit.*: "si [Karolus] eos [Normannos] inlesos abire permetteret, etc." The *Miracula* does not mention the tribute. *Ann. Bert., loc. cit.*: "quibusdam pactionibus, et munere septem millium librarum eis [Normannis] exhibito." *Ann. Fuldenses, loc. cit.*: "[Normanni] tam ab ipso [Karolo] quam incolis terrae accepta pecunia copiosa cum pace discesserunt." Cf. *Annales Mettenses*, 845, Duchesne, *H. F. S.*, III, 302. *Ann. Xantenses, loc. cit.*: "[Karolus] dedit eis [Normannis] multa milia ponderum auri et argenti." *Chronica Albrici, loc. cit.*: "pecuniam multam." Paschasius Radbertus, *Lamentationes Ieremiae*, Migne, *Patr. Lat.* CXX, col. 1220: "censum plurimum." *Chronicon Hermanni contracti*, Bouquet, VII, 233: "accepta magna pro pace pecunia." Cf. *infra*, n. 55.

46 Cf. Vogel, 111; Wenck, *Das fränkische Reich nach dem Vertrage von Verdun*, 124, n. 2. That the Danegeld was raised by means of a general tax seems likely for the following reasons: (1) the Vikings appear not to have left the Seine until late in June or early in July (see *infra*, n. 53); (2) the *Annales Fuldenses* and the *Annales Mettenses* say, "tam ab ipso [Karolo] quam incolis terrae accepta pecunia copiosa," while the *Chronica Albrici* has, "dederunt rex et populus Normannis pecuniam multam"—which indicates that the Danegeld was contributed at least in part by the people; (3) Loup of Ferrières, in a letter to Hincmar of Rheims written shortly after the levy of the Danegeld, speaks of "his expensis quae maiores nostri congregaverunt" (see *infra*, n. 48); (4) after his return to Denmark, Ragnar is said to have boasted that he had laid the entire kingdom of Charles under tribute (see *infra*, n. 55); (5) Paschasius Radbertus (see the preceding note) speaks of "censum plurimum."

47 At least that would seem to follow, if the entire kingdom of Charles was subjected to tribute (cf. the alleged boast of Ragnar referred to in the preceding note). Aquitaine and Brittany of course escaped the Danegeld altogether, for Charles the Bald had not been able effectively to assert his authority in either of those countries (see Lot and Halphen, *op. cit.*, 72 ff., 84 ff., 112 ff., 126, 130, 149 ff.; and cf. Dümmler, I, 244 ff., 248). In fact he was forced to recognize the independence of Pippin the Younger in Aquitaine in June or July, 845 (Lot and Halphen, 149 ff.; Dümmler, I, 288 ff.) and that of Nominoë in Brittany in the summer of 846 (Lot and Halphen, 166-67; Dümmler, I, 297 f.). The rebel Lambert, who had allied himself with Nominoë, might well have prevented the collection of any royal tax in the counties (*pagi*) of Anjou, Maine, and Nantes (Lot and Halphen, 75 ff., 117 ff.; Dümmler, I, 244, 247, 289). In Septimania (Gothia) and the Spanish March the authority of Charles the Bald had been at least in part restored during the spring of 844 (Lot and Halphen, 97 ff., 120, n. 1; Dümmler, I, 246); but owing to their remoteness from the invaded portion of the realm and also to the inadvisability of immediately burdening them with taxes, it seems very doubtful that any Danegeld was collected there. We may assume that Francia had to furnish the major portion of the tribute, since it was

money from the great landholders,⁴⁸ who probably obtained these sums by levying extraordinary taxes on the peasants and others subjected to their authority.⁴⁹ Did the king demand from each landholder a specific sum proportionate to the number and value of his holdings? Such at least was the plan according to which many later Danegelds were raised,⁵⁰ and, lacking evidence, we may conjecture that a similar plan was used on this occasion. We know that merchants and priests were taxed for some of the later Danegelds,⁵¹ and that at certain times even the treasuries of the churches had to be emptied in order to raise the sums demanded.⁵² Were any such measures necessary in 845? That, too, must be left to conjecture.

To determine accurately the length of time required to raise this tribute is out of the question. Since in all probability the Danegeld was not paid before June — it may have been paid much later — we may assume that two months or more elapsed before the entire yield of the tax was in the hands of the royal officials.⁵³

the invaded district; and it is probable that the neighboring parts of Neustria and Burgundy also were taxed, for the royal authority was maintained in those regions by the itinerant *missi*. (Note the following in a document of Charles the Bald for the year 845: "missis nostris per universon imperium nostrum discurrentibus."—Bouquet, VIII, 482. Loup of Ferrières tells us that he was a *missus* in Burgundy in the year 844. Cf. Levillain, "Étude sur les lettres de Loup de Ferrières," *Bibl. de l'école des chartes*, LXIII, 75-78, 116-17; Thompson, *Decline of the Missi Dominici in Frankish Gaul*, 8-9). Eastern Neustria certainly contributed, as is evident from the testimony of Loup, who was abbot of the monastery of Ferrières in the extreme eastern part of Neustria (see the following note).

⁴⁸ Loup of Ferrières, *Epistolae*, XLII, ed. Desdèvises du Désert, p. 116: "hoc turbulente Reipublicae tempore, his expensis quae maiores nostri congregaverunt." This seems to be a reference to the Danegeld. Desdèvises du Désert dates this letter for the beginning of the year 846, but Levillain, *op. cit.*, p. 88, has demonstrated that it was written late in August, or in September, 845.

⁴⁹ This method of raising taxes and other contributions was very common at the time (see *supra*, n. 39); and there can be little doubt that the Danegeld, too, was obtained in this way. Cf. *infra*, pp. 81 ff.

⁵⁰ See *infra*, chap. xvii.

⁵¹ See *ibid.*

⁵² See *ibid.*

⁵³ In the *Ann. Bertiniani*, 845, pp. 32, 33, the departure of the Vikings from the Seine is not mentioned directly after the negotiation of the treaty providing for the payment of tribute. Between the description of these two events Prudentius refers among other things to the treaty by which Charles the Bald recognized Pippin the Younger as the almost independent ruler of Aquitaine. Accordingly we may believe—for there is no reason to suppose that Prudentius here departed from his habit of rough adherence to chronological sequence—that the Vikings did not quit the Seine until after Charles had concluded the treaty with Pippin, which event took place late in June or early in July (Lot and Halphen, *op. cit.*, 149 and n. 3; cf. Dümmler, I,

Having received the tribute money, the Vikings in truth sailed out of the Seine, but they could not resist the temptation to plunder and devastate a number of places on the seacoast.⁵⁴ After various adventures and experiences they eventually returned to Denmark with their booty. The hagiographical account represents Ragnar proceeding to King Horich, to show him the vast amount of gold and silver he had brought with him, and to boast not only that he had captured the wealthy city of Paris but also that he had subjected the entire kingdom of Charles to tribute.⁵⁵

What happened to Ragnar and his associates later, is largely a matter of speculation and need not detain us long. It may be true that this particular group of Vikings fell prey to a mortal disease of some kind, which prevented any of them from ever enjoying the fruits of their expedition.⁵⁶ But what of that? The success of their bold enterprise probably interested their country-

289). Even after allowance has been made for a possible interval of several weeks between the payment of the Danegeld and the final departure of the Vikings, the date of the payment can hardly be placed prior to the beginning of June. That the total proceeds of a tax levied in March (cf. *supra*, nn. 23, 24) could have become available before June, i. e. in less than two months, does not seem probable (cf. Lot and Halphen, 139, n. 1).

54 Whether these operations really constituted a violation of the treaty just concluded, cannot be determined, for we do not know the exact location of the devastated region. If it was outside the West Frankish realm, the Northmen were of course not guilty of any breach of faith. *Ann. Bert.*, 845, p. 33. Cf. Vogel, 111 and n. 3; Levillain, *op. cit.*, pp. 90 ff.; Lot and Halphen, *op. cit.*, 139, n. 1.

55 Aimoin, I, c. 12, p. 789: "Ragenarius Dux, . . . ante profanum Horich Nortmannorum Principem cum ingenti superbia veniens, ostendit ei quod secum hinc asportaverat aurum argentumque multum: dixitque quod opinatissimam Parisius civitatem captam haberet; . . . insuper et quod omne Karoli Regnum sibi ratione tributis subjugatum haberet." The *Mirac. s. Germani* agree substantially with Aimoin, except that they do not mention the tribute. The *Ann. Bertiniani*, *loc. cit.*, tell of a misfortune which befell the Vikings on their return journey and of its influence on King Horich of Denmark; cf. *Ann. Xantenses*, *loc. cit.* *Chronica Albrici*, *loc. cit.*: "[Normanni] reversi sunt in terram suam."

56 According to the *Mirac. s. Germani*, c. 31, p. 16, those Vikings who finally got back to Denmark either died of disease or were executed by King Horich, who thereby hoped to prevent the pestilence from spreading. Four Vikings were said to have escaped the king, but it was believed that they too died very soon. Cf. Aimoin, *loc. cit.*; Vogel, 112; Steenstrup, *op. cit.*, I, 97-104. The *Ann. Bertiniani*, *loc. cit.*, tell us that King Horich, after he had learned of what was regarded as the judgment of God on the followers of Ragnar, sent envoys to Louis the German, offering to free all Christian captives and to restore the stolen treasure so far as possible. His envoys did in fact appear at the court of Louis the German in October (*Ann. Fuldenses*, *loc. cit.*) and he may have freed the captives (*Ann. Xantenses*, *loc. cit.*; *Mirac. s. Germani*, c. 30, p. 16; Aimoin, I, c. 13, p. 790), but whether he ever returned the treasure is not known. If any treasure actually was returned, it very probably was the booty obtained by Horich's own men in the sack of Hamburg this same year, and not that which was brought to Denmark by Ragnar. Cf. Vogel, 100-2, 114-15.

men vastly more than the mystery of their death. For these pioneers had made a veritable discovery,⁵⁷ a discovery full of fascination for the Viking spirit and pregnant with dire consequences for the fortunes of the Franks.

Charles the Bald's policy of paying tribute was to prove hardly a palliative, much less a cure, for the malady with which the West Frankish kingdom had become afflicted. In point of fact, this first Danegeld had revealed to the freebooters of the North certain very important facts concerning the western realm of the Franks: prosperous economic conditions, lack of preparedness against invaders coming by sea, and inability or reluctance to fight on the part of the aristocracy — on the whole, a most satisfactory state of affairs from the Viking point of view. The first Danegeld, therefore, did not deter other Vikings from adopting the methods and continuing the operations of Ragnar's men; on the contrary, it encouraged and invited them to emulate their example.⁵⁸

57 It is true that the Vikings had, before this, been levying tribute in Frisia (see *infra*, Appendix III), but the Frisian payments were of a local character and probably were small as compared with those secured in the West Frankish kingdom. It was the West Frankish kingdom and England that were destined henceforth chiefly to attract the Vikings.

58 The following in the *Vita Faronis*, *loc. cit.*, is significant: "Franci . . . consilium inierunt ad ruinam et ad interitum per omnia labentia saecula, dato tributo copiosissimo terrae." Paschasius Radbertus, *loc. cit.*, also appears to have realized that the Danegeld never would bring security against Viking raids.

CHAPTER II.

THE DANEGELD OF 853.

After his first payment of tribute, in 845, Charles the Bald did not again resort to the Danegeld until 853.¹ While there can be little doubt that Danegeld was actually paid in the latter year, it must be admitted that our information concerning the payment and the circumstances that made it necessary is very scant.

On October 9, 852, a large fleet of Danish Vikings, led by the two chieftains Sydroc and Godfrey, son of Harold, entered the Seine and ascended that river beyond Rouen as far as Augustudunas.² Though an army made up exclusively of West Franks had succeeded in expelling another group of Vikings from their lodgment on the lower Seine earlier in the same year,³ Charles the Bald did not deem it advisable to move against the undoubtedly larger force under Sydroc and Godfrey⁴ without some auxiliaries. He therefore appealed for aid to his elder brother, Lothaire I, with whom he happened to be at this time on a friendly footing.⁵

Having mobilized their available fighting strength,⁶ the royal brothers advanced with their armies toward Jeufosse, to which place the Northmen had in the meantime ascended, and where they had established themselves for the winter.⁷ The Franks

1 Favre (*Eudes, comte de Paris et roi de France*, p. 223) inaccurately states that the Danes were bought off in 852. The following discussion will make clear that the Danegeld was paid in 853.

2 *Ann. Bertiniani*, 852, ed. Waitz, p. 42 and note g); *Chron. Fontanellense* 852, *M.G.H.*, *SS.*, II, 304; cf. *Ann. Fuldenses*, 850, ed. Kurze, pp. 39-40. For the location of Augustudunas, see Vogel, 134, n. 3.

3 *Chron. Fontanellense*, 851, p. 303; *Ann. Bert.*, 851, p. 41. Cf. Vogel, 133.

4 The *Ann. Bert.*, 852, do not mention Sydroc, but refer, p. 42, to the forces collected by Godfrey in Denmark as "manus valida," and to his fleet as "multitudo navium." The size of the contingent under Oscar, which the Franks had expelled in June, 852, is nowhere indicated; but since a West Frankish army ventured to engage these Vikings and forced their withdrawal from the Seine, it is safe to conclude that their number was small compared with that of the followers of Godfrey and Sydroc.

5 *Ann. Fuld.*, 850, p. 40: "Ad quorum [Nordmannorum] expulsionem Hlutharius in auxilium vocatus." *Ann. Bert.*, 852, p. 42; *Chron. Fontanellense*, 852, p. 304. Cf. Dümmler, I, 347-49; Vogel, 134.

6 *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*: "occurrentibus Lothario et Karolo cum omni suo exercitu."

7 *Chron. Fontanellense*, *loc. cit.*: "Nortmanni aqua freti deputatam sibi hilemem exegerunt in loco qui vocatur Ghivoldi fossa." For the location of the latter place (Jeufosse), see Vogel, 135, n. 1.

invested both banks of the Seine at this point,⁸ but they probably did not succeed in completely isolating the Northmen.⁹ However that may be, it is certain that the siege was continued through the winter into the next year (853), and that an attack by storm was eventually proposed. But this plan proved incapable of execution, because the army of Charles the Bald for some reason refused to fight.¹⁰ Charles therefore opened negotiations with Godfrey and was able to conciliate him by making certain concessions the nature of which is not entirely clear.¹¹ After this pact had been made it appears that Godfrey and his men retired from Jeufosse.¹²

The treaty with Godfrey did not, however, secure the withdrawal of Sydroc and the other Danes. Rather it made them more troublesome; they now began to pillage, burn, and make captives, without restraint. It was not until early in March that the Vikings were induced to desist from these operations.¹³ The inducement appears to have come in the form of an agreement

⁸ *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*: "utramque ripam . . . obsident." Cf. the preceding note.

⁹ That seems to be implied in the words of the *Chron. Fontanellense* quoted in note 7, *supra*. Certainly the Vikings could not have remained in Jeufosse throughout the winter unless in the meantime they had been able to secure provisions. The statement, *infra*, n. 12, that they pillaged more freely after the departure of Godfrey, implies that the Franks had not been able wholly to prevent them from pillaging in the preceding period.

¹⁰ *Ann. Fuld.*, *loc. cit.*: "Hlutharius . . . cum sibi pugnandum esse cum hoste putaret." *Ann. Bert.*, 853, p. 42: "nolentibus qui ex parte Karoli erant inire bellum."

¹¹ *Ibid.*: "Karolus . . . Godefridum quibusdam pactionibus sibi conciliat." *Ann. Fuld.*, *loc. cit.*: "Karolus clam mutato consilio Godafridum cum suis in societatem regni suscepit et terram eis ad inhabitandum delegavit." Vogel, p. 135, is inclined to accept the testimony of the *Annals of Fulda* in this case despite the erroneous chronology of those annals; he believes that Prudentius, by reason of a desire to shield Charles the Bald, did not tell the whole truth in the *Annals of St. Bertin*. This view, it must be admitted, is certainly tenable; but Vogel's distrust of the statements of Prudentius in this case, does not harmonize with his great faith in the accuracy of what that writer said for the year 845 on a similar subject (see *supra*, chap. i, n. 26). Why should Prudentius have withheld in 853 the kind of information which he did not hesitate to divulge in 845? Is it not possible that what he says for 853, instead of being intentionally "verblümt," is simply a concentrated form of expression and in that respect very similar to his entry for 845? Vogel thinks also that the Danegeld of this year (853) was paid to Godfrey; for a discussion of this question, see *infra*, n. 24.

¹² That Godfrey and his men left before the other Vikings, is clearly implied in the following statement (*Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*): "Ceteri Danorum usque ad mensem Martium inibi absque ulla formidine residentes, cuncta eo furiosius quo liberius diripiunt, cremant atque captivant."

¹³ See the preceding note. Since Charles the Bald signed a diploma at Kiersy on March 21 (Bouquet, VIII, 522), it seems probable that he had come to an agreement with the Danes earlier in the month.

by Charles the Bald to pay tribute. That monarch had for the second time found it necessary to resort to the Danegeld because his men were not willing to risk a determined onslaught against the Vikings.¹⁴

This reluctance to fight on the part of the West Franks, seems very strange, especially when contrasted with the apparent willingness of Lothaire's men to engage the enemy.¹⁵ Were the West Franks lacking in courage? It is difficult to convince oneself of that, in view of the fact that they had attacked and routed a group of Vikings in the spring of the previous year (852).¹⁶ Were the Danes so superior in numbers that it was hopeless to engage them? That may, indeed, have been the case sometimes,¹⁷ but seems improbable in 852—853, when they were confronted by *two* Frankish armies, that of Lothaire as well as that of Charles.

The most satisfactory solution of this rather knotty problem will probably have to be sought in connection with the relations existing between Charles the Bald and his magnates. It was upon the latter that Charles really had to depend, if he was to have an army at all. The resisting part of the West Frankish army at this time consisted, not of the freemen fighting on foot, but of contingents of mounted knights, each under the leadership of some magnate or seignior.¹⁸ If, therefore, the army of Charles the Bald refused to enter into conflict with the Danes,

14 See *infra*, n. 24; cf. *supra*, chap. i, nn. 19, 22.

15 Cf. *supra*, n. 10.

16 Cf. *supra*, n. 3. Of course, it cannot be denied that when taken by surprise or outnumbered, the Franks usually fled before the Vikings; but since the Vikings ordinarily did likewise under similar circumstances, that really proves nothing. What we wish to know is why the Franks refused to fight when that would apparently have been the wiser thing to do. In the winter of 852-53 the Frankish armies had come to Jeufosse for the purpose of fighting; Lothaire and his men never thought of anything else, if we may believe the *Annals of Fulda*, 850, p. 40. It seems anomalous to think that the West Franks refused to fight, simply because they were more cowardly than their neighbors.

17 On many occasions the success of the Vikings was largely due to their superior mobility, which enabled them to reach their destination before a Frankish army could be summoned to oppose them, nay before anyone knew of their approach. See Vogel, 43 and n. 3; cf. *infra*, chap. vii.

18 Baldamus, *Das Heerwesen unter den späteren Karolingern*, in Gierke's *Untersuchungen zur deutschen Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte*, IV, pp. 17 ff., 60 ff., and *passim*; Roth, *Geschichte des Beneficialwesens*, pp. 415-16. Vogel, p. 13, calls attention to the fact that the most energetic and successful resistance to the Vikings was made by the people of those regions where the system of commendation and vassalage was least developed, i. e. by the Frisians and the Saxons.

we understand that this was due to objections raised probably not so much by the ordinary freemen as by the magnates and seigniors. And since it is improbable that the Franks were either cowardly or outnumbered on this occasion, we must perforce conclude that the unwillingness of their leaders to engage the Vikings was due to the fact that they had no interest in driving them off.

But why not? Because the expulsion of the foreign enemy would have enabled the monarch to give his undivided attention to the reduction of the power of the aristocracy; a power which, since the days of Charlemagne, had never ceased to make inroads on the prerogatives of the crown. There can be no doubt that Charles the Bald wished to increase, or at least to rehabilitate, the power of the monarch. In this effort he was supported by most of the higher clergy, who recognized in him the protector of their interests and their property against the greed and unscrupulous avarice of the lay nobility.¹⁹ The lay nobles, or at least a large number of them, bitterly opposed the policy of Charles and, in order to gain their point, were willing, not only to make indirect use of the Viking invasions, but even to ally themselves with the Northmen when necessary.²⁰ If sometimes these magnates were not averse to securing the removal of the Vikings by the payment of Danegeld, it was probably because they themselves did not have to bear the burden of the tax levied to raise the tribute, and because in collecting the impost from their peasants they were able to retain a considerable part for themselves.²¹

When this general situation is kept in mind, the apparent helplessness of the West Frankish armies before the Vikings becomes more intelligible. We begin to understand that the Danegeld was often the only means whereby the king might hope to rid his realm of the invaders from the North.²² Also, we may perhaps be able better to appreciate the attempts that have

19 Fustel de Coulanges, *Les transformations de la royauté pendant l'époque carlovingienne*, 640-66; Dümmler, I, 222, 295, 380-81.

20 *Ibid.*, 381 and n. 1, 412-16, 420-21; cf. Vogel, 151-52.

21 See *supra*, chap. 1, nn. 39, 49.

22 This seems to have been understood by Lothaire, who, despite the fact that his expedition had proved useless, remained on very friendly terms with Charles. Evidently Lothaire realized that Charles had done the only thing possible under the circumstances. Cf. *supra*, nn. 10, 11, 16; *infra*, n. 27.

recently been made²³ to clear Charles the Bald of the old charges of cowardice and pusillanimity.

The amount of the Danegeld of 853 is unknown, and very little can be said concerning the method by which the tribute was raised. All we know is, that the king prescribed certain contributions to the Northmen, and that these had been paid before April 22, 853.²⁴ It would seem that the contributions were furnished chiefly if not exclusively by the prelates of the church.²⁵

The Vikings had ceased plundering probably early in March; but they did not sail out of the Seine until in June or July.²⁶ In the meantime Lothaire I had returned home from what must have seemed to him a fruitless expedition.²⁷

23 For example by Lot and Halphen in *Le règne de Charles le Chauve*; even Vogel (see especially pp. 256-57) has at least to a certain extent ventured to depart from the traditional German point of view as represented by Dümmler and others.

24 *Capitulare Missorum Suessionense, M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 267*: "Inbrevient [missi] . . . quid etiam Nortmannis per nostram commendationem sive sine nostra commendatione datum sit." It is true that this clause does not appear in all the extant manuscripts of the capitulary, and that the editors of the *Monumenta* have relegated it to the obscurity of a footnote. But the clause is included in most of the manuscripts, and whether it ever was an integral part of the capitulary, is a matter of only secondary importance for our purpose. In any case, the words in the clause prove beyond peradventure that Charles had ordered contributions to be made to the Northmen. If the clause was part of the capitulary, the contributions must have been made before the capitulary was issued, i. e. before April 22, 853. Since the Danegeld had probably been agreed upon early in March (cf. *supra*, n. 13), there was ample time to raise the tribute before the issuance of the capitulary.—I cannot share the view of Vogel, p. 135, that the Danegeld was paid to Godfrey. It is not likely that he received both lands and money. Moreover if the Danegeld was paid to Godfrey, what did the other Danes receive that induced them to cease plundering in March? Baldamus, *op. cit.*, p. 29 and n. 71, assumes that the quotation given at the beginning of this note refers to land, but the context does not bear out his interpretation.

25 This may be inferred from the position in the capitulary of the clause referred to in the preceding note; it follows directly after a provision requiring the prelates to submit an inventory of the property of their churches. The clause indicates also that some of the payments to the Northmen had been made without royal authorization. These may have been voluntary contributions to the sum promised by the king; but more probably they were payments made directly to the Danes, in the form of ransom, by individual churches or monasteries, which thereby escaped pillage or destruction in the period before Charles came to terms with Sydroc and his followers.

26 According to the *Chron. Fontanellense, loc. cit.*, in June; but according to the *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*, in July.

27 Vogel, p. 136, seems to imply that Lothaire returned home immediately after Charles had come to an understanding with Godfrey (see *supra*, n. 11); but the *Annals of St. Bertin*, 853, p. 42, give the impression that he did not depart until after the Danes had ceased plundering in March (see *supra*, n. 12), and this impression is not weakened by the vague and chrono-

While the Danegeld of 853 apparently secured a temporary removal of the Vikings from the Seine,²⁸ it did not prevent them from continuing their devastations with increased fury on the Loire in the same year;²⁹ and within three years Sydroc had returned to the Seine.³⁰ It is impossible to determine whether the Vikings by virtue of these operations were guilty of bad faith, for we do not know the terms on which they had accepted the Danegeld.³¹

logically inaccurate statement in the *Annals of Fulda*, 850, p. 40. We have no certain indication that Lothaire was back on his own soil until July 3, when he signed a diploma at *Teodonis villa* (Böhmer-Mühlbacher, *Die Regesten des Kaiserreichs unter den Karolingern* [1908], p. 475, no. 1159)

28 Sydroc may have gone to Ireland at first. The so-called *Annales Inisfallenses*, 853, O'Connor, *Rerum Hibernicarum scriptores veteres*, II, 34, Codex Dubl. (quoted by Steenstrup, *Normannerne*, I, 113, n. 5), state that two brothers, Sitricus and Ibarus, came with an expedition to Ireland in 853. However that may be, Sydroc was again operating in the West Frankish realm before very long; he was there at least as early as the summer of 856 (see *infra*, p. 45 and nn. 1-3).

29 See Vogel, 137 ff.

30 *Supra*, n. 28; cf. Vogel, 150 ff. So far as known, Godfrey did not return to the Seine, and he is not mentioned in the sources after 855 (Vogel, 408).

31 Cf. *supra*, n. 24.

CHAPTER III.

THE DANEGELD OF 860—861.

In the year 860 Charles the Bald for the third time found it necessary to have recourse to the Danegeld in order to secure the removal of Viking invaders from his realm.¹ Since the summer of 856² the Seine had been continuously occupied by several large forces of Danes, who under the leadership of Björn and others³ had established and fortified themselves on the island of Oscellus, in the Seine, near Jeufosse.⁴ From this place they subjected the whole valley of the lower Seine to plunder and devastation without mercy.⁵ Paris itself was invaded,⁶ and only those monasteries and churches escaped pillage or destruction for which the ecclesiastics were willing to pay large sums of ransom money.⁷ The payment of ransom, moreover, did not in all cases save a place from being ultimately destroyed.⁸

Throughout the year 857 the king was unable to offer any resistance whatever to the Vikings, owing to the fact that the nobles of Aquitaine and Neustria were in revolt.⁹ And by the close of that year many of the magnates in Francia had made common cause with the insurgents to the south of the Seine.¹⁰ The rebels were in communication with Louis the German, who

1 The most complete and certainly the most satisfactory discussion of the great Viking invasion of France which began in 856, is that of Lot ("La grande invasion normande de 856-862," *Bibl. de l'école des chartes*, 1908, LXIX, 5-62). In describing the events leading up to Charles the Bald's agreement to pay Danegeld in 860, I find myself more in harmony with the conclusions, and in particular the chronology, of Lot than with those of Vogel (153-55, 160-71, 179-88).

2 Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 5, n. 1.

3 Sydroc came first, on July 18, 856; Björn arrived on August 19, of the same year; and another band probably entered the Seine early in 858. Sydroc left the Seine in 857. See *ibid.*, 7, 18.

4 *Ann. Bert.*, 856, pp. 46-47. Cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 6, n. 4, pp. 11, 25, n. 5.

5 *Ann. Bert.*, 856-61, pp. 46-54. Cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, pp. 11 ff.

6 Paris appears to have been invaded twice within the space of a few months, first on December 28, 856, and again in the spring of 857. See Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 11, nn. 3, 4. Lot proves, *ibid.*, p. 12, n. 1, that the Northmen invaded not only the environs, or faubourgs, of Paris on these occasions, but the Cité itself. Cf. Thompson, "The Commerce of France in the Ninth Century," *Journal of Political Economy*, 1915, XXIII, p. 864, n. 7.

7 *Ann. Bert.*, 857, p. 48; Aimoin, *Mirac. s. Germani*, II, c. 10, AA.SS., May, VI, p. 793. Cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 12 and n. 1, p. 13 and n. 4; and see *infra*, chap. xv and nn. 11, 12.

8 Lot, *op. cit.*, pp. 18, 21, n. 1, p. 36, n. 1.

9 *Ann. Bert.*, 857, p. 47.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 48.

secretly supported them, and who probably was even then revolving in his mind the project of invading the territories of his brother.¹¹ In spite of these threatening conditions, Charles, in the spring of 858, succeeded in winning back at least part of the disaffected nobles;¹² and with the aid of his nephew, Lothaire II, the king now undertook to expel the Vikings by force of arms from their camp at Oscellus.¹³ This fact should be emphasized, for it goes to show that Charles did not always prefer diplomacy and tribute to fighting, as some scholars would have us believe.¹⁴ Indeed, why should he?

The Viking camp on the island of Oscellus was besieged by the armies of Charles and Lothaire for some twelve weeks, and there is reason to believe that the Danes might have been brought to terms if Charles had been permitted to continue the operations.¹⁵ That, however, was precisely what the lay magnates of the West Frankish realm wished by any and every means to prevent. And since this attitude on the part of the nobles is characteristic of them in the period under discussion, it is worth while to inquire into the reasons for it.

The nobles realized that if Charles triumphed over the Vikings, he would be in position to stamp out the revolt in his realm. This accomplished, he would hardly fail to follow up his advantage; he would proceed to consolidate and magnify the royal power at the expense of the privileges and independence of the aristocracy.¹⁶ And the nobles well knew that in an undertaking

11 See Calmette, "Étude sur les relations de Charles le Chauve avec Louis le Germanique et l'invasion de 858-859," *Le Moyen Age*, 1899, III, 128 ff. Cf. Dümmler, I, 412 ff.; Lot, *op. cit.*, pp. 16, 17.

12 *M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 295, no. 269; Libellus proclamationis adversus Wentilonem, c. 5, ibid., p. 451. Cf. Calmette, op. cit., 137, n. 3; Lot, op. cit., 23, 25.*

13 *Ann. Bert., 858, pp. 48, 50; Chron. Fontanellense, 855, M.G.H., SS., II, 304. Cf. Lot, op. cit., 24 ff.; Vogel, 164.* The attack of the Vikings on the two monasteries of St. Denis and St. Germain-des-Prés at Easter, and their capture of the abbots Louis of St. Denis and Gauzelin of Glanfeuil, of course strengthened the king in his determination to expel the Vikings. Immense sums of ransom money had to be paid the Danes for the release of these captives, Louis of St. Denis in particular. On this see *infra*, chaps. xv, xvi; cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, pp. 19, 20.

14 See for example Vogel, 106, and Dümmler, I, 428, III, 55, 58.

15 *Almoïn, Translatio ss. Georgii, Aurelii et Nathaliae ex urbe Corduba Parisios, II, c. 5, Mabillon, Acta sanctorum, saec. IV, part. II, p. 53 (quoted by Lot, op. cit., p. 28, n. 3): "sed et victoriam, pro dolor!, veluti jam prae manibus susceptam."* Cf. Vogel, 164; Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 30, n. 2.

16 *Ann. Fuld., 858, pp. 49-50. Cf. Lot, op. cit., p. 24 and n. 4; von Kalckstein, Robert der Tapfere, Markgraf von Anjou, 43 ff.*

of this nature the king would probably have the almost undivided support of the higher clergy, who looked to him to protect the property of the church against the encroachments and spoliations of the lay magnates.¹⁷ The attitude of indifference or negligence on the part of the lay nobility as regards the Viking invasions, may be explained by the fact that the magnates suffered little or nothing from the ravages of the Northmen at this time. Since the operations of the Vikings were chiefly directed against towns, churches, and monasteries, i. e. against the possessions of the king or the clergy, the magnates were quite willing by their inactivity to play into the hands of the Danes, particularly if in so doing they might hope to force the hands of their opponents, the clergy and the crown.¹⁸

It is, therefore, not surprising to find that the revolt among the nobles began to gain ground again in proportion as Charles pressed the operations against the Danes with more vigor and determination.¹⁹ Many of the *fideles* who had thus far proved loyal to the king now joined the ranks of the insurgents. Charles had hardly gotten the siege operations under way, when representatives of the disaffected nobility of the western realm appeared at Frankfort, imploring Louis the German to rescue the West Frankish kingdom from the "tyranny" of his brother. Easily persuaded to undertake an invasion which he had probably been planning for some time, Louis prepared to act at once, and by September of the same year (858) he had entered West Frankish territory.²⁰ After that the loyalty of the army

17 Calmette, *op. cit.*, 136-37, 147-49; Dümmler, I, 434-35, 290-95; Thompson, *Decline of the Missi*, pp. 11-12.

18 This attitude of the West Frankish nobility is well set forth by Gfrörer in his *Geschichte der ost- und westfränkischen Carolinger*, I, 281 ff. It is true that there is plenty of evidence which indicates that the Vikings plundered the rural estates, i. e. the *villae* and the *mansî*, as well as the towns and the ecclesiastical establishments. But the *villae* and *mansî* in question must have been, in the majority of cases at least, those of the church, for these were most likely to be left without defenders. It is not conceivable that the lay nobles would have been as indifferent as they were regarding the expulsion of the Vikings, if they had suffered from the devastations of the freebooters to the same extent as the church and the crown (a passage from the *Miracula s. Bertini* is very illuminating on this point; see *supra*, chap. i, n. 6, end). On the contrary, it is highly probable that the magnates often regarded the Vikings as their allies. See *M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 284, c. 3; p. 286, c. 1. Cf. Dümmler, I, 420 ff.*

19 *Ann. Bert.*, 858, p. 50: "Interim comites ex regno Karli regis Ludoicum Germanorum regem, quem per 5 annos invitaverant, adducunt." Cf. Calmette, *op. cit.*, p. 137; Lot, *op. cit.*, 26 ff.

20 *Ann. Bert.*, 858, p. 50. Cf. Calmette, *op. cit.*, 137-40.

besieging Oscellus began rapidly to wane. Discovering evidence of treason and treachery on every hand, Charles finally gave up the siege and took hasty measures to secure himself against falling into the hands of his hostile brother.²¹

Louis the German's invasion of the West Frankish kingdom, which had as its ultimate object the dethronement of his brother, need not be described here.²² The invasion ended in fiasco, and on January 15, 859, the king of the East Franks deemed it advisable to begin a somewhat precipitate retreat back to his own territories.²³ Meanwhile, however, the West Frankish rebels, by securing the intervention of Louis in their behalf, had furnished the Danes with an opportunity to ravage the basin of the Seine unchecked.²⁴ After the expulsion of his brother, Charles was for a long time unable to take any measures against the Vikings;²⁵ most of the magnates continued to exhibit the spirit of refractoriness;²⁶ and the discouraging if not dismaying experiences of the king at the siege of Oscellus must have deterred him from attempting a new offensive against the freebooters. These, in consequence, waxed ever bolder in their work of pillage and devastation.²⁷

Meanwhile, in the summer of 859, another group of Vikings, under Weland, had entered the Somme and were now ravaging the districts in that vicinity.²⁸ The situation was becoming critical. All of western and northern Francia was menaced by the Northmen. A large number of the *fideles* were still in revolt, and as yet good relations between Charles and his brother had not been reestablished.²⁹ Though the king in his predicament put forth special efforts to bring some of the magnates

21 On this see Lot, *op. cit.*, 27-28; Calmette, *op. cit.*, 140.

22 On the invasion of Louis the German, see *ibid.*, 140 ff.; Cf. Dümmler, I, 430 ff.

23 *Ann. Bert.*, 859, p. 51; cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

24 *Ibid.*

25 *Ibid.*, p. 31.

26 Calmette, *op. cit.*, 149 ff.

27 The only resistance offered to the Danes at this time came from certain groups of peasants between the Seine and the Loire. These peasants, however, were not sufficiently well organized to be successful in their undertaking, and they were soon cut to pieces or dispersed. *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*; cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 32, n. 2, pp. 33 ff.

28 *Ann. Bert.*, 859, p. 52; cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 38. Presumably these Vikings were under the leadership of Weland, though in point of fact he is not mentioned until 861 (*Ann. Bert.*, 861, p. 55).

29 Lot, *op. cit.*, 40.

of Neustria back to allegiance,³⁰ this move appears to have been only in part successful and in any case did not materially improve the situation as a whole. Fortunately, however, the two groups of Vikings respectively infesting the basins of the Seine and the Somme, were not on friendly terms with each other. Early in 860 the latter group made a proposal to Charles³¹ which under the existing circumstances must have been very welcome to him. In return for the payment of a tribute of 3,000 pounds of silver, they offered to move against the Vikings of the Seine and either expel them or annihilate them.³² Though there were those who regarded it as precarious policy to enter into relations of this nature with the Vikings,³³ Charles probably felt that he had nothing to lose and consequently accepted the offer of Weland's freebooters.

It will be noted that the Danegeld to which Charles had now agreed was of a different character than those paid by him heretofore. In 845 and also in 853 the king had entered into direct negotiations with the particular group of Vikings that he wished to remove from his realm and had paid them a certain amount of money as the price of their evacuation of Frankish territory. But now Charles engaged one group of Vikings as his mercenaries and agreed to pay them for the services they were about to render in driving out another group.³⁴ This Danegeld therefore, was stipendiary rather than tributary in character. Even

30 Lot, 40-41. Bishop Wenilo of Sens, the only one of the higher clergy who had supported the cause of Louis the German, was reconciled to Charles before the close of 859 (*Ann. Bert.*, 859, p. 53).

31 I cannot agree with Lot (*op. cit.*, 41, n. 3) when he says that the initiative to these negotiations may have come from Charles. Lot himself admits (*ibid.*, 49, n. 1) that the Somme Vikings were determined to enrich themselves in the kingdom of Charles. The fact that they took hostages before departing to England in the spring (see *infra*, n. 39), indicates that the Vikings wished to hold Charles to his agreement and, therefore, that their interest in the contract was greater than the king's. Nothing is said of any hostages retained by Charles; evidently he regarded them as unnecessary (cf. *infra*, n. 43). Vogel, p. 179, seems to agree with Lot.

32 *Ann. Bert.*, 860, p. 53: "Karlus rex inani Danorum in Somna consistentium pollicitatione plectus, exactionem . . . fieri jubet; nam idem Dani promiserant, ut, si eis tria milia librarum argenti pondere examinato tribueret, se adversus eos Danos qui in Sequana versabantur ituros eosque inde aut expulsuros aut interfecturos."

33 By referring to the offer of the Somme Danes as "inani . . . pollicitatione" (cf. *supra*, n. 32), Prudence, the author of the second part of the *Annals of St. Bertin*, reveals that he was one of those who disapproved of the policy of Charles.

34 Lot, *op. cit.*, 50, nn. 1, 2, compares Weland and his companions to the Swiss and German mercenaries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Vogel, p. 179, likens them to the *foederati* employed by the Romans.

if Weland and his men had agreed, as they probably had, that they themselves would quit the realm after they had forced the Seine Vikings to withdraw,³⁵ the money they received must be regarded as a payment for definite services to be rendered and not simply as the price of their own withdrawal; essentially it was not a tribute but a stipend. Stipendiary Danegelds, it is well known, were very common in England at a later period;^{35a} but for the West Frankish kingdom only two payments of this kind have been recorded, the other one being the Danegeld of 862, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Finding it necessary to resort to taxation in order to raise the sum named by Weland, the king ordered an exaction to be levied on (1) the church treasuries, (2) all holdings of land designated as *mansi*, and (3) the property of all merchants, even the poorest. Though the rates of the tax are not specified, we know that an inventory was to be taken of the houses and the movables of the merchants, in order to determine the amount each of these ought to pay.³⁶ Charles probably intended to collect the exaction only in those parts of his realm which were directly subject to his authority, viz. Francia, Neustria, and Burgundy.³⁷ As for Aquitaine, that had long been regarded as a separate kingdom³⁸ and in any case was not plundered from the Seine; which makes it very doubtful that this Danegeld was levied there at all.

But it proved impossible or seemed inadvisable to raise the entire amount of the Danegeld by the time agreed upon.³⁹ The

35 Lot states, *op. cit.*, 52, that Weland had promised Charles not only that he would expel the Vikings of the Seine but also that he and his companions would depart. The basis for the latter statement appears to be these words from the *Life of St. Faro* (c. 126, Bouquet, VII, 357): "Ita quoque est ab illis actum, et fide vana illorum acceptum est promissum, ut discedendo utraque partes jam ultra nescirent finium nostrorum introitum."

35a Cf. *supra*, pp. 15, 17.

36 *Ann. Bert.*, 860, p. 53: "Karlus rex . . . exactionem de thesauris ecclesiarum et omnibus mansis ac negociatoribus etiam paupertinis, ita ut etiam domus eorum et omnia utensilia adpreciarentur et inde statutus census exigetur, fieri jubet."

37 Lot, *op. cit.*, 41, seems to think that the Danegeld was to be levied only in Francia, but gives no reason for this opinion. It appears legitimate to conclude that the entire kingdom of Charles the Bald (cf. the following note) was to be taxed, since there is no statement to the contrary. Certainly the removal of the Danes would affect Neustria as much as Francia, and even Burgundy would become more secure as a result.

38 Cf. *supra*, chap. i. n. 47. Charles, the son of Charles the Bald, had been crowned king of Aquitaine in 855 (Dümmler, I, 455).

39 *Ann. Bert.*, 860, p. 53: "Dani in Somna consistentes, cum eis non dare-

reasons for this can only be conjectured. In the first place, the territories on either side of the Seine must, as a result of the numerous payments of ransom money and the immense booty obtained by the Danes on Oscellus in the recent years, have been nearly emptied of resources.⁴⁰ In the second place, a considerable number of the magnates involved in the recent revolt against Charles were probably still more or less hostile;⁴¹ and we may suppose that until these had become reconciled to the king they were not likely to lend him any aid in raising the Danegeld. Whatever the reasons, Charles certainly was unable to conclude his bargain with the Danes of the Somme at the appointed time.⁴² The latter, however, instead of breaking off relations with the king, took hostages from him and then, in the early spring (860), departed for England.⁴³ The fact that the Vikings demanded hostages signifies unquestionably that they meant to hold Charles to his contract, though they were willing to allow him more time for procuring the sum agreed upon.⁴⁴

After an absence of over a year,⁴⁵ Weland, towards the end of the spring of 861,⁴⁶ returned to France, ready to fulfill his engagements with Charles the Bald and to demand his compensation.⁴⁷ In the meantime the Vikings encamped on the island

tur supradictus census, receptis obsidibus, ad Anglossaxones navigant." Soetbeer (*Beiträge zur Geschichte des Geld- und Münzwesens in Deutschland*, in *Forsch. z. d. Gesch.*, VI, 54, 55) seems to have overlooked the passage just quoted, and thus arrives at the unwarranted conclusion that the Danegeld of 861 was a new tribute, levied and collected after that of 860. He may have been misled, in part at least, by the erroneous dating of a document dealing with the Danegeld of 877. Cf *M.G.H.*, *LL.* Sectio II, t. 2, p. 353.

⁴⁰ See *supra*, nn. 5, 7, 13; Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 13, n. 4, pp. 18, 19.

⁴¹ The following statement does not appear in the *Annals of St. Bertin* until 861, p. 55: "pene omnes qui nuper a Karolo ad Hludovicum defecerant ad Karolum revertuntur et ab eo familiaritate et honoribus redonantur."

⁴² Cf. *supra*, n. 39.

⁴³ See Lot, *op. cit.*, 41, n. 6.

⁴⁴ Cf. *supra*, n. 31. There may have been another reason why the Danes took hostages. In this way they prevented Charles from attempting to expel the other group of Danes from Oscellus in the meantime; if Charles had succeeded in doing that independently of the Somme Danes, the latter would have lost not only the money promised them as Danegeld but also the booty which they hoped to compel the Danes on Oscellus to disgorge and share with them (cf. *infra*, n. 63). Whether or not any such considerations entered the minds of Weland and his followers, it is quite certain that Charles, for the present at least, had no thought of commencing a second siege of Oscellus. Cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, 49, n. 1.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, n. 2.

⁴⁷ *Ann. Bert.*, 861, p. 55: "Dani qui pridem Morinum civitatem incendierant de Anglis revertentes, duce Welando cum ducentis et eo amplius

of Oscellus had made another raid on Paris and had ascended the Seine as far as Melun, to which they set fire.⁴⁸ Weland's fleet of over two hundred ships now proceeded up the Seine and laid siege to the Viking stronghold on Oscellus.⁴⁹ By this time almost all those nobles who deserted Charles in 858 had returned to allegiance,⁵⁰ a fact which may at least in part explain why the officials of the king now succeeded in obtaining the sum which it had proved impossible or impracticable to raise during the early months of the preceding year. And that is not the whole truth. In point of fact, Charles paid much more to the Danes in 861 than he had promised them in 860. The reason for the augmentation of the tribute can only be surmised, for there is not the slightest attempt at explanation in our sources.⁵¹ It seems probable that Weland's army had been increased in numbers during its absence, and this may have been urged in justification of a higher price for its services.⁵² In any case there was nothing for Charles to do except to pay what was demanded, if he wished to save his realm from plunder and devastation.⁵³ Accordingly, instead of receiving only 3,000 pounds of silver, the sum originally agreed upon, Weland and his men were paid 5,000 pounds of the precious metal and in

navibus per Sequanam ascendunt et castellum in insula quae Oscellus dicitur a Normannis constructum et eosdem Normannos obsident."

48 *Ibid.*, p. 54; Loup of Ferrières, *Epistolae*, CXXVII, ed. Desdèvises du Désert, p. 211. Cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, 46.

49 See *supra*, n. 47.

50 See *supra*, n. 41.

51 It is true that the amounts of Danegeld demanded in 860 and 861, respectively, are not stated by the same writer; Prudence furnishes the figures for 860, and Hincmar those for 861; yet I can find no reason to suppose that either committed an error on this point (*Ann. Bert.*, 860, p. 53; 861, p. 55).

52 The quotation given at the end of this note seems to indicate that some further negotiations took place between Charles and Weland before the latter laid siege to Oscellus, and very probably these negotiations had to do with the higher stipend demanded by the Vikings for their services. Lot, *op. cit.*, 48, n. 1, credits Charles with having taken the initiative to these negotiations as well as to those of the preceding year (cf. *supra*, n. 31). I find it difficult to agree with Lot in either case because (1) our sources attribute the initiative to the Danes on both occasions; (2) those sources—the *Annals of St. Bertin* (Prudence) for 860, and the *Miracles of St. Riquier* for 861—are independent of each other; and (3) the Vikings under Weland had an interest of their own in the continuation of the negotiations. Cf. Vogel, 183. *Mirac. s. Richarii*, II, c. 16, *M.G.H.*, SS., XV, 918: "Qui [i. e. quidam Anseicus de propagine Danorum progenitus, christianitatis sumens insignia, contubernalis palatii d. Karoli regis] dum legationem praedictorum Danorum, quos hactenus vis marina in Anglorum sedibus detinet, pro suis negotiis d. regis orabundos clementiam duceret, ac inde cum congruis responsis redirent, etc."

53 *Ann. Bert.* (see the following note): "ne depraedaretur."

addition were furnished with large quantities of grain and cattle.⁵⁴

Presumably this Danegeld had been procured partly from the proceeds of the general tax prescribed in 860⁵⁵ and partly perhaps by additional levies.⁵⁶ While a considerable part of the tribute doubtless came from the church treasuries, it must be assumed that the bulk of it was obtained from the proceeds of the extraordinary taxes levied on the *mansi* and on the property of the merchants. The holders of the *mansi* were probably also required to contribute the supplies of cattle and grain demanded by the Northmen.

Unfortunately, our sources give no details with reference to how the various taxes levied for the purposes of this particular Danegeld were collected. It is, however, not improbable that the method employed on subsequent occasions, and concerning which we have considerable information, represents a development of an earlier practice. On this basis we may assume that the method of collecting the Danegeld for example in 866 or in 877 did not differ essentially from that which was employed in 860—861.⁵⁷ This would mean, that the great landholders — the ecclesiastical and lay seigniors — were held responsible by the king for the taxes levied on the *mansi* within their domains or their jurisdiction; that the amount of money which each seignior was expected to furnish, would vary according to the number of *mansi* over which he exercised any sort of control; and that the officials of the great seigniors — their *ministeriales* — forced each holder of a *mansus* to contribute toward the Dane-

54 Cf. *supra*. n. 32. *Ann. Bert.*, 861, p. 55: "Ad quorum obsidentium videlicet locarium quinque milia libras argenti cum animalium atque annonae summa non modica de regno suo, ne depraedaretur, exigi Karolus praecepit." *Vita s. Faronis*, Bouquet, VII, 357: "Priores [Nortmanni] vero a sequentibus Nortmannis, obsessi, nomine regis Caroli sunt devicti, statutis tamen donis gravissimis auri et argenti ex regno, immensaque adhibita ad haec pro obsidione prioris multitudinis victus abundantia." It will be noted that according to the hagiographer, the Danegeld was paid in both silver and gold. Some gold may possibly have been obtained from the church treasuries, but most of the Danegeld was probably paid in silver, for there was very little coinage of gold in this period. See *infra*, chap. xviii and n. 55; cf. Soetbeer, *loc. cit.*, IV, 354; VI, 45 ff.; Guérard, *ed.*, *Polyptyque de l'abbé Irminon*, first ed. [1844], I (Prolégomènes), pp. 129–30.

55 Cf. *supra*, nn. 36–38.

56 See *supra*, n. 54.

57 A summary of what is known concerning the usual method of collecting the taxes levied for the purposes of the Danegeld, is given *infra*, chap. xvii.

geld whatever he was able to pay. It is probable that the seigniors paid their respective quotas to the counts or the *missi*. The latter may also have been charged with the collection of the taxes levied on the church treasuries. To whom the merchants paid their taxes is nowhere indicated. We know, however, that merchants were under the special protection of the crown and that in return for this benefit they were obliged to make an annual, or biennial, contribution, consisting of a certain percentage of their profits, to the royal treasury.⁵⁸ It is not impossible that those royal officials who received these regular dues of the merchants, also collected their taxes toward the Danegeld.

That the raising of the Danegeld led to abuses and hardships, will surprise no one who is at all familiar with the customs of the period with which we are here concerned.⁵⁹ Beyond a doubt more money was collected from the tax-payers than was turned over either to the king's officers or to the Vikings.⁶⁰ The fact that the Danes insisted on weighing the money before accepting it,⁶¹ compelled the Frankish tax collectors to refuse all coins which were not of proper weight or fineness. It seems too, that the collectors declined to receive money which had been coined elsewhere than in the local mint; this practice was not in accordance with the wishes of Charles, but it was profitable to the counts and bishops who were in charge of the various mints of the kingdom, for they received a certain share of the revenue obtained through recoinage.⁶² The Danegeld, therefore, so far from being an aid to the king in his efforts to secure the universal acceptance within his kingdom of the money coined in each and all of the royal mints without distinction, rather encouraged the increasing tendency in the different localities to use only those coins which bore the stamp of the local mint.

⁵⁸ Cf. Waitz, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, IV, second ed. [1885], pp. 44, 45, 586.

⁵⁹ Cf. Sée, *Les classes rurales et le reg. dom. en France*, p. 92.

⁶⁰ Cf. *infra*, chap. xvii and n. 11.

⁶¹ In 860 the Vikings had demanded 3,000 pounds of silver *pondere examinato* (*supra*, n. 32). Evidently they had reason to suspect not only the weight and fineness of the Frankish coins, but also the good faith of the Frankish officials in the process of weighing. See the following note.

⁶² *Constitutio Carisiacensis de moneta* [July, 861], *M.G.H., LL.* Sectio II, t. 2, pp. 301-2; cf. Soetbeer, *loc. cit.*, VI, 4, 5, 7-9. A tendency to reject *denarii* which, though of proper weight and fineness, were for some reason deemed undesirable, is noticeable at least as early as the time of Charlemagne (*M.G.H., LL.*, Sectio II, t. 1, p. 125, c. 18). Exactly what prompted

The Vikings under Weland had embarked on an enterprise which proved eminently successful and highly profitable. With the aid of another group of their countrymen they were able to force the Vikings on Oscellus to capitulate and to hand over to them, out of the immense booty collected during a sojourn of five years in the heart of the West Frankish realm, 6,000 pounds in gold and silver.⁶³ Altogether, therefore, Weland and his men secured, through this undertaking alone, 11,000 pounds of the precious metals and, besides, large quantities of victuals.

The Danes did not quit the West Frankish realm until March of the following year. It is true that they had descended to the

persons to reject these *denarii* is not stated anywhere in the sources, and varying solutions of the problem have been offered by different scholars (See e. g. Prou, *Les monnaies carolingiennes*, Intro., pp. XXVI ff.; Soetbeer, *loc. cit.*; Dopsch, *Wirtschaftsentw. d. Karolingerzeit*, II, 248-49, 303-4). To me the theory of Soetbeer seems the most satisfactory. Dopsch accepts this theory as a partial, but not an adequate, explanation of why good *denarii* were rejected; he then proceeds to invent another theory of his own (*loc. cit.*, pp. 303-4) and insists that it furnishes the most important reason for the rejection of the good *denarii*. In my opinion, the new theory of Dopsch contains no solution whatever of the problem under consideration, and I have therefore adopted, and perhaps somewhat amplified, Soetbeer's explanation, the validity of which is admitted by Dopsch. Soetbeer argues that the local authorities (counts, bishops, abbots, etc.) when they collected imposts due in cash, frequently would accept only money coined in the particular local mint which they controlled, because in this way they could materially increase the business of recoinage at that mint, and thus augment their own income from this source. The consequence of this abuse of power on the part of the local authorities would be that private individuals would decline to accept every *denarius* which, though in other respects perfectly satisfactory, had not been coined in the local mint. This state of affairs must have been a serious hindrance to trade and commerce, and it probably threatened to undermine the universality of the royal coinage. Heavy penalties had therefore been imposed on those who refused a good *denarius* simply because it did not bear the stamp of the local mint. But the practice persisted in spite of the penalties and seems to have been extended as a result of the payments to the Northmen. After the exaction of the Danegeld of 860-61, it became necessary to mitigate the penalties for refusing other than locally coined *denarii*, and to advise the *missi* to be more lenient in the prosecution of those who violated the law; which proves not only that the *missi* had been guilty of oppression and extortion, but also that there were others who profited from the Danegeld besides the Vikings. Before 864, there probably were a number of private and unauthorized mints in operation, the owners of which did not fail to utilize their advantages in connection with the levy of the Danegeld. At any rate the coinage edict of 864 expressly forbade coinage anywhere in the entire West Frankish kingdom except at nine specified places (*M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 2, p. 315, c. 12*). Lot, *op. cit.*, 50, n. 2, is certainly in error when he says that the Franks rejected the *denarii* in circulation, because they were of bad alloy. Penalties were imposed when one refused to accept a *donum denarium i. e. merum et bene pensantem*, but it was perfectly legitimate to decline a bad *denarius*.

⁶³ *Ann. Bert.*, 861, p. 56: "Obsessi . . . sex milia libras inter aurum et argentum obsidentibus donant eis que sociantur." I understand this to mean that the besieged paid over, not all the money they had accumulated, but a considerable part of it—6,000 pounds. Cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, 51-52.

mouth of the Seine soon after the capitulation of the Vikings on Oscellus; but the approach of the stormy season made them reluctant about putting to sea, and they decided that it would be much more convenient to spend the winter in France.⁶⁴ Negotiations leading to an understanding with Charles on this point may have followed.⁶⁵ Be that as it may, it is certain that the Northmen reascended the Seine and that they were able to establish themselves for the winter, without opposition, in various places along that river and its tributaries.⁶⁶

About the same time that the Vikings were returning inland, Charles the Bald set out on his futile expedition to Provence.⁶⁷ During the winter some of the Vikings could not resist the temptation to plunder. Charles, therefore, who meanwhile had returned from Provence, found it advisable to take the field against them early in 862. By prompt action and a piece of clever strategy, he succeeded in cutting off the retreat of an isolated group of the marauders, who had gone to attack Meaux, and as a result was able to bring pressure to bear on the rest.⁶⁸ Toward the end of February, 862, Weland swore fealty to Charles, and soon thereafter he persuaded all the Danes to descend the Seine a second time. At Jumièges they stopped long enough to repair their ships, but before the end of March the Northmen had left France, departing in various directions.⁶⁹

The policy of engaging one group of invaders to drive out another in return for the payment of Danegeld, at least had not proved so signal a failure as some had predicted;⁷⁰ and we may well doubt whether, as things stood in 860, Charles could have removed the Vikings from his realm in any other way.⁷¹

The Northmen, as we have seen, did not depart with empty hands. On the contrary, they carried off what may be regarded as a by no means negligible portion of the available cash in the West Frankish kingdom. What effect did the passing of such large sums of money into the possession of an alien enemy have

64 *Ann. Bert.*, 861, p. 56.

65 Such at least is the opinion of Lot, *op. cit.*, 53.

66 *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*

67 *Ibid.*; cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, 53-54.

68 *Ann. Bert.*, 862, p. 57; cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, 55 ff.

69 *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*; Aimoin, *loc. cit.*, c. 13, p. 794.

70 Cf. *supra*, n. 33.

71 See *infra*, n. 75; cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, 59.

upon economic conditions in the invaded country? Unquestionably it would be a mistake to assume that the money taken by the invaders in the form of tribute and plunder represented a total loss to the Franks. While it is doubtless true that the Vikings were in the main parasites, who added little or nothing to the wealth or resources of the West Frankish kingdom, but instead used up a very considerable part thereof; on the other hand we must not fail to note that during the time they remained in Frankish territory these parasites must have expended large amounts of their ill-gotten gain in trade. Certainly, *all* the money paid to the Northmen did not leave the country. There is no indication that the Vikings who infested France at this period engaged in agriculture while they were there. Therefore they must have had to plunder or buy all their foodstuffs. Probably they bought more of these than has commonly been supposed; and it is certain that they purchased other things besides victuals.⁷² In this way the Vikings of Oscellus doubtless used up some portion of the money they had obtained through numerous payments of ransom and otherwise.⁷³ Even the followers of Weland must have disposed of some part of the Danegeld during the winter and spring of 861—862. Thus, there can be little doubt that, in spite of hostilities, a brisk trade was going on continually between the Franks and the Northmen so long as the latter remained in the country. This in itself must be regarded as an advantage, for it could hardly fail to give a new stimulus to the rather sluggish course of economic life during the early middle ages.⁷⁴ The Danegeld and the other payments to the Danes may have emptied many church treasuries and may have borne hard on the poorer population, the peasantry in particular;⁷⁵ but, on the other hand, they brought

72 In particular there were frequent sales of armor, weapons and horses to the Northmen. See *M.G.H., LL.* Sectio II, t. 2, p. 321, c. 25. In this trade it appears that even ecclesiastics sometimes participated. Cf. Vogel, 207, n. 1.

73 Still it must not be concluded that the Vikings disposed of *all* their money and plunder while they were sojourning in France. When the freebooters on Oscellus surrendered to Weland and his followers, they were able to pay the latter 6,000 pounds in gold and silver! And they probably had something left for themselves after that (cf. *supra*, n. 63).

74 On this whole subject, see Thompson, "Commerce of France in the Ninth Century," *loc. cit.*, pp. 858-59, 865-68, 887; Vogel, 233 ff.

75 That the Danegeld of 860-61 proved a heavy burden on the poorer population is evident from the coinage regulations of 861 (cf. *supra*, n. 62). In these Charles almost apologizes for resorting to the Danegeld and declares that it was the only resort left to him as things stood at the time (see the quotations given *infra*, p. 83, n. 114, chap. xvii, n. 20).

much more money into circulation, not only the money of the peasants, but also the hoarded treasures of the Church.⁷⁶ Let it be remarked too, that the usual amount of money in circulation during the ninth century must have been much larger than was until recently assumed. Those who are still inclined to put very strong emphasis on the self-sufficiency of the *villa*, or manor, of this period and on its economic independence of the outside world, would do well to remember that the Danegeld was paid in cash by the tax-payers⁷⁷ and that there are other evidences of the frequent use of money even by *coloni* and serfs.⁷⁸

It would seem very strange indeed if the numerous payments of Danegeld had had no effect whatever on the mining of the precious metals, silver in particular. The only support for such a view would be the fact that our sources fail to supply us with information on the subject. In this case, however, as in most others, the argument from silence had better be studiously avoided. To the present writer it does not seem too bold to assume that as a result of the loss of specie through the payment of Danegeld, and in order to keep a sufficient amount of money in circulation, the output of silver ore at the mines had to be considerably increased.⁷⁹

Mention should also be made at this point of another matter, the full discussion of which must be reserved for the concluding chapter. From various bits of evidence it becomes clear that the Danegeld had a salutary effect on the quality of the West Frankish coinage. The fact that the Vikings insisted on weighing as well as counting the money that was paid to them, must have discouraged the tendency to clip and to falsify the coins.⁸⁶

76 Cf. Soetbeer, *loc. cit.*, VI, 8, 54; Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 867.

77 The argument of Dopsch (*Die Wirtschaftsentwicklung der Karolingerzeit*, II, 253-54, 305) on this point seems almost conclusive. Cf. Soetbeer, *loc. cit.*, p. 54; *infra*, n. 78. Not only the Danegeld but also the old war taxes known as *hostilitium* and *caraticum* (by this time converted into redevances) and various other manorial dues were probably in many cases paid in money. Cf. Guérard, *op. cit.*, pp. 669-70 and n. 10.

78 The various coinage edicts of Louis the Pious and Charles the Bald furnish incontrovertible evidence of the frequent use of cash money by all classes in this period. Practically all the coinage regulations are quoted and elucidated by Soetbeer, *loc. cit.*, pp. 1-112. On the general subject of the money economy of the Carolingian period, see Dopsch, *op. cit.*, II, 252, ff.

79 Cf. Soetbeer, *loc. cit.*, p. 56.

80 Cf. *supra*, n. 61; see also *infra*, chap. xviii and nn. 56-61, especially n. 57.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DANEGELD PAID BY ROBERT THE STRONG IN 862.

The various groups of Vikings referred to in the preceding chapter were in the spring of 862 forced by Charles the Bald to evacuate the West Frankish kingdom. As they left the Seine, these marauders separated into several fleets,¹ the respective destinations of which probably cannot, and for the present purpose need not, be determined. We must note, however, that the larger number of the Vikings proceeded from the Seine mouth directly to Brittany, where they were joined by another group of Northmen just returning from an expedition to the Mediterranean.² It appears that Duke Solomon, of Brittany, who was hostile to the Franks, engaged the Vikings from the Mediterranean as his mercenaries, to harry the region of the lower Loire. But the strategy of the Breton chief was frustrated by Robert the Strong, now "duke," and viceregent of Charles the Bald, in Neustria. Robert captured twelve of the Viking ships and killed all the Vikings on them save a few who escaped by flight.³ Though this was an important success for the Franks, it did not solve their whole problem;⁴ there were the Breton forces still to be reckoned with, and there was the possibility that Solomon might enlist also the Vikings from the Seine in his service. But Robert anticipated his Breton adversary in the matter of negotiating with the freebooters from the Seine. For a consideration of 6,000 pounds of silver the latter declared themselves willing to become his mercenaries and allies against Solomon. The Frankish leader promptly consented to these terms and sealed his bargain by exchanging hostages with the Vikings.⁵

Was Robert's payment a Danegeld? To be sure, the money was not paid expressly in the form of tribute, nor directly for

1 *Supra*, p. 56 and n. 69.

2 *Ann. Bert.*, 862, p. 57. Cf. Vogel, 178, 187-88; Lot, "La Loire, l'Aquitaine et la Seine de 862 à 866," *Bibl. de l'école des chartes*, 1915, LXXVI, 473, 477 and n. 3.

3 *Ann. Bert.*, 862, pp. 57-58. On the position of Robert, see Vogel, 190, n. 1; Favre, *Eudes*, 4, 227 f.; von Kalckstein, *Robert der Tapfere*, 72, 152 ff. Cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, 479, n. 3.

4 Cf. von Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 77.

5 *Ann. Bert.*, 862, p. 58: "Rotbertus autem Salomonem sustinere non valens, cum praefatis Normannis qui de Sequana exierunt, antequam eos Salomon sibi adversus eum adscisceret, [datis] utrimque obsidibus, in sex millibus argenti contra eundem Salomonem convenit." Cf. Vogel, 191.

the purpose of effecting the removal of the Vikings; it was paid rather as a stipend in return for the promised aid of the Northmen against the Bretons under Solomon. If, however, Robert had failed to engage the Vikings from the Seine in the Frankish service, it is very probable — to Robert it must have been a foregone conclusion — that these, like their countrymen from the Mediterranean, would eventually have joined forces with the Bretons. In the latter case, Solomon would probably have undertaken a double invasion of the West Frankish realm, directing the Vikings to ascend the Loire on their ships while he with his Bretons proceeded to attack by land. Thus, in the end the Vikings would, as usual, have established themselves in a fortified camp, from which they could probably not have been dislodged save by the payment of tribute.⁶ All this was avoided by Robert's diplomacy, which, while it prevented Solomon from invading Frankish territory, also kept the Vikings busy in Brittany.⁷ Therefore, since the payment of 862 really had the effect of temporarily keeping the Vikings out of the Loire region, there can be little objection to regarding it, like the payment of 860—61,⁸ as a stipendiary Danegeld.

Our sources indicate neither whence nor how Robert obtained the Danegeld of 862.⁹ But since the tribute of the preceding year, which did not amount to more than 5,000 pounds,¹⁰ could be raised only by means of general taxation,¹¹ it does not seem probable that a sum of 6,000 pounds could have been secured without the levy of taxes. Doubtless these taxes fell in large part if not exclusively upon the population residing within the limits of the territory subject to Robert's authority, i. e. in Neustria.¹²

The Danegeld of this year had, as we have seen, been promised and arranged for by Robert the Strong, "duke" in Neustria.¹³ Though there is no reason to doubt that Charles the Bald fully approved of the sagacious expedient to which Robert had re-

6 Cf. *infra*, n. 19.

7 Vogel, 191-92.

8 See *supra*, pp. 49-50 and nn. 32, 34, 35, 35a.

9 All the information we have concerning this particular Danegeld, is that which is furnished by the *Annals of St. Bertin* (see *supra*, n. 5).

10 Cf. *supra*, pp. 52-53 and n. 54.

11 Cf. *supra*, p. 50 and nn. 36-38, pp. 53-54.

12 Cf. von Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 77, 152 ff.; Lot, *op. cit.*, 477 and n. 3; Favre, *op. cit.*, 5.

13 Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

sorted,¹⁴ it is none the less true that on this occasion it was one of the magnates, not the king, who found it necessary practically to buy off the Vikings. Thus we have here another illustration of the fact that responsibility for the policy of paying Danegeld cannot be fastened exclusively upon Charles the Bald.¹⁵ As will be pointed out later in these pages,¹⁶ the Danegeld was, by reason of a peculiar combination of circumstances, virtually a necessity during the reigns of Charles the Bald and several of his successors; a necessity from which, it would seem, there was no escape for any ruler, royal or otherwise, so long as conditions remained what they were in the latter half of the ninth century.

The payment of 862, or rather the sequel to it, illustrates also the fact that the Danegeld never could be more than a temporary expedient in dealing with the Viking problem. By engaging the Vikings as his mercenaries and paying them a stipend, Robert had, indeed, for a time restrained the freebooters from ravaging Frankish territory and had also warded off a threatened invasion on the part of Solomon of Brittany; the latter, in fact, found himself so hard pressed by the coalition between Robert and the pagans, that in the spring of 863 he deemed it advisable to submit to the king of the Franks.¹⁷ The establishment of friendly relations between Charles the Bald and Solomon, however, appears to have ruptured the coalition of the Franks with the Vikings, for the latter began forthwith¹⁸ to plunder and devastate the region to the south of the Loire.¹⁹ Robert the Strong's payment of Danegeld, therefore, brought security against the Vikings for hardly a year.²⁰

¹⁴ Cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, 477.

¹⁵ Cf. the three preceding chapters.

¹⁶ See *infra*, chap. vii.

¹⁷ *Ann. Bert.*, 863, p. 61. Cf. Vogel, 191-92, 197. Lot, *op. cit.*, 478, underestimates, it seems, the value of Robert's compact with the Vikings. There can be no doubt that the latter by their operations in Brittany caused Solomon to abandon his plan of invading Neustria. Von Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 83, n. 2, calls attention to a passage in Regino's *Chronicle* (866, ed. Kurze, p. 91) which indicates that Charles the Bald was preparing to invade Brittany, but decided to enter into negotiations with Solomon when he saw that the Bretons were prepared to resist to the uttermost. If Regino's statement contains any element of truth, it strengthens the view that the Viking operations had produced a diversion in Brittany; as a result of these operations the offensive had passed from the Bretons to the Franks.

¹⁸ I. e. directly after Solomon's reconciliation with Charles the Bald. See Lot, *op. cit.*, 480, nn. 1, 2.

¹⁹ See Vogel, 197 ff.; Lot, *op. cit.*, 479 ff. According to Lot, *ibid.*, 480 and n. 3, the Vikings established themselves in the lower Loire, on an island which they had occupied once before.

²⁰ From April, 862, to April, 863 (cf. *ibid.*, 477, n. 3, 480, n. 1.)

CHAPTER V.

THE DANEGELD OF 866.

For some time after the departure of the Vikings from the Seine in March, 862,¹ the general course of events in the West Frankish realm points to a gradual but steady improvement in the position of Charles the Bald.² The Treaty of Coblenz (June 5, 860), which definitively closed the hostilities engendered by Louis the German's invasion of the western kingdom in 858 and re-established amicable relations between Charles and his brother, also probably helped to promote a better understanding between Charles and his *fideles*; for after this treaty the rebellious and dissatisfied element among the West Frankish nobility could no longer look for support to their cause from the king of the East Franks.³ Perhaps the best illustration of the increasing accord between Charles and the magnates is the co-operation that was possible at the Assembly of Pitres in June, 864.⁴

The *Edict* issued at Pitres indicates a serious intention on the part of the king — an intention apparently shared and certainly not opposed by the magnates — to enforce the laws and to correct or repress the numerous abuses and disorders prevailing in the land, many of which had grown out of the recent long drawn out occupation of the Seine valley by the Northmen.⁵ This *Edict* shows also that the king was determined to provide adequately against possible future invasion of his realm by the Northmen;⁶ that he intended to place the country in such a state of preparedness as would be sufficient for any emergency. The measures taken by him with that end in view included not only a very emphatic restatement in the *Edict* of the obligation for all classes to render military service in defense of the realm;⁷ they included also the project of building a fortified bridge at

1 *Ann. Bert.*, 862, p. 57; cf. *supra*, p. 56 and n. 69.

2 Vogel, 204; cf. 188-90.

3 Dümmler, I, 461.

4 *Edictum Pistense* [June 25, 864], (A.), *M.G.H., LL.* Sectio II, t. II, p. 311. Cf. Vogel, 203-8.

5 *Edictum Pistense*, (B.), cc. 6, 7, 25, 31, *loc. cit.*, pp. 313-14, 321, 323-24; (C.), c. 1, p. 328.

6 *Ibid.*, (A.), c. 2, p. 311; (B.), cc. 26, 27, 37, pp. 321-22, 327-28; (C.), c. 1, p. 328.

7 *Ibid.*, (B.), cc. 26, 27; (C.), c. 1.

that point on the Seine where the above mentioned assembly met, i. e. at Pitres.⁸ With the aid of this river fortification Charles hoped in the future to be able to prevent the Vikings from ascending the Seine. He appears to have placed a great deal of confidence in this means of defense; and we may admit that if it had been properly developed and completed, the scheme would probably have reduced very materially those advantages which the possession of ships gave the Northmen over the Franks.⁹

It is well known that the military superiority of the Vikings was due in no small measure to their superior mobility. This great mobility, in turn, depended largely if not exclusively on the remarkable rapidity with which they could propel their ships in the rivers, up stream or down.¹⁰ Successfully to oppose an enemy thus equipped, the Franks would have needed a large and efficient fleet; but they possessed most of the time no fleet at all, and never any that was comparable to that of the Vikings.¹¹ Unless, therefore, the Franks would build obstructions in their principal water courses, and thereby bar the passage of hostile fleets, they could hardly hope effectively to prevent the Vikings, either from making sudden surprise attacks on the large river towns, or from establishing themselves in fortified camps on islands in the rivers. And once the Vikings had secured a lodgment for themselves on an island, it was well-nigh impossible for the Franks to eject them; because even such an operation could not be successfully carried out save with the aid of a fleet.¹²

The adoption and development of the idea of a system of fortified bridges built at strategic points in the lower courses

⁸ *Edictum Pistense*, (A), c. 2, p. 311; *Ann. Bert.*, 864, p. 72.

⁹ See Lot, "Melanges carolingiens. II. Le pont de Pitres," *Le Moyen Age*, 1905, IX, 1-6, 9.

¹⁰ See *supra*, chap. i, n. 33; ii, n. 17.

¹¹ On this see Vogel, 36 and n. 1. The fleet employed by Charles the Bald at the siege of Oscellus in 858 (cf. *supra*, pp. 45-48), had been specially constructed for that purpose, and when Charles was forced to give up the siege his fleet fell into the hands of the Vikings. See Lot, "La grande invasion normande," *Bibl. de l'école des chartes*, 1908, LXIX, 28, n. 3.

¹² The Vikings referred to in the preceding note had maintained themselves for five years—from 858 to 861—on the island of Oscellus, and their eventual dislodgment was the work, not of the Franks, but of two groups of their own countrymen who, of course, had adequate fleets at their disposal (cf. *supra*, p. 52 and n. 49, p. 55 and n. 63). For another illustration of the same thing, see Vogel, 148.

of the rivers, therefore constituted a very important advance in the Frankish method of defense against the Viking raids;¹³ a fact of which Charles himself was probably fully aware.¹⁴ Perhaps for this reason and for others to be mentioned presently, the king was inclined at the Assembly of Pitres, in 864, to be somewhat optimistic as regards the future.¹⁵ Practically all the magnates had now returned to allegiance;¹⁶ they had come in large numbers to the assembly¹⁷ and had brought with them laborers, implements, carts, and beasts of burden, for the purpose of bringing to completion the work on the bridgehead at Pitres begun two years earlier.¹⁸ The Aquitanians gave proof of their loyalty by delivering into the hands of Charles his nephew, the traitor Pippin, and even Solomon of Brittany professed his submission and allegiance to the king of the West Franks by paying the customary tribute.¹⁹ From a survey of the general situation in June, 864, one might be led to the conclusion that whatever the Vikings might henceforth attempt on the Seine, there was in any case no likelihood that the king would very soon be placed in such straits as would make it necessary to buy off the foreign enemy by the payment of Danegeld. Yet Charles the Bald did find himself in just that plight less than two years after the Assembly of Pitres.²⁰ In order to ascertain the causes of this rather startling change in the situation of the king, an attempt must be made carefully to analyze certain events that transpired in the meantime.

Toward mid-July, 865,²¹ Vikings had again found their way to the enticing shores of the West Frankish kingdom. Their fleet of fifty ships had without delay moved up the river Seine

13 Vogel, 188-89.

14 *Edict. Pistense*, (A.), c. 2, *loc. cit.*, p. 311; *Ann. Bert.*, 864, p. 72. Cf. Lot, "Le pont de Pitres," *loc. cit.*, pp. 1, 2, 9.

15 *Edict. Pistense*, (A.), cc. 1, 2, *loc. cit.*

16 *Ibid.*, c. 1: "non omnes . . . tamen ex maiori parte observastis." Cf. Vogel, 204.

17 *Edict. Pistense*, *loc. cit.*: "pleniter et cum pace ad hoc nostrum placitum convenistis."

18 *Ibid.*, c. 2; *Ann. Bert.*, 864, p. 72. Cf. Vogel, 204 and n. 3; Lot, *op. cit.*, pp. 1, 4 and n. 1.

19 *Ann. Bert.*, 864, p. 72. Cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

20 *Ann. Bert.*, 866, p. 81, and see *infra*.

21 *Annales Rotomagenses*, 865, *M.G.H.*, *SS.*, XXVI, p. 494. Lot (*op. cit.*, p. 5 and n. 1) appears to have overlooked the statement in the *Annals of Rouen* relative to the arrival of the Northmen; this, however, does not invalidate what he says in the note about the date when Charles left Attigny for Pitres. See *infra*, n. 25.

as far as Pitres.²² Beyond this point the freebooters had not yet advanced, probably because the partly constructed bridgehead²³ at Pitres made further progress temporarily impossible or inadvisable. The time and labor spent in previous years on the fortifications at Pitres had, therefore, not been wasted effort. Even in its state of incompleteness, the bridgehead was capable of functioning for a considerable space of time as an effective obstacle in the path of the invaders.²⁴ Meantime, while the Vikings were being held in check, Charles mobilized an army²⁵ and with it hastened to meet the enemy at Pitres. But, contrary to what might be expected, no engagement took place. Perhaps the Franks, temporarily relying in the strength of their fortifications, decided it would be unnecessary to risk an open battle, or even a sally, so long as the bridgehead could inhibit the Northmen from advancing. The king, however, on the advice of his *fideles*, ordered two more fortified bridges to be built: one at Auvers on the Oise, and another at Charenton on the Marne;²⁶ the evident purpose of these measures being to prevent the Vikings from ascending the tributary streams, in the event that they should succeed in breaking through at Pitres on the Seine. Also, Charles arranged to have both banks of the Seine guarded, assigning this task to a certain Adalard and two relatives of the latter, Hugo and Berengar.²⁷ These various arrangements of the king seem to indicate some doubt on his part as to whether the fortifications at Pitres could permanently prevent the Vikings from continuing their course up the Seine. Yet we must believe that Charles did not apprehend any immediate danger; for, about the middle of the month of September, he journeyed northward to Orville, to enjoy the pleasures

²² *Ann. Bert.*, 865, p. 78.

²³ Lot (*op. cit.*, p. 5) and Vogel (p. 213, n. 4) agree that the fortifications at Pitres were not complete when the Northmen arrived in 865.

²⁴ It is difficult to find any other reason for the fact that the Vikings halted at Pitres, and the sequel shows that they had intended to advance much farther up the Seine. Lot admits (*op. cit.*, p. 17) that in 885 the bridge at Pitres probably did function in the manner indicated.

²⁵ Lot (*ibid.*, p. 5, n. 2, and p. 6) indicates that the Frankish army had been mobilized before the Northmen entered the Seine, and that upon the news of their arrival Charles at once set out from Attigny to Pitres. This appears unlikely in view of the fact that the Northmen entered the Seine in July, while Charles did not depart from Attigny before the middle of August. Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

²⁶ *Ann. Bert.*, 865, p. 79. Cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

²⁷ *Ann. Bert.*, 865, p. 79: "deputatis custodibus qui utrasque ripas custodirent, etc.;" *ibid.*, p. 80: "Adalardo, cui custodiam contra Nortmannos [Karolus] commiserat, sed et suis propinquis Hugoni et Berengario, etc."

Danegeld. 5.

of the chase,²⁸ thereby indicating that he no longer regarded his own presence in the Seine region as essential. Did he believe that all necessary precautions against an advance on the part of the Vikings had now been taken?

Whatever confidence Charles may have had in his measures of defense was soon put to shame. Hardly had he departed on his journey northward when the negligence of the guardians on the Seine became evident. They failed to place any of their forces on the north bank of the river, and therefore could not, or at any rate did not, prevent a detachment of about two hundred Vikings from proceeding to Paris for the purpose of securing wine; moreover, they permitted these freebooters to return from their futile errand unscathed. It is true, however, that when, somewhat later, another band of five hundred Northmen attempted a raid to the south on Chartres, they were repulsed with losses by the Frankish forces stationed on the left bank of the Seine.²⁹

What effect had the two incidents just described on the relations between Charles the Bald and his chief guardian on the Seine? Did Adalard's failure to guard the right bank of the Seine lead the king to suspect disloyalty on the part of his *fidelis*?³⁰ And was the later repulse of the Vikings headed for Chartres, insufficient to allay the suspicion?³¹ While our sources give no definite answers to these questions, they do furnish evidence of a growing estrangement between Adalard and the king. We know that in October, 865, shortly after the events referred to in the preceding paragraph, Charles the Bald secured, at a meeting with his brother in Cologne, the cancellation of the proposed marriage of Adalard's daughter to the son of Louis the German.³² This action on the part of Charles, whether or not it may be interpreted as having been at least in part dictated by a desire to revenge the disloyalty of Adalard, could hardly fail to bring a crisis in the relations between the king

28 *Ann. Bert.*, 865, p. 79.

29 *Ibid.* Cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 7, n. 4.

30 Cf. Lot, "Une année du règne de Charles le Chauve. Année 866," *Le Moyen Age*, 1902, VI, 435, n. 3, last sentence.

31 It is possible that Adalard and his companions had been charged with the defense of only the right bank of the river, and that the defense of the left bank had been committed to others (Lot, "Le pont de Pitres," *loc. cit.*, p. 7); if so, there was all the more reason to doubt the good faith of Adalard.

32 *Ann. Bert.*, 865, pp. 79-80.

and his ambitious vassal. If, as seems probable, these relations had been strained almost to the breaking point even before the actual cancellation of the marriage project,³³ then that event must unquestionably have been followed by a complete rupture.³⁴ And the sequel of events will point to a deep causal relation between this rupture on the one hand and the ultimate collapse of Frankish resistance to the Vikings on the other.

On the return from Cologne Charles was met by the news that the Vikings had entered the monastery of St. Denis on October 20, and that they had remained there for almost three weeks undisturbed by anyone. The marauders were said to have obtained a vast amount of booty from the monastery and then, after much devastation, to have returned to their camp, located only a short distance from St. Denis.³⁵ All of which signified that the Vikings had been able at last to break through the defenses at Pitres, and that the men appointed to guard the banks of the Seine — Adalard, Hugo, and Berengar — had for some reason failed to do their duty. Indeed it seems there had been no opposition whatever to the Northmen, not even an attempt to intercept them on their return from St. Denis.³⁶

In the light of what we know about the relations between Charles the Bald and Adalard at this time, the meaning of these facts is clear. We may legitimately conclude that Adalard and his relatives had, by way of retaliation, purposely neglected the defense of the Seine in order to embarrass the king; that, therefore, these magnates were largely if not exclusively responsible for the success of the Viking enterprise and, consequently, for the creation of a situation which was eventually to lead to the payment of another Danegeld. And these conclusions are strengthened by the fact that Charles, after his return from Cologne, divested Adalard, Hugo, and Berengar of their *honores*, on the ground that they had failed to render services of any value against the Northmen.³⁷

33 See *supra*, n. 30.

34 See Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 7, n. 4.

35 *Ann. Bert.*, 865, p. 80; *Annales sancti Germani minores*, 865, *M.G.H.*, *SS.*, IV, p. 3. Cf. Vogel, 214, n. 2.

36 *Ann. Bert.*, 865, p. 80: "[Nortmanni] sine contradictione culusquam ad castra sua . . . sunt reversi."

37 *Ibid.*, p. 80; *Ann. s. Germani minores*, *loc. cit.* For further information on the general significance of the humiliation of Adalard, etc., see Vogel, 220, n. 3.

The poor performance and bad faith of Adalard and his supporters did not induce the king to give up all thought of dealing with the Vikings in a military way. As already indicated, the Northmen were by this time firmly established on an island in the Seine near the monastery of St. Denis.³⁸ Charles seems to have determined if possible to prevent them from ascending farther up the river. He stationed guards (*scaræ*) along both banks of the Seine,³⁹ and entrusted the direction of the operations of defense to *fideles* in whom he probably felt he could repose confidence: Robert the Strong, Count Odo of Chartres, and certain others whose names we do not know.⁴⁰ Apparently satisfied of the sufficiency of these precautionary measures, the king presently repaired northward to Senlis, to celebrate the solemnities of Christmas.⁴¹

Again the faith of the king in the Frankish power of resistance and in the loyalty of his *fideles* was to be shattered. Early in 866⁴² the Vikings moved up the Seine as far as Melun. The Frankish troops followed them, one column on each side of the river. At Melun the Northmen left their ships and launched an attack on that one of the Frankish columns, which seemed the larger and stronger, and which was commanded by Robert and Odo.⁴³ Contrary to what might have been expected of troops led by Robert the Strong, these men took to flight without striking a blow, and the Vikings, having loaded their ships with booty, returned safely to camp.⁴⁴

This unfortunate adventure is so out of harmony with what is otherwise known of the career and the exploits of Robert

38 *Ann. Bert.*, 865, p. 80: "Nortmanni tertia decima Kalend. Novembris monasterium S. Dionysii intraverunt; . . . post multam deprædationem ad castra sua non longe ab eodem monasterio sunt reversi." Cf. *ibid.*, 866, p. 81: "Nortmanni mense Iunio ab insula secus monasterium S. Dionysii movent."

39 *Ibid.*, 865, p. 80: "dimissis custodibus contra eosdem Nortmannos"; *ibid.*, 866, p. 81: "scaræ Karoli ex utraque parte ipsius fluminis [Sequanæ] perperunt." Cf. Vogel, 214.

40 Hincmar tells us (*Ann. Bert.*, 866, p. 81) that Robert and Odo commanded the larger and stronger of the *scaræ* mentioned in the preceding note. The names of those who commanded the other *scara* are not given.

41 *Ibid.*, 865, p. 80. Towards the close of the year, the Vikings had lost some of their men as a result of various diseases which broke out among them. Knowledge of this fact led Charles to believe that there was no immediate danger to be feared.

42 Lot, "Une année . . . de Charles le Chauve," *loc. cit.*, 398, n. 2.

43 Cf. *ibid.*, 396, n. 4, 397.

44 *Ann. Bert.*, 866, pp. 80-81.

the Strong, that one is tempted to inquire whether there may not have been special reasons for what happened on this occasion. It is well known that, in 861, very cordial relations had been established between Charles the Bald and Robert, and that in consequence thereof the latter had received not only large holdings of land but also the *ducatum inter Ligerim et Sequanam*.⁴⁵ From 861 to 865 Robert was practically ruler, and military commander-in-chief, of the district between the Seine and the Loire; and as such he rendered very distinguished and very valuable services by his campaigns against the Northmen and the Bretons,⁴⁶ respectively. But in 865 Charles divested Robert of the military authority, and also of certain holdings, in Neustria, to make room for his eldest son, Louis, surnamed the Stammerer. Presumably it was by way of recompense for what he had lost in Neustria, that Robert was granted the counties of Auxerre and Nevers in Burgundy.⁴⁷ Why Charles made this change can only be conjectured. It is difficult to believe that it had been suggested or even approved of by Robert, whose position in Burgundy certainly did not give him the prestige and power which he had possessed as the lord and defender of Neustria.⁴⁸ With more reason, the affair may be regarded as an indication that Robert had temporarily lost his influence with the king, and that the latter was now acting at the instigation of that party at his court which sought to advance the interests of Prince Louis.⁴⁹ In any case, the removal of Robert to Burgundy was a blunder — a blunder which Charles later found it necessary to correct so far as possible.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, after the dismissal of Adalard and his relatives, the king had summoned Robert to the defense of the Seine.⁵¹ And we have seen how poor an account Robert gave of himself in the discharge of this commission. Though the *scara* commanded by Robert and Odo was the larger and stronger of the two Frankish divisions, it fled before the Vikings without striking a blow, and apparently Robert and Odo fled with it.⁵²

⁴⁵ *Ann. Bert.*, 861, p. 55; Regino, *Chronicon*, 861, ed. Kurze, p. 79. Cf. Vogel, 189, 190 and n. 1, where further references are given on this point.

⁴⁶ Lot, "La Loire, l'Aquitaine et la Seine de 862 à 866," *Bibl. de l'école des chartes*, 1915, LXXVI, 473 ff.; Vogel, 190-92, 197, 198, 208-10.

⁴⁷ *Ann. Bert.*, 865, p. 79. Lot, *op. cit.*, 497 and n. 7, 498.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 497, n. 7.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 498.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 501; *id.*, "Une année . . . de Charles le Chauve," *loc. cit.*, 400 ff.

⁵¹ Cf. *supra*, nn. 37, 39, 40.

⁵² Cf. *supra*, nn. 43, 44.

By reason of the fact that we have no record of such or similar conduct on the part of Robert on any other occasion, some students of this period have been inclined to believe, either that Hincmar is guilty of exaggeration in reporting this event, or that the fiasco was due to a panic produced among the Frankish troops by the suddenness of the Viking attack; both of which views serve admirably to exonerate the character of Robert.⁵³ It should be noted, however, that these explanations of the affair at Melun are based on an assumption: the assumption that Robert's attitude toward the king was still one of undiluted loyalty and perfect good faith. They fail to take into account the possibility that Robert had been nettled by his removal from Neustria to Burgundy. It would seem indeed very strange, being exactly the opposite of what had happened in 858,⁵⁴ if Robert had now permitted himself to be superseded by Prince Louis, with entire good will and without exhibiting any signs of dissatisfaction or taking any measures to secure rehabilitation. It appears much more probable that, though he continued to exhibit a more or less superficial loyalty in the royal service, Robert really was looking about for an opportunity to force Charles to reinstate him in the position he had formerly held in Neustria; a position whose importance was second only to that of the king himself.⁵⁵ Such an opportunity offered itself at Melun, and Robert knew how to exploit it. This interpretation of Robert's discomfiture will be found in perfect accord with later events and on the whole seems much more satisfactory than those previously referred to.

After the fiasco at Melun Charles gave up all hope of expelling the Northmen, and even of holding them in check, by military measures. That was evidently out of the question so long as he could not count on the loyal co-operation of the *fideles*; for without such co-operation it was impossible to secure forces

⁵³ von Kalckstein, *Robert d. Tapfere*, 101; Vogel, 215; Lot, *op. cit.*, 398, nn. 1, 3. Later, Lot evidently changed his opinion on this matter; see his "Le pont de Pitres," *loc. cit.*, 9. n. 2.

⁵⁴ On this see von Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 52 ff.

⁵⁵ Cf. Lot, "Le pont de Pitres," *loc. cit.* In fact, the policy of Robert led precisely to the result indicated in the text. So far from losing the favor of the king after his disgraceful flight before the Vikings, Robert increased in that favor and became even more powerful and influential than he had been before he was transferred to Burgundy in 865. Cf. *id.*, "Une année . . . de Charles le Chauve," *loc. cit.*, 400-2; von Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 102 ff.; *infra*, pp. 90-91 and notes.

that would be equal to the task.⁵⁶ There remained, therefore, only one alternative for securing the removal of the Vikings, namely, the payment of Danegeld. Obviously it would be better to submit to this than to expose the country to further violence and devastation at the hands of the Vikings. Negotiations with the invaders were opened,⁵⁷ and Charles the Bald found it necessary to consent to what has usually been regarded as a disgraceful treaty.⁵⁸ That its terms were very humiliating may be admitted, but responsibility for the treaty must be fixed on the disloyal and negligent magnates more than on the king. Charles had throughout the period of this invasion displayed considerable activity at least in devising and preparing various measures to hold the Vikings in check; but all his precautions had been rendered futile by the willful recreancy of those *fideles* to whom the operations of defense had been entrusted.⁵⁹

The Northmen agreed to depart from the West Frankish realm,⁶⁰ and presumably to refrain from further devastation and plundering, in return for a payment of 4,000 pounds of silver according to their (the Northmen's) weight.⁶¹ In addition to this sum of money, the invaders may have demanded a certain quantity of wine.⁶² The pact further included the following stipulations: slaves, who had been captured by the Northmen, but who ran away from them after the conclusion of the treaty, were to be either returned to the Vikings or re-

56 Dümmler, I, 222 and n. 1; II, 107; Lot, "La grande invasion nor-mande," *loc. cit.*, 7, n. 4; Waitz, *D. Verfassungsgesch.*, III, 560-61; Prou, "De la nature du service militaire du par les roturiers aux XIe et XIIe siècles," *Rev. Hist.*, 1890, XLIV, 314.

57 *Ann. Bert.*, 866, p. 81: "Karolus cum eisdem Nortmannis . . . paciscitur."

58 *Ann. Bert.*, ed. Dehaisnes, p. 154, note (a); Vogel, 215.

59 Cf. *supra*, pp. 65 ff.

60 This may be inferred from the fact that the Vikings made preparations for their departure while they were awaiting the payment of the tribute (*Ann. Bert.*, 866, ed. Waitz, p. 81, bottom).

61 *Ibid.*, p. 81: "Karolus cum eisdem Nortmannis in quattuor millium libris argenti ad pensam eorum paciscitur." The words, *ad pensam eorum*, seem to indicate that the money was to be weighed by the Vikings on their own scales. Evidently Frankish and Danish weights were not identical (cf. Soetbeer, "Beiträge z. Gesch. d. Geld- und Münzwesens," *Forsch. z. d. Gesch.*, VI, 55-56. In 860, the Vikings had demanded 3,000 pounds *pondere examinato* (see *supra*, chap. III, nn. 32, 61), which does not necessarily mean that Danish scales were used in the weighing. What Lot says on this subject ("Une année . . . de Charles le Chauve," *loc. cit.*, 399, n. 1) is not to the point; see Soetbeer, *op. cit.*, pp. 8, 9.

62 At least the *regni primores* were required to furnish a *coniectum* toward the Danegeld *tam in argento quam et in vino* (see *infra*, n. 136).

deemed at a price named by the latter; and if one of the Northmen were killed, the Franks were to pay the amount of money (*wergeld*) demanded for him.⁶³

To raise the Danegeld, Charles levied taxes — though, as will be shown, it probably was not intended that they should be construed as taxes — on all the important kinds of property and resources⁶⁴ within his kingdom, which at this time included Francia, Neustria, and Burgundy.⁶⁵ It appears that four different assessments and collections were necessary before the entire sum demanded by the Vikings was forthcoming.⁶⁶ In the following discussion each of the assessments will be studied separately and in the order it was issued.

By the first assessment, taxes were laid on all dependent holdings of land and on the property of merchants and priests,⁶⁷ and the payment of the *heribannus* was required of all free

⁶³ *Ann. Bert.*, 866, p. 81.

⁶⁴ This statement is not intended to imply that all those who owned or were in possession of property or resources contributed in proportion to their ability to pay, or that there was no shifting of the burden of taxation; it refers solely to the manner in which, according to our sources, the taxes were distributed by the king. It is true that there is no specific mention, in any of the assessments, of demesnes or dominant holdings (*mansi indominicati*). But all owners or tenants of such property were at least freemen; and all freemen were required to pay the *heerbann* (see *infra*, n. 68), which, as we shall see, was in this case tantamount to a tax. Moreover, the demesnes included in the beneficiary holdings, or *honores*, of the *fideles* of the king were, at least in theory, directly affected by the last two assessments; see *infra*, pp. 87 ff. and nn. 136, 137, 143. It is true also that the comparatively scarce kinds of dependent holdings, as for example *mansi censiles* and *mansi tidiles*, were ignored in all the assessments levied by the king. But, despite that, they probably did not escape taxation; see *infra*, n. 69 and cf. n. 124.

⁶⁵ Cf. *supra*, chap. iii, nn. 37, 38. *Ann. Bert.*, 866, p. 81: "indicta per regnum suum conlatione ad idem exsolvendum tributum." These words surely indicate that the tax was levied in the entire kingdom of Charles the Bald, including Francia, Neustria, and Burgundy, but not Aquitaine (cf. Lot, "Une année . . . de Charles le Chauve," *loc. cit.*, 412 and n. 2), which was a separate kingdom (*id.*, "La Loire, l'Aquitaine et la Seine," *loc. cit.*, 496-97). Lot takes a different view ("Une année . . . de Charles le Chauve," *loc. cit.*, 400, n. 2), which is based on a supposed analogy between the Danegeld of 866 and that of 877. In 877 Neustria was, to be sure, not included in the assessment levied for the Danegeld demanded by the Vikings of the Seine; it applied only to Francia and Burgundy. But there was a special reason for the exclusion of Neustria from this assessment, namely, that the Neustrians were to raise another Danegeld for the Vikings of the Loire, a fact which is carefully pointed out by Hincmar (*Ann. Bert.*, 877, p. 135). For a fuller discussion of this matter, see *infra*, p. 98 and n. 38. If, however, it is reasonably certain that the tax of 866 had been levied by Charles throughout his kingdom, it is very doubtful that it could be collected everywhere. Cf. *infra*, pp. 89-90.

⁶⁶ *Ann. Bert.*, 866, p. 81; cf. *infra*, nn. 135, 136.

⁶⁷ *Ann. Bert.*, 866, p. 81: "de unoquoque manso ingenuilli exiguntur sex denarii et de servilli tres et de accola unus et de duobus hospitiis unus de-

Franks.⁶⁸ Each *mansus ingenuilis* was assessed at six *denarii*, and each *mansus servilis*, at three;⁶⁹ one *denarius* was demanded for each *accola*⁷⁰ and for every two *hospitia*,⁷¹ respectively. The merchants were required to contribute a tenth of all they possessed;⁷² and the priests similarly were taxed on the basis of

narius et decima de omnibus quae negotiatores videbantur habere; sed et a presbiteris secundum quod unusquisque habuit vectigal exigitur." Cf. *infra*, n. 119.

68 *Ann. Bert.*, 866, p. 81: "heribanni de omnibus Francis accipiuntur." The *Franci* were the *liberi homines*, as is proved by the *Edict. Pistense* [864], (B.), c. 34, *loc. cit.*, pp. 325-26, where the two terms are used synonymously. They all owed military service, but since the time of Charlemagne the character and amount of this service had varied according to the resources of each one (*ibid.*, cc. 26, 27, p. 321; cf. Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 558 ff.). The amount of the *heerbann* had varied in a similar way (see *infra*, n. 75). The term *Franci* as employed by Hincmar in the quotation given at the beginning of this note must be taken to include not only ordinary freemen, but also those who possessed jurisdictional rights and were under obligation to lead the freemen, over whom they exercised such rights to the army muster (cf. Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 326 ff., 335, 459 ff., 597, 604; Guérard, ed., *Polypt. d'Irminon*, I, (Prolég.), pp. 212 ff.). In other words it must be assumed that the *heerbann*, as one of the taxes levied for the Danegeld of 866, was due not only from freemen of lesser rank and fortune, but also—and at the standard rate of sixty *solidi* (cf. *infra*, p. 76)—from all seigniors who were laymen, including counts and other magnates. The king knew or ought to have known, through the reports of the counts and the *missi*, how many free Franks there were in each *pagus*, or county (*Edict. Pistense*, (B.), c. 27, *loc. cit.*, p. 321).

69 *Mansi*, *accolae*, and *hospitia*, are the names applied to the tenures which, together with the *mansus indomiticatus* on which they depended, made up a large estate, or *villa*. The holders of such tenures were, as a rule, either *coloni* or serfs; but in the ninth century the character of each tenure was fixed by custom, and did not depend on the condition of the tenant. *Coloni* might hold *mansi serviles*, and serfs, *mansi ingenuiles*. The real distinction between different kinds of dependent tenures was, at this time, economic. As a rule, more services and redevances were required from holders of *mansi serviles* than from those of *mansi ingenuiles*, regardless of whether the actual tenant was a *colonus* or a serf (cf. Sée, *Les classes rurales et le rég. dom. en France*, 28-42, 45-68; Guérard, *op. cit.*, 233 ff., 277 ff., 577 ff.; Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, I, 212). Lot's statement ("Une année . . . de Charles le Chauve," *loc. cit.*, 399, n. 2), that the "*mansus ingenuilis* est le manse tenu par un colon," is inaccurate, for such tenures were often held by serfs. Cf. Vogel, 215, n. 2. The *mansi lidiles* and the *mansi censiles* are not mentioned by Hincmar as having been taxed. But he may have meant to include them in the *mansi ingenuiles*, from which they did not at this period essentially differ. The question is not of much importance, for these holdings were few in number at the time of Charlemagne, and were rapidly disappearing (Sée, *op. cit.*, 38 ff.).

70 *Accola* here means a tenure, not a person, as Lot seems to think (*op. cit.*, 399, n. 3). Evidently the *accola* was estimated at about one third of the value of a *mansus servilis*. See Guérard, *op. cit.*, 426, n. 2, 630 and n. 24.

71 The *hospitium*, like the *mansus* and the *accola*, was a tenure. It is difficult to determine the character of the *hospitium* in any precise way, for it probably varied somewhat according to time and place. Here it is estimated at half the value of an *accola*. Cf. *ibid.*, 627 ff.; Sée, *op. cit.*, 63-65.

72 In 860 the amounts paid by merchants toward the Danegeld had been proportioned to the value of their houses and movables. Cf. *supra*, chap. iii, n. 36.

the value of their resources.⁷³ The *heribannus*, originally a fine amounting to sixty *solidi* in each case,⁷⁴ here appears to be tantamount to a tax. If, as seems probable, this *heerbann* was proportioned to the circumstances of those liable to pay it,⁷⁵ we may justly regard it, like the other imposts of the first assessment, as in fact though not in theory a tax on property or resources.⁷⁶

These rates of assessment — the most detailed and specific that have been thus far furnished — must now be subjected to closer scrutiny. It seems desirable to ascertain first what information they yield concerning the legal basis of the Danegeld considered as an impost. The question as to how this form of taxation — unknown throughout the period preceding the reign of Charles the Bald — was legalized, is, it will be agreed, one of fundamental importance in the study of the Danegeld, and particularly in the study of its institutional development.

Very significant from the viewpoint of such an inquiry is the obligation placed on all free Franks (*Franci*) to pay the *heribannus*, or *heerbann*. Ordinarily and regularly, the *heerbann* of sixty *solidi* had always been and still was a fine levied on freemen who when summoned to the army failed to go.⁷⁷ But the *heerbann* with which we are here concerned cannot be con-

73 See *supra*, n. 67.

74 Brunner, *op. cit.*, II, 213; cf. *supra*, n. 68.

75 The *heerbann* had been so proportioned even by Charlemagne (Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 557, n. 4), but in the later years of his reign Charlemagne seems to have exacted the full *heerbann* in each case (*ibid.*, 564, n. 1). However that may be, it is certain that Charles the Bald in the year 864 exacted a *heerbann* proportionate to the resources of the freemen (*Edict. Pistense*, (B.), c. 27, *loc. cit.*, p. 322), for he refers to the "discretionem, quae in progenitorum nostrorum, capitulo XIV continetur," which is a restatement of the capitulary of 805 on this subject. See Baldamus, *Das Heerwesen unter den späteren Karolingern* (in Gierke's *Untersuchungen z. d. Staats- und Rechtsgesch.*, IV), p. 36; Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 564, n. 1; Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, XCVII, 553; cf. *infra*, pp. 76-77.

76 This statement is not intended to imply that military service, for the non-performance of which the *heerbann* was the regular fine, rested on the property. In principle and in legal theory, that had always been and doubtless still was the obligation of every free man. *Edict. Pistense* [864], (B.), c. 25, *loc. cit.*, p. 322: "ad defensionem patriae omnes sine ulla excusatione veniant." Cf. Roth, *Gesch. d. Beneficialwesens*, 402. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that we have here an excellent illustration of how the principles and legal theories of an age lag far behind the facts of that age. Cf. Brunner, *op. cit.*, II, 202 ff.; Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 538; Baldamus, *op. cit.*, 4-11.

77 Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 548, 557 ff.; cf. *supra*, n. 74.

sidered a penalty for the non-performance of military service.⁷⁸ It is rather a tax levied as a substitute for military service, and as such it resembles in some ways the feudal payment which in England was called scutage.⁷⁹ Accordingly, the liability of the Frankish freeman to pay this tax must have rested partly on his obligation to render military service at the summons of the king; and partly on a theory in law that the king might, if he chose, dispense with the personal services and exact instead what was regarded as the equivalent in money.⁸⁰ To indicate a legal ground, other than this, on which freemen might have been held liable to contribute toward the Danegeld, would be difficult if not impossible; since according to a very old and still at least formally valid principle, they could not be taxed on either their persons or their property.⁸¹

But the collection of the *heerbann* as a substitute for military service was, it should be noted, in all likelihood an innovation due to the exigencies created by the Viking invasions. For, to say the least, it is extremely doubtful that the predecessors of Charles the Bald had ever, in theory and principle, exacted the *heerbann* otherwise than as a penalty.⁸² It is true, to be sure, that the possibility of evading active service in the field had always existed for every freeman who was able and willing to pay the *heerbann*.⁸³ It is true also, that in the past there had

78 Cf. Baldamus, *op. cit.*, 10. Examples are not wanting of an analogous use of the word somewhat earlier; see Brunner, *op. cit.*, II, 212 and n. 41; cf. *infra*, n. 82.

79 Commutation of military service into a money payment was not unknown even to the Romans. On the whole subject see Baldwin, *The Scutage and Knight Service in England*, 1-17; cf. Viollet, *Histoire des institutions politiques et administratives de la France*, II, 433-34. There is reason to believe that the Carolingians applied this principle regularly with respect to merchants. See Baldamus, *op. cit.*, 40-60; and cf. *infra*, p. 86 and n. 127.

80 Cf. Lot, "Une année . . . de Charles le Chauve," *loc. cit.*, 399, n. 4; Viollet, *op. cit.*, II, 433 and n. 6.

81 Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 112; Brunner, *op. cit.*, II, 234; Viollet, *op. cit.*, I, 323, 82 Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 575, n. 4. I cannot agree with Lot when he says (*op. cit.*, 399, n. 4) that the *Capitulary of Thionville* of 805 (*M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. i, p. 125, c. 19*) perhaps offers an example of the commutation of military service into a money payment. The *heerbann*, according to that capitulary, was exacted as a fine for the non-performance of military duty (cf. Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 557). Brunner, *op. cit.*, II, 212, refers to a money payment, sometimes called *heerbann*, which was paid in lieu of the *hostilitium* and *carnaticum* by the unfree peasants to their seigniors. This is, of course, not the same thing as the ordinary *heerbann* of the free Franks, which, so far as my observations go, was up to this time always paid, in theory at least, as a fine for the non-fulfillment of military obligations.

83 Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 575: "Auf die Strafe kam am Ende alles an. Wer diese zahlen wollte, konnte zu Hause bleiben."

been many abuses in the collection of the *heerbann*; frequently, no doubt, it had been exacted in cases where it was not legitimately due.⁸⁴ Perhaps, therefore, what Charles the Bald had done was not at the time understood to be, or generally recognized as, an innovation. But, however that may have been, the collection of the *heerbann* as a tax did in fact introduce a new principle — a principle based on the legal fiction that the king had the right to demand from every freeman *either* personal military service *or* its money equivalent — in the future application of which the kings and the great feudal nobles, the latter being the real successors to the authority of the Carolingian monarchs, were to secure for themselves important financial resources.⁸⁵

Before dismissing the subject of the *heerbann*, attention must be directed once more⁸⁶ to the fact that this exaction had, even as early as the time of Charlemagne — when it was in theory regarded exclusively as a fine — sometimes been graduated in proportion, more or less, to the means of those who were liable to pay it. Thus, in 805, freemen possessing movables⁸⁷ worth but one pound, paid a *heerbann* of not more than five *solidi*; others with movables worth two or three pounds, paid ten and thirty *solidi*, respectively; and only those whose personal property was valued at six pounds, paid the standard rate of sixty *solidi*.⁸⁸ This graduated scale of the *heerbann* of 805 is important, in part because it illustrates the usual policy of Charlemagne, but more especially because it was also the scale adopted by Charles the Bald in 864; for we know that in the latter year Charles the Bald issued a capitulary which, in so far as it referred to the *heerbann*, was virtually a restatement of the provisions of Charlemagne in 805.⁸⁹ It is true, however, that in 864 Charles the Bald had levied the *heerbann* as a *fine*; was the *tax*, in 866, similarly graduated in proportion to the resources of the tax-payers? To this question it is not possible to give a conclusive answer. But since there is no reason to suppose that Charles the Bald had changed his policy in this matter

⁸⁴ Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 579, n. 2; Brunner, *op. cit.*, II, 165.

⁸⁵ See Borrelli de Serres, *Recherches sur divers services publics du XIIIe au XVIIe siècle*, 467-528.

⁸⁶ Cf. *supra*, nn. 68, 75.

⁸⁷ The fine could not be exacted in land or slaves; see Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 557, n. 3.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, n. 4.

⁸⁹ Cf. *supra*, n. 75.

between 864 and 866,⁹⁰ it seems probable that the graduated scale applied to the *heerbann* as a fine in 805 and again in 864, was also followed in 866, when the exaction was levied, not as a fine, but as one of the taxes to raise the Danegeld.

We have seen that the *heerbann* demanded for the Danegeld of 866 was in legal theory a money payment substituted for active military service. But what was the legal basis of the other taxes levied for the same purpose? Obviously it will not be improper, in attempting to find a solution of this problem, to proceed on the hypothesis that all the taxes for the Danegeld rested on the same basis; that they were all legalized on the ground that they were substitutes for the service of war. The conversion of this hypothesis into a well supported theory will involve the establishment in fact of the following points: (1) that each of the people whom the king held responsible for the taxes was regularly liable to an amount or a degree of military service which corresponded more or less to the sum of money now demanded from him for the Danegeld; and (2) that in the case of these taxpayers just as in that of the men from whom the *heerbann* was demanded, there were cogent reasons why the king should have desired to avoid undisguised taxation and preferred to exact the contributions on the ground that they were substitutes for military service.

A glance at the distribution of the taxes for the Danegeld of 866, according to the first assessment, will immediately reveal the fact that the bulk of these taxes had been levied on various kinds of dependent holdings — *mansi ingenuiles*, *mansi serviles*, *accolae*, *hospitia* — whose occupants belonged, for the most part, to the class of unfree peasants. But Frankish law did not require, or at least had not heretofore required unfree persons — *coloni*, *servi*, and certain others of similar condition — to render personal military service in the field. That was an obligation which, in legal principle, rested only on freemen (*franci*).⁹¹ Moreover, it must be admitted that the unfree peasants, with exception of those who were attached to the royal domain, owed neither services nor payments, of any kind, to the king directly;

90 The *Edict. Pistense* of 864 (see *supra*, n. 75) was intended to be an edict with general application for the future, and not only a temporary regulation for the current year.

91 Brunner, *op. cit.*, II, 202 ff.; Roth, *op. cit.*, 392 ff.; Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 538. Cf. *supra*, nn. 68, 76.

they were under direct obligations only to their seigniors.⁹² Accordingly, if we assume for the moment that the taxes levied on the dependent holdings were legalized on the ground that they were substitutes for military service, we are obliged to conclude that this military service was not owed directly by the peasants actually occupying those holdings; but, on the same assumption, that it must have been thus owed by the seigniors in control of the great estates which included the dependent holdings of the peasants.

From the seigniors, ecclesiastical as well as lay, the Frankish kings demanded very important services in time of war. Charlemagne had required of seigniors, in addition to what was incumbent on them as freemen, a special and supplementary service commensurate with the jurisdictional rights they exercised and proportioned to the resources at their disposal.⁹³ While it may be true that some few of the seigniors had by the time of Charles the Bald been able to free themselves of this burden, there are not many such cases on record;⁹⁴ and it is safe to assume that most of the great landholders — bishops, abbots, and lay seigniors — could, in principle at least, still be required to render their share of military service.⁹⁵ The special military obligation of a seignior included not only the duty to lead the freemen living within his jurisdiction, properly armed and equipped, to the place where the army was to be mustered;⁹⁶ it included also that he furnish a certain number of oxen, wagons, and other war equipment, sufficient for the needs of his contingent of fighters.⁹⁷ The outlay involved in furnishing this *matériel* was supplied by the proceeds of certain annual war taxes (*hostilitium, carnaticum*) levied by the seigniors on the holdings of their unfree tenants — chiefly on the *mansi ingenuiles* but also, in some cases, on the *mansi serviles*.⁹⁸ These taxes were collected, sometimes in kind and sometimes in money, once a year by the

92 Sée, *op. cit.*, 26 ff.; cf. Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 625 and n. 2.

93 Cf. *supra*, n. 68. On the special obligations of the seigniors, see Guérard, *op. cit.*, 661; Fustel de Coulanges, *Les transform. de la royauté*, 519–23; Roth, *op. cit.*, 409 ff.; Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 621 ff.; Brunner, *op. cit.*, II, 212.

94 Guérard, *op. cit.*, II, 675–77; Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 583.

95 Cf. Prou, *op. cit.*, p. 323.

96 See the letter of Charlemagne to Abbot Fulrad (*M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 1. 168*), and cf. Roth, *op. cit.*, 408.

97 See the references cited *supra*, n. 93.

98 Sée, *op. cit.*, 92; cf. Roth, *op. cit.*, 410, n. 97.

ministeriales of the seignior.⁹⁹ It may be admitted that Charlemagne had probably never required either all the freemen or all the seigniors to render military service each year, and that his successors had demanded this service from their *fideles* and their subjects with much less frequency than Charlemagne;¹⁰⁰ but it must be insisted that none of the Carolingian monarchs had ever abdicated their right to it. Accordingly, the military obligation of the Franks, seigniors as well as ordinary freemen, remained during the reign of Charles the Bald, in principle and in law, essentially the same as it had been in the time of his grandfather.¹⁰¹

Charles the Bald, accordingly, had a perfect legal right to demand from the various seigniors not only the regular military service due from them as freemen — though this was of course not due from ecclesiastical seigniors personally — but also, except in certain rare instances, the additional service due from them as seigniors. We have seen that Charles, in exacting the *heerbann* for the purposes of the Danegeld, had virtually claimed with respect to the military service required of freemen as such, the power to substitute for the specific performance of that service the payment of a money equivalent.¹⁰² Why should he not have claimed the same power with respect to the additional services required of the seigniors? Indeed, was not that precisely what he did when he levied taxes for the Danegeld on all dependent holdings throughout his kingdom? On what other ground could such taxes have been legally justified?¹⁰³ To the

99 Guérard, in the *Prologomènes* to his edition of the *Polypt. d'Irminon*, pp. 660–75, has the most complete discussion of these matters; for other references see *supra*, n. 93.

100 Prenzel, *Geschichte der Kriegsverfassung unter den Karolingern von der Mitte des achten bis zum Ende des neunten Jahrhunderts*, Erster Teil, 29–37. On the disinclination of the *fideles* of Charles the Bald to render military service, cf. Lot, "Une année . . . de Charles le Chauve," *loc. cit.*, 434, n. 3; Baldamus, *op. cit.*, 50.

101 Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 572 ff., 581; cf. Brunner, *op. cit.*, II, 202: "Da eine verfassungsmässige Aufhebung der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht nicht erfolgte, hat sie theoretisch bis zur Auflösung der fränkischen Monarchie bestanden." See also Baldamus, *op. cit.*, 13, 40, and *passim*.

102 See *supra*, pp. 74 ff.

103 It is perhaps unnecessary to insist that the Danegeld was never regarded as part of the *dona annua*. In 877 the king clearly distinguished between these two payments by accepting *dona annua* at the close of the same assembly at which arrangements were made for raising the Danegeld of that year (*Capitula excerpta in conventu Carisiacensi coram populo lecta* [877], *M.G.H., L.L. Sectio II, t. II, p. 383*). The *dona annua* were obviously not interpreted as substitutes for military service; for we have evidence that they were in many cases required in addition to the military

latter question it is, of course, very easy to reply that the Danegeld was an emergency measure sufficiently sanctioned by the law of necessity. But if we are to remain content with such a reply, we must be willing wholly to eliminate from consideration the fact that the emergency referred to, an emergency which Charles was now endeavoring to terminate by the payment of tribute, had been created by certain disloyal magnates for the direct purpose of embarrassing, or forcing the hand of, the king; we must be willing also—and this is more important—utterly to ignore the inveterate and deep rooted aversion of the Frankish freeman, whether in high station or low, to the *idea* of being taxed.¹⁰⁴

These magnates, ever intent upon increasing their power and prestige; these seigniors, jealously watchful of their rights and privileges; would they, who otherwise were chiefly interested in curtailing the prerogatives of the crown, now have consented to an augmentation of the royal prerogative such as it evidently had been assumed¹⁰⁵ that even ordinary freemen would never have countenanced? Would they have permitted the establishment of the principle that the king had, even though it were only in an emergency, the right of taxation? No scholar at all conversant with the character and ambitions of the West Frankish nobility in the latter half of the ninth century could for a moment think of answering this question in the affirmative. And Charles, we may believe, was well aware that an attempt to raise the Danegeld as an undisguised tax would have proved abortive. In order to insure even measurable success for his policy, the king must have found it necessary so to interpret his method of raising the tribute as clearly to give the impres-

service (Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 108 and n. 1, 601). The king's right to the *dona annua*, after they had lost their original voluntary character (cf. Fustel de Coulanges, *op. cit.*, 502 ff.), was of course in the main based on custom; though it is true that according to Hincmar, the church paid them "causa suae defensionis" (see *infra*, chap. xvii, n. 43), i. e. in return for the special protection given it.

104 That the disloyal magnates—especially Adalard, Hugo, and Berengar, but also to some extent Robert and Odo—were really responsible for the emergency of 866 has been shown *supra*, pp. 65–71. For the general aims and policy of the West Frankish nobility in the time of Charles the Bald, see *infra*, pp. 114–15 and nn. 20, 21. On the Germanic principle that a freeman could not be taxed, see the references cited *supra*, n. 81, and cf. *infra*, chap. xvii and n. 58.

105 That this assumption had been made is evident from the fact that the taxes required of the freemen for this Danegeld were disguised under the name of *heribanni*.

sion that whatever else it might be, it was not really taxation. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that Charles had levied the Danegeld on holdings of *dependent condition: mansi, acolæ, and hospitia*; not only those included within the royal domain but *all* such holdings throughout the realm. But, as we have seen, the king had no direct authority, financial or otherwise, over the unfree occupants of these holdings, unless they were attached to the royal domain.¹⁰⁶ Outside the royal domain the king and his officials entered into direct relations only with seigniors and freemen, not with the unfree population. The king had, in other words, no right to tax either the seigniors or their dependents. Obviously, therefore, the Danegeld would not in either of these cases have been legal if it had been levied in theory as a tax; and it has been shown above that illegal taxation would for various reasons have been practically impossible. Accordingly there remains but one alternative: the necessary basis of the Danegeld assessments levied on the dependent holdings must have been the king's right to demand military service from the seigniors; a right to which Charles the Bald, here as in the case of ordinary freemen, subjoined the corollary that the king might, if he chose, exact a sum of money in lieu of the actual service.¹⁰⁷

At this point it may be proper to discuss a certain problem that arises in connection with the levy of the Danegeld on dependent holdings. The fact that the seigniors were, by the time of Charlemagne, in the habit of collecting certain annual war taxes (*hostilitium, carnaticum*) from the tenants of their dependent *mansi*, has already been referred to.¹⁰⁸ In theory, the proceeds of these taxes were to be used by the seigniors to meet their military obligations to the king. But though the peasants were required to pay the tax each year, the seigniors rendered

106 Cf. *supra*, nn. 65, 67, 91, 92.

107 It may be added that this theory is not invalidated by the fact that in certain cases—they are comparatively rare—exemption from military service had been granted by charters of immunity (Sée, *op. cit.*, 21 ff.; Brunner, *op. cit.*, II, 294 ff.); for such immunity did not apply when a *levée en masse* was necessary to resist foreign invasion (Guérard, *op. cit.*, 676; Prou, *op. cit.*, 323; Prenzel, *op. cit.*, 46 ff.; cf. Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 315, 317, n. 3, 574, 575; on the origins of the *levées en masse* see Flach, *Les orig. de l'anc. France*, I, 317-18; and cf. *infra*, n. 129). In an emergency such as that produced by the Viking invasion of 866 Charles had the right to call on *all* seigniors for either military service or a money equivalent (cf. *supra*, n. 80).

108 See *supra*, p. 78.

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military service only when called upon to do so by the monarch;¹⁰⁹ and they were called upon much less frequently by Charles the Bald than they had been by Charlemagne.¹¹⁰ It might therefore be conjectured, especially if the Danegeld was in law a substitute for military service, that the seigniors on this occasion were expected when they paid their respective quotas toward the Danegeld, simply to apply to this purpose a certain portion of the proceeds of the annual war taxes. But did they in fact take their quotas of the Danegeld from this regular source of income; or did they raise the Danegeld by levying on the peasant holdings an additional burden, distinct and separate from the annual war taxes?

The correct answers to these questions may be easily conjectured by anyone at all familiar with the character and methods of seigniorial exploitation. A sentence of M. Sée¹¹¹ is so much to the point here that it deserves to be quoted: "Et tel est l'un des traits caractéristiques du régime domanial: il n'est aucune taxe, même d'ordre public, qui ne retombe tout entière sur les classes inférieures." If the seigniors had applied the proceeds from the annual war taxes toward the Danegeld, the latter exaction would not have been felt at all by the peasants; they would have paid their lords no more in a year when Danegeld was levied than they did any other year. In that case the bulk of the Danegeld would have been paid by the seigniors out of what they were now inclined to regard as their private resources.¹¹² Such, of course, was not the case. The evident willingness of the seigniors to aid the crown in raising the Danegeld, the fact that on many occasions they preferred buying off the Vikings to fighting them,¹¹³ are sure indications that the burden of the Danegeld fell on other shoulders than those of the great landholders. But we need not rely on mere indications; for we have the direct evidence of Hincmar that the peasant population had in many cases been reduced to penury in consequence of the numerous exactions of Danegeld during the reign of Charles the Bald. Indeed it would appear that the peasantry, so far from escaping the burden of the tribute, prob-

109 Roth, *op. cit.*, 411 and n. 100; Brunner, *op. cit.*, II, 212.

110 See *supra*, n. 100.

111 *Op. cit.*, 92.

112 *Ibid.*, 92-93, 116.

113 See *supra*, pp. 33, 41-42; cf. *infra*, chap. vi.

ably had to bear its heaviest load.¹¹⁴ The annual war taxes were levied, as a rule, only on *mansi ingenuiles*. But for the Danegeld of 866 all dependent *mansi*, the *serviles* as well as the *ingenuiles*, were taxed; and even the smallest, or least profitable holdings — *accolae* and *hospitia* — did not escape.¹¹⁶ It is clear, therefore, that the Danegeld was levied on a large number of holdings which were as a rule exempt from the ordinary war taxes, viz., most of the *mansi serviles*, and all *accolae* and *hospitia*. On the other hand, it must be assumed that tenants of *mansi ingenuiles* and, in some cases, of *mansi serviles* were required to contribute toward the Danegeld in addition to paying the annual war taxes.¹¹⁷ If the contrary had been the case, they would have escaped those serious hardships in which we know they were involved as a consequence of the Danegeld.¹¹⁸

The seigniors, accordingly, had contributed little if anything out of their private resources to meet the first assessment for the Danegeld of 866.¹¹⁹ This fact is of considerable importance in helping us to understand why it was easier for Charles the Bald to raise a Dangel and buy off the Vikings than to raise an army and defeat them.¹²⁰ But it is not the whole truth. There were also other reasons why the seigniors did not in the main or as a rule object to raising the Danegeld. For them the Dane-

114 This is indicated by Hincmar in a letter written to Louis the Stammerer shortly after the exaction of the Danegeld of 877 (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, CXXV, 987): "qualiter . . . miser iste populus, qui jam per plures annos deprædationes diversas et continuas, et per exactiones ad Nortmannos repellendos affligitur, aliquod remedium habeat, . . . ut virtutem nobis Deus reddat contra paganos: quia usque modo jam ante plures annos locum in isto regno defensio non habuit, sed redemptio et tributum, et non solum pauperes homines, sed et Ecclesias quondam divites jam evacuatatas habent." Charles the Bald also refers to the burdensomeness of the Danegeld for the poorer classes in the *Constitutio Carisiacensis de moneta* of 861 (*M.G.H.*, *LL.* Sectio II, t. ii, 301): "volumus, quia . . . consideratio misericors . . . in hac commendatione nostra est necessaria propter paupertatem hominum, quia necesse fuit in istis temporibus coniectum de illis accipere et ad navium compositionem et in Nortmannorum causa pro regni . . . salvamento." The remainder of this capitulary shows that in referring to the "poverty of men," Charles was thinking not only of freemen but also of *coloni* and *servi*. Cf. *supra*, chap. iii, n. 75.

115 In certain exceptional cases they were exacted on *mansi serviles*. Cf. *supra*, n. 98.

116 Cf. *supra*, n. 67.

117 Cf. Flach, *op. cit.*, I, 322.

118 Cf. *supra*, n. 114.

119 The seigniors ought of course to have furnished a *heerbann* for themselves out of their demesne resources (cf. *supra*, nn. 64, 68); but if M. Sée's view (see the quotation on the preceding page) is correct, it would seem to follow that even this burden was shifted on the peasantry.

120 Cf. *supra*, n. 113.

geld meant not merely a saving of the expense that participation in a military expedition would have involved; it meant also an actual augmentation of their financial resources and the establishment of a precedent of great value in connection with their exploitation of the peasants.

We have already seen how the seigniors might enrich themselves by requiring their subjects to pay the Danegeld in locally coined money.¹²¹ It does not seem probable that the seigniors and their *ministeriales* would have gone to the trouble of collecting the Danegeld, unless there had been some prospect of remuneration for the service thus rendered.¹²² Though the royal assessment called for a specific tax from each of the various kinds of dependent holdings, it is very unlikely that the exact amount indicated, no more and no less, was collected in each case.¹²³ It is much more likely that the purpose of the assess-

121 See *supra*, chap. iii, n. 62.

122 We know that the *ministeriales* received a certain percentage of the annual war taxes (*hostilitium, carnaticum*) which they collected from the tenants of the *mansi* (Guérard, *op. cit.*, 668 and n. 1; See *op. cit.*, 123-24). We also know that when the count collected the *heribannus* in his county he was permitted to retain one-third of the proceeds therefrom (Waitz *op. cit.*, IV, 578; Flach, *op. cit.*, I, 321, n. 3). It therefore seems probable that the *ministeriales* likewise retained a portion of the Danegeld for their own profit.

123 This view is based on a study of how the *hostilitium* and *carnaticum* were raised. According to Guérard (*op. cit.*, 673-74), these annual war taxes were not paid directly by each tenant to the abbey of St. Germain. On the contrary, they were estimated for each *fisc* in what may be called lump sums—either in money or in kind—which were paid to the abbey by its *ministeriales*. Allowance was made for some variation in the amount and value of these lump sums, a variation which must have been due not only to fluctuations in the prices of oxen, etc., but also to changes occurring from time to time in the situation of the individual tax-payer; sometimes he was able to pay in kind, sometimes in money; one year he could pay more, another year less. It was for the *ministeriales* to adjust these matters as best they could, but meanwhile see to it that the abbey received approximately what was due from each *fisc*. An arrangement such as this could hardly have failed to develop numerous irregularities in the collection of the annual war taxes (cf. Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 625 and n. 3); and these irregularities were probably increased rather than decreased by reason of the fact that many *mansi* supported more than one family of peasants. (Guérard, *op. cit.*, II, 897). I am inclined to think that there were more irregularities in the collection of the Danegeld than in that of the *hostilitium* and the *carnaticum*. The amount of these latter had been proportioned, more or less, to the value or yield of each individual *mansus*, and doubtless there were difficulties in the way of collecting more from any *mansus* than its tenants were accustomed to pay (*ibid.*, 658-59). But in the exaction of the Danegeld there was no custom which might help secure equity. In theory, it is true, the Danegeld had been assessed at one and the same figure for all *mansi ingenuites*, and at another, theoretically invariable figure for all *mansi serviles*, etc. But the following considerations lead me to believe that, in practice, varying amounts of Danegeld were exacted from tenants

ment was merely to furnish a basis for estimating the proper contribution of each of the several seigniors, and that the latter were free to raise the amounts required of them more or less as they saw fit.¹²⁴ However that may have been, we shall not err in assuming that some arbitrariness and some abuses were bound to develop in connection with each levy of the Danegeld, and that the purpose as well as the result of such abuses was the enrichment of the seigniors.¹²⁵

In the development of seigneurial exploitation, therefore, the Danegeld must have been a factor of more than negligible importance. The royal authority had imposed on the seigniors an obligation to furnish a certain quota of the tribute money demanded by the Vikings. That obligation could readily have been interpreted as conferring upon the seigniors a more or less general legal right to levy extraordinary contributions on their unfree dependents in times of emergency. And it is easy to see how the seigniors and their agents by the adroit application of such a theory may in many cases have succeeded in giving a color of legality to what in fact were arbitrary and unjust exactions; how precedents established in connection with the levy of the Danegeld may have aided and perhaps accelerated the development of the legal principle, so well known in feudal times, that the unfree peasants were *taillables à merci*.¹²⁶

of the same kind of *mansi*: (1) *mansi* of the same class were not always of the same value even in the time of Charlemagne (*ibid.*, 601), and by the time of Charles the Bald the differences in value had been much increased (*ibid.*, 602-3); (2) the redevances due from *mansi* of the same class differed considerably in quantity and nature (*ibid.*, 659, 672 ff.); (3) *mansi* of one class were in some cases burdened with the kind of redevances ordinarily due from *mansi* of another class (*ibid.*, 659); (4) for these reasons and for others of a more temporary nature, the ability of tenants of the same kind of *mansi* to pay Danegeld must have been very unequal, and, therefore, (5) the *ministeriales* obviously found it necessary, as well as profitable, to adopt the method of exacting in each case the largest amount obtainable. This view as regards the manner in which the Danegeld was exacted from the peasant population, appears to me to be in harmony with what is known about the collection of the annual war taxes and about the general situation and circumstances of the tenants on the dependent holdings. Cf. Roth, *op. cit.*, 410.

124 On this basis one might hazard the conjecture that the seigniors compelled every one of their dependents who had any kind of resources on which he might draw, to contribute toward the Danegeld; in other words, that the Danegeld was exacted not only from those dependents who occupied holdings in land—*mansi*, *accolae*, *hospitia*—but also for example from artisans, who may not in all cases have been tenants of even small plots of land, but whose labors in the crafts or otherwise must have yielded some measure of resources.

125 Cf. *supra*, n. 114.

126 Luchaire, *Manuel des institutions françaises, période des Capétiens*

It now remains to be determined whether the Danegeld contributions required of merchants and priests were, like those of freemen and seigniors, exacted on the theory that they were substitutes for military service. As regards the merchants, it is at least questionable whether they were in general obliged to render personal military service; it appears more probable that they were required to contribute toward military expeditions in some other way, perhaps by payments of money.¹²⁷ But what reason is there to suppose, as between these regular payments of the merchants and their contributions to the Danegeld, a difference of legal basis? On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that since the two exactions were in both cases made necessary by war, they were also in both cases legalized on the ground that they were substitutes for military service.

The priests, it is true, had been exempt from personal military service, at least since the middle of the eighth century.¹²⁸ Whether the predecessors of Charles the Bald had ever required them to contribute in any way toward the expenses of war, cannot be determined from the sources at our disposal. But after Charles the Bald¹²⁹ had introduced the principle that in the case of a *necessitas*, or *lantweri* — i. e. in a time of great national danger, as when the country was invaded by a foreign army¹³⁰ — all men without any exception were liable to military

directs, 206-7, 309, 336; cf. Flach, *op. cit.*, I, 342-43; Viollet, *op. cit.*, II, 449-50.

127 Baldamus, *op. cit.*, 40-60. The merchants of the Carolingian period were under the special protection of the king, and in return for this protection they were required annually or biennially to pay over to the royal treasury a certain percentage of their profits; but the latter payments, it should be noted, were probably distinct from the war contributions (Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 44-45, 586 and n. 4). Fustel de Coulanges (*op. cit.*, 510, 518) holds that the merchants were not exempt from military service. He bases his opinion on a capitulary requiring freemen who had property in movables, but not in land, to render their share of military service (cf. Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 560 ff.) But this general rule need not necessarily have applied to merchants. The latter were certainly excused by Louis the Pious from *scara* service and from paying *heerbann* (*ibid.*, 586, n. 4).

128 *Ibid.*, 592, n. 1.

129 Beyond a doubt it was Charles the Bald who introduced the principle of universal obligatory military service in the event of foreign invasion. It is first mentioned in the *Conventus apud Marsnam primus* [847], III, Adnuntiatio Karoli, c. 5 (*M.G.H., LL.*, Sectio II, t. ii, 71): "talīs regni invasio, quam lantweri dicunt, . . . acciderit, ut omnis populus illius regni ad eam repellendam communiter pergat." Cf. Brunner, *op. cit.*, II, 215; Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 574-75. Roth (*op. cit.*, 411) seems to think that this principle had also applied in the time of Charlemagne; yet he can furnish no evidence of its application prior to the year 847 (*ibid.*, n. 102). Cf. *supra*, n. 107.

130 See Prenzel, *op. cit.*, 46-47 and notes; cf. Baldamus, *op. cit.*, 51 ff.

service, then priests no longer could be or were regarded as completely exempt from the burdens of war.¹³¹ Accordingly, owing to the existence of a *neccissitas*, or *lantweri*, in 866,¹³² the lower clergy, since they had not been called upon to take the field, might conceivably, by way of substitution, be required to contribute toward the Danegeld.¹³³ Legally to justify the taxation of the priests in any other way, would be difficult if not impossible.

The first assessment for the Danegeld of 866 ought, it would seem, to have yielded vastly more than 4,000 pounds.¹³⁴ Yet for some reason it proved inadequate and, consequently, a second assessment became necessary.¹³⁵ By this assessment an additional tax of one *denarius* was levied on the two most numerous kinds of dependent holdings: the *mansi ingenuiles* and the *mansi serviles*. Even that did not suffice, and Charles finally had to ask for two successive contributions from the great magnates (*regni primores*). These contributions, consisting partly of money and partly of wine,¹³⁶ were in each case proportioned to the value of the *honores* held by the several magnates.¹³⁷

131 Baldamus, *op. cit.*, 52 and n. 75. It is interesting to note that Hincmar refers to the Danegeld paid by the priests in 866 as *vectigal* (cf. *supra*, n. 67). Another statement of Hincmar (*Opera*, II, 325, quoted by Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 107, n. 3) may shed some light on what he meant by *vectigal*: "causa suae defensionis regi ac rei publicae vectigalia, quae nobiscum *annua dona* vocantur, praestat ecclesia." Yet the Danegeld must not be confused with the *annua dona* (see *supra*, n. 103).

132 Cf. *supra*, pp. 64 ff.

133 Cf. Prenzel, *op. cit.*, 46, n. 46.

134 The *mansi* held by the abbey of St. Germain (Guérard, *op. cit.*, II, 903) ought alone to have yielded nearly 200 pounds; and it is difficult to believe that that abbey held five per cent of all the *mansi* in Francia, Neustria, and Burgundy. Moreover, in addition to the taxes laid on the dependent holdings, there were the payments of the freemen, the priests, and the merchants, which ought to have yielded a considerable sum. These considerations lead me to believe that the first assessment, if it had been generally paid, would have been ample to raise the entire Danegeld, even according to Danish weight (cf. *supra*, n. 61). Cf. Soetbeer, *op. cit.*, *Forsch. z. d. Gesch.*, VI, p. 55.

135 *Ann. Bert.*, 866, p. 81: "Inde de unoquoque manso, tam ingenuilli quam et servilli, unus denarius sumitur." These words of course imply that a second assessment was made.

136 *Ibid.*: "et demum per duas vices, iuxta quod unusquisque regni primorum de honoribus habuit, coniectum tam in argento quam et in vino ad pensum quod ipsis Nortmannis pactum fuerat persolvendum contulit." The first five words of this quotation taken together with the quotation in the preceding note, indicate that all told four successive assessments had been required in order to raise the Danegeld of 866.

137 The exact meaning of the expression, "iuxta quod unusquisque . . . de honoribus habuit, coniectum" (see the preceding note), is difficult to determine. Does it mean that the nobles were taxed in proportion to the estimated value of each of their *honores* as a whole; or does it mean that they were required to pay a specific sum for each dominant holding (*man-*

The fact that the contributions required from the *regni primores* were proportioned to the value of their *honores*, furnishes additional support for the above propounded theory concerning the legal basis of the Danegeld. *Honores* and *beneficia*, between which there was in the time of Charles the Bald little if any distinction,¹³⁸ were granted by the king principally in order to enable their holders to perform at the bidding of the monarch a certain amount of military service.¹³⁹ It is clear, therefore, that the king's right to require the great magnates to contribute appropriately toward the Danegeld, was based on his right to demand military service from them in proportion to the number and value of their benefices or *honores*;¹⁴⁰ and in the case of the *regni primores* as in that of the other classes, the king acted on the principle that he had a right to commute the actual military service into a money payment.¹⁴¹

The words of Hincmar, superficially at least, seem to indicate that the magnates paid their contributions to the Danegeld out of their private—as distinct from their dependents'—resources.¹⁴² The possibility that some may have done that cannot of course be wholly eliminated, since we have no *direct* evidence to the contrary.¹⁴³ On the other hand, it is, as we have seen, a well established fact that all payments of whatever kind which the seigniors of this period had to make, as a rule were supplied ultimately by the lower classes of the population, in particular the unfree peasants. To suppose that the Danegeld was in this respect an anomaly, is made impossible by the direct evidence we have of its deleterious effects on the economic con-

—sus indominicatus) within their *honores* and perhaps, in addition, a part of the redevances due them from their dependents? We know that they were taxed on the latter basis in 877 (see *infra*, chap. vi, n. 42). Is it too bold to assume that the same arrangement was made in 866?

138 Bourgeois, *Le capitulaire de Kiersy-sur-Oise*, 129 ff.; Brunner, *op. cit.*, II, 255; Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 215, 216 and n. 1. Cf. *Ann. Bert.*, 869, p. 98, where practically no distinction is made between *honores* and *beneficia*, and where both are said to consist of *mansi*.

139 Brunner, *op. cit.*, II, 210–11; cf. *ibid.*, I, 209; Viollet, *op. cit.*, I, 439.

140 Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 597, n. 2. Cf. *Ann. Bert.*, 869, p. 98.

141 Cf. *supra*, pp. 74 ff.

142 Cf. *supra*, n. 136.

143 Hincmar (see *ibid.*) does not say that the magnates themselves made the contribution. He does say that a *coniectum* in proportion to the number and value of the *honores* held by each magnate *ad pensum . . . contulit*. It does not seem advisable to base the argument that follows in the text on this peculiarity of statement, but it should be noted that the words of Hincmar do not disprove the argument.

dition of the peasantry.¹⁴⁴ It is in much better accord with the established facts to believe that the contributions of the *regni primores*, and for that matter of all the seigniors, were furnished largely if not exclusively by their unfree dependents. Many of these doubtless had to pay considerably more than the amounts at which their holdings had been assessed by the king. The probability is that the sums actually paid by the unfree tenants were determined, not by royal decree, but by the lord or his agents; and that these sums were always intended to cover at least two things: (1) the assessment levied by the king and (2) a liberal profit for the lord and his *ministeriales*.¹⁴⁵ But the *regni primores* probably deemed it necessary to increase these sums somewhat in the case of the peasants on those estates which were held as *honores*; in order that the payments of these peasants might cover not only the two things above mentioned, but also the two special contributions required of the *primores* — contributions which ought strictly to have been furnished by the magnates out of their private, demesnial resources.¹⁴⁶ Thus, it will be seen, the Danegeld always, even when it was levied on *honores*, proved for the great magnates a much lesser burden than actual military service; a fact which, as pointed out before, is of considerable help in trying to understand why it was easier for Charles the Bald to buy off the Vikings with money than to expel them by force of arms.¹⁴⁷

Four different assessments¹⁴⁸ had been required in order to raise the sum demanded by the Northmen as the price of their withdrawal. Why so many levies were necessary, is a very important and interesting question, but one which cannot be answered with more than approximate certainty. It has been pointed out that the magnates and seigniors had, for various reasons, less objection to furnishing certain quotas of Danegeld than to equipping themselves and their men for the service of war. Always, however, there were some seigniors who, by reason of hostility to the crown, did neither of these things. Probably a certain number — e. g. Adalard and his following, perhaps even Robert the Strong for a time — pursued such a

144 Cf. *supra*, pp. 82–83 and nn. 111, 114.

145 See *supra*, nn. 119, 122, 123, 124.

146 The *heridanni* due from the seigniors may have been obtained by them in a similar way (cf. *supra*, n. 119).

147 See *supra*, pp. 82 ff.

148 See *supra*, n. 136.

policy in 866. There is, as we have seen, reason to believe that the first assessment for the Danegeld of this year would have proved amply sufficient if all the tax-payers had properly responded.¹⁴⁹ Evidently they did not, since three additional assessments had to be levied in order to secure the required amount of 4,000 pounds. It is clear, however, that the first assessment did yield by far the larger part of what was needed, for the second assessment was calculated to bring a much smaller amount of money than the first.¹⁵⁰ The last two contributions, which were based on the values of the *honores* held by the *primores*, must have aggregated but a small fraction of the whole Danegeld.¹⁵¹

The agreement with the Vikings had been reached rather early in the year 866;¹⁵² yet the Danegeld could not be paid until July, and not until after Robert the Strong had been given back his commanding position in Neustria.¹⁵³ Was there any connection between the latter event and the raising of the Danegeld? To this question only a hypothetical answer can be given. The view expressed above regarding the reasons for Robert's failure to make a stand against the Vikings at Melun,¹⁵⁴ implies that Robert was taking advantage of the presence of the Vikings for the furtherance of his own interests. If this view is correct, it follows that Robert would lend no aid in securing the removal of the Northmen, at least until Charles had done something toward rehabilitating the prestige of his ambitious vassal; or, more specifically, Robert would be reluctant to do his share in raising the Danegeld, unless and until Charles would reinstate him as his vicegerent in Neustria.¹⁵⁵ But we know that the Danegeld was not paid until after Robert had regained his posi-

149 Cf. *supra*, n. 134.

150 Cf. *supra*, n. 135.

151 Lot ("Une année . . . de Charles le Chauve," *loc. cit.*, 405-6) supposes that Charles the Bald's sale of the abbey of St. Bertin to Hilduin for thirty pounds of gold, on June 19, 866, was largely due to the necessity of securing more money for the Danegeld. I can find no basis for this conjecture except the fact that the sale took place about a month before the Danegeld was paid to the Vikings, which fact really has no particular significance.

152 *Ibid.*, 398, n. 2.

153 *Ann. Bert.*, 866, p. 81. Cf. von Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 102-3; Lot, *op. cit.*, 400-1.

154 See *supra*, pp. 68-70.

155 Robert had a large following, particularly in Neustria, where he had taken an important part in the revolt of 858 (Lot, *op. cit.*, 401). Opposition on his part would therefore have been a serious obstacle in the collection of the Danegeld.

tion in Neustria.¹⁵⁶ Accordingly, it seems not too much to say that among the various considerations¹⁵⁷ which led Charles to readopt Robert the Strong as his most highly favored vassal¹⁵⁸ must be included also the necessity of, or the difficulties encountered in, raising the Danegeld. There can be little doubt that Robert and his followers, after their reinstatement, actually did raise the Danegeld for those *honores* in Neustria which had been granted to them, and thereby materially aided Charles in securing the amount demanded by the Vikings.¹⁵⁹

It was probably late in June, or early in July,¹⁶⁰ that the Northmen quitted their island stronghold near the monastery of St. Denis. Thence they proceeded to a point farther down the Seine, where they tarried for a time to repair their ships and to await the payment of the Danegeld. Meanwhile, Charles, with a force of workmen and wagons, had repaired to Pitres to complete the fortifications in that place, in order that the Northmen might not again be able to ascend the Seine.¹⁶¹ These measures on the part of the king indicate that in spite of recent events he had not lost faith in the fortified bridge as an effective means of opposing the Viking raids,¹⁶² provided he could have the loyal coöperation of his *fideles* in the operations of defense.

Towards the end of July the Northmen received their money,¹⁶³ and then put to sea. Some of the Vikings proceeded directly to the *pagus Isalgae* (Ijsselgau?), in the realm of Lothaire II. Here they seem to have continued their operations without encountering any resistance on the part of Lothaire.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁶ Cf. *supra*, n. 153.

¹⁵⁷ Other reasons which may have induced Charles to favor Robert as he did, are given by Lot, *op. cit.*, 402.

¹⁵⁸ Lot, *op. cit.*, 401, calls Robert "le vrai roi du pays entre Seine et Loire."

¹⁵⁹ *Ann. Bert.*, 866, p. 81. Cf. von Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 102-3.

¹⁶⁰ *Ann. Bert.*, 866. This source, in the edition of Waitz, p. 81, reads "mense Iunio." Dehaisnes (p. 155) and others have "mense Iulio." No explanation of this discrepancy has ever been given so far as I can ascertain.

¹⁶¹ *Ann. Bert.*, 866, pp. 81-82. Cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, 402-3.

¹⁶² *Adonis Chronicon*, 868, *M.G.H., SS.*, II, p. 323. Cf. Lot, "Le pont de Pitres," *loc. cit.*, 9. Charles apparently continued in the future to place much confidence in this means of resistance (*ibid.*, 15 ff.).

¹⁶³ *Ann. Xantenses*, 866, *M.G.H., SS.*, II, p. 232: "pagani crudeliter Galliam vastaverunt. Acceptoque inde a Karolo rege innumerabili censu, ad tempus reversi sunt." *Ann. Bert.*, 866, p. 82: "Nortmanni mense Iulio mare intrant."

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*; *Ann. Xantenses*, 866, *loc. cit.*, p. 232. Cf. Vogel, 217, n. 2; Lot, "Une année . . . de Charles le Chauve," *loc. cit.*, 403, n. 3.

But the Seine region was now for ten years left undisturbed by Vikings.¹⁶⁵

Thus, by reason of the negligence, disloyalty, and self-interest of his *fideles*,¹⁶⁶ Charles the Bald had been compelled for the fourth time¹⁶⁷ to secure the removal of a group of Vikings by the payment of Danegeld. And on this occasion, as in 860, he had found it impossible even to raise the Danegeld, until the ambitious demands of the more powerful among the *fideles* had been satisfied. The Danegeld, whatever may have been its legal basis, served only on the one hand further to curtail the royal power and, on the other, steadily to augment the power of the *fideles* politically as well as financially.¹⁶⁸

165 Vogel, 217-18.

166 For an illustration of the total lack of public interest on the part of the West Frankish nobility at this time, see Lot, *op. cit.*, 430-31.

167 Vogel, p. 216, calls the Danegeld of 866 the third payment of this kind to the Vikings. He overlooks the Danegeld of 853.

168 Cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, 401-2.

CHAPTER VI.

THE TWO DANEGELDS OF 877.

After 866, a period of eleven years elapsed before Charles the Bald was again reduced to the necessity of paying Danegeld. The decade from 866 to 876 on the whole proved to be, for the greater part of the West Frankish realm, an era of peace, a time of recuperation from the ravages of the Northmen.¹ To the population of the Seine region in particular, which after suffering the consequences of six successive Viking expeditions² was doubtless on the verge of complete exhaustion, this period of tranquillity and recovery must have been especially welcome. Yet there was in it no promise of security for the future. For the Northmen had after all not ceased from their destructive labors; they had only shifted for a time the principal scene of their plundering operations from the continent to England. And with the arrival in the Seine, in the year 876, of a seventh expedition of Vikings, the ten years of peace came to an abrupt close.³

The invaders had as usual timed their adventure well. When the Vikings entered the Seine, Charles was preoccupied with a project of such great moment to him, that there was small likelihood that he would swerve from it to deal with them. On the contrary, the Northmen had good reason to believe that they would be able to establish themselves and gain firm footing in the kingdom, before anything would be done to expel them or even to limit the area of their operations.⁴

This is not the place to give a detailed account of Charles the Bald's unsuccessful attempt, on the death of Louis the German in 876, to gain possession of eastern Lorraine.⁵ For the purposes of the present discussion it will suffice to note the relation between the failure of that enterprise and the success of the Viking adventure.

It was at Cologne, on the way to the fateful field of Andernach, that Charles received the news of the arrival of the Vikings.

¹ Vogel, 217, 224 ff.

² In 841, 845, 851, 852, 856-62, and 865-66. On the effects of these expeditions, see Vogel, 138 ff., 205 ff., and *passim*.

³ *Miracula sancti Dionysii*, III, cc. 1-2, Bouquet, VII, p. 365; also see *infra*, n. 6. For the activities of the Northmen between 866 and 876, see Vogel, 217-18, 224 ff.

⁴ See *ibid.*, 252, and cf. 83 ff.

⁵ See Dümmler's account (*Gesch. d. ostfr. Reiches*, III, 36-38).

On September 16, so the king was informed, they had entered the Seine in a fleet numbering about one hundred large vessels.⁶ These tidings did not induce Charles to abandon his project of conquest. To him the acquisition of Lorraine probably seemed the more important thing for the moment; and he may have trusted that the fortifications at Pitres would prove a sufficient check to the Northmen until, after a victory over the East Franks, he would be able to give the Vikings his personal attention.⁷ Accordingly, Charles continued on his way to Andernach, where, on October 8, his forces were completely routed by an army of Saxons and Thuringians commanded by his nephew, Louis the Saxon.⁸

This defeat probably cooled the martial ardor of Charles considerably. At all events an offensive against the Northmen was now utterly out of the question.⁹ To have attempted it would have been futile, not to say foolhardy, for the army of Charles had suffered unusually heavy losses at Andernach.¹⁰ It is, therefore, not surprising that Charles very soon dispatched a group of nobles, headed by Count Conrad II of Paris, to open negotiations with the Vikings. The envoys were instructed to make the best bargain possible under the circumstances, and to report to the king at a *placitum* which he had summoned to Samoussy for November 25.¹¹ Whether the embassy of Count Conrad was able to reach an agreement with the invaders, and whether any report on this matter was submitted to the king at Samoussy, we do not know.¹² However that may be, it is certain that

6 *Ann. Bert.*, 876, p. 132; *Annales Vedastini*, 876, ed. Dehaisnes, p. 295.

7 Cf. Vogel, 252. Lot ("Le pont de Pitres," *Le Moyen Age*, 1905, IX, p. 12) believes that either the fortifications at Pitres were not yet completed, or they were not guarded.

8 *Ann. Bert.*, 876, pp. 132-33.

9 According to the *Annals of St. Vaast*, Charles, before he opened negotiations with the Vikings, had made an unsuccessful attempt to expel them by force of arms; but no such attempt is mentioned by Hincmar, and it seems very unlikely so soon after the catastrophe at Andernach (cf. *infra*, n. 13).

10 *Ann. Bert.*, 876, p. 133; cf. Vogel, 251.

11 *Ann. Bert.*, 876, p. 134: "Karolus imperator Chuonradus et alios primores ad Nortmannos qui in Sequanam venerant misit, ut, quocumque modo possent, foedus cum eis pasiscerentur, et ad condictum placitum [in Salmonciaco 15. die post missam s. Martini] ei renuntiarent." *Ann. Vedast.*, *loc. cit.*: "Unde de redemptione regni cogitare coepit [Karolus]." Cf. Vogel, 252-53.

12 Hincmar mentions the fact that the *placitum* at Samoussy was duly held, but says nothing of any report as regards the negotiations with the Northmen. There is good reason to suspect that these first negotiations had been without definite result, as will appear from what follows in the text.

Charles before leaving Samoussy stationed *scaræ* along the Seine, hoping probably that he might be able in this way at least to prevent the Vikings from making a further advance.¹³

If negotiations with the Northmen had not been altogether broken off before Charles left Samoussy, they certainly must have been materially delayed by a very severe illness which fell upon the king soon after his departure, and from which he did not begin to convalesce until early in 877.¹⁴ Then, if we may believe the *Annals of St. Vaast*, envoys were again dispatched to the Vikings with instructions to negotiate with them concerning their evacuation of the kingdom in return for the payment of tribute.¹⁵ This time a definite understanding was arrived at,¹⁶ the Northmen agreeing to depart for a consideration of 5,000 pounds of silver according to weight.¹⁷

About the same time that the treaty with the Vikings in the Seine was concluded, or shortly afterward, a similar agreement was reached with another group of Northmen who for some time past had been established in the region of the lower Loire.¹⁸ The negotiations with the latter appear to have been conducted, not

13 *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*: "Scaras quoque, quae contra Nortmannos secus Sequanam in procinctu essent, disposuit [Karolus]." The *Annals of St. Vaast* (*loc. cit.*), it is true, seem to indicate that Charles for a time had attempted to take the offensive against the Vikings, though without success: "Contra quos [Nortmannos] Karolus exercitum dirigit; sed nil utiliter egere." According to the same source, this offensive preceded an eclipse of the sun on October 29—i. e. it took place nearly a month before the *placitum* was held at Samoussy on November 25. But it is not safe to place too much reliance on the sequence of events as given in the *Annals of St. Vaast*. Some further details as to the probable whereabouts of Charles himself in October and November, are given by Dümmler, III, 38, n. 2. The Vikings entered the monastery of St. Denis on November 30, but appear to have remained there only a short time (*Lot, op. cit.*, pp. 13-14).

14 *Ann. Bert.*, 876-77, p. 134.

15 *Ann. Vedast.*, 877, p. 295: "Karolus legatos misit qui cum Nortmannis tractarent, ut munerati e regno ejus abirent." Hincmar makes no mention of this embassy.

16 *Ann. Vedast.*, *loc. cit.*: "Et facta pactione, etc."

17 *Ann. Bert.*, 877, p. 135: "Summa vero tributii fuerunt quinque milia librae argenti ad pensam." Cf. *supra*, n. 15, and *infra*, n. 97. On the significance of the provision that the money was to be weighed, see *supra*, chap. iii, nn. 61, 62; chap. v, n. 61.

18 On the long continued occupation of the lower Loire region by the Northmen, see Vogel, *passim*, and especially, for their operations between 874 and 878, pp. 248-51. The statement in the text as regards the probable time when the treaty with the Loire Vikings was made, is based on the fact that Hincmar mentions this treaty (see the following note) immediately after he has described the manner in which the Danegeld for the Vikings in the Seine was raised.

by the king himself, but by the magnates of Neustria,¹⁹ among whom at this time Abbot Hugh functioned as the king's vice-regent.²⁰ We have no information concerning the amount of the tribute which was demanded by the Vikings of the Loire.²¹

Meanwhile there had arrived in France two papal envoys bringing letters from John VIII to Charles the Bald. The latter, it is well known, had in 875, on the death of his nephew, the Emperor Louis II, undertaken an expedition to Italy, where, thanks to the friendly attitude of Pope John, he had been able to secure the imperial title and some nominal recognition of his suzerainty. Before the emperor left Italy he had given the pope, whose position was precarious, assurance of his speedy return.^{21a}

It was the immediate fulfillment of this engagement which John VIII urged in the letters dispatched to the emperor early in 877. The pope besought Charles in impetuous terms to come without further delay to his aid against the Saracens and other enemies; and he emphasized the necessity of asserting and establishing the imperial authority in the peninsula.²² This was not the first time that John VIII had reminded Charles of his promise to come to the defense of the Roman church,²³ and now the emperor probably felt that in spite of the various problems confronting him at home, he could no longer defer the fulfillment of his promise to the pontiff.²⁴

Charles, having determined to undertake a second journey to Italy, at once set about making his preparations. Before he could start out it was necessary, among other things, to provide adequately for the general administration of the West Frankish kingdom during his absence, and for the raising of the tribute

19 *Ann. Bert.*, *loc cit.*: "Illi vero, tam episcopi quam et alii qui trans Sequanam sunt de Neustria, tributum illis Nortmannis qui in Ligeri erant secundum quod sibi ab eis fuit impositum, undecumque valuerunt, reddere procuraverunt."

20 Vogel, 220-22; cf. Bourgeois, *Le capitulaire de Kiersy-sur-Oise*, 99 ff.

21 Two considerations lead me to conjecture that it was a smaller amount than that paid to the Vikings of the Seine: (1) it was to be raised in a smaller district—only in Neustria, while the other was to be raised in Burgundy as well as in the larger part of Francia; (2) the Vikings in the Loire were probably fewer in number than those in the Seine (cf. Vogel, 248, bottom).

21a See Dümmler, II, 388-400.

22 *Ann. Bert.*, 877, pp. 134-35. The letters of John VIII are printed in Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum nova, et amplissima collectio*, XVII, 27 ff. Cf. Dümmler, III, 40.

23 Cf. *ibid.*, 39 ff.; Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, 74 ff.

24 Cf. Dümmler, III, 40-41.

due the Northmen of the Seine. It was to arrange these and other matters that the emperor summoned his magnates to the famous assembly at Kiersy on June 14.²⁵

It has been supposed that a first assessment for the Danegeld promised the Vikings of the Seine was prepared at a meeting held at Compiègne on May 7, six weeks prior to the Assembly of Kiersy.²⁶ But careful study reveals the fact that there is nothing to support this view except an erroneous superscription added by some monk, or scribe, of a later period, to one of the two tax documents evidently drawn up at Kiersy.²⁷ There can scarcely be any doubt that the rates of assessment, as we have them, were fixed at the Assembly of Kiersy, and that they were part of what is usually called the *Capitulary of Kiersy*.²⁸ It is true that the manuscript of this capitulary, in the form that we know it,²⁹ contains only a very brief reference to the Danegeld, a mere topical statement, indicating that it was one of the subjects discussed at the meeting.³⁰ But we are fortunate in obtaining more detailed information from the *Annals of St. Bertin*,³¹ the *Annals of St. Vaast*,³² and the two tax documents just mentioned.³³

The money paid as Danegeld to the Vikings of the Seine in 877, was raised in a more limited area than most of the preceding Danegelds:³⁴ only in the kingdom of Francia and in Burgundy.³⁵

25 *Ann. Bert.*, 877, ed. Waitz, p. 135; cf. ed. Dehaisnes, p. 255, notes (a) and (b); *M.G.H., LL.* Sectio II, t. ii, pp. 355 ff. As regards the tribute to the Loire Vikings, see *infra*, n. 38.

26 See *infra*, appendix i, nn. 1, 4, 5.

27 See *infra*, appendix i.

28 According to Bourgeois (*op. cit.*, 68, and *passim*), this was not a capitulary in the proper sense, but merely a record of deliberations such as usually preceded the issuance of a capitulary. Cf. Fustel de Coulanges, "Les articles de Kiersy," *Nouvelles recherches sur quelques problèmes d'histoire*, 417 ff.

29 The text of the *Capitulary of Kiersy* was preserved to the nineteenth century in only a single manuscript, which, unfortunately, is now lost. Practically all that is known about this manuscript may be found in Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, 11 ff.

30 *Capitulare Carisiacense*, c. 30, *M.G.H., LL.*, Sectio II, t. ii, p. 361: "Qualiter hoc perficiatur et ad effectum perveniat, quod Nortmannis dari debet de coniecto."

31 877, ed. Waitz, p. 135.

32 877, ed. Dehaisnes, pp. 295-96.

33 The documents are printed in *M.G.H., LL.* Sectio II, t. ii, p. 354, under the title *Edictum Compendiense de tributo Nordmannico*, and are there designated respectively as A. and B. On the relation of these documents to each other and to the *Capitulary of Kiersy*, see *infra*, appendix ii.

34 See *supra*, chap. i, n. 47; chap. iii, n. 37; chap. v, n. 65. Cf. chap. iv and n. 12.

35 It was doubtless partly for this reason, and because the amount of the Danegeld. 7.

And it was specifically provided that that part of Francia which Charles the Bald had acquired by the treaty of Mersen in 870, was not to be taxed.³⁶ Neustria, which heretofore had usually been taxed along with Francia and Burgundy,³⁷ was not included in this levy,³⁸ manifestly because another and separate Danegeld was to be raised there for the Vikings of the Loire.³⁹ Aquitaine, which was regarded as a separate kingdom, had never before been required to contribute toward the Danegeld, and was not in 877.⁴⁰

Danegeld was higher in 877 than in 866, that the *mansi indomincati* had to be included, and the rate of the tax on the other *mansi* increased, in the assessment of 877 (cf. *supra*, chap. v, nn. 61, 67-69.) But there were other reasons, too (see *infra*, p. 101 and n. 59).

36 *Ann. Bert.*, 877, p. 135: "quomodo tributum de parte regni Franciae quam ante mortem Lotharii habuit, sed et de Burgundia exigeretur, [Karolus] disposuit." *Ann. Vedast.*, 877, pp. 295-96: "omne regnum ad hoc tributum dat ut ab hac liberarentur clade. . . . At hi qui in Francia remanserant, dato tributo, Danos e regno abire coegerunt." Also in the superscriptions of the tax documents mentioned above, there are references to the territory in which the Danegeld was levied; but these convey no additional information, and one is inaccurate (cf. *infra*, appendices i and ii). On the tax in Burgundy, cf. *infra*, n. 40. Lot, *op. cit.*, 15, suggests that it would have been poor policy to tax that part of Francia which had been acquired after the death of Lothaire II.

37 Except for the Danegeld of 862, which probably was not levied outside of Neustria (cf. *supra*, n. 34).

38 Vogel, p. 255, seems to think it possible that Neustria was taxed for both Danegelds: that paid to the Vikings of the Seine as well as that paid to the Vikings of the Loire. But Hincmar's words leave no room for doubt on this point. He speaks first of the "tributum de parte regni Franciae quam ante mortem Lotharii [Karolus] habuit, sed et de Burgundia" (*Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*), and then, after he has explained how this was raised, proceeds to mention another tribute for the Loire Vikings. That, he says, "tam episcopi quam et alii qui trans Sequanam sunt de Neustria . . . reddere procuraverunt" (*ibid.*). On the other hand, it is doubtless true that those seigniors who, like Abbot Hugh, held benefices in Neustria as well as in Francia or Burgundy, had to contribute toward both Danegelds in 877 (cf. von Kalkstein, *Abt Hugo aus dem Hause der Welfen, Markgraf von Neustrien*, in *Forsch. z. d. Gesch.*, XIV, 74).

39 Cf. *supra*, n. 19.

40 Bourgeois (*op. cit.*, 98-99) seems to think that in 877 the magnates of Aquitaine had been asked to contribute, but had refused; and he believes that the seigniors of Burgundy had likewise refused to pay the Danegeld. But his hypothesis can not be sustained. It is based on the following fallacies: (1) The relations between the *fideles* assembled at Kiersy and Charles the Bald were strained, and a revolt was brewing. This theory has been disposed of by Halphen ("A propos du capitulaire de Quierzy-sur-Oise," *Rev. Hist.*, 1911, CVI, 286 ff.). (2) The non-appearance of a magnate at Kiersy implies that he was not in favor of buying off the Northmen, and that, therefore, he had refused to contribute to the Danegeld. This is, of course, nothing more than a gratuitous assumption; and it is invalidated by the fact that the seigniors had heretofore as a rule been more inclined to collect the Danegeld than to enter into combat with the Vikings (cf. *supra*, chap. v, n. 113, and what follows in the text of that chapter). (3) The position of that clause in chapter 31 of the *Capitulary of Kiersy* which relates to the *honores* of Boso and others (in Burgundy), implies that these

To raise the Danegeld in Francia and Burgundy, a graduated property and income tax was levied on (1) the dominant and dependent holdings of land which constituted the *honores*, or benefices,⁴¹ of bishops, abbots, counts, and royal vassals;⁴² (2) the property, or resources, of all priests;⁴³ and (3) the property of merchants and townspeople.⁴⁴ Presumably the tax did not yield the whole amount required,⁴⁵ for it became necessary, as it had been on at least one preceding occasion,⁴⁶ to draw also on

men had refused to pay the Danegeld. This argument is, in my opinion, disposed of *infra*, in appendix ii (cf. appendix i, n. 5). (4) The theory that a first, or preliminary assessment for the Danegeld due the Vikings of the Seine, had been drawn up at Compiègne on May 7. Without this theory, which represents an attempt to reconcile two conflicting statements in the sources—and it is a theory which seems to have been in the main accepted by most scholars—Bourgeois could hardly have constructed the thesis which he defends in his book. The present writer, however, believes that this theory must be abandoned, if the argument set forth *infra*, in appendix i, is accepted as valid.

41 On the practical identity of *honores* and benefices at this time, see *supra*, chap. v, n. 138; see also *infra*, n. 48.

42 *Edictum . . . de tributo Nordmannico*, B., *loc. cit.*: "Episcopi, abbates, comites ac vassi dominici ex suis honoribus de unoquoque manso indomnicato donent denarios duodecim, de manso ingenuilli quatuor denarios de censu dominicato et quatuor de facultate mansuarii, de servilli vero manso duos denarios de censu indomnicato et duos de facultate mansuarii." *Ann. Bert.*, 877, p. 135: "de mansis indomnicatis solidus unus, de unoquoque manso ingenuilli 4 denarii de censu dominico et 4 de facultate mansuarii, de manso vero servilli duo denarii de censu dominico et duo de facultate mansuarii." It will be noted that the only difference between these two statements is that the second is more inclusive than the first. According to Hincmar all the *mansi* in the realm were to be taxed, but according to document B. the tax applied only to those *mansi* which constituted the *honores* of the magnates and the royal vassals (cf. *infra*, n. 61). Of course, we must regard the document as more accurate than the statement of Hincmar (see *infra*, appendix i, n. 14). As regards document A., see *infra*, appendix, ii.

43 *Edictum . . . de tributo Nordmannico*, B., *loc. cit.*: "De omnibus vero ecclesiis unusquisque episcopus . . . vel abbas . . . accipiant . . . de presbyteris secundum possibilitatem . . . a quo plurimum quinque solidos, a quo minimum quatuor denarios." *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*: "unusquisque episcopus de presbiteris suae parochiae secundum quod cuique possibile erat, a quo plurimum, etc." On document A., according to which the priests of churches held by the emperor appear to be exempt, see *infra*, appendix ii.

44 *Edictum . . . de tributo Nordmannico*, B., *loc. cit.*: "De negotiatoribus autem vel qui in civitatibus commanent iuxta possibilitatem, secundum quod habuerint de facultatibus, coniectus exigatur." *Capitulare Carisiacense*. c. 31, *ibid.*, p. 361: "Et de cappis et aliis negotiatoribus, videlicet ut Iudaei dent decimam et negotiatores christiani undecimam." This tax is not mentioned either in the *Annals of St. Bertin* or in document A.

45 At least that inference may be drawn from the recital of Hincmar, who does not mention the contribution from the churches until after he has explained all the details of the tax proper; also it does not seem probable that the church treasuries would have been drawn upon if the tax had yielded a sufficient amount. Cf. *infra*, n. 47.

46 In 860-61; cf. *supra*, chap. iii, n. 36.

the church treasuries, each of which contributed in proportion to the resources at its disposal.⁴⁷

The tax on the *honores* was assessed in accordance with the following schedule: for each *mansus indominicatus*⁴⁸ there were to be paid twelve *denarii* (or one *solidus*);⁴⁹ for each *mansus ingenuilis*⁵⁰ eight *denarii*,⁵¹ of which four were to be taken from the *cens* due the seignior,⁵² while the other four were to be contributed (in addition to the regular redevances due the seignior) by the holder (or holders)⁵³ of the *mansus*;⁵⁴ for each servile *mansus*⁵⁵ four *denarii* were exacted,⁵⁶ of which two were to be taken from the seignior's *cens*, and two contributed (likewise in addition to the regular redevances) by the tenants.⁵⁷

47 *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*: "Sed et de thesauris ecclesiarum, prout quantitas loci extitit, æd idem tributum exsolvendum acceptum fuit." *Ann. Vedast.*, 877, p. 295: "Et facta pactione spoliantur ecclesiae, et omne regnum ad hoc tributum dat." The fact that the "spoliation" of the churches is mentioned before the collection of the tax in the *Annals of St. Vaast*, does not seem to invalidate the argument given above in n. 45, since Hincmar evidently gives more detailed, and more accurate, information on the raising of the Danegeld. The author of the *Annals of St. Vaast* probably mentioned first that feature of the Danegeld which to him seemed most important, or rather, most reprehensible. That he did not approve of using the treasures of the church for this purpose is indicated by his characterization of the act as a "spoliation" (cf. Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, 82-83).

48 The *mansus indominicatus* was the demensne, or home farm—dominant holding—to which the *mansi ingenuiles* and *mansi serviles* were attached, and on which the labor services owed by the tenants were performed (cf. Sée, *Les classes rurales et le rég. dom. en France*, 28 ff.). Since the term *honores* at this time usually was applied to very important benefices (Waltz, *D. Verfassungsgesch.*, IV, 16 and n. 1), perhaps we may infer that the *honores* ordinarily consisted of several *mansi indominicati* with their dependent tenures (cf. Guérard, ed., *Polypt. d'Irminon*, I (Prolég.), 565-67, 579-82, 891).

49 See *supra*, n. 42.

50 Cf. *supra*, chap. v, n. 69.

51 See *supra*, n. 42.

52 The *cens* was a real, as distinct from a personal, redevance. It varied in amount, probably according to custom, and was payable sometimes in money, sometimes in kind (Sée, *op. cit.*, 78-83). By this time the *cens* had probably come to include the old war taxes (cf. *ibid.*, 116); at any rate, while the terms *hostilitium* and *carnaticum* disappear in the course of the ninth century (cf. Du Cange, *Glossarium*, s. v.), the taxes which they represented certainly continued to be collected (Waltz, *op. cit.*, IV, 624; Guérard, *op. cit.*, 661 ff.). Cf. *supra*, pp. 78 ff.

53 Many *mansi* supported more than one family of peasants (Guérard, *op. cit.*, 897).

54 In other words, the tenant of a *mansus ingenuilis* was, in theory, to pay toward the Danegeld only four *denarii* out of what remained of his income after he had paid all other dues which he owed. But cf. *infra*, pp. 102-3.

55 Cf. *supra*, chap. v, n. 69.

56 See *supra*, n. 42.

57 What is said *supra*, nn. 52-54, applies here also, *mutatis mutandis*.

In the preceding chapter it was shown that the Danegeld must be regarded, in its legal aspects, as a money payment which the king claimed the right to exact as a substitute for the military service owed by all freemen. We have also seen how, in 866, all freemen, including those of very moderate fortune, were required to contribute toward the Danegeld by paying a *heerbann*.⁵⁸ But in 877 no tax, not even a disguised one, was laid on freemen *as such*. And an examination of the schedule of assessments for the Danegeld of this year will show that it fails to provide for any taxes whatsoever on allodial property. All of which may, superficially at least, seem to invalidate the theory that the Danegeld was, in legal principle, a substitute for military service. It must be remembered, however, that in the ninth century the freeman of moderate fortune, and with him his allodial property, was rapidly disappearing. Long before the close of the reign of Charles the Bald, the Carolingian armies of freemen had in large part been superseded by armies made up almost exclusively of groups of vassals. The latter, unless they were royal vassals, were not under the direct command of the king, or the king's officials as such; they were subject only to the control of their lords, the great seigniors, lay and ecclesiastical.⁵⁹ Moreover, the principle that the seigniors owed military service, not so much because they were freemen as because they were benefice holders, and that they owned it strictly in proportion to the size or value of their benefices, was now rapidly gaining headway.⁶⁰ These facts will probably serve to explain why the Danegeld of 877 was levied, not on the *allodial* property of any freeman, nor on benefices held of other lords than the king, but only on the *honores*⁶¹ held directly of the king by bishops, abbots, counts, and royal vassals; and they clearly indicate that

⁵⁸ *Supra*, chap. v, pp. 73 ff.

⁵⁹ Dümmler, I, 222, 322-24; Baldamus, *Das Heerwesen u. d. spät. Karolingen* (in Gierke's *Untersuch. z. d. Staats- u. Rechtsgesch.*, IV), pp. 32 ff., 39; Prou, "De la nature du service militaire, etc.," *Rev. Hist.*, 1890, XLIV, 314-15; Fustel de Coulanges, *Les transform. de la royauté*, 509-23, 640-65; Flach, *Les orig. de l'anc. France*, I, 317-22; Lot, "La grande invasion normande," *Bibl. de l'école des chartes*, 1908, LXIX, 7, n. 4; Brunner, *D. Rechtsgesch.*, II, 202 ff. The facts referred to above in the text may explain why no attempt was made at this time to collect the *heerbann* as a tax for the Danegeld. Owing to the impoverishment of those freemen who were not seigniors, and to the dwindling of their numbers, it was probably felt that at best a collection of the *heerbann* would have yielded very little. It is, unfortunately, impossible to estimate how much the *heerbann*, as a tax for the purposes of the Danegeld, had yielded in 866 (cf. *supra*, pp. 73-77).

⁶⁰ Baldamus, *op. cit.*, 28 ff., 34-35; Waltz, *op. cit.*, IV, 597 and n. 2; cf. *Ann. Bert.*, 869, p. 98.

the holder of a *honor* was by the king held liable to *either* military service *or* its money equivalent — Danegeld.

There are certain indications of an attempt to lighten the burden of the Danegeld for the poorer classes on this occasion. *Accolæ* and *hospitia*, which had been taxed in 866,⁶² were exempt in 877, theoretically at least.⁶³ And the taxes on the *mansi ingenuiles* and *serviles* were in the latter year divided in such wise that only one half was to be paid by the holder (or holders) of the *mansus*, the seignior being required to furnish the other half from the customary *cens* paid him by his tenants. In 866, the tenants of dependent *mansi*, had been required to furnish the entire tax laid on their holding, and this tax was to be paid in addition to the *cens* due the seignior, which was at that time left untouched by the Danegeld.⁶⁴ It must be assumed, therefore, that the king now wished the seigniors to contribute a very considerable part of the Danegeld out of what may be regarded as *their* resources — in contradistinction to those of their tenants — and that those provisions of the assessment of 877 by which taxes were laid on the *mansi indominicati* and on the lord's *cens*,⁶⁵ were intended to secure this result.

But did they? Though this question can not be answered categorically, for want of sufficient and direct evidence, the evidence that we do have⁶⁶ seems to imply that in practice the assessment of 877 was regarded very much in the same way as that of 866 had been.⁶⁷ We may believe that while the seigniors probably raised amounts of money corresponding more or less to those for which they were responsible according to the assessment, yet they arranged to have the whole burden of the entire tax — even that part of it which they had been ordered by the king to contribute out of *their* resources — fall

61 Cf. *supra*, nn. 41, 42. That there was still an important distinction between benefices and allodial property, and that the magnates of the West Frankish realm usually possessed both kinds, is proved by that provision in chapter 10 of the *Capitulary of Kiersy* which permits a *fidelis* in a given case to transfer his *honores* to a relative, though he retains his *allodium* (*loc. cit.*, p. 358). Cf. Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, 130 ff.; Fustel de Coulanges, *Nouvelles recherches*, 427, 466 ff.

62 See *supra*, chap. v, nn. 67, 70, 71.

63 I. e. they are not mentioned in the assessment.

64 Cf. *supra*, pp. 79–85.

65 Cf. *supra*, nn. 42, 52, 54, 57.

66 See *supra*, chap. v, n. 114; cf. *infra*, n. 114.

67 Cf. *supra*, pp. 81 ff.

on the peasantry.⁶⁸ It is, for this reason, very improbable that each tenant paid for his holding the exact amount specified in the assessment, i. e. four *denarii* for a *mansus ingenuilis* and two *denarii* for a *mansus servilis*. It is much more likely that the assessment was regarded by the seigniors merely as a schedule according to which the quotas for which they were held responsible would be computed.⁶⁹ To raise his full quota, a seignior probably found it necessary to exact from each one of his tenants — even from those occupying *acolæ* and *hospitia* — as large a sum as the tenant could be forced to pay.⁷⁰ This levy of Danegeld, therefore, so far from proving a special hardship for the seigniors, simply provided them with another opportunity to exploit their peasantry and to accelerate the development of the principle that the unfree peasant was *tailable à merci*.⁷¹ Small wonder that the magnates did not object to the Danegeld; they were probably beginning to regard it as a substantial, if somewhat irregular, source of income.

The tax levied on the priests in 877,⁷² varied in proportion to the property or resources of each, but apparently no priest was wholly exempt.⁷³ The maximum paid by any priest was five *solidi* (or sixty *denarii*); some paid four *solidi*, others three, two, or only one; and the minimum was four *denarii*.⁷⁴ For the

68 According to Sée, this was a general rule applying not only to the Danegeld, but to all taxes of whatever kind. See *supra*, p. 82.

69 This opinion is strengthened by the wording of document B. (see *supra*, n. 42), which requires the *benefice-holders* to give (*donent*) "de unoquoque manso, etc." It is true that document A. has *accipiat*, but this document was superseded by B. (cf. *infra*, appendix ii).

70 It is not impossible that the seigniors also forced the unfree peasants on their allodial lands to contribute toward the Danegeld, in spite of the fact that seigniors themselves were not required to furnish anything toward the Danegeld by virtue of their ownership of such lands; cf. *Ann. Vedast.*, 877, p. 295: "omne regnum ad hoc tributum dat."

71 Cf. *supra*, pp. 84 f.

72 It has been shown above that the contributions of the priests probably were regarded as war taxes, and a substitute for actual military service; see *supra*, pp. 86 f. Cf. also what Hincmar said regarding the military obligations of the bishops (quoted by Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 597, n. 2).

73 See the following note, and cf. *supra*, n. 43.

74 *Edictum . . . de tributo Normannico*, B., *loc. cit.*: "De omnibus vero ecclesiis unusquisque episcopus de suo episcopatu vel abbas de sua solummodo abbatia, in cuiuscumque episcopi sint parrochia, accipiant cum misso episcopi, in cuius parrochia sunt, de presbyteris secundum possibilitatem quinque solidos vel quatuor vel tres vel duos vel unum solidum; a quo plurimum quinque solidos, a quo minimum quatuor denarios. De ecclesiis vero imperatoris et imperatricis et comitum ac vassallorum imperialium, tam de illis, qui cum imperatore pergunt, quam et illis, qui remanserint, episcopus, in cuius parrochia consistunt, secundum praedictum modum coniectum accipiat." *Ann. Bert.*, 877, p. 135: "unusquisque episcopus de presbi-

collection of the priests' taxes special provisions were made,⁷⁵ evidently at the instigation and in the interest of their ecclesiastical superiors.⁷⁶ The prelates would probably not have tolerated the collection by lay seigniors of taxes due from clergymen; such a procedure would have been sure to lead to abuses and the establishment of bad customs.⁷⁷ And then the prelates doubtless preferred to secure for themselves the profits accruing from the collection of those taxes.⁷⁸ As a general rule, therefore, only bishops were authorized to collect the taxes of the priests. But an exception was made in the case of those priests who held parishes that were dependent on monasteries;⁷⁹ their contribution was to be collected by the abbot and the bishop's *missus* jointly.⁸⁰ Thus, even in this case, provision was made for episcopal supervision. In all other cases each bishop had the exclusive right of collection within the limits of his diocese. This right applied not only to churches directly under the bishop's control, but also to those which had lay patrons, such as the emperor, the empress, counts, or royal vassals.⁸¹ With reference to churches held by counts or royal vassals it was specifically provided that the bishop was to collect not only

teris suae parochiae secundum quod cuique possibile erat, a quo plurimum quinque solidos, a quo minimum 4 denarios episcopi de singulis presbiteris acciperent et missis dominicis redderent."

75 See the preceding note. It will be observed that Hincmar, in his summary (cf. *infra*, appendix i, n. 14) of the assessment, does not give all the provisions with regard to the collection of the taxes from the priests. They are given in document A., as well as in B., and these documents differ very little from each other on this point. The differences that do occur will be pointed out in the following notes.

76 This statement and the following one are based on the nature of the provisions made; but cf. *infra*, n. 78.

77 That such abuses and bad customs had been common during the recent period, is indicated by the following passage from Hincmar's letter to Louis the Stammerer in 877 (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, CXXV, 987): "ut Ecclesiae in isto regno per occasionabiles circadas et per indebitas consuetudinarias exactiones, quae tempore Pippini, Caroli et Ludovici non fuerunt, ante annos viginti impositas non affligantur." Cf. also chapter 8 of the decisions of the Synod of Fismes in 881 (quoted by Dümmler, III, 150, n. 2, and 151, n. 1): "quatenus ecclesiae in isto regno . . . per indebitas consuetudinarias exactiones, quae tempore Pippini, Caroli et Hludovici non fuerunt, sed moderno tempore impositae fuerunt, non affligantur."

78 It is at least an interesting fact that the only copy of the *Capitulary of Kiersy* of which we have any knowledge, was found on a manuscript containing dispositions very favorable to the church (cf. Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, 26).

79 This is mentioned in both tax documents, but not by Hincmar.

80 Cf. *supra*, n. 74. The coöperation of the bishop's *missus* is mentioned only in tax document B.

81 The churches of the emperor himself are specifically mentioned in document B. (cf. *supra*, n. 74), but not in A. (cf. *infra*, appendix ii).

from those priests whose patrons were to accompany the emperor to Italy, but also from those whose patrons were to remain in France.⁸² The purpose of this provision is fairly clear. Charles did not wish to have it appear that those seigniors who were permitted to remain in France, were to have any opportunities for financial gain of which those whom he designated to accompany him to Italy would not be able to avail themselves.⁸³ It is obvious, of course, that the collection of the Danegeld was regarded, not as a burdensome duty, but as a very valuable and highly profitable right.⁸⁴ The arrangement to have the prelates collect the taxes from the priests is therefore in perfect accord with the general policy of Charles the Bald to seek support for his various enterprises from the higher clergy rather than from the lay nobility.⁸⁵ In making his preparations for the Italian expedition Charles could probably not have chosen any other policy, for a very large majority of the lay magnates were bitterly opposed to the expedition; and in spite of the favor shown by the king to the bishops, many of these eventually joined hands with the revolting nobles.⁸⁶

The contributions exacted from merchants toward the tribute of 877 were, as usual, proportioned to the fortune of each.⁸⁷ Evidently all merchants without exception were taxed.⁸⁸ Several

82 This provision occurs in both documents. The version in *B.*, given *supra*, n. 74, may be compared with that in *A.*, given here: "De ecclesiis vero, quas comites et vassalli dominici habent, seu de illis, qui cum seniore nostro pergere debent, sive qui remanserint, episcopus, in cuius parrochia consistunt, secundum praetaxatum modum accipere procurabit."

83 A provision such as the one just noted may have been necessary also in order to enable the bishops to collect from the priests in question, in the event that the patron should fail to give his consent, or in case he should be absent in Italy when the bishop's officials came to collect. In view of the probability that the tax-payers would avail themselves of any and every pretext to escape the tax, a special emphasis on the bishop's right to collect, particularly from those priests whom they did not themselves appoint, and whose incomes they did not control, may have been absolutely indispensable.

84 If the contrary be assumed, the various provisions relating to the collection of the priests' taxes seem to lose their point.

85 Cf. Dümmler, I, 295, 382 and n. 4, 434 ff.; III, 55 ff. An army raised by Charles the Bald in 866 is said to have consisted principally of episcopal contingents (*Ann. Bert.*, 866, p. 84).

86 *Ann. Vedast.*, 877, p. 296: "Contra voluntatem . . . suorum . . . [Karolus] iterum Italiam ingressus est." Hincmar tells of the conspiracy formed by Abbot Hugh and Counts Boso and Bernard against Charles, after he had reached Italy: "Qui [i. e. Hugh, Boso, and Bernard] una cum aliis regni primoribus, exceptis paucis, et episcopis adversus eum [Karolum] conspirantes coniuraverunt" (*Ann. Bert.*, 877, p. 136). On this whole subject, cf. Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, 69-126.

87 See *supra*, n. 44, and *infra*, appendix ii.

88 At least no exemptions are mentioned. The tax on the merchants, as

different classes are mentioned: itinerant merchants (*cappi*?),⁸⁸ resident merchants or townsmen, Jews and Christians.⁹⁰ So far as the contribution to the Danegeld was concerned, no distinction was made, except possibly as between Jews and Christians. According to one source,⁹¹ the former were taxed at one tenth, the latter at one eleventh (of their property?).⁹² We have no direct information as to who were authorized to collect these taxes. But it is well known that during the Carolingian period merchants were under the special protection of the king, and that in return for this protection they were required to make an annual or biennial contribution to the royal treasury;⁹³ therefore it does not seem too bold to presume that in the case of the Danegeld, too, the merchants paid their taxes to the usual royal officials.

After the various local authorities had collected the taxes due within their respective territories or jurisdictions, they were, according to Hincmar, to turn over the amounts thus raised to the *missi dominici*.⁹⁴ The *missi*, whose office was at this time in the process of becoming territorialized,⁹⁵ are probably not

on the other classes, probably was interpreted as a substitute for military service (cf. *supra*, p. 86).

89 Lot ("Le pont de Pitres," *loc. cit.*, 14, n. 2) and Thompson ("Commerce of France," *Journal of Polit. Economy*, 1915, XXIII, 874 and n. 6) believe that the *negotiatoribus* of document B. must be itinerant merchants, since they are contradistinguished from those *qui in civitatibus commanent*. But who were the *cappi* referred to in chapter 31 of the *Capitulary of Kiersy*? The latest theory offered in solution of this very vexing problem is that of Thompson (*op. cit.*, 882-87), who suggests that the *cappi* may have been Syrian merchants trading in France, with their headquarters at the emporium of Chappes, just above Troyes, on the upper Seine.

90 Cf. *supra*, nn. 87, 89.

91 The *Capitulary of Kiersy* (*supra*, n. 44). As to the value and reliability of this part of the capitulary, see *infra*, appendix ii.

92 In 866 all merchants, apparently without any distinction, had been required to pay one tenth of "all they seemed to have"; in 860 the rate of their tax was not specified, but it was based on a valuation of their houses and movables, and even the poorest had to contribute. Cf. *supra*, chap. v, n. 67; chap. iii, n. 36. If a distinction was made in 877 between Jews and Christians, and in favor of the latter, it is the only instance of its kind on record for this period.

93 Cf. *supra*, chap. v, n. 127.

94 See *supra*, n. 74, end. I interpret Hincmar's words to mean that the seigniors in general, not only the bishops, were to remit the Danegeld to the *missi*. This feature of the collection is mentioned only by Hincmar.

95 On the whole subject see Thompson, *Decline of the Missi Dominici*, 19 ff. The following passage from chapter 18 of the *Capitulary of Kiersy* is illuminating: "Et missi nostri, qui per per omne regnum nostrum constituti sunt, missaticum nostrum prout eis opportunum fuerit, agere non negligant." This seems to imply that the office of the *missi* had become territorial, or at least that it was no longer merely temporary. It is not a question of appointing or reappointing *missi*, but of admonishing those who held that office to be faithful and diligent in the discharge of their duties.

to be distinguished from the *principes regni*; or *primores*, who, according to the *Annals of St. Vaast*, were engaged in the collection of the Danegeld.⁹⁶

Charles the Bald had entrusted the general supervision of the raising of the tribute to his son, Louis the Stammerer, and those *primores* who were to remain with Louis in France. The collection of the taxes had been begun probably late in June or early in July, but was not completed until some time after the emperor had departed for Italy, hardly before the middle of August and possibly later.⁹⁷ Since it became necessary eventually to draw on the church treasuries,⁹⁸ it must be assumed either that the assessment prepared at Kiersy had proved inadequate or that unexpected difficulties were encountered in the collection of the tax, the latter being the more probable.⁹⁹

96 See the following note.

97 *Ann. Vedast.*, 877, pp. 295-96: "Et dum in his [i. e. the collection of the Danegeld] principes regni occupantur, Karolus imperator ad hoc negotium perficiendum Hludowicum filium suum delegit in regno cum suis primoribus relinquendum, et iterum iter parat quo Italiam pergeret. . . . Papiaque civitate Johannes papa ei occurrit. . . . At hi qui in Francia remanserant, dato tributo, Danos e regno abire coegerunt." Folcwin, *Gesta abbatum sancti Bertini Sithiensium*, c. 87, *M.G.H.*, SS., XIII, p. 622: "Karolus . . . Romam properare volens post medium Iulium de Francia iter arripuit." The diplomas of Charles confirm the statement of Folcwin (Böhmer-Mühlbacher, *Die Regesten d. Kaiserreichs u. d. Karolingern*, nos. 1815-24), as do the *Miracula s. Dionysii* (cf. Lot, "Le pont de Pitres," *loc. cit.*, 16, n. 2). In view of the fact that the collection of the Danegeld was not at most more than barely begun when Charles set out for Italy, it is impossible to assume a connection between the large treasure which the emperor took with him on his journey (*Ann. Bert.*, 877, p. 135), and the raising of the Danegeld. The treasure in question may have consisted, at least in part, of the *annua dona* which certain seigniors presented to the king immediately after the Assembly of Kiersy had been dissolved (*M.G.H.*, LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 363, lines 7 ff.). Cf. *supra*, chap. v. n. 103. Gfrörer's theory (*Gesch. d. ost- u. westfränk. Carolinger*, II, 141, 163), that this Danegeld really was, in large part, a *Römersteuer*, was disposed of by von Noorden (*Hincmar, Erzbischof von Rheims*, 334, n. 6), who substituted for it another, equally untenable theory (cf. *infra*, appendix ii and n. 6).

98 See *supra*, n. 47.

99 It is not unlikely that in many cases the poorer people had become so impoverished as not to be able to pay the taxes levied upon their holdings (cf. *infra*, n. 114). The letter written by Hincmar to Louis the Stammerer about this time, and referred to by Flodoard (*Historia Remensis ecclesiae*, III, c. 19, *M.G.H.*, SS., XIII, 510) as being "de coniecto Normannis dando," may have dealt with these and other difficulties in the collection of the tax. It is a noteworthy fact that the draft on the church treasuries is not included in either of the tax documents drawn up at Kiersy. Perhaps Hincmar in his letter to Louis had suggested some other way of raising the remainder of the tribute. That he disapproved, fully as much as the author of the *Annals of St. Vaast* (cf. *supra*, n. 47), of delivering the treasures of the churches into the hands of the pagans, is evident from what he says in another letter to Louis (cf. *infra*, n. 114).

With the aid of the contributions from the churches, however, the *primores* were finally able to bring together the needed sum of 5,000 pounds, which they then paid over to the Northmen.¹⁰⁰

It has already been indicated that another tribute was meanwhile being raised in Neustria, to secure the removal of the Northmen in the Loire.¹⁰¹ Our information on this Danegeld is very scant. We know, however, that the Neustrian bishops and magnates had undertaken to procure it, probably with the consent if not at the instigation of Charles the Bald, and perhaps under the direction of Abbot Hugh who functioned in the capacity of viceroy in this region.¹⁰² The words of Hincmar, who is our only source here, seem to imply that there was no attempt at any orderly and regulated assessment, but that the magnates, probably by the application of coercive measures in cases where such seemed necessary, collected money wherever there was any to be had.¹⁰³ How long they were occupied in this, no doubt very profitable, task cannot be ascertained. The amount demanded by the freebooters of the Loire remains likewise unknown, though it was probably a smaller sum than that paid to the Vikings of the Seine.¹⁰⁴

The magnates in Francia and Burgundy, after they had paid the Danegeld, forced the Northmen of the Seine to evacuate the realm.¹⁰⁵ The Neustrian magnates, on the other hand, appear to have been unable to secure the removal of the Vikings from the Loire.¹⁰⁶ Why, we do not know. It may be that it had proved impossible to raise the sum of money demanded; or the Vikings, after they had received the money, may have repudiated their agreement, and remained in spite of their

100 Cf. *supra*, n. 97.

101 See *supra*, nn. 18, 19, 21.

102 Cf. *supra*, n. 20.

103 That is my interpretation of the following: "tributum . . . secundum quod sibi [i. e. the magnates of Neustria] ab eis [Northmannis] fuit impositum, undecumque valuerunt, reddere procuraverunt" (*Ann. Bert.*, 877, p. 135).

104 The reasons for this conjecture are given *supra*, n. 21. It has also been shown that the magnates of Neustria as such, were not, so far as we know, required to raise any part of the Danegeld paid to the Vikings of the Seine (see *supra*, n. 38).

105 See *supra*, n. 97.

106 In the following year (878) Louis the Stammerer was constrained by Abbot Hugh to undertake what proved to be a fruitless expedition against them (*Ann. Bert.*, 878, p. 140; cf. Vogel, 257 ff.).

promise to evacuate.¹⁰⁷ However that may be, it is certain that the Loire region was not entirely cleared of Vikings until 882.¹⁰⁸

The Danegelds of 877 were the last levied during the reign of Charles the Bald, for that monarch died on the return from his second expedition to Italy.¹⁰⁹ There can be no doubt that the tributes of this year had, like those of preceding years, proved a heavy burden on the tax-payers; a burden which, moreover, had been very inequitably distributed. Unquestionably it was the unfree peasants and the priests — that part of the population which, though most numerous, was the least able to pay — who had furnished the great bulk of the tax money. And if the merchants, who shared the burden with the peasants and the priests, were in some instances well situated economically, many were doubtless comparatively poor men;¹¹⁰ besides, their property had been taxed at a much higher rate than that of the others. The seigniors, on the other hand, who could and who ought to have borne the heaviest share of taxation, not only escaped their part of the burden altogether, by shifting it on the peasantry, but very probably were enriched as a result of the abuses to which they resorted in collecting the taxes of their dependents.

As the cumulative result of six successive levies¹¹¹ of general Danegeld¹¹² — all during the reign of Charles the Bald — there was now in the West Frankish realm an unusual degree of pecuniary distress. If we may believe Hincmar, the laboring classes had been impoverished, and the church treasuries emptied. Beyond that, abuses of various kinds, depredation, and rapine were current everywhere; but right and justice were dead. All of which, according to our informant, was a consequence of the corrupt policy of buying off the Northmen when they should have been resisted with the sword. In a letter to Louis the Stammerer, written at the time of his accession to the throne, Hincmar earnestly admonished the new monarch

¹⁰⁷ The latter conjecture seems the more probable. Even the Seine Vikings, after they had received the tribute, did not evacuate until they were forced so to do. Cf. *supra*, n. 97.

¹⁰⁸ Vogel, 259, 347 ff.

¹⁰⁹ *Ann. Bert.*, 877, p. 137.

¹¹⁰ For a reference to very poor merchants, see *supra*, chap. III, n. 36.

¹¹¹ In 845, 853, 860-61, 862, 866, and 877. See *supra*.

¹¹² In addition to these levies of general Danegeld, there had also been a number of exactions of local Danegeld, or ransom, in various places (see *infra*, chaps. xv, xvi).

to take counsel with God and with his *fideles* as to how some measure of relief might be brought to the wretched and pitiable populace, exhausted by continual depredations and by exactions of Danegeld. And he added: "May justice and equity, which now are as it were dead, be revived among us; may God once more endue us with valor and martial strength, so that we may be able to resist our pagan enemies: for until now there has for many years been no thought of defense in this kingdom,¹¹³ but only of ransom and tribute; and not only poor men, but even churches once rich, have become impoverished."¹¹⁴

¹¹³ This is not strictly true, as shown *passim* in the preceding pages, and by Lot, *op. cit.*, 1-27. Cf. Vogel, 257.

¹¹⁴ *Epistola ad Ludovicum Balbum* (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, CXXV, 987-88): "Quarto, ut inveniatis cum Deo et vestris fidelibus, qualiter istae rapinae et depraedationes in isto regno cessent, et miser iste populus, qui jam per plures annos depraedationes diversas et continuas, et per exactiones ad Nortmannos repellendos affligitur, aliquod remedium habeat, et justitia et iudicium, quae quasi emortua apud nos sunt, reviviscant, ut virtutem nobis Deus reddat contra paganos: quia usque modo jam ante plures annos locum in isto regno defensio non habuit, sed redemptio et tributum, et non solum pauperes homines, sed et Ecclesias quondam divites jam evacuatatas habent."

CHAPTER VII.

SUMMARY OF THE CAUSES WHICH FORCED CHARLES THE BALD
TO RESORT TO THE DANEGELD.

No one at all familiar with the character of Charles the Bald as it is revealed in his various activities, could say that he was a model ruler.¹ But it must be insisted that Charles was neither exclusively nor mainly responsible for the policy of securing the removal of the Vikings by the payment of Danegeld.² Each time he agreed to pay tribute, except possibly in 877, Charles was virtually forced to do so by the attitude of his magnates.³ Usually it was the magnates who were responsible for the creation of a situation out of which the king saw no better means of escape than that afforded by the Danegeld. And if it is true that the situation in 877 was not one for which the nobles can be held responsible, it is also true that Charles could not have foreseen the coming of the Vikings when he proceeded to the invasion of Lorraine, and that after the defeat at Andernach there remained no method of procuring the removal of the invaders other than the payment of tribute.⁴ Moreover, we must not forget that in 862 Robert the Strong had been quite willing to pay a stipendiary Danegeld to the Vikings of the Seine in return for their services against the Bretons;⁵ and that, in 877, Abbot Hugh and the magnates of Neustria rather than enter into conflict with the Northmen of the Loire, chose to pay them tribute.⁶ There is not the slightest evidence to prove that the lay seigniors ever were opposed to the payment of Danegeld on principle, or that for this reason they ever refused to collect the taxes levied to raise the tribute;⁷ on the other hand, there is considerable evidence which indicates that they secured a substantial profit each time they collected such taxes from their

1 Cf. Dümmler, III, 54 ff.

2 Dümmler. (*ibid.*, p. 58) seems to hold Charles exclusively responsible for the policy of paying tribute, and practically all the older students of this period do likewise. Vogel (p. 257) and Lot ("Le pont de Pitres," *Le Moyen Age*, 1905, IX, p. 9, and elsewhere) are inclined to regard the policy of paying Danegeld as the only resource left after military efforts had proved futile.

3 See *supra*, pp. 33 ff., and n. 36, pp. 40 ff., 45 ff., 66-71.

4 This is also the view of Vogel (p. 257).

5 Cf. *supra*, chap. iv.

6 Cf. *supra*, chap. vi.

7 The contrary opinion of Bourgeois on this point is erroneous. See *supra*, chap. vi., n. 40.

dependents.⁸ We have reason to believe that if the military forces of the realm had been under the complete control, and at the free and immediate disposal of Charles, he would seldom if ever have resorted to the expedient of buying off the Northmen. With Charles the Danegeld was a matter, not of choice, but of necessity; with the nobles it appears to have been a matter of profit, a deliberate policy, based on selfish material interest.

Yet, while Charles the Bald cannot be held exclusively responsible for the policy of paying Danegeld, it is none the less true that he was the first monarch who was forced to adopt that policy.⁹ A principal reason for this is found by some scholars in the character of Charles, which has been represented as very weak and, on the whole, despicable. That the personality of Charles the Bald fades into insignificance when compared with that of his great ancestors, particularly Charlemagne, will not be denied. But Charles was undoubtedly a much stronger monarch than his father, Louis the Pious; and what evidence is there to show that he was so very much weaker than Lothaire I or even Louis the German?¹⁰ It is not true that Charles, unlike his brothers, was by nature disinclined to engage in military exploits, and for that reason would rather pay Danegeld than resist the Northmen by force of arms.¹¹ The fact is that he

⁸ See *supra*, pp. 53-54 and notes, pp. 81-85, 102-3.

⁹ We have no evidence that any monarch prior to Charles the Bald ever consented to the payment of Danegeld. It is true, however, that the Vikings had compelled the Frisians to pay local Danegeld in Charlemagne's time and on several occasions during the reign of Louis the Pious. For a discussion of these payments and their relation to the Danegeld in France, see *infra*, appendix iii.

¹⁰ Cf. *supra*, n. 2. No one, perhaps, would deny that Charles the Bald was a stronger ruler than Louis the Pious. But until recently the opinion has prevailed that the character and personality of Charles the Bald was far weaker than that of Louis the German. See especially Dümmler's (II, 412 ff.) eulogy on Louis the German, and cf. this with his unfavorable attitude toward Charles the Bald (III, 54 ff.). A careful comparison of what is known concerning the lives of the two brothers leads one to doubt the correctness of this opinion, which undoubtedly has been colored by national sympathies as well as by preconceived ideas and inherited notions (Bourgeois, *Le capit. de Kiery-sur-Oise*, 161-67, 194-98, 200-2; Lot, "Une année . . . de Charles le Chauve," *Le Moyen Age*, 1902, VI, 398, n. 3). Recently, however, there have been attempts to arrive at a more correct and just estimate of the character of Charles the Bald. Such attempts, of course, have been made chiefly by French scholars: Fustel de Coulanges, Bourgeois, Lot, and others. But at least one German scholar, namely Vogel, has recently given indications of a sounder judgment on this subject (pp. 256-57), though it is apparent that he can divorce himself from the older opinion only with great difficulty (pp. 106, 110 and n. 3). Cf. also Thompson, *Decline of the Missi Dominici*, p. 18.

¹¹ Cf. Vogel (256-57), who discards the view of Dümmler (III, 55).

did resist the Vikings in a military way whenever that was possible; and in the latter part of his reign, when he had come to a fuller appreciation of the significance of the Norse invasions, he was very active in providing for the military defense of the exposed portions of his realm.¹²

The foregoing detailed study of each of the various occasions on which Danegeld was paid between 845 and 877, will, I believe, substantiate the view that Charles the Bald was *compelled* to adopt this policy by reason of a very peculiar combination of circumstances; a combination which had not existed before his time, and which during his time appears to have been more fully developed in the western kingdom than in any other part of the Frankish realm. These circumstances may be grouped under eight general heads, as follows:

(1) The great change which took place after the death of Louis the Pious in the frequency, the character, and the purpose, of the Viking expeditions. It was no longer a question merely of an occasional raid by a small band of freebooters looking only for plunder. In the time of Charles the Bald the activities of the Vikings almost reached their climax. There was hardly a year of his reign when some part of the kingdom was not occupied or raided by the Northmen. They came now in large, well organized, and highly disciplined armies under the command of chieftains whose strategy and general military skill was on the whole superior to that of the Franks; and they purposed not only to enrich themselves with the fruits of pillage, but also to secure territory, make settlements, and establish colonies.¹³

(2) The kingdom of Charles the Bald was more exposed to the Viking expeditions than any of the other Frankish states, owing to the fact that it had the longest coast-line.¹⁴ Therefore, the only adequate defense against the Vikings would have been an efficient fleet. But that means of defense the Franks did not possess.¹⁵ Furthermore, the coast-guard formerly maintained

12 Lot, "Le pont de Pitres," *loc. cit.*, 1-17.

13 Vogel, 39-44, 125-27; cf. 49.

14 Cf. *ibid.*, 86-87.

15 Charles the Bald's efforts to create a fleet were not successful (cf. *supra*, p. 49 and nn. 11, 12). It is curious that no attempt was ever made to organize a fleet of river craft by utilizing the barges belonging to the abbey. On this see Thompson, "Commerce of France," *Journal of Polit. Economy*, 1915, XXIII, p. 870, n. 3.

Danegeld. 8.

by Charlemagne had by the time of Charles the Bald fallen into decay.¹⁶

(3) The wealth and material resources of the western kingdom probably were more considerable than those of the other Frankish kingdoms and, therefore, its power of attraction for the Vikings was greater.¹⁷

(4) After the death of Charlemagne, the steady decline of the power and prestige of the crown had been accompanied by an increasing tendency toward independence on the part of the local magnates and great seigniors; in other words, the rapidly developing influence of feudalism had tended to weaken the position, and destroy many prerogatives, of the king. Perhaps the most important feature of this development was the practice of commendation, which eventually transformed the Frankish army of freemen into one consisting of vassals and their retainers. This metamorphosis in the character of the army materially reduced the military power of the king; henceforth he was virtually impotent if deserted or disobeyed by the magnates.¹⁸

(5) After the division of the Frankish realm between the sons of Louis the Pious, and the exhaustion resulting from the civil wars waged by Louis the German and Charles the Bald against Lothaire I, the Frankish power of resistance was much lowered. The matter of defense in each one of the kingdoms, but particularly in that of the west, which was more exposed than the others, now became a very difficult problem to solve;¹⁹ and one which was further complicated by reason of its connection with point 4 above, and points 6, 7, and 8 below.

(6) The perverse character of the West Frankish nobility; their increasing greed and selfishness and their declining, if not utter lack of patriotism. Hostile to the interests both of the higher clergy and of the crown, the lay magnates lusted to gain possession of and to exploit the lands, the revenues, and all the accumulated wealth of the church; while they regarded the tenure of *honores*, or public functions, merely as opportunities for pecuniary gain. Some went to the extreme of forming secret

16 Cf. *supra*, chap. i, n. 5.

17 Dümmler, I, 221.

18 See especially Fustel de Coulanges, *Les transform. de la royauté*, 616-66; cf. the references given *supra*, chap. vi, n. 59.

19 Vogel, pp. 82-83; cf. p. 65 and n. 4.

alliances with the pagans, and few hesitated to make indirect use of the Viking operations in the furtherance of their own ends. The ravages of the invaders concerned them little, so long as their own property and interests were not at stake. Usually secure from attack in their rural strongholds, they had no desire to take the field against the Vikings for the purpose of defending churches, monasteries, and towns. Moreover, warfare with the Northmen, besides being always a very uncertain adventure, was from the viewpoint of the magnates an enterprise of rather doubtful value; if successful it might strengthen the hands of the king, and it always involved much expense with little hope of pecuniary gain. Payment of Danegeld was, with the nobles, the preferred method of securing the removal of the Vikings. By this expedient the magnates, in the first place, escaped all danger and all expense; for if to raise the tribute taxes were levied also on demesne holdings, these taxes could easily be shifted on the peasantry. And, in the second place, the magnates in collecting the taxes due from their dependents were able to reap a considerable harvest for themselves.²⁰

(7) The revolts of the West Frankish nobles, and the support given the rebels by Louis the German. These revolts were due, in large part, to attempts made by Charles the Bald to check the growing independence and disobedience of the nobles, and toward rehabilitating the position and the prerogatives of the crown.²¹

(8) The ambitious projects of Charles the Bald to annex Lorraine and to secure the undisputed recognition of his imperial authority in Italy.²² The fateful preoccupation of Charles with

²⁰ Richer's description (*Historiae*, I, c. 4, ed. Waitz, pp. 3-4) of conditions at the close of the ninth century is also applicable to the time of Charles the Bald: "cum regnorum principes nimia rerum cupidine sese preire contenderent, quisque ut poterat rem dilatabat. Nemo regis provectum, nemo regni tutelam querebat. Aliena acquirere summum cuique erat. Nec rem suam provehere videbatur, qui alieni aliquid non addebat. Unde et omnium concordia in summam discordiam relapsa est. Hinc direptiones, hinc incendia, hinc rerum perversiones exarsere. Quae cum immanissime agitantur, piratae . . . ad rerum immanitatem incitantur." Ermentarius (*Miracula sancti Filiberti*, *M. G. H.*, SS., XV, 302) adds the following to his recital of events for the year 850: "omnes fugam arripiunt, rarus est qui dicat: 'state, state, resistite, pugnat pro patria, liberis et gente!' Sicque torpentes atque invicem dissidentes, quod defendere debuerant armis, tributis redimunt, ac christianorum pessumdatum regnum." For a fuller discussion of these matters and additional details, see Dümmler, I, 222, 228-29, 420-21; cf. Flach, *Les orig. de l'anc. France*, I, 147-48 and *passim*; Favre, *Eudes*, 221 ff.; *supra*, pp. 26-27 and n. 6, 33-34, 41-43, 45-49, 66-71; *infra*, chap. ix.

²¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 37-39 and notes.

²² For detailed discussion of these enterprises, see Dümmler, III, 32 ff.

these projects in the last years of his reign was doubtless one of the principal reasons why Danegeld had to be paid in 877.²³ Moreover, these unwise and unsuccessful enterprises helped to exhaust the resources needed for the defense of the home lands.

These various circumstances, which apply in particular to the western kingdom, combined to form during the reign of Charles the Bald that peculiar situation which must be regarded as the real reason why he was constrained to pay Danegeld. To assume that Louis the German, or any other contemporary ruler, could have done better than Charles the Bald in a similar situation, is either to ignore the essential facts in the case, or to underestimate the power of the controlling forces of the age.²⁴

On the accession of Louis the Stammerer, Hincmar voiced the hope that the ensuing reign would be one of better accord between king and magnates than that of Charles the Bald had been; that, consequently, there would be a revival of public spirit, of patriotism, and of military valor; that the policy of buying off the foreign enemy would be discontinued; and that the abuses engendered by the exaction of the Danegeld would be gradually stamped out.²⁵ But all such hopes were to prove vain. On several occasions the successors of Charles the Bald found themselves in situations out of which they could devise no means of escape other than the one to which he had resorted, because in the nature of the case there was no other.

It will perhaps be agreed that in the situation analyzed above the most important single factor, next to the Vikings themselves, was the attitude of the West Frankish nobility. Almost always it was the magnates who were chiefly responsible for the conditions which forced the king to fall back on the Danegeld as a last resort. For this reason, the policy of paying Danegeld must be regarded as much less the policy of the king than of the magnates. And the truth of this assertion is further illustrated by the fact that Danegeld continued to be paid in the West Frankish kingdom long after the death of Charles the Bald. His successors, who are distinguishable from the other magnates only by

23 Cf. *supra*, pp. 93-96; Vogel, 83 ff.

24 We know that Lothaire II on at least one occasion found it necessary to resort to the Danegeld (see *infra*, appendix iv). As for Louis the German, he "never raised a finger to repel the numerous inroads of the Northmen in Saxony" (Vogel, 257).

25 See *supra*, chap. vi, n. 114.

their royal title, were not in position to oppose the policy of the all-powerful aristocracy.²⁶ There was to be no change in this policy until the magnates began to realize that the continued pursuit of it would undermine their own interests.²⁷

²⁶ Cf. Fustel de Coulanges, *op. cit.*, 640-66, 689-702; Baldamus, *Heerwesen* (in Gierke's *Untersuch. z. d. Staats- u. Rechtsgesch.*, IV), pp. 32-34; Flach *op. cit.*, I, 147-48.

²⁷ Cf. *infra*, chap. xiv.

PART II.

THE DANEGELD AFTER 877.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE DANEGELD PAID FOR CARLOMAN IN 884.

The payment of Danegeld in the West Frankish realm did not cease with the death of Charles the Bald in 877.¹ Only seven years after that date, in 884, the Vikings were again in position to demand tribute; and they received then a larger sum than they had on any preceding occasion, indeed the largest ever paid them by the Franks.²

If Louis the Stammerer, the immediate successor of Charles the Bald, did not find it necessary to resort to the Danegeld, this may be explained not only by the brevity of his reign (877—79), but also by the fact that during these years the Danish Vikings made England the principal theater of their operations.³ It is to be noted, moreover, that many Vikings about this time gave up their former habits, and reconciled themselves to a more settled and domesticated mode of existence in what came to be called the Danelaw.

1 Cf. *supra*, p. 116.

2 What follows in the next succeeding paragraphs, down to the establishment of the Vikings at Condé (see *infra*, p. 122 and n. 22), is not intended to be more than a brief summary of the Viking movements and the general situation in the West Frankish kingdom, from the death of Charles the Bald to the time of Carloman. It is based largely on the detailed discussion of this period given by Vogel (pp. 260—311); in some cases, however, references are given also to the work of Dümmler (III, 113—71, 198—258).

3 Vogel, 260—63. It is true that a band of Vikings was operating in the lower Loire during the reign of Louis the Stammerer (cf. *supra*, pp. 108—9 and nn. 106—8), and that the latter made an attempt to aid Abbot Hugh in expelling them. But the king fell ill on this expedition, and, so far as known, nothing ever came of it. In any case, the Loire was not cleared of Vikings until the time of Louis III (882). See Vogel, 257—59, 311.

There was, however, among the Danes in England, a more adventurous element, the members of which could not or would not resign themselves to peaceful pursuits. Quite naturally these came to regard conditions in England as less and less satisfactory for their purposes, in proportion as Alfred the Great was able to increase the efficiency and the resisting power of the West Saxon fyrd. The numbers of this adventurous element were much augmented by the arrival in the Thames, about the year 878, of a fresh group of Vikings from Denmark. These adventurers and freebooters, old and new, soon coalesced to form the nucleus of a very large and powerful military organization, later known as the "great army" of the Danes.

Abandoning England as a land of small opportunities for plunder and tribute, these Vikings in the summer of 879 transported themselves across the channel to the Frankish realm, where conditions were from their point of view much more inviting. Their landing, in July, on the coast of Flanders at a point not far from Calais, marked the beginning of a long period of calamities for the Franks; a period during which the Vikings plundered, burned, and massacred almost at will throughout the entire region between the Rhine and the Seine. This disastrous epoch did not come to a close until in 892, when the "great army" at last returned to the Thames, its original point of departure.⁴ To follow all the movements of this army after its arrival in Frankish territory, does not fall within the scope of the present treatise. But an attempt must be made to explain how that situation arose which in 884 led to the payment of another Danegeld.

On the death of Louis the Stammerer, in 879, certain magnates of the West Frankish kingdom, under the leadership of Abbot Gauzelin and Count Conrad of Paris, endeavored to exclude Louis and Carloman, the two youthful sons of the Stammerer, from the succession to the throne. This party of opposition allied itself with Louis the Younger, king of the East Franks, who, on the invitation of the rebels, at once undertook to invade and conquer the kingdom to the west. The plan was foiled only by the prompt action of Abbot Hugh, guardian and protector of the young princes; by the concession of western Lorraine, Hugh induced Louis the Younger to give up his am-

⁴ Vogel, 371-72.

bitious project and to return home. In September of the same year (879) he was able to secure the coronation of his two royal wards.⁵

New troubles, however, did not long wait to announce themselves. In October occurred the revolt of Boso, who was recognized and crowned as king in Burgundy;⁶ and in January of the following year (880), Louis the Younger, at the instigation of Abbot Gauzelin and Count Conrad,⁷ renewed his invasion of the western kingdom.

Probably it was the threatening activities of the Northmen at this time which induced the Franks to compose their grievances, and to give attention to the real dangers facing them.⁸ With the retirement of Louis the Younger, and the reëtrance of the West Frankish rebels into royal favor, it became possible at last to proceed to a division of the western realm between the two (elder) sons of Louis the Stammerer: Francia and Neustria were to constitute the kingdom of Louis III; while Aquitaine, Burgundy, and Gothia fell to the lot of Carloman.⁹

There can be no doubt that the events above described were well known to the Northmen, and that the latter intended to avail themselves of the favorable opportunity created by the domestic quarrels and rivalries of the Franks. After its arrival in Flanders in July, 879, the "great army" had proceeded at once to plunder and devastate the valleys of the Yser, Lys, and Scheldt. In November the Vikings established themselves in winter quarters at Ghent; and from that point as a center, they rapidly extended their plundering operations in all directions. Owing to the preoccupation of the Franks, which we have noted above, the freebooters met with practically no resistance.¹⁰ The blow dealt by Louis the Younger (of the East Franks) in February, 880, to one division of the "great army," at Thiméon in Lorraine,¹¹ was hardly more than an incident; and during the spring and summer of 880 both Louis III and

5 Dümmler, III, 113-18; cf. Vogel, 263.

6 Dümmler, III, 121-27.

7 Gauzelin and Conrad were the leaders of a party of nobles opposed to that of Abbot Hugh. It appears that they were jealous of Hugh, whose influence with Louis III was from their point of view altogether too great. *Ann. Vedast.*, 880, ed. Dehaisnes, p. 302 and note (a).

8 Dümmler, III, 127-33; cf. Vogel, 266-67.

9 Dümmler, III, 137-38.

10 Vogel, 264, 266.

11 *Ibid.*, 267-69.

Carloman were occupied in a futile endeavor to subjugate Boso in Burgundy.¹² It is true that in the meantime Abbot Gauzelin had been charged with the defense of Francia; but his ambitious project to wipe out the "great army" at Ghent, ended in miserable failure, and served only to increase the audacity of the invaders.¹³

In November the Viking camp was moved from Ghent to Kortrijk, on the Lys, from which place the entire region as far south as the Somme, was subjected to pitiless devastation. So heartrending was the lamentation that arose as a result of the terrible calamities which his land suffered at the hands of the Vikings, that Louis III, abandoning the attempt to reduce Boso to obedience, determined to give his exclusive attention to the Northmen. In June, 881, he moved against them with considerable forces, and on August 3 won a brilliant victory, over a large division of the "great army" at Saucourt (in the Vimeu, just south of the mouth of the Somme). Some eight or nine thousand Danes are said to have fallen in this engagement.¹⁴ Thenceforth the Vikings probably harbored a wholesome fear of the military prowess of Louis III. Discovering presently that conditions in the East Frankish realm were now better adapted for their purposes, the invaders gave up their camp at Kortrijk, and proceeded both by land and by water to Elslloo, on the Meuse.¹⁵ Here they began, in November 881, the construction of a very strong camp, from which the valleys of the Meuse, the Rhine, and the Moselle, were to be plundered.¹⁶

In the West Frankish realm there followed, after the events just described, a period of comparative quiet. It was, however, not of long duration — hardly a year.¹⁷ On August 5, 882, Louis III, the hero of Saucourt, died;¹⁸ and in the following month his brother Carloman, a mere youth, was acknowledged king of the entire West Frankish realm.¹⁹ About the same

12 Dümmler, III, 137-38.

13 Vogel, 269 ff.

14 Cf. Dümmler, III, 153 ff.

15 Vogel, 269-75.

16 *Ibid.*, 280 ff.

17 *Ibid.*, 311 ff.

18 Dümmler, III, 207. In July, 882, hardly a month before his death, Louis III appears to have concluded an arrangement with the Northmen of the Loire by which the latter were persuaded to put to sea in the fall of that year. Just what the terms of the agreement were we do not know. See Vogel, 349, 350 and n. 1.

19 Dümmler, III, 207, 228.

time the "great army," under the leadership of Godfrey, Siegfried, Vurm, and Hals, had abandoned its camp at Elsloo and, in accordance with a treaty concluded with Charles the Fat,²⁰ had evacuated the territories of the East Franks.²¹ Godfrey probably retired to his newly acquired fiefs in Frisia; while Siegfried and his followers sailed out of the Meuse only to ascend the Scheldt as far as Condé, where, in October, 882, they established themselves in a fortified winter camp.²²

The usual operations were promptly commenced, and the entire territory west and south to the Somme was speedily plundered.²³ Carloman made some attempt to check the invaders but was able to accomplish little, since his right-hand man, Abbot Hugh, was absent in Germany,²⁴ and since several of the magnates refused to aid him.²⁵ The Northmen, evidently aware of this situation, proceeded to make the most of their opportunity. Plundering and burning, they advanced to the vicinity of Rheims. It was doubtless feared that they would attack the episcopal city itself; for Hincmar hastily collected the relics and treasures of his church and with these fled beyond the Marne.²⁶ Undaunted by the scant success of his earlier effort, Carloman for the second time ventured with his meager forces to oppose the invaders. Having engaged and defeated one group of Vikings, he compelled another hastily to fall back and to rejoin the main army; and the latter, though not attacked, yet deemed it prudent to return to the camp at Condé.²⁷

But this was only a partial and temporary success. In December (882) the pagans recommenced their operations, advancing as far as the Oise without meeting any resistance.²⁸

20 See *infra*, appendix iv.

21 Part of the "great army" may have remained for some time in the district of the lower Rhine or of the Meuse. See Vogel, 294 and n. 4.

22 *Ibid.*, 312 and n. 1. Cf. Dümmler (III, 209, n. 1), who quotes some additional sources.

23 *Ann. Vedast.*, 882, pp. 314-15.

24 Abbot Hugh had departed in November on an embassy to Charles the Fat. Hugh at this time was the most influential magnate in the western kingdom, the real ruler in fact, and the defense of the realm had been specially entrusted to him. Cf. Dümmler, III, 207, n. 5.

25 *Ann. Bert.*, 882, ed. Waitz, p. 154.

26 *Ibid.* Hincmar asserts that the Vikings intended to conquer the kingdom (of Francia?). The aged archbishop died in exile from his see on December 21, 882 (cf. Dümmler, III, 209-10). The *Annals of St. Bertin*, it may be noted, were not continued after his death.

27 *Ann. Bert.*, 882, p. 154; *Ann. Vedast.*, 882, pp. 314-15. Cf. Vogel, 313-14.

28 *Ann. Vedast.*, 882, p. 315.

Abbot Hugh, who had by this time returned home, now collected his men and united them with the army of the king. Together they inflicted some minor losses on the Vikings and forced them back to their ships.²⁹ At all to no avail. Early in 883 the Vikings again set forth on their work of destruction, and again Carloman's efforts to check them met with no success.³⁰ In the spring, however, the "great army" quitted its camp at Condé and proceeded to Flanders, to spend the summer plundering that territory.³¹

Carloman, who may have been aware of the plans of the Northmen,³² in the fall (883) again placed himself at the head of his army and took up a position at Miannay (in the Vimeu), on the left bank of the lower Somme; doubtless hoping that he might be able successfully to resist the Vikings should they attempt to ascend the Somme.³³ That the young monarch was doing everything in his power to protect the kingdom, can hardly be denied. But his efforts proved all in vain. Towards the close of October, the whole "great army" arrived at a place on the right bank of the Somme directly opposite that occupied by the forces of Carloman; and about the same time the Danish fleet entered the mouth of the river.³⁴ Whether an engagement took place is not known, but Carloman and his army were forced to flee beyond the Oise.³⁵

The Vikings then advanced up the valley of the Somme to Amiens, where they prepared to spend the winter³⁶ — a terrible winter for the population between the Somme and the Seine. The entire region was laid waste; monasteries and churches, houses and villages, were burned to the ground. The North-

²⁹ *Ann. Vedast.*, 882, p. 315.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 883, p. 316. Cf. Vogel, 315, n. 1.

³¹ *Ann. Vedast.*, 883, p. 316.

³² This may be inferred from the fact that he took up his position at a point which commanded the entrance to the Somme. Cf. *infra*, n. 34.

³³ *Ann. Vedast.*, 883, pp. 316-17.

³⁴ *Ann. Vedast.*, 883, p. 317: "Nortmanni vero, octobrio mense finiente, Latuerum cum equitibus et peditibus atque omni supellectili veniunt. Naves quoque per mare Sumnam fluvium ingressae, etc." Regino, *Chronicon*, 884, ed. Kurze, p. 121: "Nortmanni, qui ab Haslon recesserant, Somnam fluvium intrant ibi se condecorunt." *Ethelwerdi chronicon*, III, 884, *M.G.H.*, SS., XIII, p. 17. Florentius Wigorn., *Chronicon ex chronicis*, 884, *Mon. historica Britannia*, pp. 560-61; *Annales anglo-saxonici*, 884, *M.G.H.*, SS., XIII, pp. 104-5. Cf. Vogel, 315.

³⁵ *Ann. Vedast.*, 883, p. 317: "regem cunctumque exercitum ejus fugere compulerunt [Nortmanni], atque Hisam fluvium transire fecerunt."

³⁶ *Ibid.*

men, according to the *Annals of St. Vaast*, "ceased not to take Christian people captive and to kill them. . . . Through all the streets lay bodies of the clergy, of laymen, nobles and others, of women, children, and suckling babes. There was no road nor place where the dead did not lie; and all were filled with sorrow and despair when they saw the Christian people brought almost to the verge of destruction."³⁷ Encountering no resistance whatever,³⁸ the Vikings threw off all restraint and converted the country subject to their raids into an immense shambles. It became patent that something had to be done at once to stem the tide of destruction, or all would be lost.

In tardy recognition of this fact, the West Frankish magnates assembled at Compiègne early in 884, to discuss what measures ought to be taken by them — not by the king — to secure the removal of the Danes.³⁹ So far as we know, the

³⁷ *Ann. Vedast.*, 883-84, pp. 317-18. The translation of this passage inserted into the text above, is, except for a few emendations, that given by J. H. Robinson in his *Readings in European History* (Chicago, Ginn and Company, 1906), I, p. 164.

³⁸ *Ann. Vedast.*, 883, p. 317: "nemine eis [Nortmannis] resistente. Tunc Franci, videntes Nortmannorum res prospere in omnibus accrescere, etc."

³⁹ *Ibid.* (this follows immediately after the words quoted in the preceding note): "quemdam Danum christianum, Sigefridum nomine, mittunt ad eos, qui caute cum eis de redemptione regni ageret." *Ibid.*, 884, p. 318: "Interim, quia rex juvenis erat, omnes principes Compendio palatio conveniunt, tractaturi quid illis esset agendum; initoque consilio, Sigefridum . . . mittunt ut cum principibus suae gentis tractaret, ut tributum acciperent, et a regno abirent." As appears from the above quotations, the *Annals of St. Vaast* contain two separate recitals regarding the embassy of Siegfried. According to the first of these, the negotiations with the Danes were begun before the end of the year 883; while according to the second, they did not commence until early in 884. Though there is no disagreement between the two recitals, except in the matter of the dates, it is true that the first lacks certain details given in the second and does not follow the negotiations to their conclusion. It is possible that Siegfried was sent before the close of the year 883, but that no agreement with the Vikings could be reached until February, 884 (cf. von Kalckstein, *Abt Hugo*, in *Forsch. z. d. Gesch.*, XIV, 120-21). The basis for this view is the fact that the entry for 883 mentions only the sending of Siegfried, the purpose of his mission, and his arrival in Amiens; while the entry for 884 goes on to describe the protraction of the negotiations and the final arrangement. I am inclined, however, to take a different view. Two important considerations lead me to believe that the entry for 883 is erroneous, and that the magnates did not decide to parley with the Danes until early in 884 (Vogel, p. 316, apparently takes a similar view, but without giving any reasons for it). In the first place, it is very strange that a medieval annalist, and particularly one with as great a love for brevity as the annalist of St. Vaast, should have repeated at the beginning of his entries for 884 information which he had already given at the end of his recital for 883; secondly, it is very improbable that the Danes would have engaged in the terrible devastation described at the beginning of 884, if, in fact, negotiations for the payment of tribute were already under way. On this basis, therefore, I venture the following con-

magnates came together on their own initiative — there is no evidence that they had been summoned by the king — and they tried to justify the taking of matters into their own hands by urging the youthfulness of Carloman. Of the deliberations of the magnates no record has come down to us save that, having taken counsel, they decided to open negotiations with the Viking leaders, to sound them cautiously as to their demands, and if possible to persuade them to evacuate the kingdom in return for the payment of tribute. There is no indication of any kind that it entered the minds of the magnates to get rid of the Danes in some way other than by payment of tribute.⁴⁰

Before we seek to penetrate into the motives of the magnates when they adopted this course, it will be desirable first to try to ascertain whether *their* explanation of Carloman's failure to check the advance of the Northmen — namely that it was due to his youth and inexperience —⁴¹ is the true one. It must be admitted that despite all the efforts of the young monarch to check the ravages of the Vikings, these had increased rather than diminished.⁴² Just why this was so, why Carloman had not been able to offer effective resistance, is, of course, a question of capital importance in an attempt to determine the *raison d'être* of the Danegeld of 884. Was it principally because of immaturity and lack of military ability? Or was it rather because he had not been properly supported? Or were there perhaps other reasons? While it is difficult to elicit from our sources thoroughly satisfactory answers to these questions, the

jecture. The person who wrote the entries for 884 was, it would seem, not aware of any previous entry relative to the embassy of Siegfried. It is possible, therefore, that the annals beginning with 884 were not written by the person who had made the entries for the preceding period. We know that the author of the *Annals of St. Vaast* was an inmate of the monastery of that name (see Dehaisnes' note on p. 307 of his edition of these annals); we know also that Rodulf, the abbot of St. Vaast, died in 883 (*ibid.*, 883, p. 317). Rodulf may have been the author of the annals until his death in 883; some later scribe in possession of this earlier part of the work, but not of the remainder, may have added at the end of the manuscript in his possession the sentences referring to Siegfried, without indicating, possibly without knowing, that the negotiations with the Danes were begun in 884 and not in 883.—See also *infra*, n. 69.

40 Compare with this the deliberations of the East Franks in 882. They appear to have had no other thought than that of expelling the invaders by force of arms. See *infra*, appendix iv.

41 Cf. *supra*, n. 39.

42 *Ann. Vedast.*, 883, p. 317: "Franci, videntes Nortmannorum res prospere in omnibus accrescere, etc." Regino, *Chron.*, 884, *loc. cit.*, p. 121: "Quorum [Normannorum] creberrimas incursiones cum Carlomannus sustinere non posset, etc." Cf. *supra*, pp. 121 ff.

considerations set forth in the following paragraph may serve to throw some light on the general situation. Obviously it would be a serious error to attribute the ill success of the Franks exclusively to the youth and inexperience of their king unless, indeed, no other reasons for it were apparent. Our first task, accordingly, must be to note the other factors entering into the situation, and to determine, so far as we may, the relative importance of each of these.

It is generally admitted that the "great army" was one of the largest Viking forces with which the Franks ever had to contend.⁴³ On the other hand, it is very improbable that Carloman had ever had at his command anything approaching an adequate number of troops.⁴⁴ The freemen who owed military service were growing ever less in number,⁴⁵ and there is reason to believe that their diminution in the recent period had been very rapid.⁴⁶ For some time past the real military strength of the kingdom had been, not the army of freemen under the leadership of the counts, but the contingents of vassals led by the great magnates.⁴⁷ Though some of the latter may have come to the aid of Carloman,⁴⁸ it is very doubtful that even a majority of the magnates had properly supported the young monarch in his military endeavors.⁴⁹ We must note also that with regard to organizations, tactics, and leadership, the Franks were as yet

43 Steenstrup, *Normannerne*. I, 209-17; Vogel, 262-63, 315, 325.

44 Cf. *supra*, pp. 121 ff.; *infra*, n. 49.

45 Cf. *supra*, chap. vi, n. 59; p. 114 and n. 18.

46 Hincmar, *Ad episcopos regni admonitio altera*, c. xv (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, CXXV, 1016): "in tantum . . . affligerentur pauperes, ut inde prius in exercitu plures ire poterant, vix aliqui modo ire praevaleant." These words were written by Hincmar at the close of the year 882, shortly before he died.

47 Cf. *supra*, chap. vi, n. 59.

48 At the time the Northmen came to Rheims in 882, Hincmar's men were with the army of Carloman (*Ann. Bert.*, 882, p. 154). Abbot Hugh, after he had returned from Germany, collected his forces and joined the king (cf. *supra*, p. 123); Hugh (accompanied by his men?) was with Carloman also at Miannay (cf. *ibid.*) according to a document issued at that place (Bouquet, IX, 431; cf. Dümmler, III, 207, n. 5 and v. Kalkstein, *op. cit.*, p. 120).

49 According to the *Annals of St. Vaast* (882, p. 290), Hugh's absence in Germany in 882 was very unfortunate "quia Karlomannus non habuit unde Nortmannis posset resistere, quibusdam regni primoribus ab ipsius auxilio se retrahentibus." Later in the same year Carloman is said to have opposed the Northmen "cum quibus potuit" (*ibid.*, p. 291); which seems to imply that there were comparatively few men at the king's disposal. In connection with the ravages of the Vikings in 882, and again in 883, we meet the words, "nemine sibi [eis] resistente" (*ibid.*, pp. 315, 317).

inferior to the Northmen.⁵⁰ There can hardly be any doubt that engagements between equal numbers of Vikings and Franks, even when the latter were under the direction of their ablest men, had so far usually ended in favor of the Vikings.⁵¹ There is, furthermore, conclusive evidence that the Frankish army of this period was sadly lacking in morale.⁵² These facts speak for themselves; doubtless they were the real reason for Carloman's failure to defeat the Northmen. His lack of experience and insight may perhaps have had something to do with the matter; but it is at best very doubtful whether a more mature ruler placed in the same circumstances as Carloman, could have succeeded in forcibly expelling the Northmen.⁵³

Remains now to explain the reasons for the policy of the West Frankish magnates. Why did they not give better support to the military efforts of Carloman? What made them prefer to resort to the Danegeld? Attention should be called to the fact that this was not the only course open to them.⁵⁴ They might, conceivably, have chosen to support the military policy of the king and, in accordance therewith, have attempted by a united effort forcibly to expel the Danes from the realm. But they

⁵⁰ Vogel, 39-41, 43-44; cf. Vander Linden, "Les Normands à Louvain," *Rev. Hist.*, 1917, CXXIV, 69, 70 and n. 1. If it is true that the superiority of the Vikings in leadership and tactics began to wane towards the close of the ninth century (Vogel, 44), this change is certainly not noticeable before the siege of Paris in 885-86 (cf. *ibid.*, 337-38, 368-69).

⁵¹ To support and illustrate this statement, it seems necessary only to cite a few examples, such as the following: the engagement at Brissarthe in 866, where Robert the Strong was killed (Vogel, 218-19); the miserable defeat and rout of the troops under Abbot Gauzelin in 880 (*ibid.*, 269-70); the sanguinary defeat of Duke Brun's Saxon army in the same year (*ibid.*, 276). Louis III's victory over the Vikings at Saucourt (see *supra*, p. 121) is doubtless to be explained in part by the probable numerical superiority of the Franks (cf. Vogel, 274); like other lesser successes of the Franks, its importance has no doubt been much exaggerated not only by tradition (*ibid.*, 273, n. 1), but also by the contemporary annalists (see Vander Linden, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67).

⁵² Robbery had become so common among the West Franks that it must have been a serious risk for anyone to leave his holdings for any length of time. The man who went to perform the army service required of him might return home only to find himself plundered of all or most of what he possessed. Quite naturally many preferred not to go. Of those who actually went to the army many are said to have gone merely for the sake of thereby securing more favorable opportunities for plunder and pillage. All of which must have had a disastrous effect on the morale of the army (*Capit. Vernensc. M.G.H., LL.* Sectio II, t. 2, p. 371, lines 37-38; p. 372, lines 2 ff. Cf. *infra*, n. 61 and *supra*, n. 35).

⁵³ Vogel (p. 316) apparently takes a different view; but cf. v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

⁵⁴ Vogel, *loc. cit.*, thinks it was, or at least believes the magnates thought so.

did not. Why? Obviously on one or both of the following grounds: (1) Knowing the strength and military superiority of the Northmen, the magnates believed it impossible to defeat them under existing circumstances; or (2) the magnates had a special interest in securing their removal by the payment of Danegeld.

As regards the first of these points, the following considerations may suffice. If we admit that the Vikings were superior to the Franks in military qualities, and that their "great army" had outnumbered the army of Carloman,⁵⁵ it is still difficult to believe that the Frankish resources in men and matériel, potentially at least, were not far greater than those of the Vikings.⁵⁶ And while the army of Carloman had been lacking in morale,⁵⁷ it can not be conceded that the Franks in all cases were inferior to the Northmen in personal valor.⁵⁸ If the Vikings had the advantage of superior leadership, it is nevertheless true that there were men of considerable ability among the Franks, such as Abbot Hugh, Abbot Gauzelin, Count Odo, and others.⁵⁹ With these assets in their favor, there seems to be some reason for believing that if the Franks had set aside their selfish personal interests, and had patriotically united their efforts in defense of their land and their possessions, they would in the end have prevailed over the Vikings.⁶⁰ And since this

55 Cf. *supra*, nn. 49, 50.

56 The point here is that Carloman's army had represented but a small fraction of all the military resources of the western kingdom—even exclusive of Aquitaine and Burgundy. If all the "effectives" of Francia and Neustria, or even a majority of them, could have been brought into the field, it seems to the present writer that they must have far outnumbered the entire "great army." At the siege of Paris (885-86) the "great army" is said to have numbered some forty thousand men, and Vogel (p. 325) believes this to have been "die grösste normannische Armee, die je auf fränkischem Boden vereinigt worden war." Yet, this army was but a fraction of the *surplus* male population of Denmark. It does not seem possible that the *total* male population of Denmark—or even of Scandinavia—could have been greater than that of Francia and Neustria (Levasseur, *La population française*, I, 132-41, estimates the population of France in the ninth century at five and one-half millions; in Hildebrand's (ed.) *Sveriges historia*, III, 282, the population of Sweden with Finland and its other possessions, in the sixteenth century, is estimated at one-half million). Can there be any doubt, then, that the potential military strength of the western Franks, had it been available, would have been overwhelmingly greater than that of the Viking forces?

57 Cf. *supra*, n. 52.

58 Vogel, 39, 44.

59 v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, p. 126; Vogel, 323. Cf. Eckel, *Charles le Simple*, p. 3.

60 After the payment of the Danegeld, which doubtless proved far heavier

was recognized at the time, in fact almost taken for granted,⁶¹ we are perforce driven to the conclusion that the real or principal reason for the policy of the magnates was, not any diffidence in their own ability to resist and even to defeat the Northmen, but rather a preference to secure their removal by the payment of Danegeld, a preference which grew out of the purely selfish interests to which these magnates were committed.

What has been said above is not intended to imply that the Frankish magnates had entered into conspiracy with the Vikings in the matter of the Danegeld. The fact that they eventually took measures to secure the removal of the invaders, is evidence that even from their point of view the presence of the Danes, with its attendant destruction of life and property, was an evil, which sooner or later had to be cured in some way.⁶² For this very reason, however, their failure to support the military efforts of Carloman, and their dilatory tactics in general, seem all the more striking. Not until the northern part of Francia had been converted into a shambles, did the magnates evince anything like a serious concern in the welfare of their country.⁶³ Were

than had been expected (cf. *infra*, pp. 131-32), the Franks did unite their forces, and prepared to support Carloman in case the Vikings should violate the terms of their agreement. See *infra*, n. 96.

61 The following quotations from Carloman's *Capitulare Vernense*, issued in March, 884 (*M.G.H., LL.*, Sectio II, t. 2, pp. 371 ff.), may suffice to illustrate the point referred to in the text: "[p. 371] non est autem mirum, si pagani et exteræ nationes nobis dominantur nobisque temporalia tollunt, dum unusquisque proximo suo per vim tollit, unde vivere debet, etc. [p. 372] Nos vero prædamur fratres nostros, et idcirco pagani merito nos nostramque substantiam deprædantur. Quomodo igitur securi poterimus pergere contra inimicos . . . nostros, cum 'rapina pauperis inclusa est in domo nostra'? Et non solum domi reclusa est, verum etiam plerumque evenit, ut pleno ventre rapina in hostem quidam proficiscantur. Et quomodo poterimus inimicos nostros devincere, cum sanguis fratrum nostrorum ab ore nostro distillat, et manus nostræ plenæ sunt sanguine et brachia pondere miseriarum et rapinarum gravantur totaque virtus animi corporisque debilitatur?" On two occasions the annalist of St. Vaast, after having described the ravages of the Vikings, adds with a reproach: "nemine eis [Normannis] resistente" (*supra*, n. 49). Cf. v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

62 Cf. *supra*, n. 39.

63 Cf. *supra*, pp. 123-25. The statement in the text applies to the magnates as a class, or a body. It is true that a few individuals among them, like Hincmar and Abbot Hugh, may have given Carloman some support (cf. *supra*, n. 48). Still, even Hugh did not, so far as we know, lift a finger against the Vikings after they had established themselves at Amiens in 883 and were devastating the valleys of the Seine and the Oise. That was permitted to go on *nemine eis resistente* (*supra*, n. 49). v. Kalckstein's words (*op. cit.*, p. 120): "Da man ihren Fortschritten kein Ziel zu setzen vermochte," are misleading, for not the slightest attempt was made to check the Vikings after they had reached Amiens. It must not be assumed that Hugh had any insuperable objections to the policy of paying Danegeld. We

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they endeavoring now, as on several occasions during the reign of Charles the Bald, to create a situation out of which the payment of Danegeld would offer the only avenue of escape? It is certain that when the magnates finally convened for the purpose of dealing with the Viking problem, they had no solution to offer other than the payment of tribute.⁶⁴

With the general character and interest of the magnates in the western kingdom we are sufficiently familiar.⁶⁵ It has been pointed out above that, as between fighting the Northmen and paying them tribute, the magnates usually preferred to pay tribute.⁶⁶ And for good reasons. In the collection of the tribute they were able to shift the burden of the tax so that it fell almost exclusively on the subject population. Not only did the magnates themselves escape the tax altogether, but in most cases they were probably enriched by it. And, besides, it furnished them with a valuable precedent to which appeal might be made in connection with future exploitations of the peasantry.⁶⁷ There is, therefore, little room for doubt as to the motives by which the magnates were actuated in the formation of their policy on this occasion. From their point of view warfare with an enemy who was their superior in strategy and tactics, if not in numbers, was unnecessary when it could be avoided by payment of tribute. Warfare, moreover, involved expense, hardships, even bodily danger. That method of removing the Vikings would hardly be

know that he had agreed to it in 877 (cf. *supra*, pp. 95-96 and nn. 19, 20, p. 108), and since he was present at the assembly of magnates in Compiègne in 884—which included *omnes principes* (see *supra*, n. 39, and cf. v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, p. 121)—we may infer that Hugh, as the foremost of the magnates, was closely identified with the policy there and then adopted.

64 Cf. *supra*, pp. 124-25 and n. 40.

65 Cf. *supra*, pp. 114-15 and n. 20.

66 *Ibid.*

67 This matter is well illustrated by Hincmar in the last of his extant writings, *Ad episcopos regni admonitio altera* (cf. *supra*, n. 46): “[c. xiv] De oppressione pauperum providendum est, quia in eorum afflictione Deus offenditur. . . . Providendum est ne affligantur in aedificiis superfluis, in exactione hostili, si Deus pacem pro sua misericordia tribuerit, etc. [c. xv] quando enim sperant aliquid lucrari, ad legem se convertunt [sc. comites et vicarii, vel etiam decani]: quando vero per legem non aestimant acquirere, ad capitula confugiunt: sicque interdum fit, ut nec capitula pleniter conserventur, sed pro nihilo habeantur, nec lex.” While it is true that Hincmar is here referring particularly to those abuses that were connected with summonses to courts of law and with the fines levied in consequence of failure to appear, there can be little doubt that other abuses were legalized by a similar method of procedure. Cf. Flach, *Les origines de l'anc. France*, I, 342-44, and *passim*.

chosen by men devoid of public spirit, utterly selfish and greedy; they would prefer a method which, while it was much more convenient, might also yield them a financial return.⁶⁸

Having agreed in principle as to the policy they were to pursue, the nobles at once proceeded to open negotiations with the Vikings.⁶⁹ For this purpose they employed as their envoy a certain Siegfried, a Christian Dane, who was at that time a *fidelis* of the West Frankish king.⁷⁰ It was probably felt that a native Dane might be able to drive a better bargain with the Vikings than a Frank. Siegfried was instructed to enter into parley with the Viking leaders, and to propose to them in a discreet and cautious manner that they accept tribute and depart

68 These traits of the magnates evidently were well known to the Vikings. In the following year (885), when Charles the Fat sent an army of Lorrainers and West Franks against the Northmen at Louvain, the latter are said to have affected surprise at seeing the nobles of the western kingdom engaged in such an enterprise, and to have taunted them saying: "Why did you come to us? That was not necessary. We know who you are; you desire that we return to you; which we shall do" (see *infra*, n. 110). Vander Linden (*op. cit.*, p. 70) doubts that these words ever were spoken by the Northmen, and supposes that the annalist of St. Vaast inserted them in his narrative merely for the purpose of making it interesting and dramatic; in other words, Vander Linden would reduce this passage to a mere artifice of style without any element of truth in it whatever (*ibid.*, p. 67). His opinion probably has been formed too hastily, and evidently is not the result of any comparison of the style of the annalist of St. Vaast with those of other writers of this period. Conclusions that are based exclusively on what are supposed to be the general characteristics of the literary style of an epoch, are at best very precarious. No one, perhaps, would deny that the literary device of letting the *dramatis personae* talk, was frequently employed by the writers of the ninth century, and especially by the hagiographers. But it will not do to carry the generalization too far and assume that every author of that period habitually made use of this device. In particular, it must not be assumed that the annalist of St. Vaast used it very much, for, if my observations are correct, this is the only occasion on which he ever put words into the mouths of the persons who figure in his narrative. Even in describing the siege of Paris, which offered plentiful opportunities for the employment of this device (cf. the poem of Abbo, which abounds with such artifices), the annalist of St. Vaast refrained from using it. In fact, the most distinguishing characteristics of his style are its brevity (cf. *supra*, n. 39) and its freedom from rhetorical embellishments and literary artifices. For these reasons I prefer to believe with Dümmler (III, 237, 349; cf. Vogel, 320) that the words accredited by the annalist of St. Vaast to the Northmen do contain the substance of a sarcastic remark actually made by the Vikings to the western magnates. A contrary opinion must certainly be supported by more convincing arguments than those advanced by Vander Linden, if it is to gain general acceptance.

69 Cf. *supra*, n. 39. Regino (884, p. 121) states that it was Carloman who promised to pay the Danegeld. But his information is at best very inaccurate, and certainly is not to be given precedence over that furnished by the *Annals of St. Vaast*. Cf. *supra*, nn. 76, 105, 106.

70 *Ann. Vedast.*, 884, p. 318: "Sigefridum Danum, christianum regique fidelem, qui nepos fuerat Hrorici Dani, etc." Cf. *supra*, n. 39. On the identity of Siegfried, see Vogel, 316, n. 2.

from the kingdom.⁷¹ This commission Siegfried faithfully discharged. Setting out from Compiègne, he went by way of Beauvais to the Viking headquarters at Amiens, and there presented the proposals of the Frankish magnates to the leaders of the "great army."⁷² The Vikings, conscious of their advantage, evidently demanded an enormous tribute as the price of their withdrawal,⁷³ much to the surprise and disappointment of the Frankish magnates; the latter had, in all probability, expected to pay an amount of money corresponding more or less to the sums paid at previous times.⁷⁴ Quite naturally, therefore, repeated efforts were made to induce the Danes to lower their demands; and Siegfried was compelled to journey back and forth between Compiègne and Amiens a number of times before an agreement could be reached.⁷⁵ Finally after very protracted negotiations, the Vikings named as the price of their withdrawal a tribute of 12,000 pounds of pure and tested silver according to Norse weight, to be levied on Carloman and the Franks.⁷⁶

71 *Ann. Vedast.*, 883, p. 317: "qui [i. e. Sigefridus] caute cum eis [Nortmannis] de redemptione regni ageret." *Ibid.*, 884, p. 318 (cf. *supra*, n. 39): "Sigefridum . . . mittunt, ut cum principibus suae gentis tractaret, ut tributum acciperent, et e regno abirent."

72 *Ibid.*, 883, p. 317: "Ille [Sigefridus] vero Bellovagus venit, et ita Ambianis perrexit ad exercendum injunctum sibi negotium." *Ibid.*, 884, pp. 318-19 (cf. *supra*, n. 39): "At ille quod sibi injunctum fuit, opere implere studuit, Ambianis venit, primoribus gentis quae sibi fuerant dicta enuntiat, etc."

73 Regino, 884, p. 121: "Mox avidae gentis animi ad optinendam pecuniam exardescunt, etc." *Ann. Fuldenses*, III, 884, ed. Kurze, pp. 101-2: "Nordmanni, qui regnum illius [Karlomanni] praedis et incendiis longo tempore fatigaverunt, audaciores effecti, etc."

74 At least I can suggest no other reason for the protraction of the negotiations.

75 *Ann. Vedast.*, 884, p. 319: "et post longam et diuturnam concionem in eundo et redeundo, renuntiando nunc his nunc illis, etc."

76 *Ibid.*: "ad ultimum 12 milia pondera argenti cum suo pondere imposuerunt [Nortmanni] regi et Francis in tributum." Regino, 884, p. 121: "et XII milia pondera argenti puri atque probati exigunt totidemque annis pacem promittunt." The last statement of Regino must be regarded as both inaccurate and false. He probably meant twelve years, not twelve thousand; i. e. *totidem* must be taken to refer, not to the word *milia*—that would be absurd—but to the numerals *XII* only. Even so, the truth of his statement may be doubted. No other source indicates that the treaty was made for a definite term of years. This may be one of those numerous errors in Regino's *Chronicle* that are to be attributed to the author's uncritical adherence to tradition and hearsay (see Dümmler's introduction to Regino in *Geschichtschreiber d. d. Vorzeit*, IX Century, XIV, p. x; cf. Lot, "Une année . . . de Charles le Chauve," *Le Moyen Age*, 1902, VI, 427, n. 4; Vander Linden, *op. cit.*, 65-66). *Ann. Fuld.*, III, 884, p. 102: "duodecim milia librarum auri et argenti ab illa regione tributum nomine exegerunt." I am inclined to doubt that any part of the Danegeld was paid in gold, partly because there is no mention of it either in the *Annals of St. Vaast* or in Regino's *Chronicle*

This was, so far as we know, the heaviest Danegeld ever demanded by the Vikings in Frankish territory;⁷⁷ and it was levied at a time when the ruin, desolation, and loss of life, caused by the Northmen, seemed perhaps more appalling than ever before.⁷⁸ The agreement with the Danes evidently was reached on or shortly before February 2, for from that date a truce was declared to and including the month of October.⁷⁹ The truce being guaranteed by an exchange of hostages, even that part of the West Frankish population which dwelt north of the Oise — and which therefore had been most directly exposed to the ravages of the Vikings⁸⁰—began henceforth to enjoy some measure of security. But in the East Frankish kingdom, beyond the Scheldt, the devastation continued as before.⁸¹

The evidence relating to the method by which the Danegeld of —the first of which must be regarded as more reliable on this point than the *Annals of Fulda*—and partly because the accuracy of the Bavarian (Fulda) annalist may be gravely questioned; according to him, this Danegeld was neither agreed to nor paid until after the death of Carloman, which is obviously not correct (cf. Vogel, 317, n. 1; Dümmler, III, 229, n. 3). Abou-el-Cassim, an Arabic writer of the tenth century, whose information appears to be badly confused, has this to say of Carloman: "Ce fut ce roi acheta des Madgiousses une paix de sept ans au prix de 600 rattals d'or et de 600 rattals d'argent" (cited by Depping, *Histoire des expéditions maritimes des Normands*, 201, n.2). We know that Berengar raised a large tribute for the Hungarian king, Taxis, who invaded Italy in 947 (see Liutprand, *Antapodosis*, V, 33, ed. Dümmler, p. 118). Is it possible that Abou-el-Cassim confused Carloman with Berengar, and the Vikings with the Magyars?

77 The next highest Danegeld is that of 845, which amounted to 7,000 pounds (cf. *supra*, chap. i, n. 45). It is true that the amounts of the Danegelds paid between 889 and 926, inclusive, are unknown; but it does not appear likely that they were as high as the tribute for 884, since on the later occasions the Vikings did not have such decided advantages over the Franks as they did in 884. To my mind, the reign of Carloman marks the culmination of the Viking invasions in the West Frankish kingdom (cf. Vogel, p. 259, last paragraph).

78 The plaint of the annalist of St. Vaast, given *supra*, p. 124, seems to justify this statement. Cf. Vogel, 316 and n. 1.

79 *Ann. Vedast.*, 884, p. 319: "datis obsidibus ad invicem, coeperunt hi qui trans Hisam erant, aliquatenus securi esse. A die itaque purificationis s. Mariae usque mense octobrio inter eos haec securitas data est."

80 Cf. the preceding note. I can not agree with Vogel (p. 317) that *trans Hisam* should be translated "southeast of the Oise." In that case, the population on either side of the Somme, which had suffered most, would have obtained no relief. The truce must have applied to all that portion of the western kingdom in which the "great army" had been operating, i. e. to the entire district between the Scheldt, the Oise, and the Seine. There is no evidence that the Vikings had extended their ravages southeast of the Oise at this time. If they had, the magnates would hardly have assembled at Compiègne, *on the Oisc.* to deliberate. Cf. *supra*, p. 124 and n. 39, and see the following note.

81 *Ann. Vedast.*, 884, p. 319: "Sed Nortmanni trans Scaldum . . . more sibi solito . . . devastant, etc."

884 was raised, is very scant.⁸² All we really know is that a general tax was levied for the purpose,⁸³ and, probably because the tax did not yield the required amount,⁸⁴ that it became necessary also to draw on the church treasuries. Perhaps we shall not go far wrong if we assume that this Danegeld was secured by methods very much akin to those employed for a similar purpose in 877.⁸⁵ Whether or not a graduated assessment was prepared, proportioned in each case to the value of holdings in land or to other sources of income, it may be taken for granted that the burden of the tax fell, as usual, on that part of the population which was least able to pay;⁸⁶ in other words, that the holders of *mansi*, together with priests and merchants, were forced to pay not only what might be regarded as their legitimate share, but also that additional amount which, in justice, ought to have been contributed by their seigniors.⁸⁷

The sources at our disposal do not permit us to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion as regards the territorial limits within which this Danegeld was raised. There can be no doubt that the tax was levied in Francia, which had been chiefly exposed to the operations of the "great army."⁸⁸ Whether Neustria, Aquitaine, and what remained of Burgundy, also were required to contribute, must be left to conjecture. It seems hardly possible that the largest tribute ever demanded by the Vikings on the continent,⁸⁹ could have been raised in Francia alone. On most previous occasions (when the sums required were much smaller) it had been usual to tax Neustria and Burgundy as well as Francia;⁹⁰ and after the recent devastations Francia was, in 884, more exhausted than ever. Since Carloman was now ruler of

82 *Ann. Vedast.*, 884, p. 319: "Post sanctum itaque pascha inchoatur tributum persolvi, spoliatur ecclesiae et ecclesiastica mancipia, tandem soluto tributo, mense octobrio finiente, adunantur Franci, etc."

83 I take it that the words, "inchoatur tributum persolvi" (see the preceding note), imply a collection of taxes levied to raise the Danegeld; the expression, "spoliatur . . . ecclesiastica mancipia," undoubtedly indicates that the serfs on the lands of the church were required to contribute toward the Danegeld.

84 In 877 the church treasuries were drawn upon only after the proceeds of the tax had proved inadequate (cf. *supra*, chap. vi, nn. 45, 47). The words, "spoliatur ecclesiae . . . tandem soluto tributo" (cf. *supra*, n. 82), lead me to believe that this holds true also for 884.

85 Cf. *supra*, pp. 99 ff.

86 Cf. *supra*, pp. 102-3 and n. 68, p. 109.

87 Cf. v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

88 Cf. *supra*, n. 80.

89 Cf. *supra*, n. 77.

90 See *supra*, pp. 97-98 and nn. 34, 37-40.

the entire West Frankish realm (not including Lorraine and the kingdom of Boso),⁹¹ and since *all* the magnates are said to have been assembled when they decided to buy off the Vikings,⁹² it is possible to argue that the whole kingdom of Carloman, at least all of it outside of Aquitaine,⁹³ was required to contribute in 884.⁹⁴ But no statement can be made on this subject with any degree of assurance. — At least seven months were required to raise the enormous tribute; the first payments to the Danes were made shortly after Easter (April 16), but the final installment could not be paid until the end of October.⁹⁵

After the tribute had been liquidated, the Frankish magnates, suspicious of the good faith and the intentions of the Vikings, mobilized their forces, and prepared to offer armed resistance to the invaders in the event that they should fail to live up to their engagements.⁹⁶ But the Vikings set fire to their camp and departed from Amiens toward the sea-coast. Carloman and the Franks, having crossed the Oise, followed the retreating Danes at some distance, evidently to make sure of their departure.⁹⁷

⁹¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 121 and n. 19.

⁹² Cf. *supra*, n. 39. The fact that the magnates who assembled at Compiègne are sometimes referred to as *Franci* (*Ann. Vedast.*, 883, p. 317; 884, p. 319), is of no significance as regards their number or nationality. The *Franci* are also said to have invited Charles the Fat to become the ruler of the West Frankish kingdom (*Ann. Vedast.*, 884, p. 320); yet we know that Charles the Fat was recognized as king not only in the North, but also in Aquitaine (Dümmler, III, 235, n. 1). See also *infra*, n. 95.

⁹³ Aquitaine had thus far never been required to contribute toward the Danegeld (cf. *supra*, p. 98 and n. 40). It seems very doubtful that a tribute for Vikings operating from the Somme would have been raised in southern France.

⁹⁴ v. Kalckstein (*op. cit.*, p. 123) believes that Abbot Hugh supervised the collection of the Danegeld in Neustria.

⁹⁵ See *supra*, n. 82. I interpret the words, "inchoatur tributum persolvi" (cf. *supra*, n. 83), as signifying that the tribute was paid to the Vikings in successive installments, according as it could be collected from the taxpayers. Since the first installments were paid after Easter, it may be assumed that the collection of the Danegeld from the subject population had begun at, or even before, Easter (i. e. April 16, according to v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, p. 123). It will be remembered that the Franks had agreed to raise the Danegeld on, or probably before, February 2 (cf. *supra*, n. 79). v. Kalckstein (*op. cit.*, p. 123) believes that the Danegeld was assessed at the Assembly of Ver in March. But it seems more probable that this had been done at Compiègne in February. *All* the magnates had been present at Compiègne (cf. *supra*, n. 39), but only part of them came to Ver (*M.G.H. LL. Sectio II*, t. 2, p. 371, line 22), and the Danegeld is not even mentioned in the *Capitulare Vernense*.

⁹⁶ *Ann. Vedast.*, 884, p. 319: "mense octobrio finiente, adunantur Franci, ut si Nortmanni inmutari fidem vellent, eis resisterent."

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*: "Nortmanni vero sua castra incendunt, atque ab Ambianis recedunt; rex vero et Franci, transito Hysa, lente itinere eos insequuntur." Regino, 884, p. 121: "Accepta tam ingenti pecunia, funes a litore solvunt, naves conscendunt et marina litora repetunt."

Arrived at Boulogne, the Vikings took counsel among themselves as to future operations. They finally separated into two groups, some going to England, while others proceeded to the old kingdom of Lothaire. The latter group eventually established itself for the winter in a camp constructed at Louvain, on the River Dyle.⁹⁸

Hardly had the Frankish army disbanded, after the departure of the Vikings, when Carloman was accidentally wounded by one of his companions on a hunting expedition.⁹⁹ The young monarch survived but a few days, passing away on December 12, 884, in the eighteenth year of his life.¹⁰⁰ This left a five year old boy, Charles — later called the Simple — the nearest heir to the western kingdom.¹⁰¹ It was recognized that the situation did not permit the experiment of elevating a mere child to the throne; and we may assume that the experiences of the magnates during the reign of Carloman did not incline them to set up a regency under a man like Abbot Hugh.¹⁰² Also there is reason to believe that the nobles were now fully alive to the danger that threatened their own interests if they permitted the Vikings to continue their operations unchecked and with impunity.¹⁰³ The tribute of 884 had doubtless been far heavier than the magnates had expected;¹⁰⁴ and they probably wished to avoid the necessity of having to pay another Danegeld, at least for some time. But

98 *Ann. Vedast.*, 884, pp. 319–20: “Praedicti vero Dani iter agentes Bononiam veniunt; ibique agentes consilium, quid sibi faciendum est, pars illorum mare transiit, atque pars Luvanium in regno quondam Hlotharii; ibique sibi castra statuunt ad hyemandum.” See also Regino, 884, p. 122 (quoted *infra*, n. 106); *Ethelwerdi Chron.*, III, 884, *loc. cit.*, p. 123; Florentius Wigorn., 885, *loc. cit.*, p. 561; *Ann. Anglo-Saxonici*, 885, *loc. cit.*, pp. 104–5. On the sojourn of the Northmen at Louvain, see Vander Linden, *op. cit.*, 64–81.

99 *Ann. Vedast.*, 884, p. 320.

100 Dümmler, III, 232 and n. 1.

101 *Ibid.*, 233.

102 Though Hugh had enjoyed the favor of Louis III and Carloman, whom he had loyally supported (cf. *supra*, p. 120 and n. 7, pp. 122–23), and though he doubtless had a considerable following (cf. *supra*, p. 122 and n. 24), it is also true that there was a party strongly opposed to the advancement of his interests (cf. *supra*, nn. 7, 49). Cf. Eckel, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

103 Cf. *supra*, pp. 124–25. In 885 the western magnates, at the request of Charles the Fat, actually took part in an expedition against the Viking camp at Louvain, outside their own boundaries. It is true that the expedition ended in failure, but it was the first occasion on which the West Franks ever went to engage the Northmen beyond the limits of the western kingdom (*Ann. Vedast.*, 885, p. 321; cf. *infra*, p. 138). The determined resistance of the Franks at the siege of Paris (see *infra*, chap. ix), is another indication of a change in their attitude as regards the Viking invasions.

104 Cf. *supra*, p. 132 and nn. 73, 74.

it was rumored, and possibly believed by some, that the leaders of the "great army," having learned of the death of Carloman, regarded the recent treaty as no longer binding and were therefore demanding that the successor of Carloman, whoever he might be, pay another tribute of 12,000 pounds as the price of peace.¹⁰⁵ Whether the Vikings had really made any such demand is doubtful,¹⁰⁶ but the rumor to that effect may indicate what was feared. In any case, it is clear that the magnates felt they could afford to take no risks. Passing over the claims of the boy

105 What I have interpreted as a rumor current among the Franks, is by Regino presented as a fact (884, p. 122): "Nordmanni cognita morte regis protinus in regnum revertuntur. Itaque Hugo abba et ceteri proceres legatos ad eos dirigunt, promissionem et fidem datam violatam esse proclamant. Ad haec illi respondent, se cum Carlomanno rege, non cum alio aliquo foedus pepigisse [but cf. *supra*, n. 76]; quisquis ille esset, qui ei in regnum succederet, eiusdem numeri et quantitatis pecuniam daret, si quiete ac pacifice imperium tenere vellet. Territi huiuscemodi mandatis optimates regni ad Carolum imperatorem missos dirigunt eumque ultro in regnum invitant, etc." In this case, as in the one cited before (*supra*, n. 76), Regino's statements are not corroborated by any other writer, and we may well doubt whether what he says is literally true. His information on what took place at this time is at best very inaccurate. To be convinced of this, one needs only compare his entries for the year 884 with those for 886, and note how he confused the chronology of the events he was describing. A second Danegeld of 12,000 pounds was certainly never paid by the Franks. Cf. the following note.

106 Both Dümmler (III, 233) and Vogel (318-19) accept the testimony of Regino on this point (cf. the preceding note) without question. But neither of them has given sufficient attention to what Regino says in the context. Both assume that the Vikings did not learn of Carloman's death, and therefore did not demand a second Danegeld, until after they had reached Louvain. But that is not what Regino says (884, pp. 121-22): "Accepta tam ingenti pecunia funes a litore solvunt [Nordmanni], naves conscendunt et marina litora repetunt. . . Nordmanni cognita morte regis protinus in regnum revertuntur, etc." (see preceding note). These words imply that the Northmen learned of the death of Carloman before they had left the sea-coast, and that it was thence, and not from Louvain, that they returned to the western kingdom (cf. *supra*, n. 98). Not until the end of his recital for 884 does Regino state that the Northmen left the Somme and proceeded to Louvain (p. 122): "His etiam diebus Nordmanni a Somna exeunt et rursus in regno Lotharii revertentes in loco, qui dicitur Lovon, castrametati sunt in confinio eiusdem regni et continuis incursionum infestationibus utraque regna fatigant." A passage almost identical with the one just quoted occurs again for 886 (p. 125). All this is very confused. And since there is not a word in any other source regarding a demand for a second Danegeld, I am not only inclined to doubt that such a demand was ever made; I question also whether the Northmen returned inland immediately upon receiving news of Carloman's death. There is every reason to believe that they did not reënter the western kingdom until after their sojourn at Louvain (cf. the following page and n. 110). Dümmler (III, 234, n. 1) apparently believes what Regino says about the demand for a second Danegeld, but thinks he goes too far when he asserts this to have been the reason why the western magnates gave their allegiance to Charles the Fat (cf. the preceding note). The statements in the *Annals of Fulda* (III, 884, pp. 101-2) on these matters, are confused and altogether unreliable (cf. *supra*, n. 76, end; Vogel, 317, n. 1).

Charles, they gave their allegiance to Emperor Charles the Fat,¹⁰⁷ who, in spite of his weakness in matters military and otherwise, was at that time the most prominent figure among all the Franks, partly because of his imperial position, but more on account of the powerful supporters he had as ruler of the eastern kingdom.¹⁰⁸

Charles the Fat seems to have recognized the necessity of expelling the Northmen from his realm; for one of his first acts, after he had received the homage and fealty of his new vassals early in 885, was to order a combined army of West Franks and Lorrainers to proceed against the stronghold of the Vikings at Louvain.¹⁰⁹ It is certain that from this time, if not before, the leaders of the "great army" ceased to consider themselves bound by the terms of their treaty with Carloman and the western magnates in 884.¹¹⁰ Within a few months the Vikings left their camp at Louvain, and proceeded by land and sea to the Seine.¹¹¹ Rouen was taken on July 25, 885, and by November of the same year the memorable siege of Paris had begun.¹¹²

In return for the enormous tribute of 12,000 pounds of silver, the western kingdom had enjoyed peace for a period of less than eighteen months.¹¹³ Though we possess no direct evidence on the point, there can scarcely be any doubt that the Danegeld had been raised only with very great difficulty,¹¹⁴ coming as it did after a period during which the country had suffered terribly from devastation and plundering.¹¹⁵ Whatever may have been the mo-

107 *Ann. Vedast.*, 884, 885, p. 320. Cf. the two preceding notes.

108 Dümmler, III, 233-35.

109 *Ann. Vedast.*, 885, p. 321. According to Regino (see *supra*, n. 106), both kingdoms, the western as well as the eastern, had been raided by the Vikings from their camp at Louvain. Cf. Vander Linden, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

110 This is indicated by the jeers with which the Vikings greeted the Franks from the western realm (*Ann. Vedast.*, 885, p. 321): "Francosque qui venerant ex regno Karlomanni irrisere Dani: Ut quid ad nos venistis? non fuit necesse; nos scimus qui estis; et vultis ut ad vos redeamus; quod faciemus." That this was not an idle threat is sufficiently demonstrated *infra* in the text. Cf. *supra*, n. 68.

111 *Ann. Vedast.*, 885, p. 321; Regino, 887, p. 125. Cf. Vogel, 320, n. 3, where some additional references are given.

112 *Ann. Vedast.*, 885, pp. 321-23. Cf. Vogel, 320 ff.

113 From February 2, 884, when the truce was declared (see *supra*, n. 79), to about July 25, 885, when the Viking army entered Rouen.

114 The words of the annalist of St. Vaast (cf. *supra*, n. 82): "spoliantur ecclesiae et ecclesiastica mancipia, tandem soluto tributo," and the long period required to raise the tribute, are indications to this effect. Cf. Dümmler, III, 230.

115 Cf. *supra*, pp. 123-24.

tives of the magnates when they entered into negotiations with the Vikings,¹¹⁶ it is fairly clear that for the present they had had enough of the policy of paying tribute, and that their eyes had been opened to the imminent danger with which their own interests were threatened by the operations of the "great army."¹¹⁷ Yet it would undoubtedly be a mistake to suppose that the strengthening of the resistance to the Vikings which followed the payment of this Danegeld,¹¹⁸ resulted from a sudden outburst of patriotism or a spontaneous birth of public spirit on the part of the magnates.¹¹⁹ They probably remained quite as self-seeking and greedy as before; and their interests were the same as they had always been. But they found themselves in a somewhat changed situation. The Vikings of this period were not loose bands of freebooters bent solely on the acquisition of plunder; they were a strongly organized "great army," which had come for the purpose of conquest, and with the intention of establishing colonies and making permanent settlements in the conquered territory.¹²⁰ At this time there was no ambitious monarch¹²¹ whose schemes of strengthening the royal power had to be frustrated by keeping him occupied with the Northmen, as was the case in the time of Charles the Bald.¹²² The real danger in the present situation lay in the fact that the monarch was not sufficiently strong to be able to give protection against the foreign enemy. Such a situation was a direct menace to the private interests of the magnates.¹²³ And the recognition, by the nobles, of that menace furnishes the only satisfactory explanation of their unusual efforts to prevent the return of the "great army" to their country after 884, their stout resistance to the Vikings at the siege of Paris (885—86), and their refusal to buy the removal of the invaders by the payment of another Danegeld—¹²⁴ for the next chapter will make clear that the Danegeld which eventually was paid to the Vikings at Paris, was agreed to and

116 Cf. *supra*, pp. 124 ff.

117 Cf. *supra*, p. 132 and n. 74, p. 136.

118 See *supra*, n. 103 and cf. Vogel, 44, 321 ff.

119 Cf. *supra*, pp. 128—31, 114—17.

120 See *supra*, n. 26. Cf. Vogel, 260—61; Vander Linden, *op. cit.*, 64—65.

121 It will be agreed that Emperor Charles the Fat was not regarded as such.

122 See *supra*, pp. 114—17.

123 This is well brought out by Fustel de Coulanges (*Les transform. de la royauté*, 695—96) when he explains why the western magnates chose Charles the Fat instead of Charles the Simple as their king in 884. Cf. *supra*, pp. 136—38.

124 These matters are taken up for discussion in the following chapter.

furnished, not by the defenders of the city, but by Emperor Charles the Fat.

The situation above described did not, however, last very long.¹²⁵ We shall find Odo and Rudolph paying Danegeld under circumstances not essentially different from those which had forced Charles the Bald to resort to this expedient.¹²⁶

¹²⁵ Cf. Fustel de Coulanges, *op. cit.*, 696-97.

¹²⁶ See *infra*, chaps. x-xiv; cf. *supra*, chap. vii.

CHAPTER IX.

PAYMENTS MADE TO THE DANES (886—87) IN CONNECTION
WITH THE SIEGE OF PARIS.

At the close of the preceding chapter attention was called to that peculiar situation which during and after the year 884 led to a temporary strengthening of the resistance offered by the magnates of the western kingdom to the Viking invaders. But it was also pointed out that this determined effort of the Frankish nobles to expel the Danes, did not prevent the invaders from securing a payment of Danegeld from Charles the Fat before they quitted Paris.¹ In truth, two money payments were made to the Danes in connection with the famous siege of 885—86, though only one of these can be regarded, in any proper sense, as a Danegeld; and we shall find that even this differed in several ways from preceding Danegelds.

No attempt will be made here to tell again the whole story of the siege of Paris.² But if the reasons for the two payments just mentioned are to be made at all clear, it will be necessary briefly to review the general course of the siege operations, and to examine certain details in connection with the negotiations that took place between the Franks and the Vikings.

The "great army" had arrived before Paris on November 24, 885.³ The following day, Siegfried, one of the Viking leaders, appeared before Bishop Gauzelin, requesting that the Danes be permitted to ascend the Seine, and promising on this condition to spare the city of Paris from destruction or damage.⁴ When this request was peremptorily refused, the Vikings on November 26 and 27 attempted, though in vain, to take the city by storm.⁵ They thereupon proceeded to a regular investment

1 See *supra*, pp. 139-40.

2 The most detailed and accurate secondary account of the siege of Paris is that of Favre (*Eudes*, 17-68); other more or less detailed descriptions are given by Vogel (320 ff.) and Dümmler (III, 260 ff.). Freeman ("The Early Sieges of Paris," in *Historical Essays*, First Series, 212-56) has the only account in English that even approaches completeness. For other references see Vogel, 324, n. 6. My sketch of the earlier part of the siege is based in part, but by no means exclusively, on the work of Favre.

3 Favre, 35; cf. Vogel, 324, n. 5.

4 Favre, 35-36.

5 *Ibid.*, 36-39.

of the place, meanwhile engaging intermittently in plundering raids throughout the surrounding district.⁶

Up to February, 886, comparatively small progress was made in the siege operations, although the Vikings had very large forces at their disposal.⁷ Under the staunch and able direction of Bishop Gauzelin and Count Odo,⁸ the Franks had thus far baffled every attempt of the Vikings to gain entrance to the city or to break down the system of defenses.⁹ But on February 6 the Danes, aided by a flood of the Seine, finally captured and destroyed one of the protecting towers.¹⁰ This misfortune induced Bishop Gauzelin to appeal for aid to Count Henry in Saxony, one of the ablest leaders of the East Franks in their warfare with the Northmen.¹¹ For certain reasons that are not entirely clear, Henry was able to accomplish little or nothing; after having spent a month or more in a futile attempt to secure an engagement with the Vikings in the open field, he returned home towards the beginning of April.¹²

The departure of Count Henry left the brave defenders of Paris with no present hope of aid or succor. After another attack on the citadel, which was sanguinarily repulsed,¹³ the Danes moved their camp from the north to the south bank of the Seine,¹⁴ where they would have the river between themselves

6 Favre, 39 ff.

7 *Ibid.*, 35 and n. 2, 39-43; cf. Vogel, 324-25.

8 Favre, 26 ff.

9 *Ibid.*, 43-46.

10 *Ann. Vedast.*, 886, ed. Dehaisnes, pp. 323-24. Cf. Favre, 46 ff.

11 *Ann. Vedast.*, 886, p. 324; Abbo, *De bellis Parisiacae urbis*, II, lines 3-4, *M.G.H., Poetae Latini*, IV, Part I. See also Favre, 48-51.

12 *Ann. Vedast.*, 886, p. 324; Abbo, II, lines 3-22; Regino, *Chron.*, 887, ed. Kurze, p. 125; *Ann. Fuld.*, III, 886, ed. Kurze, 104.

13 Abbo, II, lines 15-22. This attack appears to have been overlooked by most writers on the subject, including Favre.

14 Abbo, II, lines 34-40. I agree with Favre (52, n. 2) in rejecting the view of Steenstrup (*Normannerne*, II, 225) and Dümmler (III, 266), that only part of the Viking army — i. e. Siegfried and his men — crossed the Seine to erect a new camp. Undoubtedly it was the entire "great army" which changed its place of encampment. But it seems to me that all writers on this subject, including Favre (52, n. 2) and Vogel (331) err when they assert that the Viking camp was moved on the advice of Siegfried. This assertion is based on a misinterpretation of the following words of Siegfried to his companions (Abbo, II, lines 32-33): "Hanc linquite sedem, Hic non stare diu nostrum manet, hinc sed abire!" Here Siegfried is not urging the Vikings merely to transfer their camp from one place to another, but to go away, to depart, *abire*; in other words, to give up the siege of Paris and go elsewhere. To my mind it seems that Abbo here uses the verb *abire* in exactly the same sense as he does in lines 64-65, where there can be no question as to its meaning (see *infra*, rr. 32). Furthermore, the reason assigned by

and any hostile relief force coming, as it most likely would, from the north.¹⁵ There was, however, nothing on which the besieged might base any hopes of a change in the general situation, for the Vikings fortified themselves very strongly and prepared to continue the siege.¹⁶ Indeed, the prospect must have seemed gloomy enough, and it is hardly to be wondered at, if, under such circumstances, the defenders of Paris began to consider the possibility of putting an end to the siege, or at least of securing the withdrawal of part of the "great army," by means of bribery.¹⁷

Aware that such a scheme would be successful only if some Viking chief with considerable prestige and influence could be interested in it, the Franks determined to approach "King" Siegfried with a proposal of this nature.¹⁸ A meeting arranged between Siegfried and Odo,¹⁹ seems to have resulted in an agreement that Siegfried was to attempt to induce his fellow leaders and their men to give up the siege and to retire from Paris.²⁰ Hardly had this compact been made, however, when a group of Vikings appeared, ready to overpower Odo and carry him

Abbo in lines 31-32 for what he represents Siegfried as saying in lines 32-33, would be meaningless if Siegfried were suggesting only that the camp be moved; "conspiciens Sigemfredus nostros in agone esse feros"—Siegfried perceived that the Parisian Franks were impetuous in battle, and therefore he advocated that the Vikings move their camp from one side of the city to the other (!); in truth, a poor remedy against the impetuosity of the Franks! The usual misinterpretation of this passage is probably due to an erroneous translation of the word *ergo* in line 34; it should not be translated "therefore" or "consequently," but "now when"; for it is used to resume the discussion dropped in line 22, or, more exactly, to bring the reader's attention back to what happened at the time Count Henry returned to Germany (see line 15).

15 Vogel, 331. Favre's view (p. 52), that the camp was transferred by reason of a disease which broke out among the Vikings, seems less probable.

16 Abbo, II, lines 37-40.

17 *Ann. Vedast.*, 886, p. 324: "Episcopus vero, corde concontractus ex gravi damno. . . mandans ut . . . [Heinricus] ei et populo christiano subveniret. . . sed Heinricus nil ibi profecit; atque in suam rediit regionem. Gozlinus vero, dum omnibus modis populo christiano juvare studeret, cum Sigefrido, rege Danorum, amicitiam fecit, ut per hoc civitas ab obsidione liberaretur." Cf. *infra*, nn. 24-26.

18 Cf. Vogel, 40, n. 3, 325 and n. 3; Favre, 35, n. 9.

19 Abbo, II, line 23: "Rege Sigemfedo simul ast Odone loquente." Cf. *supra*, n. 17. According to the *Annals of St. Vaast* it was Gauzelin, but according to Abbo it was Odo, who conducted the negotiations with Siegfried. This need raise no difficulty if it be remembered that the two men were coöperating, and that Odo may well have undertaken this mission at the suggestion, or at least with the approval, of Gauzelin, who probably was ill at this time (*Ann. Vedast.*, 886, p. 325). Gauzelin held the supreme command at Paris until his death gave it to Odo (Favre, 54, n. 3).

20 Cf. *infra*, n. 22.

off as a prisoner. But Odo stood his ground, and the Viking band was driven off by a number of Franks who had rushed forward to the aid of their leader.²¹ Siegfried now took occasion to point out to his fellow Vikings the fierce valor of Odo's men in battle, hoping by such argument to persuade them that it would be useless to continue the investment of Paris, and better policy to go elsewhere.²²

But it proved very difficult for Siegfried to convince the other Danes on these points,²³ and eventually he found it advisable to reopen his negotiations with the Franks on a narrower basis. It was now agreed that whether or not the other Danes could be persuaded to do so, Siegfried and his men were to depart from Paris in return for the payment of the comparatively small sum of sixty pounds of silver.²⁴ It is quite possible that Siegfried had been promised a larger bribe — for this payment can not be regarded as anything else²⁵ — if he should finally succeed in persuading his fellow countrymen to follow him.²⁶ Indeed, he made a second attempt, but without result.²⁷ The Danes, suspecting, or possibly knowing, that Siegfried was advancing his own ends rather than theirs, refused to follow him.²⁸ Whereupon Siegfried challenged them to attack Paris without his aid.²⁹ Though this challenge was accepted, the attack resulted only in

21 Abbo, II, lines 24-30.

22 *Ibid.*, lines 31-33: "Conspiciens Sigemfredus nostros in agone / Esse feros, inquit sociis: 'Hanc linquite sedem./ Hic non stare diu nostrum manet, hinc sed abire!'" Cf. *supra*, n. 14.

23 They seem to have ignored his suggestions; at least Abbo (II, lines 31-40) has nothing to say of any reply from them.

24 Abbo, II, lines 41-42: "Denique rex dictus [i. e. Sigefredus] denas capiens argenti / Sex libras nitidi nobis causa redeundi, etc." The *Annals of St. Vaast* (cf. *supra*, n. 17) mention the compact with Siegfried, but say nothing of the money payment. The other sources do not mention the agreement with Siegfried at all.

25 A payment of sixty pounds of silver hardly constitutes a Danegeld of the type that has so far been studied in this dissertation. Danegeld was paid by the Franks when they were unable, or unwilling, to offer any further resistance to the Vikings; and it was paid in amounts compared with which the sum accepted by Siegfried was a mere pittance. All we know about the policy of the Vikings in the past would lead us to believe that they would have been quite willing to raise the siege of Paris, if the Franks had been ready to pay *Danegeld*. Cf. *infra*, n. 31 and see also pp. 146-147.

26 This conjecture is based on the fact that Siegfried, even after he had received the bribe, made efforts to persuade the Vikings to give up the siege and follow him seaward. See the following note, and cf. Favre, 53, first two lines.

27 Abbo, II, lines 43-47.

28 *Ibid.*, line 47: "his [Normannis] autem nolentibus."

29 *Ibid.*, lines 48-52.

losses for the Northmen — two of their “kings” among the rest.³⁰ Yet, in spite of the repulse, the bulk of the Danish army chose to continue the siege operations, doubtless in the hope that eventually they would be able either to reduce Paris or, at the least, to secure a large sum of money, a veritable Danegeld, as the price of their retreat.³¹ But Siegfried, satisfied that without his aid little could be accomplished by the besieging army, now collected his own men and withdrew from the Seine.³²

The departure of Siegfried brought small relief to the defenders of Paris. After the death of Gauzelin, in April 886,³³ the Northmen pressed the siege with redoubled vigor, and there were violent conflicts every day for a long time.³⁴ Odo, who was now in supreme command, at length decided to apply for aid to Emperor Charles the Fat.³⁵ But that monarch, for some reason that has never been made quite clear, was in no haste to relieve the hard pressed town, and did not arrive at Paris until late in September, or early in October.³⁶

Meanwhile Count Henry, whom the emperor probably had sent on a reconnoitering exploit in advance of his main army, had fallen into a trap prepared by the Northmen, and had been killed.³⁷ Henry's death was a severe blow to the emperor,³⁸ and

30 Abbo, II, lines 53-60.

31 *Ibid.*, lines 66-67: “Mox hilaris Sequanam liquit [Sigefredus] pro munere sumpto / Sic alii facerent, eadem si tunc meruissent.” This passage indicates that the other Northmen would have followed Siegfried's example, if they had been properly rewarded. Vogel's view (p. 331), that the Parisians were willing to pay tribute, appears to be unfounded.

32 Abbo, II, lines 61-66: “Sigemfredus ovans, ridens morientibus inquit: / ‘Nunc . . . urbem capitote, / . . . !’ / Inde suis: ‘Abeamus,’ ait, ‘tempus venit ecce, / Quo gratum fuerit nobis istinc abiise!’ / Mox hilaris, etc.” (see preceding note). Siegfried returned to the Seine in November (see *infra*, pp. 96-97 and n. 66; cf. Favre, p. 53, n. 4, p. 63).

33 Dümmler, III, 267, n. 2.

34 Abbo, II, lines 154-62; *Ann. Vedast.*, 886, p. 325.

35 Abbo, II, lines 163-65. The *Annals of St. Vaast* (886, p. 325) represent Odo as applying for aid to the *principibus regni*, whom he requested to notify the emperor of the sad plight of Paris. Cf. Flodoard, *Historia Remensis ecclesiae*, IV, c. 5, *M.G.H.*, SS., XIII, p. 563.

36 *Ann. Vedast.*, 886, p. 326; *Ann. Fuld.*, III, 886, p. 105. See also Böhmer-Mühlbacher, *Regesten*, nos. 1723a, 1725a; cf. Vogel, 334, n. 5; Favre, 59, n. 4.

37 The death of Count Henry occurred on August 28, 886 (*Annales necrologici Fuldenses*, *M.G.H.*, SS., XIII, p. 185; cf. Dümmler, III, 269 and n. 2). The *Annals of St. Vaast* (886, p. 326), but not Abbo, state that Henry had been sent in advance by the emperor. The details in connection with the second expedition, and the death, of Henry are given by Regino (887, pp. 125-26), but many of his statements are no doubt inaccurate (cf. Favre, 57, n. 1; Vogel, 334, n. 3). See also *Ann. Fuld.*, III, 886, p. 105. Cf. v. Kalckstein, *Geschichte des französischen Königtums*, I, 40, n. 4.

38 *Ann. Vedast.*, 886, p. 326: “sed quia dux perlit, ipse [imperator] nil utile gessit.”

a great loss to the Franks. It ought to have emphasized the necessity of bringing immediate succor to the defenders of Paris. Yet Charles apparently made no effort to accelerate his movements.³⁹

When the emperor finally did appear before the city, at the head of a very large and splendid, though motley, host,⁴⁰ he accomplished nothing which, in the opinion of his contemporaries and of later historians, was at all commensurate with what the situation demanded or his resources permitted.⁴¹ We get the impression from the sources that precisely at the time when he had it in his power to deliver a crushing blow against the invaders, he failed to strike,⁴² and instead opened up negotiations,⁴³ which in November, 886, led to the conclusion of a very pusillanimous treaty.⁴⁴ The Northmen were given permission to proceed to Sens and the Burgundian territories, with the understanding that they might spend the winter there, plundering at will;⁴⁵ also they were promised a tribute of 700 pounds

39 Abbo (II, lines 219-330) recounts the various events which took place at Paris between the death of Count Henry and the arrival of Charles the Fat. Cf. Vogel, 333; Favre, 59; Dümmler, III, 270.

40 Abbo, II, 330-34: "En princeps de quo canitur, circumdatis armis / Omnigenis, caelum veluti splendoribus astreis, / Induperator adest Karolus comitatus opimo / Diversi populo labii, tentoria figens / Sub Martis pedibus montis speculamque secundum." *Ann. Vedast.*, 886, p. 326: "[imperator] Carisiacum veniens cum ingenti exercitu, etc." *Ibid.*: "Parisius venit cum manu valida."

41 *Ibid.* (cf. note (a) on p. 327): "ipse [imperator] nil utile gessit." Regino, 887, p. 127: "[Imperator] nil dignum imperatoriae maiestati in eodem loco gessit." *Ann. Fuld., Cont. Ratisb.*, 886, p. 114: "parum prospere actis rebus." Cf. Favre, 59; v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, I, 42; Vogel, 335; Dümmler, III, 271. See also *infra*, n. 44.

42 According to the *Annals of St. Vaast* (886, p. 327), Charles, after his arrival in the vicinity of Paris, not only had forced the Northmen to abandon one of their camps and to retire across the Seine, but also had sent reinforcements into the town; besides, he had led his own army across the river to a position from which, it may be presumed, a successful attack might have been launched against the principal camp, and main force, of the Vikings. Abbo (II, lines 315-29) tells of how a certain detachment from the imperial army, aided by the Parisians, had defeated and put to flight a group of Northmen before Charles arrived with the bulk of his forces.

43 *Ann. Vedast.*, 886, p. 327: "indeque coeperunt, quia hyems imminabat, missi ad invicem discurrere, ut imperator pacem cum Danis faceret."

44 *Ibid.*: "factum est vere consilium nimis miserum." Abbo, II, line 389: "foedere . . . fragili." For the date of the treaty, see Favre, 61, n. 1; Böhmer-Mühlbacher, *op. cit.*, no. 1733a.

45 *Ann. Vedast.*, 886, p. 327: "via sine impedimento attributa, ut Burgundiam hyeme depraedarent." Abbo, II, line 338: "Annuiturque feris licitum Senones adeundi." Regino, 887, p. 127: "concessis terris et regionibus, quae ultra Sequanam erant, Normannis ad depredandum." *Ann. Fuld.*, III, 886, p. 105: "quibusdam per Burgundiam vagandi licentiam dedit" (cf. the following note).

of silver, payable in March of the following year; after the receipt of, and in return for, this payment, they were to return to their own country.⁴⁶

Thus, in spite of the long and brave resistance of the defenders of Paris, in spite of the departure of Siegfried, in spite also of the great Frankish army which had come to relieve the city, the Vikings had triumphed. What the Parisians had sought by herculean efforts and by great sacrifices to prevent, what they had steadfastly denied the Vikings — tribute and free passage up the Seine — was conceded to them, almost without a murmur, by the emperor at whose request Bishop Gauzelin and Count Odo had undertaken to hold Paris at all costs.⁴⁷ The language used by a German scholar to describe a similar event in 882, could be used with even greater propriety in this case; for indeed we have here “das jammervollste Schauspiel, das sich überhaupt in der Geschichte der normannischen Einfälle den Blicken bietet.”⁴⁸

Why did Charles conclude a so humiliating treaty? To this question our sources give three different answers. In the first place, the winter season was approaching;⁴⁹ which was indeed true, but does not seem a sufficient reason for the treaty. Secondly, Charles wished to chastise the population *ultra Sequanam*

46 Abbo, II, lines 339-40: “Septies argenti libris causa redeundi / Martis mense datis centum sua ad impia regna.” *Ann. Vedast.*, 886, p. 327: “nam utrumque, et civitatis redemptio illis promissa est et data, et via sine impedimento, etc.” (cf. the preceding note). *Ann. Fuld.*, III, 886, p. 105, wrongly state that the permission to plunder Burgundy was given to one group of Vikings, and the Danegeld to another: “quibusdam per Burgundiam vagandi licentiam dedit, quibusdam plurimam promisit pecuniam, si a regno eius statuto inter eos tempore discederent.” Regino (cf. the preceding note) mentions the permission to plunder Burgundy, but not the tribute. A comparison of these statements, and an analysis of the various factors that serve to explain the nature of the treaty (*infra*, pp. 147-50), lead me to conclude that the annalist of St. Vaast is not entirely accurate when he refers to the money payment as *civitatis redemptio*. There is reason to believe (cf. Abbo and the *Annals of Fulda*) that the payment was, not a mere ransom for the city of Paris—a *local* Danegeld (see *infra*, chap. xv)—but a *general* Danegeld, i. e. a payment made to secure the eventual evacuation of Frankish territory by the “great army.” Cf. *infra*, n. 83.

47 Abbo, I, lines 36-59. Cf. *supra*, p. 141; Favre, 36; Vogel, 325. Even if it be admitted that Gauzelin and Odo were defending their own interests at the same time that they proved their fidelity to the emperor, that does not lessen the pusillanimity of the latter.

48 Vogel (291, cf. 325) applied these words to the treaty which Charles the Fat concluded with the “great army” in 882. But at that time the Vikings were not dispatched into the heart of the Frankish realm to plunder, and they had not been held at bay for a whole year (see *infra*, appendix iv).

49 Abbo, II, 341: “Tunc glaciabantur torpentis saecula Novembris.” *Ann. Vedast.* (see *supra*, n. 43).

for refusing him obedience; which is doubtful, at the least.⁵⁰ Thirdly, Charles was terrified at the news of Siegfried's return; which was not true, for Charles did not learn of the approach of Siegfried until some time after he had concluded the treaty.⁵¹

In the opinion of the present writer, a more satisfactory explanation of the course followed by the emperor, may be found in his diseased physical condition,⁵² and in his dejected state of mind, the latter due to the loss of his right hand man, Count Henry.⁵³ Charles was by nature timorous,⁵⁴ and now he simply could not muster sufficient courage to attack the Danes, who, it must be remembered, had a very large army at their disposal.⁵⁵ This view is strengthened by the fact that the emperor, in order

50 Regino, 887, p. 127: "eo quod incolae illarum [sc. terrarum et regionum quae ultra Sequanam erant] sibi obtemperare nollent." This reason is given by Regino only. But here, as elsewhere, Regino's testimony can hardly be accepted at its face value (cf. Vander Linden, "Les Normands à Louvain," *Rev. Hist.*, 1917, CXXIV, 65-66; Lot, "La Loire, l'Aquitaine et la Seine, etc.," *Bibl. de l'école des chartes*, 1915, LXXVI, 507, note; id., "Une année . . . de Charles le Chauve," *Le Moyen Age*, 1902, VI, 427, n. 4), and we have nothing to corroborate it. Dümmler's early conjecture that Charles the Fat wished to employ the Northmen against Boso in Lower Burgundy, is improbable, and has long ago been abandoned even by Dümmler himself (see Favre, 62, n. 1 and Dümmler, II, 317, n. 4). Cf. Wenck, *Erhebung Arnulfs*, p. 12, n. 5.

51 This reason is given only in *Ann. Fuld.*, III, 886, p. 105: "[imperator] inde contra Nordmannos profectus est. Ubi dum aliquanto tempore moraretur, Heimrih comes a suis desertus et ab hostibus circumdatus occiditur. Interea Sigifrid cum magna multitudine Nordmannorum caeteris, qui ibi residebant, auxilium laturus venit ac christianis magnum intulit metum. Unde imperator perterritus quibusdam per Burgundiam vagandi licentiam dedit, etc." (see *supra*, n. 46). Most writers, including Favre (61, n. 1) and Dümmler (III, 271, n. 2), accept this as one of the probable reasons for the treaty. But the *Annals of St. Vaast* (886, pp. 327-28) state explicitly that Charles was not apprised of the return of Siegfried into the Seine until after the conclusion of the treaty, and these annals certainly are more reliable on this point than those of Fulda. The latter are inaccurate also with reference to the terms of the treaty (cf. *supra*, n. 46).

52 On the return journey to Germany Charles fell very ill (*Ann. Fuld.*, III, 886, p. 105; *ibid.*, *Cont. Ratisb.*, 887, p. 115; Abbo, II, line 342), and he seems always to have suffered more or less from nervous disorders. See Dümmler, III, 286; cf. Vogel, 333.

53 *Ann. Vedast.*, 886, p. 326: "Ille [imperator] vero audito [sc. mortuo Heinrici] multum doluit . . . sed quia dux [Heinricus] periit, ipse [imperator] nil utile gessit."

54 Dümmler, III, 290-92.

55 Prior to the departure of Siegfried the "great army" at Paris was, so far as known, the largest host ever collected by the Vikings in the ninth century (see Steenstrup, *op. cit.*, I, 214-17; Favre, 35; cf. *supra*, chap. viii, n. 56). Even after Siegfried's departure the numbers of the besiegers must have been very large (cf. Favre, 52, n. 2), and many Franks are said to have made common cause with them (Flodoard, *Hist. Rem. eccl.*, IV, c. 5, *loc. cit.*, p. 563). In the following winter Siegfried's army is said to have numbered 5,000 men (Vogel, 336, n. 3).

to avoid an armed conflict, agreed to furnish the tribute in return for which Paris was to be spared, out of his own resources.⁵⁶ The Parisians, aware of the strength of their citadel, and unwilling to have their past efforts go for naught, evidently had refused to raise any money on their own account to buy off the invaders. They were willing to continue the fight if necessary, but the emperor was not.⁵⁷

These relations between the emperor and the Parisians may aid us in understanding why Burgundy was conceded to the Danes as a field for plunder. Undoubtedly the Northmen had demanded the privilege of spending the winter in some interior region of France.⁵⁸ They could not very well have been sent into the valley of the Marne, for the Parisians — Count Odo and Bishop Askrich, in particular — probably raised objections, based on the fact that they, or their relatives, had large holdings and important interests in that district.⁵⁹ But there was no objection to letting loose the fury of the invaders in Burgundy — particularly against the town and *pagus* of Sens — for the relations between the Parisians and the Burgundians were at that time very strained.⁶⁰ Add to this the fact that Burgundy was a rich country, so far practically untouched by the Vikings,⁶¹ and one may easily comprehend why an agreement was reached on this point.

We may conclude, then, that while the principal reason for this treaty was the personal disinclination of Charles the Fat to enter into a sanguinary conflict with the Northmen, and his consequent willingness to accept what must be regarded as highly unsatisfactory terms, yet the concession to plunder Burgundy, rather than some other interior district, probably was in part due to Parisian influence. That the policy of Charles was supported by some of the East Franks, who dreaded the inconveniences of a return journey during the winter season, is quite

56 See *infra*, n. 73.

57 Cf. *supra*, nn. 25, 31.

58 From the time the Vikings entered the Seine, in the fall of 885, it had been their plan to penetrate into the *hinterland* (see Abbo, I, lines 40 ff., and cf. Favre, 35-36). If they had not demanded this privilege from Charles, we may be certain that it would not have been accorded them; for, of course, Charles had come to Paris with the intention of expelling the Vikings from his territories.

59 A later treaty with the Parisians expressly prohibited the Northmen from entering the Marne (Abbo, II, lines 411-16). Cf. Favre, 66; *infra*, p. 152 and n. 80.

60 Favre, 62, n. 2; cf. 66.

61 Abbo, II, lines 343-46.

probable; but, by reason of the determined resistance, and the endurance, of the defenders of Paris, and in view of the general condemnation of the treaty by contemporary chroniclers,⁶² it must be assumed that the majority of the Franks, and particularly those of the west,⁶³ did not approve of the imperial policy.

Before quitting Paris, Charles appointed Askrich successor to Bishop Gauzelin, and invested Count Odo with the fiefs formerly held by Odo's father, Robert the Strong.⁶⁴ Thereupon the emperor set out on the return journey to Germany;⁶⁵ the speed of his travel no doubt being accelerated somewhat by the news of the return of Siegfried into the valley of the Oise.⁶⁶

Meanwhile, the Northmen who had been besieging Paris hastened to avail themselves of the terms of the recent treaty; they moved up the Seine, entered the Yonne, and, on November 30, 886, laid siege to the episcopal city of Sens.⁶⁷ According to one account,⁶⁸ Evrard, the archbishop of that place, immediately entered into negotiations with the invaders, and succeeded

62 Cf. *supra*, nn. 41, 44.

63 A large number of the western magnates appear to have been present at Paris when the treaty was concluded. Cf. Favre, 60.

64 Abbo, II, lines 335-37; *Ann. Vedast.*, 886, p. 327; Regino, 887, pp. 126-27. Cf. Favre, 60, 69 ff.

65 *Ann. Vedast.*, 886, p. 327; Abbo, II, line 342.

66 *Ann. Vedast.*, 886, p. 327: "necdumque se de eo [Suessione] moverat loco, et ecce Sigefridus rex . . . Hysam fluvium ingressus, etc." *Ann. Fuld.*, III, 886, p. 105 (cf. *supra*, n. 51).

67 *Ann. Vedast.*, 886, p. 328; Abbo, II, lines 343-46; cf. Regino, 888, pp. 130-31. Regino states that the Parisians refused to permit the Vikings to ascend the Seine, and that the latter therefore dragged their ships for 2,000 paces overland, after which they launched them again and proceeded up the river. But this statement is not corroborated by any other source, and I am inclined, with Dümmler (III, 272, n. 2) and Vogel (337 and n. 1), to reject it, not because the Vikings could not have performed such a feat—it was a common thing with the Varangians in Russia—but because the recital of Regino can seldom be relied upon when his statements are not confirmed by other writers (cf. *supra*, n. 50). For the date of the siege of Sens, see *Annales sancti Columbae Senonensis*, 886, *M.G.H.*, SS., I, p. 104, and cf. Böhmer-Mühlbacher, *op. cit.*, no. 1733c, where November 10 evidently is a misprint for November 30.

68 *Ann. Vedast.*, 886, p. 328: "Evrardus, archiepiscopus ipsius civitatis, statim cum eis de redemptione civitatis agi coepit, et obtinuit quod voluit." Regino (888, p. 131), *Chronicon sancti Petri Vivi Senonensis* (Bouquet, IX, 33), and *Vita sancti Romani abbatis Autissiodorensis* (*ibid.*, 135), do not mention any negotiations; according to them, Sens was besieged continuously for six months, from November 30 to sometime in May, but withstood all attempts of the Northmen to take it. Favre (64, n. 3) thinks that the essential agreement of these three sources is a sufficient reason for rejecting the statement in the *Annals of St. Vaast*. I can not share his faith in those sources. As noted before (*supra*, nn. 50, 67), Regino's statements can seldom be accepted without corroboration. The fact that the other two are local sources does not necessarily make them reliable, as Favre seems to

in buying them off.⁶⁹ Other sources indicate that the siege of Sens was continued for several months.⁷⁰ However that may be, it is certain that the Vikings spent the winter in Burgundy, which they are said to have devastated so thoroughly that it was left practically a wilderness.⁷¹

In May, 887, the Vikings returned to Paris for the purpose of receiving the Danegeld promised them by Charles the Fat.⁷² To secure the tribute for the invaders, Askrich, the bishop of Paris, journeyed to Kirchen in Alemannia, where the emperor was sojourning in June, 887. Having obtained the promised amount apparently without difficulty, Askrich on his return paid it over to the Northmen.⁷³

We possess no information whatever as to how this Danegeld of 886—87 was raised, and conjectures on the subject would be idle. Compared with preceding Danegelds, the amount of this one was very small — only 700 pounds; in that respect it offers a marked contrast to the enormous tribute of 12,000 pounds paid in 884.⁷⁴ Yet it must not be supposed that the Vikings had made a bad bargain, for doubtless the proceeds of their perfectly legitimate plundering operations in Burgundy,⁷⁵ had been very

think; it should be remembered that they are not contemporary; the *Vita s. Romani* was written in the eleventh, and the *Chron. s. Petri Vivi Senonensis* in the twelfth, century. Whether the information contained in them was derived from some older and more reliable source, which is now lost, remains to be proved. Meanwhile it seems advisable to follow the *Annals of St. Vaast*, which usually may be relied upon, and with which the statement in the *Ann. s. Columbae Senonensis* (886, *loc. cit.*, p. 104) may be reconciled. Cf. *Chronica Albrici*, 888, *M.G.H.*, *SS.*, XXIII, p. 745, and see Steenstrup, *op. cit.*, II, 231.

69 If the city of Sens really was ransomed, this is but one example of the numerous payments of *local Danegeld* that were made during this period. This whole matter is taken up for discussion *infra*, chap. xv.

70 See *supra*, n. 68.

71 Regino, 888, p. 131; *Annales sancti Benigni Divionensis*, 887, *M.G.H.*, *SS.*, V, p. 40; *Chron. s. Petri Vivi Senon.*, *loc. cit.*, p. 33; *Vita s. Romani Abb. Autiss.*, *ibid.*, p. 135. Cf. Favre, 65.

72 According to the terms of the treaty with Charles the Fat, the Danegeld was to have been paid in March (cf. *supra*, n. 46). But from the *Annals of St. Vaast* (887, pp. 328—29) it would appear that the money was not paid until late in the spring. Cf. Abbo, II, line 347. The *Ann. s. Columb. Senon.* indicate that the Northmen retired from Burgundy in May (cf. *supra*, n. 68). See Böhmer-Mühlbacher, *op. cit.*, no. 1749a.

73 *Ann. Vedast.*, 887, p. 329: "Dani vero Parisius regressi propter tributum ab imperatore promissum; pro qua re Askrichus ad imperatorem abiit, et pro quo ierat, rediens, secum detulit. Datoque tributo, etc." Odo appears also to have been present at Kirchen, and may have accompanied Askrich thither. Cf. Favre, 65; Dümmler, III, 278—79; Böhmer-Mühlbacher, *op. cit.*, no. 1749a.

74 See *supra*, chap. viii, nn. 76, 77.

75 Cf. *supra*, n. 45.

considerable. The Danegeld of 886—87 also differs from its predecessors in that it came from the eastern, not from the western, kingdom. By whatever method the tribute was raised, it is certain that the western Franks did not contribute toward it.⁷⁶ Therefore, despite the fact that it was paid to secure the removal of the Vikings from the West Frankish realm, this payment had no influence on the institutional development of the Danegeld in France.

After they had received the tribute, the Vikings, in accordance with the terms of their treaty with Charles the Fat, ought to have returned to their own country.⁷⁷ But the absence of the emperor, and perhaps of Odo,⁷⁸ may have encouraged them to disregard the treaty. They made a desperate attempt to ascend the Seine a second time.⁷⁹ This design of the Northmen, though at first resisted and checked, was afterwards consented to, by the Parisians, on condition that the Danes enter no other river than the Seine.⁸⁰ But after the freebooters had once passed the Parisian bridges, they violated this second treaty, as they had the first one, entered the Marne, and established themselves in a fortified camp at Chessy, some twelve kilometers distant from Meaux.⁸¹ From this stronghold they continued to plunder and devastate in the usual way throughout Champagne and northern Burgundy.⁸²

The tribute paid by Charles the Fat had utterly failed to secure the result aimed at, namely, the return of the Danes to their own country.⁸³ In fact, the emperor's whole policy with reference to the Vikings had proved worse than useless.

⁷⁶ See *supra*, n. 73, and cf. nn. 25, 31.

⁷⁷ Cf. *supra*, n. 46.

⁷⁸ Odo is not mentioned among those who opposed the Vikings when they tried to reascend the Seine. Cf. Favre, 66, n. 2.

⁷⁹ Abbo, II, lines 388-95. Regino, 889, p. 123, inaccurately says that the Parisians refused to permit the Northmen to *descend* the Seine.

⁸⁰ Abbo, II, lines 396-423. The *Annals of St. Vaast*, 889, p. 327, say: "quia nullus erat qui eis resisteret, iterum per Sequanam Maternam fluvium ingressi." It is not true that there was no resistance offered when the Vikings, in violation of the treaty, attempted to reascend the Seine, for the evidence of Abbo on this point cannot be disregarded. But if the statement in the *Annals of St. Vaast* applies only to the ascent of the *Marne*—which did not take place until after the Northmen had come to terms with the Parisians—it is, in the main, true.

⁸¹ *Ann. Vedast.*, 887, p. 329; cf. Asser, *Gesta Aelfredi regis*, M.G.H., SS., XIII, 122; *Ann. Anglo-Saronici*, *ibid.*, 106. See also Favre, 67, n. 1.

⁸² *Ann. Vedast.*, 887, p. 330. Cf. Vogel, 342.

⁸³ Of course, the fact that Paris escaped destruction at the hands of the Vikings must be attributed, not to the payment of the Danegeld, but to the valor and endurance of its defenders. See *supra*, p. 149 and notes, and cf. nn. 25, 31, 46, 80.

CHAPTER X.

ODO'S FIRST DANEGELD (889).

The Danish army which in the year 887 had ascended the Marne and established itself in a fortified camp at Chessy,¹ spent the following winter (887—88) in plundering and devastating the valley of the Meuse and parts of Burgundy.² Early in the summer of 888 the Vikings invested the city of Meaux, which eventually was forced to capitulate, and then, on June 14, was burned and almost totally destroyed.³ The Vikings remained in the vicinity of Meaux throughout the summer and early fall of 888.⁴

Meanwhile Odo, who on February 29, 888, had been crowned king at Compiègne,⁵ fearing that the Northmen might attempt again to besiege Paris, took measures to forestall such eventuality by collecting an army in a fortified camp protecting the city.⁶ The Danes, indeed, returned to the Seine toward the beginning of November, but did not proceed to Paris, presumably because of Odo's measures of defense.⁷ Instead they ascended the Seine to the Loing, on the banks of which they established themselves for the winter.⁸ Their plundering operations were extended into Neustria, Burgundy, and Aquitaine,⁹ and did not

1 See the preceding page and n. 81.

2 *Ann. Vedast.*, 887, ed. Dehaisnes, p. 330.

3 *Ibid.*, 888, pp. 333—34; Abbo, II, lines 453—66, *M.G.H.. Poetae Latini*, IV, Part I; *Annales Nivernenses*, 888, *M.G.H.*, SS., XIII, 89. See Vogel, 343, 344 and n. 1; cf. Favre, *Eudes*, 116, n. 5.

4 *Ann. Vedast.*, 888, p. 334. Presumably it was part of this Viking army which was engaged, and decisively defeated, by Odo at Montfaucon on June 24, 888 (*ibid.*, p. 332; Abbo, II, lines 491 ff.; cf. Vogel, 344, n. 1). For the significance of this event, see Favre, 108 and n. 3; Vogel, 344—45; Dümmler, III, 320—23.

5 Favre, 89 and nn. 4, 5.

6 *Ann. Vedast.*, 888, p. 334: "Circa autumni vero tempora Odo rex, adunato exercitu, Parisius venit; ibique castra metatus est prope civitatem, ne iterum ipsa obsideretur."

7 I agree with Vogel (345, n. 3) in rejecting Dümmler's statement (III, 345) that the Vikings returned to Paris at this time. The only basis for it is the chronologically inaccurate account of Regino (890, ed. Kurze, p. 134), which, by the way, also has led Steenstrup (*Normannerne*, II, 237) to certain erroneous conclusions.

8 *Ann. Vedast.*, 888, p. 334: "Nortmanni vero per Maternam in Sequanam regressi, indeque navigantes et iter per terram facientes, Luviam fluvium ingressi, circa ejus littora sedem sibi firmant." Cf. Favre, 117—18 and notes.

9 *Ann. Vedast.*, 889, p. 335: "Dani vero more suo Burgundiam, Neustriam atque partem Aquitaniae, nullo resistente, igno et ferro devastant." Cf. Vogel, 346, n. 1.

cease until the following summer (889), when, probably in early July, their army and fleet appeared again, and for the last time, before Paris.¹⁰

Odo was there to meet them with a large army of Franks, Aquitanians, and Burgundians, summoned together from the various territories in which his authority had been recognized.¹¹ Some bitter fighting¹² appears to have taken place for a short time, but we get the impression that, on the whole, the Franks were getting the upper hand.¹³ This initial success, however, was not followed up; very soon the fighting ceased,¹⁴ and negotiations were commenced.¹⁵ These were concluded by the payment

10 *Ann. Vedast.*, 889, p. 335: "Circa autumni vero tempora Parisius regressi [Dani], etc." Abbo, II, line 467: "Denique Luteciae revolant [Dani] ad culmina tutae." See also the diplomas of Odo in Bouquet, IX, 447, 448, and in Favre, *op. cit.*, appendix, pp. 236-38. Cf. Regino, 890, pp. 134-35. The Vikings may have had intentions of returning to Paris earlier in the year. At any rate, Odo, who in January had journeyed to Aquitaine, for the purpose of receiving the submission of the magnates of that country, deemed it necessary temporarily to interrupt these proceedings, and hasten back to defend Francia against the Northmen (cf. Favre, 123). Perhaps it was a false alarm, for Odo soon returned to Aquitaine. However that may be, the Northmen certainly did arrive at Paris in July, when Odo again left Aquitaine to oppose them. The presence of the Vikings, as well as of Odo, at Paris in July, is proved by the diplomas cited above. The expression, *circa autumni tempora*, in the *Annals of St. Vaast*, is very indefinite, and does not invalidate the testimony of the diplomas. In the poem of Abbo the arrival of the Northmen at Paris is mentioned immediately after the description of the siege and surrender of Meaux. But Abbo was not attempting to present these events in chronological order. Cf. Favre, 127, n. 4.

11 Abbo, II, lines 468-72: "Convocat huc omnes proprios per regna morantes; / En, sine iam numero prestans Odo necit: / Francigeni appropierant alta cum fronte superbi, / Calliditate venis acieque, Aquitania, linguae, / Consilioque fugae Burgun-adiere-diones." *Ann. Vedast.*, 889, p. 335: "Contra quos [Danos] Odo rex venit."

12 That in some cases at least the fighting was of the bitterest sort, while it lasted, may be deduced from Abbo's account of the valorous deeds of Ademar, Sclademar, and Ansheric (II, lines 474-90). It is also attested to by Regino, 890, pp. 134-35.

13 The ascendancy of the Franks in the conflict is indicated in the following lines of Abbo's second book: 473, 483-84, 489-90. Cf. v. Kalckstein, *Gesch. d. franz. Königtums*, I, 63.

14 Abbo, II, line 473: "Sessio fit non longa satis frustrata triumpho."

15 *Ann. Vedast.*, 889, p. 335: "nuntiis intercurrentibus." This source has no mention of any fighting. According to Regino (890, p. 135), there were no negotiations. Instead the Vikings, when they perceived that they could not reach their goal in any other way, again (?)—see *supra*, chap. ix, n. 67—resorted to the stratagem of dragging their ships overland for some distance. But the information of Regino is not reliable, and cannot invalidate the testimony of the *Annals of St. Vaast* (cf. Vogel, 347, n. 1). Favre thinks (p. 128) that the treaty with Odo did not permit the Northmen to pass under the Parisian bridges, and that they were therefore forced to drag their ships overland; but this interpretation does not harmonize with what Regino says (pp. 134-35): "civibus . . . audaciter reluctantibus, Nortmanni desperatis rebus naves per terram . . . trahunt."

to the Danes of a sum of money, in return for which they retired from Paris and quitted the Seine.¹⁶ The Viking army did not proceed very far beyond the limits of the West Frankish realm; it invaded the Cotentin — which was then held by the Bretons¹⁷ — and, having established itself in the vicinity of St. Lo, laid siege to that place.¹⁸

The motives that led Odo to enter into negotiations with the Vikings, and eventually to pay them tribute, can only be conjectured. In spite of the bold front presented by the Franks, those of Neustria as well as those of Francia,¹⁹ and of the brave deeds performed by a few heroic individuals,²⁰ there is reason to believe that some contingents in Odo's army engaged the enemy in only a half-hearted way, or not at all. The Aquitanians, it is intimated, preferred negotiation to fighting,²¹ while the Burgundians are accused of having suggested flight;²² which indicates not only that Odo could not place entire confidence in his troops, but also that there was considerable opposition to his policy of energetic resistance.²³ To have continued the struggle under such circumstances would have been unwise, if not foolhardy;²⁴ and there remained but one alternative — the payment of Danegeld.

16 *Ann. Vedast.*, 889, p. 335: "[Dani] munerati ab eo [Odone] regressi a Parisius, relicto Sequana." Freeman (*Historical Essays*, First Series, p. 243), we may note, calls this payment a Danegeld.

17 The county of Coutances had been held by the Bretons since 867. See Vogel, 227; cf. 358.

18 *Ann. Vedast.*, 889, pp. 335-36; Regino, 890, p. 135; *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, 890, ed. Plummer, pp. 82, 83.

19 Abbo, II, line 470: "Francigeni approperant alta cum fronte superbi." The Franks, i. e. the population, or rather the vassals, of Francia and Neustria are here contrasted with those of Aquitaine and Burgundy, referred to in lines 471-72 (see *supra*, n. 11).

20 Abbo, II, lines 474-90; cf. *supra*, n. 12.

21 I take that to be the implication (cf. *supra*, n. 19) of these words of Abbo (II, line 471): "Calliditate venis acieque, Aquitania, linguae." They are differently interpreted in Guizot, *Collection des mémoires*, VI, p. 59.

22 Abbo, II, line 472: "Consilioque fugae Burgun-adiere-diones." According to Favre, p. 85, there was a party opposed to Odo in Burgundy.

23 That such was the policy of Odo is shown by the measures he had already taken to oppose the Vikings (see *supra*, pp. 153-54 and nn. 6, 11).

24 Cf. Vogel, p. 347, and Favre, p. 128, who seem to think that the intention of the Northmen to make a descent on Brittany, also may have influenced Odo to treat with them. This is possible, but the sources do not indicate that Odo was aware of the plans of the Vikings. v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, p. 63, suggests that Odo may have been forced to cease fighting because his vassals' period of military service had expired; which is a pure, and improbable, conjecture. What evidence is there that, in the ninth century, military service could be required of vassals only for a certain length of time? If that had been the case, the siege of Paris (885-86) would have been of shorter duration.

Evidently Odo found himself in a situation that did not essentially differ from those which had forced Charles the Bald to resort to the Danegeld.²⁵ It has been indicated above²⁶ that for certain reasons the policy of the western magnates with regard to the Vikings underwent a change toward the close of the reign of Carloman; that for some time after the year 884²⁷ the opposition offered to the invaders was stronger and more determined than it had been in the preceding period. This change of policy, however, was only temporary,²⁸ and by 889 it had lost most of its *raison d'être*. With the accession of Odo the magnates again found their interests jeopardized by the ambition of a vigorous monarch, anxious to rehabilitate the power of the crown, and determined to secure the submission of all the great vassals in his kingdom.²⁹ It may be true that the nobles of this period were somewhat better aware of the significance of the Viking invasions than those of a preceding generation,³⁰ and, consequently, that they were more willing, and better prepared, to engage the Northmen than their predecessors had been.³¹ Yet, like the latter, they were inclined to regard the advancement of the royal power and the exaltation of the monarch as a greater menace to their interests than foreign invasion,³² and they did not hesitate, on occasion, to make use of the presence of the Vikings in the furtherance of their own ends and to defeat the projects of the crown.³³

25 Cf. *supra*, chap. vii.

26 *Supra*, pp. 139-40.

27 The altered policy prevailed some four or five years, and was responsible for the election to the West Frankish throne not only of Charles the Fat in 884 (cf. *supra*, p. 139 and n. 123), but also of Odo in 888 (see Favre, 78-80); on both occasions Charles the Simple was passed over because it was felt that the exigencies produced by the Viking invasions did not permit the elevation of a mere child to the throne.

28 Cf. *supra*, p. 140 and n. 125.

29 The severe treatment of the rebel Waucher of Laon is an illuminating illustration of Odo's attempts to assert his royal authority (Favre, 143-45). For examples of his efforts to gain recognition as overlord in the various parts of his realm, see *ibid.*, 94, 99, 106, 116, 126, 129, 194-95.

30 See *supra*, pp. 135-40 and n. 103; cf. pp. 114-17.

31 The determined resistance offered to the Vikings at Paris, during the siege of 885-86 and on a later occasion (cf. *supra*, p. 147 and n. 47, p. 152 and n. 80), is an indication to that effect.

32 Cf. Fustel de Coulanges, *Les transform. de la royauté*, 696-97; Favre, 194-95.

33 Even Charles the Simple at one time probably was considering an alliance with the Vikings against Odo. It is true that Archbishop Fulk of Rheims severely censured such a policy, and that Charles never allied himself with the enemies of the Christians. But it is also true that certain supporters of Charles had suggested to him this method of gaining the

The amount of the Danegeld of 889 is unknown, and we have no information as to whence or how it was obtained.³⁴ It may be assumed, however, that the methods of assessment and collection which had been developed during the reign of Charles the Bald,³⁵ were resorted to now also. Thus, the right of the seigniors to tax their subject peasantry *à merci*, was further strengthened wherever the Danegeld was exacted.³⁶

This Danegeld effected what Charles the Fat had aimed at, but failed to secure, when he paid tribute to the Danes in 887;³⁷ for the invaders now sailed out of the Seine and evacuated the West Frankish realm.³⁸ But this result cannot be attributed to the Danegeld alone. The compliance of the Vikings was no doubt due, partly at least, to the presence of a large Frankish army at Paris;³⁹ and probably for a similar reason the agreement with Odo could not be immediately disregarded, as the one with Charles the Fat had been. Yet, within a comparatively short time this treaty too was violated. In the autumn of the next year (890), after having suffered defeat at the hands of the Bretons, the Vikings returned to the Seine; and before long their ships were ascending the Oise.⁴⁰

throne; which illustrates the truth of the statement made in the text. See Flodoard, *Historia Remensis ecclesiac*, IV, c. 5, *M.G.H.*, *SS.*, XIII, pp. 565-66; cf. Favre, 187-89, 221-23.

34 All we know about this particular payment of Danegeld is derived from the passage in the *Annals of St. Vaast* quoted *supra*, n. 16. The statements of Vogel, p. 346, Dümmler, III, 346, and Favre, p. 128, to the effect that the Danegeld of 889 probably was small, are purely conjectural.

35 See *supra*, chaps. v, vi; *infra*, chap. xvii.

36 Cf. *supra*, pp. 85, 102-3, and notes.

37 See *supra*, p. 152 and n. 83.

38 See *supra*, p. 155 and n. 16.

39 *Ibid.* and n. 11. Favre, pp. 128-29, indicates that Odo probably remained at Paris with his *fideles* for some time after the departure of the Vikings.

40 *Ann. Vedast.*, 890, p. 336: "Brittani vero viriliter suum defensavere regnum, atque afflictos Danos Sequanam redire compulerunt. Imminente vero festivitate omnium Sanctorum, Dani, per Sequanam Hisam ingressi, etc." Cf. Vogel, 359 ff.; Favre, 132 ff.

CHAPTER XI.

ODO'S SECOND DANEGELD (897).

Shortly before the end of his reign, Odo, the brave defender of Paris and valiant leader of the West Franks, for the second time found it necessary to agree to the payment of Danegeld.¹ The circumstances surrounding this event will be briefly set forth.²

In the year 896 a few hundred Vikings, under the leadership of a certain Huncdeus,³ left their companions in England, and in five ships sailed across the channel toward the French coast.⁴ They entered the Seine, and immediately began to plunder and devastate the surrounding districts in the usual manner.⁵ Since they were penniless when they departed from England,⁶ we may assume that their plundering operations were inspired by a desire to repair their fortunes just as speedily as opportunities permitted.⁷ Just then the opportunities probably were excellent, for Odo was occupied with other affairs, and did not offer any resistance to the freebooters.⁸ The preoccupation of Odo at this

1 As king of the West Franks Odo had paid Danegeld for the first time in 889 (see the preceding chapter); as count of Paris, and in conjunction with Bishop Gauzelin, he had also, in 886, paid a bribe of sixty pounds to Siegfried, thereby securing the removal of that chieftain and his men from Paris. See *supra*, chap. ix, nn. 24-26.

2 There is only one principal source for this Danegeld—the *Annals of St. Vaast*; but some additional information as to contemporary conditions and events may be gleaned from Abbo and the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*. Cf. Vogel, 373-79; Favre, *Eudes*, 187-93; Eckel, *Charles le Simple*, 26 ff., 64 ff.; Dümmler, III, 435-36; Steenstrup, *Normannerne*, II, 282-85; v. Kalkstein, *Gesch. d. franz. Königtums*, I, 105-6.

3 For a discussion of the name and identity of Huncdeus, see Vogel, 373, n. 2, and Steenstrup, *op. cit.*, I, 157-59. For the numbers of the Vikings, see Favre, 187 and n. 4. Steenstrup (*op. cit.*, II, 282, n. 3) believes that Rollo too came to France at this time; but cf. Vogel, 376, n. 3.

4 *Ann. Vedast.*, 896, p. 353: "Et per idem tempus iterum Nortmanni cum duce Huncdeo nomine et quinque barchis iterum Sequanam ingressi." *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, 897, ed. Plummer, p. 89. The chronology of the latter source, beginning with the entries for 879 and for some time thereafter, is one year in advance. See Plummer's *Notes* to his edition of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, p. 95; cf. Vogel, 373, n. 1; Steenstrup, *op. cit.*, II, 74, n. 1.

5 See *infra*, n. 8.

6 *Anglo-Sax. Chron.*, *loc. cit.*

7 Cf. Favre, 187.

8 *Ann. Vedast.*, 896, p. 353: "et dum rex ad alia intendit, magnum sibi et regno malum accrescere facit." Abbo, II, lines 583-91: "Et iterum misero gemitu loquor affore sevos / Allofilos. Terram vastant populosque trucidant, / Circumeunt urbes pedibus, regnantis et aedes, / Ruricolos prendunt, nexant et trans mare mittunt. / Rex audit, nec curat, Odo; per verba respondit, / O quam responsi facinus! non ore dedisti / Tale tuo, demon certe proprium tibi favit; / Non tua mens procurat oves Christo tibi missas?"

time proved very detrimental both to his own interests and to those of the kingdom, as the sequel will show.⁹

Encouraged by success and by the lack of resistance, the invaders soon grew bolder in their projects; moreover, their numbers were increased presently by the arrival of more Vikings, who, it may be presumed, likewise came from England.¹⁰ Shortly before Christmas the Northmen left the Seine and proceeded up the Oise as far as Choisy-au-Bac, near the confluence of the Oise and the Aisne, where they established themselves in a fortified camp.¹¹ From this stronghold the entire surrounding district as far east as the Meuse, was pillaged throughout the winter and spring of 897.¹²

Odo, unable to postpone resistance any longer, now moved against the Vikings with a (comparatively) large army.¹³ He encountered them as they were returning from a plundering raid, but was able to accomplish little; if an engagement took place it was indecisive.¹⁴ To be sure, the numerical superiority of the Franks¹⁵ was not altogether without effect; for the Vikings, in order that they might not expose themselves to the danger of

/ Longius ille tuum forsan nec curet honorem." Cf. Vogel, p. 375, who thinks Odo was prevented by illness from defending his realm. This view is not based on any statement in the sources for the year 896, and seems to be invalidated by these words in the *Annals of St. Vaast*: "dum rex ad alia intendit," which by no means imply illness on the part of Odo. Cf. v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 105-6.

9 As noted in the text, the invaders at this time probably numbered only a few hundred men and therefore could easily have been expelled. Later their numbers were greatly increased, until finally they were able to defy any Frankish levy that Odo might send against them. Abbo, II, lines 592-95: "Haec ubi fata receperunt probitate neglecti, / Exultant hilares, barcas agitantque per omnes / Gallia quis amnes fruitur, terram pelaguque / In dicione tenent totum, tutore ferente!" See also the *Annals of St. Vaast* (quoted in the preceding note and *infra*, n. 22).

10 *Ann. Vedast.*, 896, p. 353: "Nortmanni vero jam multiplicati, etc." Vogel, 376, n. 3, conjectures that Rollo, who later became the first duke of Normandy, may have been among those Vikings who came from England to France at this time. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

11 *Ann. Vedast.*, 896, p. 353: "[Nortmanni] paucis ante nativitatem diebus Hisam ingressi, Cauciaco sedem sibi, nullo resistente, firmant."

12 *Ibid.*, 897, p. 354: "Post haec usque Mosam in praeda exierunt [Nortmanni] nullo sibi resistente."

13 Favre, p. 189, denies that Odo accompanied the Frankish army, but on insufficient grounds; see Vogel, 376, n. 4. On the size of Odo's army, see *infra*, n. 15.

14 *Ann. Vedast.*, 897, p. 354: "A praeda vero illis Nortmannis revertentibus occurrit regis exercitus; sed nil profecerunt."

15 The Franks perhaps were more numerous (see the following note) than the Northmen just *then*; later it was the other way (see *infra*, n. 22). Odo's army could not have been large except in a relative sense. Cf. *infra*, n. 17.

being besieged, prudently ascended their ships and retired to the Seine. There was, however, no further attempt to dislodge them, and the Vikings continued during the summer to harry the country and collect booty.¹⁶

Meanwhile, Charles the Simple, who was disputing Odo's claims to the West Frankish throne,¹⁷ had entered into amicable relations with the invaders,¹⁸ and was thinking of allying himself with them in order to defeat his rival.¹⁹ It is true that this project was never carried into effect, and that, on the contrary, a reconciliation took place between Charles and Odo.²⁰ Yet the possibility of such an alliance must have caused Odo some anxiety, and may help to explain his future policy with regard to the Vikings.²¹

Toward the close of the summer of 897, the numbers of the invaders had become so large as to inspire them with the confidence that they might ravage the remaining parts of Odo's kingdom with impunity; a confidence of which their fearful devastations gave ample proof.²² Recognizing that it would be hazardous to attempt anything against the Vikings as things then stood, Odo resolved to make use, once more, of the only remaining method whereby he might hope to rid his kingdom of these pestiferous parasites. He opened negotiations looking to the removal of the Northmen in return for the payment of Danegeld.

16 *Ann. Vedast.*, 897, p. 354: "Verum Nortmanni ad naves reversi, timentes multitudinem exercitus ne obsiderentur, in Sequanam redierunt; ibique tota demorantes aestate praedas agebant, nullo sibi resistente."

17 On the strife between the partisans of Odo and Charles the Simple, see Eckel, *op. cit.*, 13-27; Favre, 158-90; Dümmler, III, 382-436. These civil wars, while they lasted, probably prevented Odo from opposing the Vikings with anything more than merely local levies (Vogel, 375).

18 At Easter, 897, Charles the Simple acted the sponsor at the baptism of Huncdeus, the Viking chieftain (*Ann. Vedast.*, 897, p. 354). Did Charles demand that Huncdeus be baptized as the prerequisite for an alliance between them (cf. Eckel, p. 25)? Steenstrup's assumption (*op. cit.*, II, 284, n. 1), that Charles at first had opposed the Vikings and vainly appealed to Odo for aid, is not warranted by the passage in Abbo's poem to which he refers.

19 Flodoard, *Hist. Rem. ecclesiae*, IV, c. 5, *M.G.H.*, SS., XIII, p. 565. Cf. Vogel, 377 and n. 1; Eckel, 61-64; *supra*, chap. x, n. 33.

20 *Ann. Vedast.*, 897, pp. 354-55. Cf. Favre, 190-91.

21 Cf. Vogel, 378; Eckel, 27.

22 *Ann. Vedast.*, 897, p. 355: "Nortmanni vero, jam in multitudine fidentes, omnes reliquias regni ferro et igne devastant." Several lines before this quotation the annalist stated that the Northmen spent the entire summer along the Seine (see *supra*, n. 16).

After the treaty had been concluded, the Viking army proceeded southward, beyond the Loire, to pass the winter in Aquitaine.²³

The reasons which induced Odo to agree to the payment of Danegeld at this time are fairly clear, and, in substance, similar to those which had led to the payment of the tribute on previous occasions. Reference has already been made to the numerical superiority attained by the Viking army,²⁴ and to the possibility of an alliance between the Vikings and some of the supporters of Charles the Simple.²⁵ These two considerations alone may have sufficed to induce Odo to act as he did; which is only another way of saying that the king was forced to resort to the Danegeld by reason of the attitude of his magnates. But if the difficulties of Odo's position are to be fully appreciated, we must remember also that during his reign there had been a heavy and continued drain on the military resources of the West Franks, and that Odo himself was no longer in possession of that energy, endurance, and resourcefulness, which in early and middle life had characterized the defender of Paris.²⁶ Having concluded the treaty with the Northmen, Odo retired to the castle of La Fère, on the Oise, where he was struck down with a serious illness,²⁷ which on January 1, 898, ended his life.²⁸

Concerning the amount of money promised the Vikings in 897 we have no specific information. Owing to the self-confidence and arrogance which their large numbers fostered,²⁹ it is improbable that the invaders would have consented to retire except for a very considerable compensation. The sources are silent also on the questions of how and where the Danegeld was to be raised. Indeed, there is some reason to doubt whether the tribute promised in 897 was ever paid.³⁰

23 *Ann. Vedast.* (this quotation follows immediately after the one given in the preceding note): "Unde rex misit ad eos, regnum redimere volens; et, facto placito, super Ligerim hie mandi gratia pergunt." Since the preposition *super* in the last sentence is used with a verb of motion, it ought to be translated *beyond*; Favre (p. 192, bottom) translates it *on*, which to me seems inaccurate.

24 Cf. *supra*, nn. 9, 17, 22.

25 Cf. *supra*, nn. 18, 19.

26 Cf. v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 106; Eckel, 28.

27 *Ann. Vedast.*, 897, p. 355.

28 *Ibid.*, 898, pp. 355-56.

29 See *supra*, n. 22.

30 The annalist of St. Vaast (see *supra*, n. 23), who is our only source of information for this Danegeld, says merely that Odo wished to ransom the

Danegeld. 11.

However that may be, the Vikings subjected not only Aquitaine but also Neustria to ruthless devastation before, in the spring, they returned to their ships in the lower Seine.³¹ Even then the Northmen did not evacuate the realm; instead they undertook a plundering raid into Francia, on the return from which they were intercepted, though without important results, by a small Frankish army led by Charles the Simple, now monarch of the western kingdom.³²

kingdom, and that he concluded a treaty with the Vikings on this basis. It is not stated anywhere that the Danegeld was paid. We know that Odo was taken ill shortly after he had come to terms with the Northmen, i. e. late in October (cf. Favre, 193), and that he died on January 1, 898 (see *supra*, n. 28); it is not impossible that these circumstances occasioned much delay in levying the taxes for the Danegeld. After the accession of Charles the Simple the attempt to raise the tribute may have been definitely abandoned; at least the activities of the Vikings about that time (see the following note) seem to indicate that they no longer entertained any hope of receiving the money promised by Odo.

31 *Ann. Vedast.*, 898, p. 356: "Nortmanni vero verno tempore rediere ad naves, vastata Aquitaniae parte atque Neustria, insuper plurimis eversis castris, interfectisque habitatoribus." Favre (192-93) seems to imply that Odo by the treaty of 897 had consented to the plundering operations of the Northmen in Aquitaine and Neustria, and he finds little difference between Odo's policy on this occasion and that of Charles the Fat in 886, who then permitted the Vikings to plunder Burgundy (cf. *supra*, p. 146 and n. 45). I am inclined to doubt that Odo consented to any plundering by the Vikings at least in Neustria, which was his own country. After the conclusion of the treaty the Vikings proceeded *beyond* the Loire (cf. *supra*, n. 23)—i. e. into Aquitaine, not Neustria—to spend the winter. Evidently it had been agreed that they were to sojourn there only during the stormy season and while they were awaiting the payment of the Danegeld; for it is inconceivable that Odo would have agreed to pay tribute for anything less than their (eventual) evacuation of the realm. Nothing is said of any plundering by the Vikings during the last months of 897. They seem to have refrained from that so long as they still hoped to receive the promised Danegeld. But when it became apparent that this was not forthcoming, the Vikings at once resumed hostile tactics; and these were not confined to Aquitaine, but included Neustria as well, and later were extended also to Francia (see the following note).

32 *Ann. Vedast.*, 898, pp. 356-57.

CHAPTER XII.

RUDOLPH'S FIRST DANEGELD (923—24).

After the treaty of St. Clair-sur-Epte in 911, by which Charles the Simple ceded part of the region afterwards called Normandy to Rollo and his followers,¹ one might conjecture that so far as France was concerned there would be no further occasion for paying tribute to the Northmen. Yet the West Franks were required to pay Danegeld at least twice after the event referred to, first in the year 924 and again in 926.² It must be admitted that the reasons which made the first of these payments necessary, are somewhat obscure; and in order to render them at all comprehensible, it seems desirable to review briefly the course of events in France during the preceding twelvemonth.³

The year 923 is not without significance in the political, and more especially in the dynastic, history of France. It was then that the fortunes of Charles the Simple were broken, beyond hope of recovery, on the field of Soissons. For though Robert of Paris, the Capetian rival of Charles, was killed in this engagement, his forces were completely victorious over those of the Carolingian. All the efforts of Charles to rehabilitate himself

1 On the treaty of St. Clair-sur-Epte, see Eckel, *Charles le Simple*, 75 ff.

2 The Danegeld of 926 is taken up in the next chapter. Lauer's statement, in his edition of the *Annals of Flodoard*, p. 35, n. 1, that Henry I of Germany in 924 agreed to buy peace from the Normans, is a gross error, due either to a misprint or to carelessness on the part of an otherwise very accurate scholar. Henry paid tribute, not to the Normans, but to the Magyars (Waitz, *Jahrbücher des deutschen Reichs unter König Heinrich I.* Third edition [1885], p. 78).

3 The principal if not the only source of information for this Danegeld and that of 926 are the contemporary *Annals of Flodoard*. Richer in his *Historiae* has something to say on the Danegeld of 924, but fails to mention any payment in 926. His account was not written until the close of the tenth century. For the preceding period Richer depended largely on the *Annals of Flodoard*, and the value of his supplementary statements is very doubtful (see the edition of Waitz, Intro., pp. vi ff.). For detailed discussions of the course of events in the West Frankish kingdom during this period, see Lauer, *Robert et Raoul*, 20-45; Lippert, *Geschichte des westfränkischen Reichs unter König Rudolf*, 31-58; v. Kalkstein, *Gesch. d. franz. Königtums*, I, 161-72; cf. Eckel, *Charles le Simple*, 116-33. In English there is a very brief account by Freeman (*Norman Conquest*, I, Third edition, pp. 175-77) and a more detailed one by Palgrave (*History of Normandy and England*, II, 50-60). Neither of these is now of much value. The work of Palgrave in particular has become very antiquated. It contains numerous errors and inaccuracies, some of which pertain to the Danegeld; but it seems unnecessary at this date to refute or even to signalize them.

proved vain. Abandoning this unfortunate scion of Charlemagne, the western magnates gave their allegiance to Rudolph of Burgundy, who was crowned king of France at Soissons on July 13, 923.⁴ Not long thereafter the wily and ambitious Herbert, count of Vermandois, by a successful ruse obtained possession of the unsuspecting Carolingian and threw him into prison.⁵

An army of Northmen now advanced into Francia, ostensibly for the purpose of supporting the cause of Charles, who had appealed to them for aid several times before he was imprisoned. This army was composed chiefly of the followers of Ragenold, who for some time had had their rendezvous near the Loire; besides these, however, it also included a large contingent from Rouen, i. e. from Rollo's army. Ragenold appears to have been the leader of the combined Scandinavian forces.⁶ While Count Herbert of Vermandois was sojourning with King Rudolph in Burgundy,⁷ the Northmen subjected the territory west and north of the Oise to devastation and plunder.⁸ It is true that the vassals of Herbert, aided by other nobles, offered effective resistance to the enemy, killed several hundred of them, and compelled the

4 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 923, p. 14 and n. 3. Cf. Lauer, *op. cit.*, 6-19.

5 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 923, p. 15; Richer, I, 47, pp. 30-31. Cf. Lauer, 20-24. In spite of several temporary releases from prison, the captivity of Charles the Simple was ended only by his death on October 7, 929 (cf. Eckel, 127-35; Lippert, 32-35).

6 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 923, p. 15: "Interea Ragenoldus, princeps Nordmannorum qui in fluvio Ligeri versabantur, Karoli frequentibus missis jampridem excitus, Franciam trans Isaram, conjunctis sibi plurimis ex Rodomo, depraedatur." Cf. Richer, I, 46, p. 30: "Nortmannis quoque usque ad effectum suasit [Karolus], adeo ut regi fidem spondere eique ut iuberet militare vellet. Qui cum regi militaturi occurrere pararent, a Gallis intercurrentibus inhibiti sunt. Unde et eorum suppetiis rex privatus est." *Ibid.*, c. 48, p. 31: "Haec [i. e. the capture and incarceration of Charles the Simple] dum agerentur, pyratae Gallias irruerunt, etc." Lauer, p. 24, indicates that Ragenold also had grievances of his own. Lippert, p. 34, asserts that for the Northmen the captivity of Charles was "nur ein Vorwand für . . . Räube-reien"; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

7 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 923, p. 15: "et sic ipse Heribertus Rodulfum regem in Burgundiam prosecutus est." Cf. v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 163.

8 Cf. *ibid.* Lauer, p. 24, and Lippert, p. 36, seem to be of the opinion that Ragenold's men had crossed the Oise and were operating in the region east of that river. But Flodoard (see *supra*, n. 6) says, "Ragenoldus . . . Franciam trans Isaram . . . depraedatur"; this must mean that the Vikings were devastating that part of Francia which from Flodoard's point of view was *trans Isaram*. Therefore, since Flodoard was writing at Rheims (see Lauer's edition of Flodoard's *Annals*, Intro., pp. vi, xvi), it follows that he referred to the territory west and north of the Oise. Doubtless most if not all of the invaded territory lay within the jurisdiction of Count Herbert of Vermandois; for it was his vassals who first offered resistance to the Northmen (Flodoard, *Ann.*, 923, p. 15), and it was he who had imprisoned Charles the Simple in whose behalf Ragenold is said to have taken up arms.

rest to seek refuge within the Norman strongholds.⁹ Yet the ravaging continued, and eventually Hugh the Great, Duke of Francia, felt that it was necessary to summon the king to the rescue.

Rudolph, in response to this summons, immediately left Burgundy and proceeded to Compiègne on the Oise.¹⁰ Learning now that the Normans had devastated the territory of Beauvais, the king hastened thither, accompanied by Archbishop Seulf of Rheims, Count Herbert of Vermandois, and others.¹¹ By way of retaliation, he penetrated with the Frankish forces into Normandy and began to harry that land after the fashion of the Vikings.

From these measures of reprisal Rudolph was called away to receive the homage and fealty of the magnates of Lorraine. Counts Hugo and Herbert were left to oppose the Normans and to prevent them from crossing the Oise.¹² In the latter endeavor the Frankish magnates were not successful, but they retaliated by ravaging in Normandy. These guerilla tactics could not be continued indefinitely, and at last both sides were ready for negotiation.¹⁴ The Normans promised Count Herbert, Arch-

9 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 923, pp. 15-16. Cf. v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 163.

10 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 923, p. 16: "Quibus urgentibus causis, rex Rodulfus ab Hugone, filio Rotberti, accitus de Burgundia venit ad Compendia super Isaram."

11 *Ibid.*: "et audito quod Nordmanni pagum Belvacensem depraedabantur, illo transit cum Seulfo archiepiscopo et Heriberto comite, aliisque quibusdam et electis viris fortibus." That Flodoard is here referring to the Normans, not to the Loire Vikings under Ragenold, is evident from what follows (see the next note).

12 *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17: "Itta fluvio transito, ingressus est terram, quae dudum Nordmannis ad fidem Xpisti venientibus, ut hanc fidem colerent et pacem haberent, fuerat data; partem quoque ipsius terrae rex cum Francis, quia ipsi Nordmanni pacem quam pepigerant, propter promissiones Karoli, qui eis latitudinem terrae pollicitus fuerat, infregere, caedibus et igne devastat."

13 *Ibid.*, p. 17: "His vero eum rebus intentum legati adeunt Lothariensium, se suaque ipsi subdere spondentium; quorum legatione revocatus ab hac devastatione, cum primatum qui secum aderant, consilio Lothariensibus obviam pergit, Hugone et Heriberto comitibus ad praesidium patriae trans Isaram relictis." Lippert, p. 36, comments thus on Rudolph's policy at this juncture: "auch er [Rudolf] konnte sich dem Zuge seiner Zeit und seiner Stellung nicht entziehen; die Ausdehnung seines Herrschaftsgebiets über das weite Reich Lothars musste wie allen Westfranken auch ihm als höherer, ruhmvollerer Gewinn gelten als die definitive Züchtigung der normanischen Räuber, welche ja seine Vasallen durchführen konnten."

14 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 923, p. 17: "Interea Nordmannis quosdam pagos nostros trans Isaram et nostratibus eorum terram depraedantibus, crebris alternatim directis legationibus, etc."

bishop Seulf, and the other French nobles, that they would make peace on condition that they be granted as large an extent of territory on the left bank of the Seine as they demanded; also the Normans sent hostages to King Rudolph — who was then at Laon, having returned from Lorraine — and accepted his proposal of a truce until the middle of May in the following year (924).¹⁵

Meanwhile Henry I of Germany, on the invitation of certain magnates hostile to Rudolph, had invaded Lorraine, and was attempting to coerce the nobility of that region to transfer their allegiance to him. These efforts, however, proved somewhat premature. Apprised that Rudolph was preparing to oppose him with a very large army, summoned together not only from Francia but also from Burgundy, Henry deemed it advisable temporarily to postpone the execution of his project, and speedily retired to Germany.¹⁶

Rudolph was now ready to give his attention to the seigniors of the south, Duke William II of Aquitaine in particular, who had so far refused him allegiance.¹⁷ But we are informed that at the beginning of the year 924, and before the king set out on his expedition to Aquitaine, there was levied in Francia an exaction for the purpose of raising a sum of money to be paid to the Northmen as the price of peace.¹⁸ In view of the fact that

15 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 923, pp. 17-18: "pacem Heriberto comiti et Seulfo archiepiscopo pollicentur ceterisque Francis qui cum ipsis contra Nordmannos sedebant, si tamen eis terra daretur quam spaciosam petebant ultra Sequanam. Rodulfo interea rege, ut dictum est [p. 17], Laudunum reverso, obsides illi mittunt et inducias ab eo usque ad medium Maium accipiunt." A few lines before this quotation (p. 17) Flodoard stated that Rudolph was detained in Lorraine *toto pene . . . autumno*. It is therefore probable that the truce with the Normans was concluded in September or October, 923. Cf. v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 164, n. 2.

16 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 923, p. 18. Cf. Parisot, *Le Royaume de Lorraine sous les Carolingiens*, p. 667; Lauer, 25-26; Lippert, 36-37.

17 See the following note, and cf. Lauer, 27; Lippert, 38-39.

18 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 924, p. 19: "Anno DCCCCXXIII incipiente, fit exactio per Franciam pecuniae collaticiae, quae Nordmannis [probably the Normans; see *infra*, in the text] pacto pacis daretur, et Rodulfus rex protectionem parabat in Aquitaniam, quia Willelmus, ejusdem regionis princeps, subditi sibi differebat." Richer, I, 48, p. 31: "Haec dum agerentur [cf. *supra*, n. 6], pyratae Gallias irruerunt, pecudum armentorumque abductione multarumque opum exhaustu cum plurimorum capitivitate terram depopulantes. Quorum impetu rex dolens, suorum usus consilio, exactionem pecuniae collaticiae fieri exactoribus indixit, quae hostibus in pacis pacto conferretur. Et collata, ad votum commune paciscuntur atque in sua concedunt. Rex vero, licet merens, ad adia se contulit. Exercitum itaque in Aquitaniam adversus

the recent warfare had not issued wholly in favor of the Scandinavians¹⁹ — it was they, not the Franks, who had furnished hostages²⁰ — it seems rather disconcerting now to find the Northmen in a position to demand, and the Franks willing to agree to, the payment of tribute. Which group of Northmen had made this demand, and what considerations had induced the Franks to yield?

Answers to these questions must be largely in the form of conjecture, for the annalists, though they furnish us with the facts, offer hardly a word of explanation.²¹ In all probability the Danegeld was paid to the Northmen of the Seine, i. e. the Normans, with whom Rudolph had arranged a truce the preceding year.²² The continued hostile attitude of the Loire Northmen, led by Ragenold, seems to preclude the possibility of the tribute having been paid, either in whole or in part, to them.²³ It is not impossible that the Normans had stipulated for the payment of Dane-

eius principem Wilelmum parat, eo quod subdi sibi contempneret." This portion of Richer's account (cf. the edition of Waitz, p. 31, n. 3) depends on the *Annals of Flodoard*. It must be assumed that the details added by Richer, such as Rudolph's grief at having to resort to the Danegeld and his consultation with the magnates, are wholly gratuitous. Richer does not mention the truce which had been arranged with the Normans prior to the payment of the Danegeld, nor does he distinguish the Loire Vikings under Ragenold from the Normans under Rollo.

19 See *supra*, n. 14. Lippert, p. 38, says: "Keiner von beiden Teilen konnte sich einen entscheidenden Sieg zuschreiben." Lauer, p. 27, agrees that there had been no decisive encounter.

20 See *supra*, n. 15. Cf. Lippert, p. 38; Lauer, p. 27.

21 Flodoard says (*supra*, n. 18) simply that the Danegeld was paid to the Northmen; he has no explanation whatever of the reasons why the Franks agreed to pay tribute, unless, indeed, we assume that a causal relation is implied between the two events described in the sentence quoted *supra*, n. 18. Richer (see *ibid.*) would have us believe that the Northmen, as a result of their tactics of devastation, had the Franks completely at their mercy—in other words, that the latter had no choice in the matter of paying Danegeld; which is not true (see *supra*, n. 19; cf. nn. 3, 18).

22 Cf. *supra*, n. 15. This is also the opinion of Lauer, p. 27, and of Lippert, p. 38.

23 In 924 the truce with the Normans was ended by a definitive peace (see *infra*, n. 35; cf. nn. 25, 27). But this, according to Flodoard, did not affect the Loire Vikings (*Ann.*, 924, pp. 24-25): "Ragenoldus cum suis Nordmanis, quia nondum possessionem intra Gallias acceperat, terram Hugonis inter Ligerim et Sequanam depopulantur." Later, after William II of Aquitaine and Hugh the Great had come to terms with Ragenold—probably by permitting him free passage through their territories (Lippert, p. 44)—the latter transferred his plundering operations to Burgundy (Flodoard, *Ann.*, 924, 925, pp. 25 ff.). Cf. Lauer, 33-34.

geld before they agreed to the truce in 923;²⁴ or it may be that Rudolph, by subsequent negotiations, had secured an extension of the truce in return for the promise of tribute.²⁵ In any case, it seems pretty clear that the king by this measure was merely taking precautions against the possible reopening of hostilities by the Normans during the period when he expected to be occupied with the business of securing submission in Aquitaine.²⁶ There is no reason to suppose that the Danegeld secured anything more than an extension of the truce.²⁷ A definitive peace with the Normans was not concluded until the late summer or early

24 In his recent work (*Robert et Raoul*, p. 27) Lauer takes the view that when the Normans gave hostages in 923 (cf. *supra*, n. 15), they did so in return for the promise of tribute. When he published his edition of the *Annals of Flodoard*, Lauer was of the opinion (p. 24, n. 5) that the Danegeld was arranged for in a separate treaty concluded early in 924.

25 The treaty which formally terminated the period of truce (see *infra*, n. 35) was probably concluded long after the middle of May (cf. *supra*, n. 15), as will appear from the following. Rudolph's illness (Flodoard, *Ann.*, 924, p. 23; cf. Lippert, 41-43) must be placed in the period after April 9 (Lauer, ed., *Ann. de Flodoard*, p. 23, n. 4), when he was at Chalon-sur-Saône in Burgundy. Before he fell ill, but after April 9, Rudolph participated in the Assembly of Attigny. It was directly after that event, and while he was preparing an expedition to Lorraine, that the illness came upon him. After a time he began to convalesce, but soon suffered a relapse, and, despairing of recovery, was brought to the monastery of St. Remy at Rheims, where he remained for four weeks. A careful consideration of these facts leads me to believe that Rudolph could not have left Rheims before June 1. Thereupon he proceeded to Soissons and thence to Burgundy. At this point in his narrative Flodoard (pp. 23-24) states that "Heinricus [the Fowler] aeque . . . valitudine corporis tota detinetur aestate"; which brings us to the summer months—July or perhaps August. Next Flodoard refers to an outbreak of hostilities between certain nobles and then, finally, to the conclusion of peace with the Normans (see *infra*, n. 35). Seven or eight lines further on (p. 25, line 2) he mentions the Synod of Trosly, held in October. There is, therefore, good reason to believe that the treaty with the Normans was not concluded much prior to September 1, and possibly later (cf. v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 167 and n. 1); which means that the truce had been prolonged from three to four months beyond the time originally agreed upon. v. Kalckstein (*ibid.*, 165) believes that Rudolph concluded a definite treaty of peace with the Normans when he agreed to the Danegeld; but see *infra*, n. 27 and cf. *supra*, n. 24.

26 Cf. *supra*, nn. 18, 21. This is also the opinion of Lauer, p. 27, and of Lippert, p. 38.

27 The contrary view of v. Kalckstein (cf. *supra*, n. 25) is hardly tenable. If a definitive peace had been concluded when the Danegeld was paid, early in 924, it would be impossible to explain why another peace treaty, and one so disadvantageous to the Franks, was necessary later in the same year, since Flodoard has not a word concerning any reopening of hostilities in the intervening period. The fact that the Franks, by the treaty concluded in the fall of 924 (see *infra*, n. 35), yielded to the demands made by the Normans at the cessation of hostilities in 923 (see *supra*, n. 15), also indicates that there had been no final settlement with the Normans in the meantime.

fall of 924,²⁸ by which time the submission of Aquitaine was an accomplished fact.²⁹

For the Danegeld of 924 our sources offer no information whatever as regards amount, rates of assessment, or method of collection.³⁰ Probably it was a considerable sum, since, as already stated, it had to be raised by means of an exaction, or general tax, levied throughout Francia — which, roughly described, then comprised the territory between the Epte, the Seine, the upper Meuse, and the Scheldt.³¹ Presumably the money was raised by methods very similar to, if not identical with, those that had been developed for this purpose in the preceding century.³²

Not until several months after the submission of Aquitaine, were the Franks ready to make peace with the Normans. Rudolph was then in Burgundy, convalescing from a serious illness.³³ It was therefore left to Counts Hugo and Herbert and Archbishop Seulf to arrange the terms of the treaty. We are assured, however, that the magnates acted with the king's consent when, yielding to the demands put forward by the Normans

28 Cf. *supra*, n. 25; *infra*, n. 35.

29 Rudolph had returned from Aquitaine before April 6 (Lippert, 41, 108); cf. Flodoard, *Ann.*, 924, p. 20 and n. 1, p. 21).

30 All the information we have on this Danegeld is given *supra*, n. 18. Richer states that the king entrusted the collection of the tax to *exactors*. It would be futile to speculate on the identity of these officials, since, in all probability, Richer himself only assumed that they must have existed and functioned. In asserting that this Danegeld was raised by a personal tax, Lauer, p. 27, is evidently following Lippert, p. 38, who refers to it as "wohl eine Art aussergewöhnlicher Kopfsteuer, die es sonst nicht gab." For this view I can find no basis. *Pecunia collaticia* (see *supra*, n. 18) cannot be interpreted to mean a capitation tax. The adjective *collaticius* does not appear in DuCange's *Glossarium*; in *Harper's Latin Dictionary* it is said to be of post-Augustan usage and to mean "brought together," "raised by contribution," or "mingled." The second of these meanings is quite appropriate for the connection in which Flodoard uses the word; furthermore, it may indicate that this Danegeld, like those of the ninth century, was not collected in strict accordance with a royal assessment, but that each tax-payer was forced to contribute whatever his resources permitted (see *supra*, chap. v, n. 123).

31 Longnon, *Atlas historique de la France*, Text, pp. 85-86; cf. Lauer, ed., *Ann., de Flodoard*, p. 24, n. 10. v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 165, assumes that when Rudolph in the spring of 924 granted Hugh the Great the county of Maine—which soon afterward was ceded to the Normans (see *infra*, n. 35)—he did so partly in order to indemnify him for his contributions toward the Danegeld.

32 These are summarized *infra*, chap. xvii.

33 Cf. *supra*, nn. 25, 28.

in 923,³⁴ they ceded to them the districts of Maine and Bessin.³⁵ This peace, of course, did not prevent the Vikings under Ragenold, who as yet had received no grant of territory in France, from plundering and devastating on their own account.³⁶ What was worse, it failed to keep the Normans pacified for more than a brief interval. In 925 Rollo's men invaded Beauvais, Amiens, Arras, and Noyon, thereby violating the compact of the previous year.³⁷

34 Cf. *supra*, n. 15.

35 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 924, p. 24: "Nordmanni cum Francis pacem ineunt sacramentis per Hugonem et Heribertum comites, Seulfum quoque archiepiscopum, absente rege Rudulfo: ejus tamen consensu terra illis aucta, Cinnomannis et Baiocae pacto pacis eis concessae." Lauer, p. 32, asserts that before he left Rheims (cf. *supra*, n. 25), Rudolph had charged the magnates to conclude peace with the Normans. Lippert, p. 43, indicates that these matters were arranged at Soissons a little later.

36 See *supra*, n. 23. Ragenold probably was incensed at having been excluded from the negotiations with the Franks, and he must have regarded the increase in the holdings of the Normans with envy. Cf. Lauer, p. 33.

37 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 925, pp. 29-30: "Nordmanni de Rodomo foedus quod olim pepigerant irruptentes, pagum Belvacensem atque Ambianensem depopulantur, etc."

CHAPTER XIII.

RUDOLPH'S SECOND DANEGELD (926).

At the close of the preceding chapter it was indicated that the peace which the West Franks concluded with the Normans under Rollo in 924 was violated by the latter in the following year.¹ After they had devastated the district about Beauvais, and had burned Amiens and Arras, the Normans proceeded to Noyon, which they intended to subject to a like fate. In this, however, they were only partially successful; though the suburbs, or *faubourgs*, were enkindled, a sally by the *castellani*, aided by the *suburbani*, forced the Normans to retire some distance, and at least part of the *faubourgs* was cleared of the enemy. In the meantime Frankish contingents had invaded Norman territory, ravaging and burning as they advanced; while Count Herbert of Vermandois undertook to strengthen the resistance along the Oise.² In this way a general diversion was produced, which compelled the Normans speedily to return to the defense of their own lands.³

King Rudolph, who had returned from Burgundy to Francia about this time, presently ordered a general mobilization of the Franks against the Normans.⁴ One division of the Frankish army, under the leadership of Counts Herbert of Vermandois and Arnulf of Flanders, moved against the Norman stronghold of Eu, near the mouth of the Somme;⁵ this citadel was taken and demolished, many Normans were killed, and the victorious Franks brought back with them a large amount of booty.⁶

1 See *supra*, p. 170, n. 37. The sources and the secondary works which contain references to this Danegeld are given in note 3 of the preceding chapter. Lippert, p. 49, has some discussion of the probable reasons for the violation of the treaty by the Normans. v. Kalckstein's statement (*op. cit.*, 169), that the Normans under Rollo broke their compact with the Franks at the instigation of Ragenold, is pure conjecture; yet Lauer, p. 37, seems inclined to accept it. v. Kalckstein (*ibid.*) also believes that the terms of the peace of 924 had not been fully executed.

2 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 925, p. 30.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 31. Cf. Lauer, 38; Lippert, 50.

5 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 925, p. 31. Richer (I, 49-50, p. 32) states, inaccurately no doubt, that King Rudolph participated in the storming of the fortress of Eu; also Richer fails to distinguish the Vikings under Ragenold from the Normans. Cf. Lippert, 51 and n. 1.

6 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 925, pp. 31-32; Richer, I, 50, p. 32. Cf. Lippert, 51 and n. 2.

Early in 926 the Franks resumed their offensive,⁷ this time under the direction of King Rudolph himself, aided by Count Herbert.⁸ An engagement took place (at Fauquembergue?) in the county of Artois.⁹ The Normans eventually were forced to retire, but not until they had killed Helgaud, the Count of Ponthieu, and inflicted serious wounds on King Rudolph, who, in consequence thereof, withdrew to Laon.¹⁰ In spite of the considerable losses which they had suffered, the Normans were able to proceed eastward as far as the county of Porcien, which they subjected to devastation and pillage.¹¹

As if that were not enough, the inhabitants of this region soon learned that a band of Hungarians had crossed the Rhine and were desolating the territory just to the east of them with fire and sword.¹² About the same time — probably in April — Duke William of Aquitaine broke his allegiance and raised the banner of revolt.¹³ Conditions had suddenly shaped themselves in such a way that Rudolph found it necessary to come to terms with one group of adversaries in order that thereby he might be enabled

7 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 925, p. 32, indicates that Hugh the Great, Duke of France, meanwhile had concluded a separate peace with the Normans, from which, however, the magnates of the maritime districts, such as the Counts of Flanders and Ponthieu, were excluded (cf. Lippert, 51, 52 and n. 1; Lauer, 39-40). Also, Flodoard mentions, near the close of his recital for the year 925 (p. 33), that the entire nobility of Lorraine swore allegiance to Henry I of Germany, thus violating their fealty to Rudolph (cf. *supra*, chap. xii, n. 13). Cf. Lauer, 40; Lippert, 52-53; v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 170.

8 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 926, p. 33.

9 *Ibid.* Lippert, p. 56, n. 1, and Lauer, p. 43, n. 2, believe that the battle referred to by Flodoard here is to be identified with that of Fauquembergue, mentioned by Folcwin in *Gesta abbatum sancti Bertini Sithiensium*, c. 101, *M.G.H.*, SS., XIII, p. 626.

10 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 926, p. 33; Richer, I, 51, pp. 32-33. Cf. Lippert, 55-56.

11 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 926, p. 34: "Nordmanni, usque in pagum Porcensem, silvestria loca depraedantur."

12 *Ibid.*: "Hungari quoque, Rheno transmeato, usque in pagum Vonzinsem, praedis incendiisque desaeiunt." Immediately after this Flodoard mentions an eclipse of the moon on April 1, and then describes the translation of the various relics, *Hungarorum metu* (cf. *infra*, n. 20). For other references on the Hungarian invasion, see Lauer, 44, n. 1.

13 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 926, p. 35 (cf. n. 3): "Hinc [i. e. after the Danegeld had been paid and peace concluded with the Normans—see *infra*, nn. 17, 21] exercitus ex Francia Burgundiaque cum Rodulfo rege et Heriberto comite proficiscitur super Ligerim et, acceptis obsidibus, ab urbe Nivernensi, quam frater Willelmi contra regem tutabatur, in Aquitaniam ad persequendum Willelmum qui a rege forte desciverat, transeunt, etc." This passage indicates that the revolt of William of Aquitaine probably preceded (*desciverat* = the pluperfect tense) the compact with the Normans. Cf. v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 171.

to oppose the others with better hope of success.¹⁴ An understanding was arrived at with the Normans, who, as usual, were willing to make peace in return for the payment of Danegeld.¹⁵

The amount of the tribute demanded by the Normans in 926 is unknown; but probably it was a large sum.¹⁶ Though we know that an exaction was levied in both Francia and Burgundy for the purpose of raising this Danegeld,¹⁷ we possess no information with reference to the distribution of the tax or the rates of assessment; presumably the seigniors procured the money in the usual way, by collecting from their dependents what each one could be induced or forced to pay.¹⁸

Rudolph's policy on this occasion must probably be regarded as very fortunate.¹⁹ Since the Hungarian invasion above referred to, proved to be but a passing danger, the king was, after the pacification of the Normans,²¹ free to give his attention once more to the rebellious William of Aquitaine. There was, it is

14 Cf. Lauer, 43; Lippert, 57. Since Hugh the Great, Duke of France, had concluded a separate treaty with the Normans in 925, whereby his own territories were made secure from devastation (cf. *supra*, n. 7), Rudolph probably could not count on any aid from him against the Normans. Cf. v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 169-71.

15 See *infra*, n. 17.

16 I infer that from the fact that it was raised in both Francia and Burgundy (see the following note).

17 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 926, pp. 34-35: "Exactio pecuniae collaticiae Nordmannis pacto pacis dandae publice fit per Franciam atque Burgundiam." Flodoard describes this Danegeld in almost the same words as that of 924 (see *supra*, chap. xii, n. 18). Richer, on the other hand, does not even mention the Danegeld of 926.

18 Cf. *supra*, chap. xii, n. 30.

19 It was fortunate for Rudolph and those northern seigniors whose interests at this moment happened to coincide with those of the king. It is well known that these nobles—Herbert of Vermandois in particular—were now supporting Rudolph not only against the Normans, but also against the magnates of Aquitaine; the latter, as well as the Normans, ostensibly were committed to the cause of Charles the Simple, though in reality that was only a pretext for the advancement of their own interests. On this see Eckel, 107 ff., 123-33; Lauer, 33-34, 52, 56-57, and *passim*; Lippert, 25-31, 38-39, 47, 59 and n. 1, and *passim*.

20 Still it produced much alarm, as is evident from the hurried removal of the bodies of the saints (cf. *supra*, n. 12). See Lippert, 56-57; Lauer, 44-45.

21 Flodoard, *Ann.*, 926, p. 35: "Data igitur pecunia, pax utrimque est cum juramento firmata." The Danegeld was paid probably late in April or early in May (see *supra*, n. 12; cf. v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 171, last line).

true, a second invasion of the Magyars;²² but like the first one, it only postponed for a time the final settlement of the question of Aquitaine. If, on the other hand, the king had had also the Normans to deal with, it seems very doubtful whether he could ever have accomplished his purpose in the south. The fact that Rudolph was not at any time during the remainder of his reign preoccupied with the Normans, must doubtless be considered a principal reason for his eventual success in securing the submission of the southern seigniors.²³

The peace which the Normans had concluded with the Franks in 926 was, unlike those of preceding years, to be of long duration;²⁴ and the Danegeld of 926 is significant as probably being the last Danegeld ever exacted from the Franks, at all events the last of which there is any record.²⁵

22 Flodoard, *Ann.* (this quotation follows immediately after the one given *supra*, n. 13): "insequunturque [sc. Rodulfus rex et Heribertus comes] fugientem [Willelmum] donec rumor infestationis Hungarorum quod iterum jam Rhenum transissent, exercitum in Franciam repedare coegit." Cf. *supra*, n. 12. See also Lippert, 57 and n. 2; Lauer, 45; v. Kalckstein, *op. cit.*, 172.

23 Aquitaine was not completely subdued until some time after the death of Charles the Simple (October 7, 929). Cf. *supra*, n. 19, and see Lauer, 55-60, 67-68; cf. 78.

24 Cf. what Lauer says in his edition of Flodoard's *Annals*, p. 35, n. 2. The Vikings under Ragenold continued to make trouble in Aquitaine until, it is said, they were almost annihilated by Rudolph in 930 (Flodoard, *Ann.*, 930, p. 45). Probably many survived, or more arrived soon afterward, for in 931 they were able, under a new leader, Incon, to gain possession of (a large part of ?) Brittany (*ibid.*, 931, pp. 51-52).

25 It does not seem impossible that stipendiary Danegelds of a more or less local character continued to be levied after this date. At any rate Normans were employed, probably as mercenaries, on several occasions by various French seigniors, and at one time, in 945, by Louis d'Outre-Mer (Flodoard, *Ann.*, 939, p. 72; 945, p. 96; 948, p. 117; 949, pp. 124, 125).

CHAPTER XIV.

SUMMARY OF THE REASONS FOR THE PAYMENT OF DANEGELD
AFTER THE TIME OF CHARLES THE BALD.

The payment of tribute to the Northmen in the West Frankish kingdom did not cease with the death of Charles the Bald.¹ It has been shown above that the Danegeld was resorted to at least six times after 877: in 884, 887, 889, 897, 924, and 926. But while the circumstances which led to the payment of Danegeld in the later period were more or less similar to those which had forced Charles the Bald to make use of this expedient,² it would be inaccurate to say that the situation throughout remained wholly unaltered. After the reign of Carloman certain changes took place not only in the relative strength and advantages of the Franks and the Northmen, but also in the policy of the magnates — their attitude to the king on the one hand and to the Vikings on the other. The latter point will be illustrated by what follows in the succeeding paragraphs of this chapter. As regards the former it may suffice to say here that the Vikings retained the military superiority until towards the close of the ninth century, when it began gradually to pass to the Franks.³ Why, under those conditions, it should have been necessary for the Franks to continue to pay Danegeld even in the tenth century, can be made clear only by specific references to the facts in each case.

The first Danegeld after the death of Charles the Bald, that of 884, was agreed to at a time when the havoc created by the Vikings perhaps had reached its climax.⁴ It is impossible to deny that the magnates were responsible for permitting this situation to arise. They had neglected or refused to support the military efforts of Carloman, and when it finally became impossible for them longer to defer action, they had nothing to propose save the payment of tribute. The motives which induced the nobles to pursue a course of this kind need not be set forth again. It is clear that in the main they were still adhering to the policy which had been characteristic of them in the time of Charles the Bald; selfish material interest dictated that it was more con-

1 Cf. *supra*, pp. 116–17.

2 Cf. *supra*, chap. vii.

3 Cf. Vogel, p. 44.

4 Cf. *supra*, chap. viii and n. 78.

venient and more profitable to pay the Vikings than to resist them with the sword.⁵

It is true, however, that a change in the policy of the western magnates becomes apparent about this time or shortly afterward. The immoderate sum demanded by the Northmen in 884, together with their unprecedented ravages in the preceding period, seem to have awakened the magnates to a realization of the true significance of the Viking incursions and to the fact that a continued policy of inaction would gravely imperil their own interests.⁶ A temporary stiffening of the West Frankish resistance to the Northmen in the period between the election of Charles the Fat in 884 and that of Odo in 888, is very noticeable especially in Francia and Neustria, the regions which were most exposed to, and which had suffered most from, the Viking raids.⁷ When Charles the Fat promised to pay Danegeld to the besiegers of Paris in 886, he did so probably against the wishes of the West Frankish nobility, and more particularly against the wishes of Odo and the Parisians,⁸ whose heroic resistance during the recent siege seemed by the emperor's compliance to be rendered futile.⁹

Firmness, however, did not for more than a brief interval characterize the attitude of the western magnates toward the Vikings. After Odo's accession to the throne the nobles reverted to their old policy of temporizing with the invaders. Odo, though, nay rather because, he was a strong monarch, found it necessary to buy off the Northmen on two different occasions. The conditions under which he was forced to resort to this expedient do not essentially differ from the circumstances which had made the Danegeld necessary in the time of Charles the Bald. The great vassals, those of Aquitaine and Burgundy in particular refused or were reluctant to coöperate with the king in his attempts to expel the enemy by military measures. They were apprehensive lest the complete removal of the Vikings might

5 See *supra*, pp. 125-31; cf. chap. vii.

6 Cf. *supra*, pp. 135-40.

7 Cf. *supra*, p. 156 and n. 27.

8 Cf. *supra*, pp. 146-50.

9 But while it is true that the action of Charles the Fat thwarted the immediate purpose of the Parisians, it would be inaccurate to say that the defense of Paris had been utterly fruitless. The impregnable citadel on the Seine henceforth proved a serious obstacle to the movements of the Vikings. Cf. Vogel, 337-38.

make possible a rehabilitation of the power of the crown, which from their point of view would have been a greater calamity than the evils attendant on the presence of the Northmen. Some of the magnates simply were jealous of the rising fortunes of the man they had elevated to the throne; others opposed Odo by reason of their real or pretended attachment to the cause of the Carolingian dynasty in the person of Charles the Simple. Probably all the seigniors were more or less influenced by their own economic interest in the levying of the Danegeld, which, it may be presumed, still yielded them a financial return, and also tended further to strengthen the legal principle so advantageous to the seigniors, viz., that the unfree peasant was *taillable à merci*.¹⁰

The Danegelds of the tenth century are not strictly identical with those of the ninth. They were not paid to a group of itinerant Vikings, who temporarily held the Franks more or less at their mercy. These last Danegelds were paid to the Normans, who by this time were permanently established on Frankish soil and had been formally admitted into the political organization of the West Frankish realm.¹¹ The purpose of these payments was, not to secure the removal of the Normans from the kingdom,¹² but only to procure a cessation of hostilities on their part.

10 See *supra*, pp. 155-56, 160-61. Cf. Eckel, *Charles le Simple*, pp. 8-9.

11 By the treaty of St. Clair-sur-Epte, on which see Eckel, 87 ff. In spite of the political relations established by the treaty of 911, the Franks and the Normans for some time afterward continued to engage in intermittent hostilities with each other. The causes of these hostilities were (1) the ostensible support given by the Normans to the cause of Charles the Simple, and (2) their efforts to enlarge their holdings in France. It was only natural that the Normans, so far as they took any part in the political affairs of the West Frankish realm, should have supported the Carolingian; for it was to him they owed their legal adoption within the Frankish state, and only from him might they expect further favors. Both Robert and Rudolph were supported by those Frankish seigniors who were particularly hostile to the Normans. The ambition of the latter to widen their boundaries by new grants, or by conquests, served to antagonize those neighboring Frankish nobles who realized that if the Normans were to be satisfied, it would be at their expense. The magnates who were most active in opposing the further expansion of the Norman duchy at the close of the first quarter of the tenth century were Count Hugh the Great of Paris, Count Herbert of Vermandois, and the lords of the maritime districts, such as the Counts of Flanders and Ponthieu. It was they rather than the king who offered the most continued and effective resistance to the Normans, though in so doing they were probably not inspired by anything more noble than the desire to defend their own interests (cf. Lauer, ed., *Annals of Flodoard*, pp. 17, n. 1, 24, n. 5). The probable reasons for King Rudolph's occasional participation in the wars with the Normans are indicated in the following note.

12 The West Frankish kingdom had by this time been transformed into a congeries of feudal states, which were only loosely held together by the

Danegeld. 12.

Why did the Franks need to resort to the Danegeld in the tenth century? Chiefly because King Rudolph and the magnates who supported him¹³ could not, or would not, devote themselves exclusively or even primarily to the subjugation of their enemies in the west. Various other projects also engaged their attention. projects which to them, no doubt, seemed more important than a final settlement with the Normans.¹⁴ Among these may be mentioned the attempts to force the seigniors of the south, especially Duke William II of Aquitaine, to recognize Rudolph; the unsuccessful struggle to keep Lorraine from falling into the hands of Henry I of Germany; the incessant warfare with Ragenold and the Vikings of the Loire; and, finally, the resistance to the Magyars, who invaded the West Frankish kingdom twice during the year 926. This constant preoccupation was doubtless the principal reason why the Franks were unable to terminate their intermittent hostilities with the Normans by a military decision. In order to be able to take the field against the insubordinate southern magnates, and also, on one occasion, in order

recognition of a common overlord or a common danger (cf. Eckel, pp. 4-i. 32 ff.). According to the preceding note, it was not the entire West Frankish realm which under the leadership of its monarch offered resistance to the Normans. The opposition came only from those northern seigniors whose interests were directly menaced, and, to some extent, from the king. It is very improbable, however, that Rudolph took part in this struggle with the intention of ultimately expelling the Normans from France; he was hardly attempting anything more than to check their territorial expansion and in that he was not so vitally interested as were the magnates. Rudolph's participation in the hostilities with the Normans is rather to be explained on the following grounds. In the first place, he was regarded as a usurper by the Normans, who, refusing him their allegiance, preferred, for the reasons stated in the preceding note, to support the cause of Charles the Simple. Also, policy dictated to Rudolph, in the early years of his reign at least, that it would be advisable to come to the aid of, and to make common cause with, those magnates to whom he owed his throne, i. e. Herbert of Vermandois and Hugh the Great in particular; otherwise they might fail him in the projects in which he was especially interested, such as the acquisition of Lorraine, the subjugation of Aquitaine, etc.; and Herbert of Vermandois always had it in his power to liberate, and to set up against Rudolph, his rival Charles the Simple. Furthermore, Rudolph's own duchy of Burgundy was to some extent exposed to the ravages of the Loire Vikings under Ragenold, who were the allies of the Normans. Finally, the fact that success in the Norman wars would lend prestige to his person and to the crown, also was doubtless a consideration of some importance with Rudolph. Thus the interests of the king so far coincided with these of the northern seigniors as to result in a cooperative effort on their part to resist the encroachments of the Normans.

13 I. e. most of the northern seigniors (cf. the two preceding notes, and see *supra*, chap. xiii, n. 19).

14 Cf. Lippert (quoted *supra*, chap. xii, n. 13).

to repel the Magyars, Rudolph and his supporters found it necessary or advisable to buy the inaction of the Normans; the Danegeld of 924 seems to have procured only a truce, or the extension of it, but that of 926, fortunately, brought permanent peace. Is it too bold to presume that in adopting this policy, the king and the northern magnates were influenced also by a custom of long standing, and by their own economic interest in the levy of the Danegeld?¹⁵

¹⁵ Cf. the two preceding chapters.

PART III.

LOCAL DANEGELD: RANSOM.

CHAPTER XV.

RANSOM OF PLACES.

So far exclusive attention has been given to what may be called the *general* Danegeld — those payments of tribute, which were made to the Vikings or the Normans on behalf of the West Frankish kingdom as a whole, and which in large part were raised by means of general taxation in considerable portions of the western realm. As pointed out before,¹ however, there were also other payments made to the Vikings in the West Frankish kingdom, payments decidedly local in character, but which none the less may properly enough be referred to as Danegeld; for there is no reason why that term should be restricted to mean only those payments which were made on behalf of the kingdom as a whole. These local payments were in the form of ransom (1) of places and (2) of persons. To distinguish them from the general Danegeld, they are referred to in this dissertation as *local Danegeld*.

It is very unlikely that the sources at our disposal offer anything like a complete record of all the occasions on which local Danegeld was paid. Doubtless many payments were made to the Vikings for the purpose of saving a town or a monastery from destruction, or of redeeming prisoners from captivity, of which no mention is made either by the annalists or by the hagiographical writers. What information has been handed down on this subject must therefore be regarded as merely illustrative of what probably were happenings of frequent occurrence in the

¹ Cf. *supra*, introduction.

ninth century. In the present chapter a survey will be attempted of those comparatively well known occasions² on which the West Franks³ by the payment of ransom secured indemnity at the hands of the Vikings for monasteries, churches, towns, etc.; the consideration of the ransom of persons being reserved for the following chapter.

The first instance on record of the payment of local Danegeld in the West Frankish realm appears to be in 841. In that year, when Charles the Bald and Louis the German were engaged in their struggle with Lothaire I, a fleet of Vikings under the chief-tain Oscar had entered the Seine and set fire to Rouen. Thence they proceeded up the river to the monastery of Jumièges, which likewise was burned.⁴ It was to save their monastery from a similar fate that the monks of St. Vandrille (Fontanelle) on May 25 paid a ransom of six pounds (of silver?) to the Vikings;⁵ and probably several other monasteries followed their example at this time.⁶ The following year (842) the population of Quentowic, after having been despoiled of most of its movables by the Vikings, finally induced them to spare the buildings of the town in return for the payment of ransom, the amount of which is

2 I do not claim, however, that the instances of the payment of ransom which I have brought together in this and the following chapter include all cases on record. In spite of my constant watchfulness for payments of this kind, it is quite possible that I may have missed some examples. This dissertation is primarily a study of the *general* Danegeld; and what is said concerning ransom, or local Danegeld, is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.

3 Local Danegeld was paid also in Frisia, Brittany, and the East Frankish kingdom. See *infra*, appendices iii, iv, and v.

4 *Ann. Bert.*, 841, pp. 24-25; *Chron. Fontanellense*, 841, *M.G.H.*, *SS.*, II, p. 301; *Ann. Rotomagenses*, 841, *ibid.*, XXVI, p. 494. See also the marginal note added to the *Poem Celebrating the Battle of Fontenay*, *M.G.H.*, *Poetae Latini*, II, p. 137, n. 1.

5 *Chron. Fontanellense*, 841, *loc. cit.*, p. 301: "8 Kal. Iunii redemptum est Fontinellense coenobium libris 6." Cf. the following note. According to an anonymous writer of the eleventh century, the monks of St. Vandrille as a result of this payment were reduced to penury, and at last were forced to seek refuge in flight (*Appendix secunda ad Chron. Fontanellense*, Bouquet, VII, p. 231): "Monachi qui sub ingenti metu . . . in praefato Fontinellae monasterio ea adhuc tempestate in ambiguo potius pendere quam vitam videbantur agere. Nam secundo dato paganis pretio se locumque redemerant: et vero deficiente jam pecunia, et invalescente persecutionis immanitate, fugae praesidium deliberarunt ad postremum arripere."

6 *Ann. Bert.*, 841, p. 25: "omnia monasteria seu [quae]cumque loca flumini Sequanae adhaerentia aut depopulati sunt aut multis acceptis pecuniis territa reliquerunt."

unknown.⁷ In the winter of 852—53 it is likely that a number of churches and monasteries in the vicinity of the lower Seine bought immunity from plunder or destruction by paying ransom to the Northmen under Sydroc.⁸ Orleans was saved from destruction in 856, probably because its bishop agreed to pay the ransom of gold demanded by the Northmen.⁹ When the Vikings who had established themselves on the island of Ocellus in the Seine invaded Paris in 857,¹⁰ they burned all but three of the Parisian churches, and these were spared only because a heavy ransom "of many *solidi*" was paid for them.¹¹ Later in the same year all the monasteries in that vicinity found it necessary to pay ransom in order not to be destroyed.¹²

In 863 the town of Poitiers secured immunity from destruction by the payment of ransom, though that did not prevent the Vikings from burning the church of St. Hilary.¹³ Ransom on a larger scale was demanded from the inhabitants of southwestern Neustria (Maine, Anjou, and Touraine) in 869 by the Vikings

7 *Ann. Bert.*, 842, p. 28: "Ea tempestate Nordmannorum classis in embargo quod Quantovicus dicitur repentino sub lucem adventu depraedationibus, captivitate et nece sexus utriusque hominum adeo debachati sunt, ut nihil in eo praeter aedificia pretio redempta relinquerent." Cf. Nithard, *Historiae*, IV, c. 3, *M.G.H.*, *SS.*, II, p. 669; *Anglo-Saxon Chron.*, 839, ed. Plummer, pp. 64—65; *Chronicon sancti Neoti*, 842 (ed. T. Gale, *Historiae Britannicae. etc., scriptores*, I, p. 155). For the location of Quantovic, see the references given by Vogel, p. 88, n. 1.

8 See *supra*, p. 41, n. 16. In the spring of 853 Charles the Bald secured the removal of these Vikings, evidently by the payment of a (more or less) general Danegeld (see *supra*, pp. 39—44).

9 Adrevaldus Floriacensis, *Miracula sancti Benedicti* (*M.G.H.*, *SS.*, XV, p. 494): "[Nortmanni] Aurelianis perveniunt captamque urbem auro distrahunt, Agio tunc temporis praesulatum praefatae urbis gerente; sicque ad tempus recedentes, etc." Cf. *Ann. Bert.*, 856, p. 46. Cf. Vogel, 153, n. 1.

10 See *supra*, chap. iii, n. 6.

11 *Ann. Bert.*, 857, p. 48: "Dani . . . basilicam b. Petri et s. Genovefae incendunt et ceteras omnes praeter domum s. Stephani et ecclesiam s. Wincetii atque Germani praeterque ecclesiam s. Dionisii, pro quibus tantummodo ne incenderentur multa solidorum summa soluta est." Cf. *supra*, p. 45 and n. 7.

12 Aimoin, *Miracula s. Germani*, II, c. 10, *AA.SS.*, May, VI, pp. 792—93: "Redimebantur omnia in circuitu vicina monasteria, ne illorum saevitia impositis ignibus cremarentur." See Lot, "La grande invasion normande," *Bibl. de l'école des chartes*, 1908, LXIX, 13, 18. Cf. *supra*, p. 45.

13 *Ann. Bert.*, 863, p. 66: "Nortmanni Pictavis venerant, et sub redemptione civitate servata, ecclesiam s. Hilarii magni confessoris incenderint." Cf. *Chronicon sancti Maxentii*, Bouquet, VII, 228, which does not mention the ransom, and states that Poitiers was devastated. See also Lot, "La Loire, l'Aquitaine et la Seine," *Bibl. de l'école des chartes*, 1915, LXXVI, 483—84.

of the lower Loire. The latter had learned of Charles the Bald's intention to have fortifications built around the towns of Le Mans and Tours, in order that these might serve as strongholds against the Northmen. Realizing that the carrying out of these plans would mean curtailment of their opportunities for plunder, the Vikings demanded as the price of peace in this region a ransom consisting of a large sum of money, together with considerable quantities of grain, wine, and live stock. But there is nothing to indicate that this demand was ever complied with.¹⁴

Hincmar in his old age was confronted with the problem of having to raise a ransom for his episcopal city of Rheims. In a letter to Bishop Hetilo of Noyon in 880¹⁵ the archbishop declared that the amount of money demanded by the Vikings was so large that it would be impossible to raise it, especially since everything of value had already been plundered. Whether this ransom ever was paid cannot be determined.¹⁶ The bribe by which Bishop Gauzelin and Count Odo secured the withdrawal of Siegfried from the siege of Paris in 886, though it has been discussed before,¹⁷ also, perhaps, should be referred to in connection with the payments of local Danegeld. Finally there is, as we have seen, reason to believe that Bishop Evrard of Sens paid ransom to the Vikings who, later in the same year (886), had laid siege to his episcopal seat.¹⁸

These instances of the payment or demand of ransom must, as pointed out before, probably be regarded only as examples of what were matters of frequent occurrence in the period of the Viking invasions.¹⁹ They are another indication that money was needed frequently, and in large quantities, to buy peace from the Scandinavian invaders. Whence the money was obtained that was paid by the local authorities to save a monastery,

14 *Ann. Bert.*, 869, p. 107: "Karolus vero civitates trans Sequanam ab incolis firmari rogavit, Cynomannis scilicet ac Turonis, ut praesidio contra Nortmannos populis esse possent. Nortmanni autem hoc audientes, multam summam argenti, frumenti quoque et vini ac animalium ab incolis terrae ipsius quaesierunt, ut cum eis pacem facerent." Cf. Vogel, 234-35.

15 Flodoard, *Hist. Rem. ecclesiae*, III, c. 23, *M.G.H.*, SS., XIII, p. 534: "ceteris omnibus depredatis tanta quaerebatur [barbari] pro civitate redemptio, quantam explere non valeret [Hincmarus]." Cf. Vogel, 267, n. 4.

16 Vogel, p. 267, seems to be of the opinion that the ransom really was paid. This may be true, but I can find nothing that proves it.

17 See *supra*, p. 144 and n. 25.

18 See *supra*, pp. 150-51 and nn. 68, 69.

19 See *supra*, pp. 180-81 and nn. 2, 3.

a church, or a town from destruction, can be only conjectured. Doubtless considerable sums were taken from the ecclesiastical treasuries, and much of the plate belonging to churches and monasteries was used, for this purpose.²⁰ But it is also probable that the local authorities, bishops, abbots, counts, or lay seigniors, sometimes availed themselves of another method to raise ransom money. The crown levied taxes to raise the general Danegeld.²¹ Why could not local Danegeld be secured in the same way? It must be admitted that such procedure would be in harmony with the general tendency of the age — to shift all burdens so that ultimately they fell on the peasantry.²² After all, did the taxpayer always know — did he ever know — by whom the contributions he was called upon to make toward the Danegeld, had been authorized; whether by the king, or only by some local potentate, perhaps his own seignior? What he was beginning to realize more and more definitely, must have been that his seignior had or claimed the right to tax him *ad voluntatem* whenever he was in need of money. If there is any element of truth in this conjecture, it follows that the local Danegeld, like the general Danegeld, was a not unimportant factor in the development of the legal principle that the unfree peasant was *taillable à merci*.²³

20 This also, of course, holds true for the general Danegeld. Hence we can easily understand why many churches and monasteries were emptied of their financial resources (cf. *supra*, n. 5) and stripped of their ornaments by the close of the reign of Charles the Bald. Cf. *supra*, p. 110 and n. 114.

21 The methods by which the general Danegeld was raised are summarized *infra*, chap. xvii.

22 Cf. *supra*, p. 82.

23 Cf. *infra*, chap. xviii.

CHAPTER XVI.

RANSOM OF PERSONS.

It may seem, on first consideration, that payments made for the purpose of redeeming persons taken captive and held for ransom by the Vikings, can not properly be included in a treatise on the Danegeld. And if the money paid for this purpose had been obtained by methods entirely different from those which were used to raise the general Danegeld, this view would perhaps be justified. But we know that on at least one occasion such ransom money was secured by a procedure very similar to that employed for raising the general Danegeld; and one is therefore inclined to suspect that the same method may have been resorted to on other occasions, even though there is no direct evidence to that effect. For this reason it seems appropriate briefly to set forth in this chapter some instances of the ransom of persons taken captive by the Vikings in the West Frankish realm.¹ Doubtless these instances are but examples of what became a very common occurrence during the course of the ninth century.²

On May 28, 841, the monks of St. Denis proceeded to the Vikings who under the leadership of Oscar were ravaging the Seine in that year,³ to redeem 68 Christian captives; for these they were required to pay a ransom of 26 pounds (of silver?).⁴

Many of the Franks taken prisoner by the Vikings who devastated Nantes in 843, were afterwards redeemed by those who had survived the catastrophe and escaped capture.⁵

1 On the ransom of captives in Frisia, Brittany, and the East Frankish kingdom, see *infra*, appendices iii, iv, and v.

2 See also the reservation expressed *supra*, chap. xv. n. 2.

3 Cf. *supra*, pp. 180-81 and nn. 4-6.

4 *Chron. Fontanellense*, 841, *M.G.H.*, *SS.*, II, p. 301: "5 Kal. Junii venerunt monachi de s. Dionysio, redemeruntque captivos sexaginta octo libris viginti sex." *Ann. Bert.*, 841, p. 25: "Interea pyratae Danorum . . . Rotumam irruentes, rapinis, ferro ignique bachantes, urbem, monachos reliquumque vulgum et caedibus captivitate pessumdederunt et omnia monasteria seu [quae]cumque loca flumini Sequanae adhaerentia aut depopulati sunt aut multis acceptis pecuniis territa reliquerunt."

5 *Chronicon Namnetense*, c. 6, ed. Merlet, p. 17: "Post haec, erasis omnibus opibus cum gregibus captivorum utriusque ordinis, sexus, aetatis ad naves remeant. Ad quorum postmodum redemptionem plurimum a cladis navestitibus collatum est." Cf. *Ann. Bert.*, 843, p. 29; *Miracula sancti Martini abbatis Vertavensis*, c. 8, *M.G.H.*, *SS.*, *rer. Merov.*, III, 573. See also Vogel, 94-95.

Immense sums of ransom money were paid to the Vikings encamped on the island of Oscellus in the Seine during the period from 856 to 861.⁶ These Vikings, it would seem, were tireless in their efforts to devise schemes and artifices by which they might capture Frankish nobles, to be held for high ransom.⁷ The best evidence of the excellent results of this business is the huge amount of money they were able to amass.⁸ Their greatest success was scored in the capture (858) of the two half-brothers Louis and Gauzelin, abbots of St. Denis and Glanfeuil, respectively.⁹ Louis in particular — who was the grandson of Charlemagne, and as archchancellor occupied the position of first rank at the court of Charles the Bald¹⁰ — proved a highly remunerative catch.¹¹ While it is impossible to arrive at a final conclusion as regards the exact amount paid for his release, we may be sure that it was not less than 688 pounds of gold and 3,250 pounds of silver.¹² Probably only a fraction of the enormous ransom¹³

6 See *supra*, pp. 45 ff.

7 Aimoin, *Miracula s. Germani*, c. 10, AA.SS., May, VI, p. 793: "Studebantque [Nortmanni] praeterea vicibus aequis, quatenus aliquas nobilium gratia pecuniae capere possent; unde (veluti ex mitissimi viri Domini Hludowici Abbatis redemptione) non modicum et incomparabile acquirebant lucri negotium. Et quotiescumque tale quid agere disposuissent, dissimulabant se multis diebus ante nullatenus quoquam ire, ne cui illorum furtivus innotesceret adventus."

8 This is referred to by Aimoin (see the preceding note); and we know that when the Vikings on Oscellus finally surrendered to the followers of Weland in 861, they were able to pay to the latter the snug sum of 6,000 pounds, which probably represented only *part* of the money in their possession at that time. See *supra*, p. 55 and n. 63.

9 *Ann. Bert.*, 858, p. 49: "Pars altera eorundem pyrataram Ludowicum abbatem monasterii S. Dyonisii cum fratre ipsius Gauzleno capiunt eisque redemptionis suae gravissimam multam imponunt." The father of Louis and Gauzelin was Rorgon, Count of Maine. Louis was the fruit of an illegitimate union of Rorgon with Rotrude, the daughter of Charlemagne. Gauzelin probably was the youngest son of Rorgon with his wife Blichilde. See v. Kalckstein, *Robert d. Tapfere*, pp. 136-41, 165.

10 Cf. Lot, "La grande invasion normande," *Bibl. de l'école des chartes*, 1908, LXIX, p. 19 and n. 3.

11 *Vita S. Faronis*, c. 124, Bouquet, VII, p. 357: "Clarior autem atque potentior Princeps insignis de nomine Ludovicus, Pastor Ecclesiae S. Dyonysii, quae caput extollit super ceteras Ecclesias terrarum potentia dignitatis, et principatum omni honore sapientiae ac religionis, impotens fuit ab eorum captivitate se observare. Cujus redemptione ponderibus inaestimabilibus auri et argenti ablata est omnis gloria et ornatus atque decor ab universis Ecclesiis regni, atque ipsa aurea Roma se spoliata suo decore aliquo modo sentit."

12 The figures given in the text are taken from the following note added to a manuscript of the ninth century (*Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques de France*, XXXIX, pp. 123-24): "Datum est in redemptione Hludovici, abbatis, a parte Sancti Dyonysii, de auro libr[as] CCCCCLXXXVIII, de argento libr[as] III mil[ia] CCL, excepto vasall[os] et illorum femin[as] et parentes illor[um]."

According to the usual in-

terpretation (cf. Vogel, p. 161), these words mean that the monastery of St. Denis alone furnished 688 pounds of gold and 3250 pounds of silver, and that this sum did not include the additional amounts paid by the vassals of the monastery and their wives and relatives. Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 20, n. 2, is probably justified in rejecting this interpretation on the ground that the monastery of St. Denis could not have possessed such vast resources. It must be admitted that the meaning of the words in this note is not clear; and unless supplementary evidence is produced, it will probably always remain more or less a matter of conjecture. Lot assumes that the words *a parte* should be *ad partem*, and then proceeds to reconcile the contents of the note with the following passage in the *Annals of St. Bertin* (for what precedes the following, see *supra*, n. 9): "Ob quam [multam] multi thesaurorum ecclesiarum Dei ex regno Karli, ipso iubente, exhausti sunt. Sed his minime sufficientibus, ab eodem rege et omnibus episcopis, abbatibus, comitibus ceterisque viris potentibus multa ad suppletionem praedictae summae certatim conlata sunt." He identifies the 688 pounds of gold and the 3250 pounds of silver with the contributions ordered by Charles the Bald from the churches in his kingdom, and supposes that the amounts which the note says were furnished by the vassals of the monastery of St. Denis and their wives and relatives, are those which according to the *Annals of St. Bertin* were furnished by the king and all the bishops, abbots, counts, and other magnates, to complete the required amount. The latter part of Lot's hypothesis is open to criticism. It is impossible to admit that the group which included the king and all the bishops, abbots, counts, and other magnates is identical with the group which consisted of the vassals of the monastery of St. Denis together with their wives and relatives. I shall therefore make bold to present another hypothesis. This will be based principally on a different interpretation of the last eight words in the note: "excepto . . . illor[um]." The old interpretation of these words is based on the tacit assumption that the only person ransomed by or for the monastery of St. Denis (Gauzelin was ransomed by the Church of Rheims—see *infra*, n. 18) was Louis, its abbot. But there is good reason to believe that the Vikings had captured a number of Franks, and that all of these were held for ransom, the amount varying in each case according to the importance of the person concerned. Aimoin (see *supra*, n. 7) indicates that the Vikings were intent on capturing a *number* of nobles, and that he refers to the ransom of Abbot Louis as an *example* of how they amassed lucre: "quatenus aliquas nobilium gratia pecuniae capere possent; unde (veluti ex . . . Hludowici Abbatis redemptione) non modicum et incomparabile acquirebant luci negotium." We know that the Vikings fell upon the Parisian churches at Easter, when they knew that there would be a large concourse of people in the various places of worship (Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 19). Doubtless many vassals of the monastery of St. Denis, together with their wives and dependents (I take it that *parentes* here signifies "subjects" or "dependents" rather than "relatives"), also were present at Paris on this occasion. It is very likely that the Vikings forced some of these to accompany Abbot Louis into captivity; and thus the monastery of St. Denis found it necessary to ransom not only its abbot, but also some of its vassals and their dependents. If this hypothesis is correct, the note quoted above would mean that 688 pounds of gold and 3250 pounds of silver were paid for the ransom of Abbot Louis, but that this sum did not include the money paid to redeem the vassals of the monastery with their wives and dependents. The *Annals of St. Bertin* state how the ransom of Louis was raised, and I refer to this *infra* in the text and in n. 17. The ransom of the vassals and their dependents presumably was raised by the monastery itself in the usual way (see *infra*, n. 17).

13 On the assumption that the ratio of silver to gold at this time was about 12: 1 (see Mayer, "Zum frühmittelalterlichen Münzwesen," *Vierteljahrsschrift für Social- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 1916, XIII, p. 352, n. 1), the total ransom would amount to not less than 11,506 pounds of silver (cf.

could be provided by the monastery of St. Denis.¹⁴ Charles the Bald found it necessary to empty the treasuries of many churches in his kingdom,¹⁵ and it is alleged that the church of Rome also parted with some of its treasure, for this purpose.¹⁶ When even such sacrifices did not bring the required amount, large contributions were eagerly furnished by the king and all the bishops, abbots, counts, and other magnates, to make up what was lacking.¹⁷ The amount paid for the ransom of Abbot Gauzelin is nowhere indicated, but we know that it was furnished by the church of Rheims, of which Gauzelin had formerly been a priest.¹⁸

The method by which the ransom of Abbot Louis of St. Denis was raised probably illustrates the usual procedure in raising money for purposes of this kind. It proves that the treasures of the ecclesiastical establishments were drawn upon not only for the general Danegeld, but also for the payment of ransom. When these did not suffice, or were not available, as perhaps in the case of laymen, contributions were voluntarily furnished by, and at a later period probably were required from, those seigniors upon whom the captive had a claim of any kind.¹⁹ To assume that such contributions were supplied by the seigniors out of their own private resources, would be to ignore the prevailing customs of the ninth century. Beyond a doubt the peasantry was frequently taxed not only for the general, but also for the local Danegeld, and for the ransom of persons no less than for the ransom of places.²⁰

Vogel, p. 216). The heaviest general Danegeld ever paid by the West Franks, that of 884 (see *supra*, chap. viii), amounted to 12,000 pounds of silver.

14 Cf. *supra*, n. 12.

15 *Ann. Bert.*, 858, p. 49 (quoted *supra*, n. 12).

16 See *supra*, n. 11.

17 Lot (*op. cit.*, p. 20) fails to note that according to the *Annals of St. Bertin* the king too made a contribution, and he assumes that "the king levied a special impost on the bishops, abbots, counts, and royal vassals." The *Annals of St. Bertin* (quoted *supra*, n. 12) indicate that the contributions of the magnates were voluntary: "multa ad suppletionem praedictae summae certatim conlata sunt." However that may be, it is very improbable that the magnates furnished their contributions out of their own resources. We may believe that they were raised in the usual way, i. e. by taxing the peasantry (cf. *supra*, pp. 183-84).

18 Flodoard, *Hist. Rem. ecclesiae*, III, c. 24, *M.G.H.*, SS., XIII, p. 536: "Ut reminiscatur quia Remensis ecclesia eum [Gauzlenum] regeneravit in Christo tonsumque in clericum sub religione nutriverit et docuerit, de captione paganorum redemerit, etc."

19 See *infra*, chap. xviii.

20 Cf. *supra*, n. 17; see also p. 184.

PART IV.

GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER OF THE DANEGELD IN FRANCE.

The various circumstances which serve to explain why the West Franks resorted to the Danegeld have been summarized above¹ and do not need to be set forth again. In this chapter those facts will be brought together which throw some light on the institutional character of the Danegeld, and in the following one will be presented an estimate of its effect on the political and economic development of France.

According to the records that we have, twelve or thirteen payments of general Danegeld² were made to the Vikings in the West Frankish realm.³ Our information concerning the methods by which the money⁴ for this purpose was raised is not complete. We have unimpeachable evidence that taxation was resorted to in five instances (860—61, 866, 877,⁵ 924, 926); in four other

1 *Supra*, chaps. vii, xiv.

2 On the local Danegeld, see *infra*, p. 204.

3 It will be remembered that there were two payments in 877, and that it is doubtful whether the Danegeld promised by Odo in 897 ever was paid. Soetbeer's catalogue of the various payments of Danegeld (*Forsch. z. d. Gesch.*, VI, 54—56) is very inaccurate. Among other errors we may note that he regards the Danegeld of 860 as the first general tribute; also he assumes that an annual tribute of 5,000 pounds was paid after 877, for which there is no basis whatever.

4 As a rule the Danegeld appears to have been paid in money or plate (see the following chapter, p. 214); but on two occasions food supplies were furnished in addition to the money payment: grain and cattle in 861, wine in 866. The magnates are said to have contributed the wine (*supra*, p. 71 and n. 62, p. 87 and n. 136). Whence the supplies of grain and cattle came in 861 cannot be definitely determined, though it may be presumed that ultimately the peasants could no more escape this burden than that of the Danegeld. Cf. *supra*, pp. 53 ff.

5 The Danegeld paid to the Vikings of the Seine in 877 certainly was raised by taxation, and that paid to the Vikings of the Loire in the same year probably was.

instances (845, 853, 877,⁶ 884) the evidence is indeed somewhat scant, but what there is of it points in the direction of taxation; and in the remaining four instances (862, 886, 889, 897) there is no evidence at all as to how the money was obtained. It should be added that in one of the last mentioned cases (886) the money came from outside the western kingdom; and, therefore, the method by which that payment was raised is of no importance for the institutional development of the Danegeld in France. We know also that on at least three occasions (860—61, 877, 884) the Danegeld was made up in part by drafts on the treasures of the ecclesiastical establishments. From these premises it seems legitimate to conclude that the general Danegeld usually was secured by resorting to taxation, though in some cases it was found necessary also to draw upon the treasures of the church; and we may assume that one or both of these methods were used on those occasions for which there is no specific evidence.

The information, that we have on the form and distribution of the taxes levied to raise the Danegeld is very limited in scope. Only for the last three payments during the reign of Charles the Bald — those of 860—61, 866, and 877 — do we get anything like particulars. Yet so far as they go, these particulars are very valuable, illustrating in all probability the usual procedure in the levying of the tax.

They indicate, in the first place, that the ordinary and most common unit of taxation was the holding of land known as the *mansus*. In 860 Charles the Bald is said to have levied a tax on *all* the *mansii* of his kingdom. In 866 he levied a similar tax, but discriminated between *mansii ingenuiles* and *mansii serviles* in such wise that he assessed the former at six, and the latter at three, *denarii* each; and by a second assessment — which proved necessary in order to raise the tribute of that year — he laid an additional tax of one *denarius* on both these kinds of *mansii*; so that, all told, the *mansii ingenuiles* were taxed at seven, and the *mansii serviles* at four, *denarii* in 866. For the Danegeld of 877, land taxes were laid on only those *mansii* which constituted the *honores* of bishops, abbots, counts, and royal vassals; but *all* the *mansii* comprising a *honor* were taxed on that occa-

⁶ 1 refer here to the Danegeld paid to the Vikings of the Loire (cf. the preceding note).

sion; not only *mansi ingenuiles* and *serviles*, but also the dominant holdings known as *mansi indomnicati*. These were assessed at the rate of twelve *denarii* (or one *solidus*); while taxes of eight and four *denarii* were required for *mansi ingenuiles* and *serviles*, respectively. It was provided in the case of the the latter (*mansi ingenuiles* and *serviles*) that the holders were to pay only one half of the taxes required for their *mansus*; the other half to be taken from the *cens*, or *redevance*, paid to the seignior. If the latter arrangement was made with the intention of placing the burden of taxation on those who could best afford to bear it, the probability is that it failed of its purpose, as will appear more clearly later in the discussion.

The taxation of demesrial holdings, it should be noted, appears to have been exceptional. The only time that the *mansus indomnicatus* was specifically mentioned as a unit of taxation for the Danegeld, was in 877; and then it referred, not to all *mansi indomnicati*, but only to those that were included in *honores* held of the king by bishops, abbots, counts and royal vassals. It is true, however, that in 866 there had been required from each of the magnates two successive contributions of money and wine, proportioned to the value of their *honores*; and this may imply that the tax of that year was, in theory, laid on *mansi indomnicati* as well as on dependent *mansi*.⁷ Whether the tax of 860, which is said to have been laid on all *mansi*, applied also to the demesnes, may be doubted. In any case there is, save for this vague statement relative to the tax of 860, no evidence that taxes for the Danegeld were ever laid on demesrial holdings other than those included in *honores* held of the king; and of the taxation of the latter we have at most two instances.

Land tenures of less extent or value than the *mansi* were taxed on at least one occasion; in 866 one *denarius* was exacted for each *accola*, and, likewise, one *denarius* for every two *hospitiu*.

All the taxes so far referred to were taxes on land or the income from land. But the Danegeld was raised also by taxes on all kinds of property and on incomes other than the income from land. Thus, merchants were required to contribute on at least three known occasions: in 860—61, 866, and 877. In 860 a careful and exact evaluation of their property was

⁷ Cf. *supra*, p. 87 and n. 137.

ordered; and taxes were levied not only on their houses, but also on their movables (merchandise and household goods); even the poorest of them could not escape the tax. In 866 they were required to contribute one tenth of all they possessed. A discrimination may have been made between Christian and Jewish merchants in 877; the former are said to have contributed only one eleventh of their resources, while the Jews were required to pay one tenth, as before.⁸

Priests, too, were taxed for the Danegeld at least twice: in 866 and in 877. The tax was graduated in proportion to their resources and income.⁹ No specific rates are given for 866, but in 877 the assessments ranged from a minimum of four *denarii* to a maximum of five *solidi*.

Another form of taxation for the Danegeld was the collection of the *heerbann* from the freemen. Of this there is only one instance (866), but it is of great significance. Originally the *heerbann* had been a fine of sixty *solidi*, imposed on those freemen who failed to respond to the summons to military service. Since the time of Charlemagne, however, both the military service and the *heerbann* had, as a rule, been graduated in proportion to the resources of the freemen; and there is reason to believe that it was so graduated in 866. The important thing about the *heerbann* of 866 is the fact that it was collected as a tax, not as a fine; in that fact may be found a clew to the legal basis of the Danegeld. But the development of this point must be postponed to a later stage in the discussion. We turn now to a résumé of what is known concerning the collection of the Danegeld.

The direct evidence as to how the Danegeld was collected from the tax-payers is very unsatisfactory, and must be supplemented by what is known about the methods of collecting other contributions — taxes and redevances — at the same period. There

⁸ The question as to whether this discrimination between Jewish and Christian merchants really applies to the Danegeld of 877 remains somewhat doubtful. See *infra*, appendix ii.

⁹ Originally at least, one part of the income from the tithe went to the support of the priest. It is true that from the ninth century onward the seigniors in many cases usurped the tithes, ceded them, sold them, infeudated them, etc. (Imbart de la Tour, "Les paroisses rurales, etc.," *Rev. Hist.*, 1897, LXIII, pp. 30-32). It must be assumed that those priests who still retained a share of the tithe were taxed for the Danegeld on the basis of their total resources, including the income from the tithe.

can be no doubt that on all seigneurial estates the taxes for the Danegeld were collected from the peasant population — the holders of dependent *mansi*, *accolæ*, and *hospitia* — not by the officers of the crown, but by the agents of the seignior, his *ministeriales*.¹⁰ In the collection of the tax the latter evidently did not consider themselves bound by the rates of assessment prescribed by the monarch, but exacted from the peasants the largest amounts possible in each case, thus securing not only what was demanded by the king, but also a substantial profit for the seignior and themselves. It is very probable that the official assessment of the tax was regarded only as a basis for calculating the amount which the individual seignior ought to turn over to the king. Indeed, we may believe that the seigniors succeeded in shifting the entire burden of taxation, even that part of it which they ought to have born themselves, upon their dependent peasantry.¹¹

It may be inferred that the taxes paid by the priests in 866¹² were collected by the officials of their patrons; the latter being, in some cases the bishop of the diocese, in others the abbot of a monastery, and in still others a lay seignior. But in 877 it was specifically provided that the bishops were to collect the taxes of all priests, except those whose churches were dependent on monasteries; in the latter case the collection was to be made by the abbot and the bishop's *missus* jointly. The taxes of the priests, like those paid by the other classes, probably were not applied exclusively to the purposes of the Danegeld; doubtless a considerable portion was appropriated by those who enjoyed the right of collection.¹³

There is no evidence whatever as to who were authorized to collect the taxes of the merchants. Probably they were paid to those officials of the fisc who received the annual or biennial contributions required by the king in return for the special protection he extended to merchants.¹⁴

¹⁰ *Supra*, pp. 77-79 and nn. 92, 99, p. 84 and nn. 122, 123, p. 99, n. 42, p. 103, n. 69.

¹¹ *Supra*, pp. 84-85 and nn. 122, 123, pp. 88-89, 102-3 and nn. 68-71; cf. p. 108, n. 103.

¹² The inference is based on the special provisions made in 877; these indicate that certain changes were made in the method of collection for that year which seem to imply a previous method of the kind suggested above. Cf. *supra*, pp. 103-5.

¹³ *Ibid.*; cf. nn. 77, 78, 84.

¹⁴ *Supra*, p. 86, n. 127, pp. 105-6.

Danegeld. 13.

The *heerbann*, as a fine, was usually paid to the *missi*,¹⁵ and there is no reason to suppose that a different arrangement was made when it was levied as a tax toward the Danegeld.

Thus, except in the cases of merchants and freemen, the taxes for the Danegeld were collected, in the first instance, by the officials (*ministeriales*) of the local authorities, seigniors and prelates. The latter, in turn, were responsible to the king for the taxes levied by him on the property and income of themselves and their dependents, the peasants and the priests. On at least one occasion (877) these local authorities — bishops, abbots, counts, and royal vassals — were instructed to pay over their respective quotas to the royal *missi*.¹⁶ This instruction perhaps illustrates the usual arrangement during the time of Charles the Bald,¹⁷ and that arrangement may possibly have prevailed as late as the reign of Odo.¹⁸ According to the doubtful testimony of Richer, the Danegelds of the tenth century were collected by (royal?) *exactores*.¹⁹

It would be interesting to know something about the method of procedure employed by the officials of the king when they were engaged in the work of distributing, apportioning, and fixing the rates of the taxes for the Danegeld. Did they plan to secure on each occasion only what had been demanded by the Vikings; or did they arrange for the collection of a larger amount, part of which was to be used for other purposes than the Danegeld? Was it their intention to distribute the tax fairly and equitably between the various classes of tax-payers, and, if so, did they succeed in this endeavor? In apportioning

15 Charlemagne sometimes had the *heerbann* collected by special *haribannatores*; but as a rule this was undoubtedly one of the functions of the *missi* (Waitz, *D. Verfassungsgesch.*, IV, 577 and n. 3, 578 and nn. 1-3). Charles the Bald in 864 prescribed that the *heerbann* was to be collected as before, i. e. by the *missi* (*Edictum Pistense*, c. 27, *M.G.H., LL. Sectio II*, t. 2, p. 322; cf. *supra*, chap. v, n. 75). I have been unable to find any references to *haribannatores* for the time of Charles the Bald and thereafter.

16 *Supra*, chap. vi, n. 74.

17 *Supra*, pp. 153-7 and nn. 94-97; cf. p. 36 and n. 48, p. 54, n. 62.

18 Cf. Thompson, *Decline of the Missi*, pp. 19-20; Viollet, *Les inst. polit. de la France*, I, 305-7. That the institution of the *missi* had not entirely disappeared by the time of Odo is proved by the following passage from a charter issued by that monarch in 899 (Favre, *Eudes*, p. 237): "Precipientes ergo iubemus ut nullus comes seu vicecomes aut aliquis ex saecularibus iudicibus vel ex missis nostris discurrentibus in praefato coenobio . . . potestative mansiones accipiat aut paratas . . . vel inferendas ab eo exigere praesumat"

19 *Supra*, p. 166, n. 18, p. 169, n. 30.

and fixing the rates of the taxes, did they have at their disposal, and for their guidance, any kind of information — general or specific — on which to base calculations and estimates as to the probable net yield of the tax? Unfortunately, the information that we possess on these matters is very sparse.

There is no evidence which proves that the monarch ever applied the proceeds of the Danegeld to any other than their proper purpose.²⁰ It is true that Charles the Bald on one occasion was *suspected* of having done something of that kind.²¹ But his own vigorous protest against this imputation, together with the undeniable fact that there had been numerous abuses in the collection of this particular Danegeld (that of 860—61), seems to make it impossible for us to regard the suspicion against the king as well grounded. On the other hand, it cannot be doubted that those who collected the Danegeld in the first instance very often exacted from the tax-payers more than was necessary to fill the quota required of them by the king.²²

The question as to whether the royal officials intended to distribute the impost equitably between the various classes of

20 The following passage from the *Const. Carisiac. de moneta* of 861 *M.G.H., I.L.* Sectio II, t. 2, pp. 301-2) has sometimes been taken to indicate that the Danegeld of 860-61 was raised not only to pay off the Vikings, but also to provide and equip a fleet: "necesse fuit in istis temporibus coniectum de illis accipere et ad navium compositionem et in Nortmannorum causa pro regni, sicut res coniacet, salvamento, ut omnes cognoscant, qui non quaestum inhonestum, sed publicam regni utilitatem quaerimus." This interpretation, however, will not bear criticism. The fleet referred to was employed by Charles the Bald when he attempted to expel the Vikings from Oscellus in 858 (cf. *supra*, pp. 45-47, 63., n. 11). He did not agree to pay Danegeld to the other group of Vikings, under Weland, until early in 860 (*supra*, pp. 48-49). Therefore, the passage just quoted must be taken to imply two levies of taxes, one probably in 857 or 858 for the construction of the fleet, and another in 860-61 for the purposes of the Danegeld. See also *supra*, p. 107, n. 97.

21 The last part of the quotation given in the preceding note practically proves that Charles the Bald had been accused of seeking a *quaestum inhonestum* when he levied the Danegeld in 860-61. It is an interesting fact that when Berengar, King of Italy, levied taxes for a tribute to the Magyars in 947, he retained for his own profit a considerable part of the money thus raised (Liutprand, *Antapodosis*, V, 33, ed. Dümmler, 1877, p. 118): "Per id tempus Taxis, Hungariorum rex, magno cum exercitu in Italiam venit. Cui Berengarius non ex propria pecunia, sed ex ecclesiarum ac pauperum collectione X modios nummorum dedit. Fecit autem hoc, non ut populi curam haberet, sed ut hac occasione magnam pecuniam congregaret. Quod et fecit. In omni enim utrius sexus homo, tamque ablactatus quam lactens, pro se nummum dedit; quibus aes commiscens, ex paucis X modios fecit; caeteram vero partem, et quicquid ex ecclesiis tulit, sibi retinuit." The Magyars evidently were less exacting as regards the quality of the coins they accepted than were the Vikings (cf. *infra*, pp. 214-15).

22 *Supra*, p. 193, n. 11, p. 194, n. 16.

the population is somewhat difficult to answer. It cannot be denied that in the official assessments there are certain indications of an endeavor to fix the rates more or less in proportion to the ability to pay. The taxes of merchants and priests were assessed on the basis of a valuation of their resources; the *heerbann* of 866 probably was graduated in proportion to the amount of property possessed by the freemen; the taxes on the dependent holdings of land varied according as they were *mansi ingenuiles*, *mansi serviles*, *acolæ*, or *hospitia*; the taxes on a *mansus indominicatus* were higher than those on a dependent *mansus*; and *honores*, or benefices, were taxed in proportion to their value or income. But whether these provisions were intended to be anything more than a basis for calculating the total amounts due from those who collected the taxes in the first instance, remains doubtful. We have only one bit of evidence which points in that direction. It is the provision in the documents for the year 877 which specifies that only one half of the tax laid on a dependent *mansus* was to be paid by the holder of the *mansus*, while the other half was to be taken from the *cens*, or *redevance*, due the seignior. It does not seem possible that the king at any time could have enforced a rigid adherence to the provisions of the official assessments, since in most cases his officers did not deal directly with the actual taxpayers. Sometimes — as, for example, to raise the Danegeld demanded by the Vikings of the Loire in 877 — no regular assessment was attempted; the magnates were authorized to raise the needed sum in whatever way they could. Assessment or no assessment, the probability is that the seigniors and prelates always succeeded in shifting the tax on their dependents; that the king was well aware of this abuse, but unable to prevent it. We may believe that the lower classes, peasants and priests in particular, usually were required to pay much more than the amount that was legitimately due from them.²³ And it may be assumed that the peasants, whose holdings were taxed oftener than any other kind of property, furnished by far the larger part of the money collected as Danegeld.

The rates of taxation prescribed in the assessments may have been fixed on the basis of a rough estimate as to the amount that would be required from each unit of taxation in order to raise

²³ *Supra*, p. 193, nn. 11-13.

the sum demanded by the Vikings. At least it is possible to point to the existence of certain prerequisites for making such an estimate. We have evidence which indicates that the king sometimes took an inventory of the benefices held from him;²⁴ the counts and the *missi* were required to report from time to time on the number of freemen in each county that were liable to military service;²⁵ the *polyptiques* of the abbeys prove that records were kept by the ecclesiastical establishments, of the number and kinds of *mansi* within their domains, and also of the number and status of their tenants; it may be inferred that similar records were kept by the lay seigniors;²⁶ undoubtedly the bishops had records of the resources of all the priests within their dioceses; and the royal fisc very probably possessed some information as regards the resources of the merchants.²⁷ Perhaps these considerations make it impossible to regard the prescribed rates of taxation as mere guesses on the subject of what each unit of taxation ought to contribute in order to raise a specific sum of money. On the other hand, however, it seems very unlikely that the royal officials ever could have secured, as the basis for their calculations, a body of fiscal information that was at all complete or accurate. Whether all of the records referred to above were constantly at their disposal, may with good reason be doubted. But even if they had been, the officials probably would have been unable to estimate in advance just how many seigniors would fail to remit all or part of the quotas for which they were held liable, and what portion of the tax for various other reasons could never be collected. The best proof of this is the fact that on some occasions more than one assessment was necessary,²⁸ while on others the required amount could be raised only by drawing on the treasures of the church.²⁹

24 *Ann. Bert.*, 869, p. 98: "[Karolus] per omne regnum suum litteras misit, ut episcopi, abbates et abbatissae breves de honoribus suis, quanta mansa quisque haberet, futuras Kalendas Maii deferre curarent, vassalli autem dominici comitum beneficia et comites vassallorum beneficia inbreviant et praedicto placito aedium breves inde deferrent, etc."

25 See for example *Edictum Pistense* (864), c. 27, *M.G.H., LL.* Sectio II, t. 2, p. 321.

26 Cf. Dopsch, *Wirtschaftsentwicklung d. Karolingerzeit*, I, 299-300.

27 This may be deduced from the obligation of the merchants to pay over to the fisc a certain percentage of their profits. See *supra*, p. 86, n. 127.

28 In 860-61 there appear to have been at least two assessments (*supra*, pp. 50-53); in 866 there were four (*supra*, p. 87, n. 136, p. 89).

29 *Supra*, p. 190.

The raising of the Danegeld appears to have been a comparatively slow process, especially when more than one assessment proved necessary in order to secure a given amount or when the amount was unusually high. Ordinarily it must have been a matter of several months; rarely, if ever, could a Danegeld be collected in less than two or three months;³⁰ and seven months were necessary to raise the enormous tribute of 12,000 pounds in 884.³¹

So far as known, the general Danegeld was never levied throughout the entire West Frankish realm. We have no certain indication that it ever was raised in Aquitaine, not even when the tribute was paid to Vikings operating from the Loire.³² Except in 886, when the entire Danegeld was furnished by Charles the Fat from Germany,³³ Francia appears to have been taxed for all the Danegelds paid to Vikings operating in northern France, including the Normans. This probably holds true of Neustria and Burgundy also, save for the following exceptions: neither of these countries was taxed for the Danegeld of 924;³⁴ Neustria did not contribute toward the payment to the Seine Vikings in 877, but furnished the entire amount paid to the Loire Vikings in that year.³⁵ Also, the stipendiary Danegeld of 862 was raised in Neustria alone.³⁶

What has been said above sufficiently demonstrates that the Danegeld was in fact an *extraordinary direct* tax levied by royal authority, within large and well defined portions of the West Frankish kingdom, on various kinds of property and resources. It was not the only direct tax known to the Carolingian period. Such burdens as the *annua dona*, and, in certain cases,³⁷ the *census, tributum, inferenda, etc.*, must also be classified as direct

30 Nearly three months were required for 7,000 pounds in 845 (*supra*, p. 36 and n. 53); five or six months for 4,000 pounds in 866 (*supra*, pp. 90-91); probably three months for 5,000 pounds in 877 (*supra*, pp. 107-8). The somewhat anomalous tribute of 853 appears to have been raised in less than two months (see *supra*, chap. II, n. 24).

31 *Supra*, p. 135 and n. 95.

32 *Supra*, pp. 60, 97-98 and nn. 37-40.

33 *Supra*, pp. 149-52 and n. 73.

34 *Supra*, p. 169.

35 *Supra*, pp. 97-98 and nn. 36-40.

36 *Supra*, p. 60.

37 In those cases where they had not been transformed into private redevances.

taxes.³⁸ But these were paid, each year or oftener,³⁹ not on the basis of an assessment prepared for each occasion, but according to custom.⁴⁰ Also, though regular, they were not general, taxes. In theory, the *annua dona* were required only of the great seigniors;⁴¹ while *census*, *tributum*, etc., were exacted (as royal taxes) only in those cases where they had not yet become private redevances.⁴² In the case of these customary taxes, moreover, no distinction appears to have been made, at least from the point of view of the uses to which they were put, between the income of the state and that of the king.⁴³ They were for both, no doubt, but mostly for the king.⁴⁴

38 This was denied by Waitz (*op. cit.*, IV, 111 ff.); but most French historians have taken the other view (see e. g. Flach, *Les orig. de l'anc. France*, III, 344 and n. 1; Viollet, *op. cit.*, I, 321 ff.). Dopsch is strongly of the opinion that a very considerable part of the Carolingian revenues was derived from taxation (*op. cit.*, II, 333 ff., 342).

39 Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 107, n. 2.

40 This is not denying that changes in custom took place occasionally, nor that customs varied. The point is simply that particular rates were not prescribed each time the taxes were to be paid (see Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 108-11, 113-20). While Dopsch (*op. cit.*, II, 334-40) insists that these burdens were, not private redevances, but true taxes, he does not deny their customary character. Cf. Flach, *op. cit.*, I, 338-41; III, 344 and n. 2; Glasson, *Histoire du droit et des institutions de la France*, II, 480-83.

41 Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 110; cf. 106 and nn. 2, 3; Glasson, *op. cit.*, II, 483.

42 *Ibid.*, 480-82; Viollet, *op. cit.*, I, 322-24; Dopsch, *op. cit.*, II, 334 ff.

43 According to Dopsch (*ibid.*, 333 and n. 6), the proceeds of the *annua dona* were intended to cover the expenditures of the state rather than those of the monarch; special gifts for the latter purpose being termed *dona privata*. The principal basis for this argument is the following statement of Hincmar (*Opera*, II, 325): "causa suae defensionis regi ac rei publicae vectigalia, quae nobiscum annua dona vocatur, praestat ecclesia." But surely this passage does not prove Dopsch's point; rather it begs the question; for Hincmar here fails to distinguish between the expenditures of the king and those of the state—the *annua dona* are for both. The fact that the *dona privata* were paid in addition to the *dona annua* does not prove that there was a distinction in the uses to which they were applied. In some cases perhaps the *dona privata* were voluntary; that would distinguish them from the *annua dona*, which for a long time had been "gifts" only in name. On this whole subject, see Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 5-6, 105-7. Lot ("Le Pont de Pitres," *Le Moyen Age*, 1905, IX, pp. 3, 4, 10 and n. 2, p. 11 and n. 1) thinks the *annua dona* were used at least in part for the building of defenses, such as the *Pont de Pitres*.

44 It is difficult to find any evidence of disbursements in the Carolingian period that were made for purely public purposes and which redounded primarily to the benefit of the people as a whole or to that of the state. Glasson (*op. cit.*, II, 482) declares that at this period there were practically no state expenditures, since the services required by the state either were performed gratuitously or were rewarded by the proceeds from land grants and from fines levied in the law courts. Waitz (*op. cit.*, IV, 9 ff.) is of practically the same opinion, though his statements are more guarded and accurate. Cf. Flach, *op. cit.*, III, 485 ff.

It has been asserted⁴⁵ that in addition to these regular taxes — *annua dona, census, tributum, inferenda* — the sources of the Carolingian period also give evidence of three extraordinary taxes other than the Danegeld. They are said to have been the following: (1) a contribution for the poor prescribed by Charlemagne in 780;⁴⁶ (2) a collection of alms in 810 for the restoration of churches in Jerusalem;⁴⁷ and (3) an exaction levied by Louis the German to secure money for the redemption of Christian captives in the Holy Land.⁴⁸ On closer examination, however, it will be found that none of these exactions really was a tax in any strict sense. Furthermore, they can not be regarded as contributions either to the king or to the state.

The Danegeld differs not only from such more or less obligatory contributions toward benevolent purposes, but also from the aforementioned customary taxes, in several respects. In the first place, it approached nearer than did any of these to being a *general tax*. In 866 probably no one who held property or possessed resources of any important kind could legitimately have escaped the Danegeld.⁴⁹ If the assessments were less comprehensive on other occasions, and if in 877 (and thereafter?) the Danegeld was, as a land tax, levied only on benefices held of the king,⁵⁰ the fact remains that no other tax of the Carolingian

45 By Dopsch, *op. cit.*, II, 254, 339.

46 This contribution was required from bishops, abbots, abesses, counts, and royal vassals, in proportion to their resources (*M.G.H., LL. Sectio II, t. 1, p. 52*). Dopsch (*op. cit.*, II, 254) calls it a poor tax (*Armensteuer*), and asserts that such taxes were levied "zu wiederholten Malen." It is true that Charlemagne often gave instructions on the subject of how the poor were to be taken care of; but I can find no evidence that he ordered specific contributions for the indigent on more than a single occasion—in 780. Furthermore, this contribution can not be regarded as in theory a tax; it was an obligation to give alms which Charlemagne imposed *at the suggestion of his prelates*; if he was legislating at all, it was for the church, but certainly not for the state. Cf. Sommerlad, *Die wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit der Kirche*, II, 110 ff.

47 The only information we have on this matter is the following (*M.G.H., LL., Sectio II, t. 1, p. 154, c. 18*): "De elemosina mittenda ad Hierusalem propter ecclesias Dei restaurandas." Dopsch's argument (*op. cit.*, II, 254, n. 2) that the word *elemosina* here should be interpreted in the sense of a tax is very weak, and in any case is invalidated by what I have said in the preceding note.

48 The exaction is thus described by the Monk of St. Gall (*M.G.H., SS., II, p. 753, c. 9*): "totam Germaniam, quae temporibus . . . Hludowici de singulis hobis regallium possessionum singulos denarios reddere compulsa est." This exaction, it will be noted, was collected only on the royal domain. So far from being in any sense a general tax, as Dopsch thinks (*op. cit.*, II, 254 and n. 2), it was simply an extraordinary redevance.

49 *Supra*, p. 72, n. 64.

50 *Supra*, pp. 99–102 and nn. 42, 61.

period (excluding the ecclesiastical taxes) was laid on more kinds of property, and paid by a larger number of persons than the Danegeld. In the second place, the Danegeld, unlike the customary taxes, was as a rule levied in accordance with special royal assessments which prescribed particular rates for each occasion. Graduated in proportion to the amount or value of property and resources, these rates, theoretically at least, applied uniformly throughout the entire territory about to be taxed. Finally, in contradistinction to all the taxes and contributions above mentioned, the Danegeld was a specific tax for the direct benefit of the state as such — for the defense of the kingdom. Legally it could not be, and probably it never was, raised by the king for any other than its proper purpose.⁵¹

The only tax of this period that seems at all analogous to the Danegeld is the exaction levied by Charles the Bald in 857, or 858, for the purpose of securing funds to equip a fleet against the Vikings. So far as we know, such a tax was not levied on more than the single occasion noted.⁵²

In the late ninth and early tenth centuries, after the regular direct taxes to the crown — *annua dona, census, tributum, inferenda* — either had wholly ceased to be paid or had been transformed into private redevances,⁵³ these extraordinary taxes — the Danegeld and the fleet tax — may be regarded as virtually the only remaining evidences of a public or state economy in the West Frankish kingdom.⁵⁴

But if it seems clear to us of the present day that the Danegeld in certain respects was a new departure in Carolingian public finance, it remains very doubtful whether the tax-payers of the ninth and tenth centuries recognized it as such. We have seen that the machinery employed to collect the Danegeld was, in large part and essentially, not the machinery of the state, but that of the seigniorial regime. Very seldom — so far as we know, only in the case of freemen and possibly in that of merchants — did the officials of the king enter into direct relations with the actual tax-payers. While tillers of the soil and priests had to bear the burdens of taxation, it was not they, but their

⁵¹ *Supra*, p. 195 and n. 21.

⁵² *Ibid.*, n. 20.

⁵³ Glasson, *op. cit.*, II, 481, 483; Viollet, *op. cit.*, I, 324; Dopsch, *op. cit.*, II, 343-44.

⁵⁴ Cf. Viollet, *op. cit.*, I, 324.

seigniors and patrons, who were held responsible for the taxes by the monarch.⁵⁵ A sufficient amount of Danegeld could never have been raised without the coöperation of the local authorities.⁵⁶ It was to their *ministeriales* that most of the money was paid in the first instance. The officials of the crown had no control over the great bulk of the tax money until, after having been collected from the tax-payers, it was paid over by the seigniors and the prelates to the royal *missi*. We have also seen that in most cases the Danegeld was collected, probably not in strict accordance with the royal assessments; but in such manner, and in such amounts, as would enable the seigniors and the prelates, after they had remitted their quotas to the *missi*, to retain a substantial profit for themselves, while they escaped having to furnish anything out of their own resources. For peasants and priests, therefore, the chief if not the only distinction between payments toward the Danegeld on the one hand, and redevances on the other, must have been that in the case of the former there was no custom to regulate the amount that might be demanded.⁵⁷

Again, it may be doubted whether the king levied the Danegeld, in theory, as a tax. It does not seem likely that seigniors, prelates, and freemen would have submitted to being formally taxed. Very probably the old Germanic principle that the free man could not be subjected to taxation either on his person or his property was still too strong to be brushed aside, even in the case of a great national emergency.⁵⁸ By what right, then, did Charles the Bald and his successors levy the Danegeld? On what principle was the exaction legally justified? In my opinion, the key to this problem is to be found in the collection of the *heerbann* for the purposes of the Danegeld. By collecting the *heerbann* as Danegeld, Charles the Bald altered its character. In that form it was not a penalty for negligence or refusal to render

⁵⁵ *Supra*, pp. 192-94.

⁵⁶ *Supra*, pp. 50-54, 90-91.

⁵⁷ *Supra*, p. 84, n. 123.

⁵⁸ On this point I venture to differ with Dopsch (*op. cit.*, II, 338 ff.), who assumes that the existence of the Danegeld and the other extraordinary burdens referred to above (p. 200) is enough to prove that the principle of immunity from taxation had by the time of Charlemagne ceased to be respected. I have shown (*supra*, p. 200, nn. 47-49) that none of these extraordinary exactions with exception of the Danegeld can be regarded as a true tax. In the following I shall endeavor to prove that even the Danegeld was not in the strict theory of the ninth century a tax, but merely a money payment substituted for military service.

military service, but a money payment substituted for military service. The legal basis of the *heerbann* was the same in both cases: the king's right to require military service of all freemen at their own expense. But when he exacted *heerbann* as *Danegeld*, the monarch must have acted on the theory that he had a right *either* to the personal military service *or* to its money equivalent, and that it lay within his discretion to determine which of the two was to be demanded on any occasion.⁵⁹ On this basis the king was legally justified in exacting Danegeld not only from freemen, but also from seigniors and prelates; for the latter were liable to render military service, no longer only in proportion to the number of freemen within their jurisdiction,⁶⁰ but — at the time of Charles the Bald and thereafter — in proportion to the size or value of their benefices.⁶¹ Moreover, after Charles the Bald had introduced the principle of the *levée en masse* — the principle that in the event of a *necessitas* (foreign invasion) it was the duty of all men, regardless of class, to take up arms in defense of their country — it was possible to collect Danegeld from all classes of the population, even priests, on the ground that it was a substitute for military service at a very critical time.⁶² And, indeed, that must have been the legal basis of the Danegeld: it was interpreted as a substitute for the military service owed by all men to the monarch as the defender of the land and its people against foreign invasion. To legitimize the taxation for the Danegeld on any other basis has proved difficult if not impossible.⁶³

There is no evidence that the French monarchs continued to collect Danegeld after the cessation of the Viking invasions and the pacification of the Normans. So far as can be ascertained,

⁵⁹ To this theory there could be little objection, since the average freeman would far rather pay the *heerbann* than render military service. See *supra*, pp. 74–77.

⁶⁰ *Supra*, pp. 77 ff.

⁶¹ *Supra*, pp. 87–88, 101.

⁶² *Supra*, pp. 86–87. Cf. Flach, *op. cit.*, I, 317–18, 321 and n. 2; III, 343, 473 and n. 2.

⁶³ Vuitry (*Le régime financier de la France*, I, 92–93) regarded the Danegeld as an evidence of the survival of the tradition of Roman taxation into the ninth and tenth centuries. Dopsch (*op. cit.*, II, 339–40) assumes that the taxing power was derived from “*der plenitudo potestatis des fränkischen Königs*,” and in particular from the royal right to issue bans. The latter part of this view, it will be noted, may be reconciled with my theory that the Danegeld was a substitute for military service. Waitz (*op. cit.*, IV, 120) referred to the Danegeld as a *Heersteuer*, but did not attempt to fix its legal basis.

the last levy of Danegeld as such, in France, took place in 926. In its local abuses the Danegeld may, indeed, have survived,⁶⁴ and this point will be discussed in the following chapter; but as a form of general taxation, authorized by the monarch in the interests of the kingdom as a whole, and applied uniformly throughout considerable portions of the West Frankish realm, the Danegeld disappears after 926. Between the latter date and 1146, when Louis VII levied the first royal aid to provide funds for his participation in the Second Crusade, there is no evidence of the collection of anything resembling a general tax, as distinct from a redevance or a feudal aid, by a king of France.⁶⁵ In this respect the history of the French Danegeld offers a striking contrast to that of the English Danegeld, which, after its revival by William the Conqueror, constituted a very important part of the regular royal revenues, and was collected under the name of Danegeld as late as 1162 by Henry II.⁶⁶

The fragmentary evidence that we have on the subject of the *local* Danegeld — paid as ransom money for towns, churches, monasteries, or captives — leads me to believe that it was raised by the same, or similar, methods as the general Danegeld. While the treasures of ecclesiastical establishments were doubtless often drawn upon, it may be presumed that when these were not available or did not suffice, taxes in the form of extraordinary redevances, were levied on the local population.⁶⁷ We know that in the case of the ransom of Abbot Louis in 858 it not only proved necessary to empty many church treasuries; the king and the magnates also had to furnish large contributions which they raised probably by taxing their peasantry.⁶⁸

64 Vogel, p. 386, conjectures that Rollo, after his establishment in Normandy, levied tribute on the peasants who had remained in the land.

65 Luchaire, *Manuel*, pp. 578-79; *id.*, *Histoire des institutions monarchiques de la France*, second ed. (1891), I, 125-28; Vultry, *op. cit.*, 390-91. Clamageran (*Hist. de l'impôt*, I, 193-94; cf. 278-79) fails to note the Danegeld of 926 and (wrongly) gives 1147 as the date of the aid levied by Louis VII. Flach (*op. cit.*, III, 349-50) asserts that the royal right to levy a general impost was not irremediably lost after the Danegeld ceased to be collected, that the royal aid of 1146 proves the survival of the principle.

66 Round, *Feudal England*, p. 500; cf. *supra*, introduction.

67 *Supra*, pp. 183-84, 188.

68 *Supra*, pp. 186-88.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE RESULTS OF THE DANEGELD: ITS EFFECT ON THE POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF FRANCE.

Some of the results of the policy of paying Danegeld have been referred to from time to time in the foregoing discussion. These may now be summarized and brought into relation with certain other matters not yet mentioned.

It is probably true that the Franks never expected to put an end to the Viking invasions by the payment of Danegeld: that they made use of this expedient only for the purpose of gaining a temporary respite from plunder and devastation, and in the hope that they would be able sufficiently to strengthen their power of resistance in the meantime.¹ Yet this hope was never realized. Each payment of tribute served only, on the one hand to whet the appetite of the invaders for more money, and on the other to lessen the inclination, and therefore the ability, of the Franks to resist their enemies by military measures.² The very knowledge that in the last resort the Vikings always could be bought off, undoubtedly made both nobles and freemen as a rule disinclined to risk the somewhat doubtful issues of armed conflicts with an enemy who in military efficiency was their superior.³ And though Charles the Bald and other monarchs in general were forced by a peculiar combination of circumstances, and presumably against their own wishes, to resort to the Danegeld, there is not wanting evidence that even they, at times when they desired to pursue some object of their choice, culpably neglected the defense of the realm and relied upon the venality of the Vikings.⁴ The Danegeld, therefore, not only failed to secure the immediate end at which it was aimed; it also had the disastrous effect of further weakening the resisting power of the Frankish army, and it led to a serious decline in patriotism and public spirit among all classes, but chiefly perhaps among the magnates. The economic advantages which each levy of Danegeld yielded them must have proved a strong temptation to the seigniors. They much preferred bying off the Vikings to

1 Cf. the statement of Charles the Bald quoted *infra*, appendix i, n. 35.

2 *Supra*, p. 38 and n. 58, p. 110 and n. 114.

3 *Supra*, pp. 113 ff., 175-79.

4 *Supra*, pp. 115-16, 146-47, 178-79.

fighting them, and thereby increased the tendency of subordinating the vital interests of the realm to the pursuit of private aims and wholly selfish ends.⁵

The policy of paying Danegeld also had the effect of detracting from the prerogatives and the prestige of the monarch at the same time that it increased the wealth, the independence, and the power of the nobility. It has been shown⁶ that the policy of paying Danegeld usually was the policy of the magnates, seldom that of the king; that the magnates in most cases forced the king to this expedient by refusing or neglecting to render the military service demanded of them; that, furthermore, they were enriched by each levy of the Danegeld on their subjects. With the transformation of the Frankish army of freemen into an aggregation of feudal vassals, the monarch was rendered powerless to defend his realm against invasion whenever the magnates and seigniors refused him their obedience and military support.⁷ By compelling the monarch to resort to the Danegeld, the magnates extracted from him what must have been regarded by his subjects as a confession of weakness, an admission that he was no longer capable of properly discharging his prime function of defense against a foreign enemy.⁸ Meanwhile, the monarch found himself almost wholly dependent on these same magnates even for the raising of the Danegeld; for without their aid and cooperation it was just as impossible to collect a sufficient amount of money as to raise an adequate number of troops.⁹ Moreover, by their control of the collection of the Danegeld, the magnates were able not only to hold in leash or to embarrass the monarch; they were able also to develop new financial rights in relation to the peasants and others who dwelt upon their lands or were subject to their jurisdiction, thereby augmenting in a general way the power and authority which they already possessed over their dependents.¹⁰

It is in connection with the matter just mentioned that one of the most important results of the Danegeld must be sought. The

⁵ *Supra*, chaps. vii, xlv.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Supra*, p. 114 and n. 18, p. 126, nn. 45, 46. See also Baldamus, *Heerwesen*, pp. 17-33.

⁸ On this matter see Fustel de Coulanges, *Les transf. de la royauté*, 616-66; cf. Flach, *Les orig. de l'anc. France*, I, 145 ff.

⁹ *Supra*, pp. 50-53, 89-92, 196, 201-2. Cf. Flach, *op. cit.*, III, 155, 474 ff.

¹⁰ *Supra*, pp. 81-85 and nn. 123-26, pp. 102-3 and nn. 69, 70, p. 108 and n. 103. Cf. Flach, *op. cit.*, I, 317-22.

Danegeld was not raised in strict accordance with the royal assessments issued for that purpose; it was exacted in a more or less arbitrary way by the agents of the seigniors, the purpose being to secure not only the exact quota demanded of each seignior by the monarch, but also an additional amount sufficient for the needs, or the avarice, of each individual magnate and his *ministeriales*.¹¹ The fact that the seigniors were charged by royal authority to collect the Danegeld from their dependents must have led to many abuses in the form of illegal and unjust exactions.¹² It is true that the seigniors had no legal right to collect Danegeld except when they had been instructed to that effect by the king. But it is doubtful whether they always considered themselves bound by that limitation.¹³ We know that the local authorities often entered into bargains with the Vikings on their own account, for the purpose of saving a town, a church, a monastery from destruction, or to ransom prisoners from captivity. In such cases it was probably felt that counts, bishops, and abbots were as justified in raising by local taxation the sums they had bargained for as the king was in raising larger tributes by general taxation. In other words, the general Danegeld must have helped to legitimize the levies of local Danegeld.¹⁴ Furthermore, it was not difficult to find a pretext for levying an exaction.¹⁵ The Vikings were all but ubiquitous in the West Frankish realm during the ninth century. Their presence in some locality, or the rumor of it, might easily be taken advantage of by a seignior to levy Danegeld on his own account, and without any intention of using it for the purpose indicated.¹⁶ His subjects and dependents probably were wholly ignorant regarding the uses to which their money was put, once it left their hands. In any case it would have availed them little to question the legality

11 *Supra*, pp. 192-93, 195-96, 201-2.

12 *Supra*, pp. 82-83. Cf. Flach, *op. cit.*, I, 318 ff.

13 M. Flach has the following to say as regards the contributions exacted from the peasants in this period (*op. cit.*, I, 342): "Le chef eut droit à des contributions chaque fois qu'une dépense exceptionnelle s'imposait à lui. Or, qui donc allait être juge de l'utilité ou de la nécessité de la dépense,—on pourrait ajouter—de sa réalité? L'obligation du sujet eut pour mesure l'intérêt du maître et sa puissance."

14 *Supra*, pp. 183-88.

15 The chicanery practiced by the magnates and the local officials is described by Hincmar; see *supra*, p. 130, n. 67.

16 Cf. Flach, *op. cit.*, I, 384-86.

or the justice of the exaction.¹⁷ Meanwhile, the right of the seigniors to levy exactions on their dependents in times of need was being ever more firmly established.¹⁸ When in the opinion of the seignior such need arose, and an exaction was levied to meet it, the seignior, or his officials,¹⁹ prescribed the amounts that were to be collected from the individual tax-payers. On these occasions, therefore, the dependents of the seignior came to be regarded as taxable at any figure determined by their lord or his agents.²⁰

We know that in the earlier feudal period the unfree peasants were held to be *taillables à merci*; they might be required to pay an arbitrary imposition known as the *taille* — the amount of which was determined by the lord — whenever the latter chose to impose it.²¹ The *taille* is not referred to as such before the eleventh century, but it must have come into existence much earlier.²² The origin of the *taille* is a subject that is still veiled in much obscurity, but there seems to be a general consensus of opinion that it grew out of the illegal and unjust exactions which are so often referred to in the documents of the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries.²³ Of course there were illegal and unjust exactions long before the first levy of Danegeld in 845.²⁴ Yet the complaints about such exactions seem to increase in number *after* the middle of the ninth century.

17 Cf. *ibid.*, 342-43, 425 ff.; Sée, *Les classes rurales et le rég. domanial en France*, 107-11.

18 Cf. Flach, *op. cit.*, I, 414 ff.

19 Doubtless many illegal exactions were originated by the *ministeriales* of the seigniors (Flach, *op. cit.*, I, 380-81) and by the advocates, or lay defenders, of churches and monasteries (*ibid.*, 435 ff.; Sée, *op. cit.*, 474 ff.).

20 See Flach, *op. cit.*, I, 342-43; cf. 466, 467 and n. 1.

21 See *ibid.*, 343-44; Luchaire, *Manuel*, 206-7, 309-10, 336, 422; Vuitry, *Etudes sur le régime financier*, 104, 268-74; cf. Sée, *op. cit.*, 177-78, 215, 356, 357; Clamageran, *Hist. de l'impôt*, I, 199-201. For the later development of the *taille*, its regulation, and its connection with the feudal aids, see *infra*, pp. 210-11 and n. 35. I am now concerned only with one of its origins.

22 See the authorities cited in the preceding note. So far as I know, the earliest reference to the *taille*, *eo nomine*, is found in a diploma issued in the year 1060 (quoted by Championnière, *De la propriété des eaux courantes*, p. 496): "Quasdam injustas consuetudines, talliam videlicet et omnes alias oppressiones." It is also mentioned about the year 1080 in the *Pan-carte blanche de Saint-Martin de Tours*, fol. 130 (quoted by Flach, *op. cit.*, I, 419, n. 1): "Hugo castelli S. Maurae dominus avariciae faucibus instinctus per violentiam suam homines S. Martini de S. Hispano talliavit et talliam reddere coegit."

23 Flach, *op. cit.*, I, 342-44; cf. 384-85, 408, n. 2, 421, n. 3, 433, nn. 1, 2. See also Glasson, *Hist. du droit et des inst. de la France*, IV, 439-41, 445 ff.; Sée, *op. cit.*, 318-26.

24 See *infra*, n. 30. Cf. Dopsch, *Wirtschaftsentw. d. Karolingerzeit*, I, 294, 295 and n. 1.

In several of these complaints it is indicated that the exactions in question had not been levied before the period of the Viking invasions and the reign of Charles the Bald.²⁵ The methods used by the seigniors to raise their quotas of Danegeld²⁶ were not very different from those employed later in the exaction of the arbitrary *taille*;²⁷ and the right of the seigniors to exact such *tailles* from their peasants, without being in any way obliged to them in return, save to protect them, could easily have been developed in connection with the levies — legal and illegal — of Danegeld.²⁸

It cannot be affirmed that the *taille* grew out of the Danegeld exclusively, and still less that there would have been no *taille*, if there had been no Danegeld. Doubtless there would have been plenty of opportunities for levying exactions, even if there had been no Viking raids;²⁹ and the best corroboration of this statement is the fact that illegal exactions are mentioned long before the Viking period — even in Merovingian times.³⁰ But it is not

25 *Capitula Synodi Bellovac.* [April, 845], *M.G.H., LL.*, Sectio II, t. 2, p. 388, c. 5: "Ut ab ecclesia mihi commissa indebitas consuetudines et iniustas exactationes de caetero non exactetis, sed sic eas conservetis, sicut tempore avi et patris vestri conservatae fuerunt." *Epistola Synodi Carisiac. ad Hludovicum regem Germ.* [Nov. 858], c. 14, *ibid.*, p. 437: "Iudices denique villarum regiarum constituite, qui non sint cupidi . . . Et servos regios iudices non opprimant, nec ultra quod soliti fuerunt reddere tempore patris vestri ab eis exigant; neque per angarias in tempore incongruo illos affligant; neque per dolos aut per mala ingenia sive inconvenientes preces colonos condemnent." Flach explains (*op. cit.*, I, 385, n. 1) that in the document just quoted it is a question not only of public (royal) officials, but also of powerful vassals (*fortiores vassi*), of seigniors and of protectors (*domini vel patroni*). *Cartulaire de Saint-Etienne de Dijon*, MS., fol. 17 (circa 912), quoted by Flach, *ibid.*, n. 2: "quidam homines servientes et fideles Ecclesiae S. Stephani Divionensis . . . conquesti sunt et reclamaverunt humiliter dicentes quod quidam eorum praepositi . . . novello tempore post Nortmannicam emersionem quoddam genus servitii ex XIII eorum colonis per occasionem et potestatem ultra censum solitum quod legitime debebant illis imposuerunt, modium videlicet musti ad opus praepositorum ex una quoque colonica vinum reddente, quod numquam antea fecerant nec ipsi, nec patres aut avi eorum, et per quosdam annos III et potestate hoc ab illis extorserint eosque in hoc facto afflixerint, etc." The document goes on to say that the matter complained of was investigated, found true, and prohibited in the future. See also *supra*, chap. vi, n. 77.

26 See the preceding chapter, pp. 192-97, 201-2.

27 I. e. both the Danegeld and the *tallia ad voluntatem* were more or less arbitrarily exacted from the lower classes of the population. Cf. Luchaire, *Manuel*, p. 309.

28 Cf. *supra*, pp. 207-8 and nn. 13, 21.

29 On the whole subject of the origins of the various seigneurial rights, see Flach, *op. cit.*, I, 315 ff.; cf. Sée, *op. cit.*, 308-26.

30 *Clotharii II Edictum* [Oct. 18, 614], *M.G.H., LL.*, Sectio II, t. 1, p. 22, c. 8: "Ut ubicumque census novus imple addetus est et a populo reclamatur, iuxta inquaesitione misericorditer emendetur." *Pippini Capitulare Aquitani-*

Danegeld. 14.

too much to say that the Danegeld must have been a very important factor in the development of the *taille*, and particularly in the development of the legal theory that the unfree peasants were *taillables à merci*.³¹

The local Danegelds that were paid for the purpose of ransoming prisoners from captivity must have contributed something toward the development of the feudal aids.³² Perhaps none of these aids appears earlier, or was more common, in France, than that one which was due from the vassals when a captive lord had to be ransomed.³³ Just as the ransom payments of the ninth century probably were raised by means of forced contributions from the peasantry, so we know that the feudal aids were secured by levying extraordinary *tailles* on the laboring classes.³⁴

cum [768], *ibid.*, p. 43, c. 4: "Ut ad illos pauperes homines magis non tollant nisi quantum legitime reddere debent." *Breviarum missorum Aquitanicum*, *ibid.*, p. 65, c. 5: "ut ad illos pauperes nova aliqua consuetudo inposita fuit postea."

³¹ Objection to the argument presented above could perhaps be taken on the ground that the Danegeld was a tax on property and resources, while the arbitrary *taille* seems to have been, originally, a charge on persons. The difficulty thus raised is, however, more apparent than real, and results from drawing too sharp a distinction between charges resting on persons and those laid on land. The arbitrary *taille*, it is said, was exacted only from persons of servile status—the *taillables*—never from the so-called free villeins (Sée, *op. cit.*, 177-78, 215, 357-58). But we are told also that the classification of a tenant, either a villein or a serf, depended more on the condition of his tenure than on the status of his person; that, speaking generally, condition was less personal than real (*ibid.*, 157-58, 166-67, 171, 216-17). It would seem, therefore, that the question as to whether the arbitrary *taille* should be classified as personal or as real, is at least not a matter of first importance. The Danegeld, it has been shown, was exacted from the holders of *mansi ingenuiles*, *mansi serviles*, *accoiæ*, and *hospitia*, without regard to the personal status of the respective tenants (cf. *supra*, chap. v, nn. 69-71, 123). The fact that they were tenants of such holdings made them taxable for the Danegeld. Probably the same fact made them subject to other exactions, legal and illegal; with the result that in the course of time they came to be regarded as taxable at will. It will be admitted that this view is in harmony with the generally accepted theory that the serfs of the feudal period—as distinct from the free villeins—were the descendants not only of the *servi*, but also of the *coloni*, who occupied dependent *mansi* in Carolingian times (Sée, *op. cit.*, 157). A distinctive feature of the latter period was the degradation of the freeholders, most of whom became dependents of the great seigniors. That a small number of the later villeins were descendants of Carolingian freeholders who by various means had escaped degradation into serfdom, will not be denied; but by far the majority of the later villeins had reached that status by virtue of the emancipation movement in the twelfth century and thereafter. The emancipation of the serf meant, among other things, that he could no longer be subjected to the arbitrary *taille* (*ibid.*, 219 ff., 239 ff.). The *tailles* levied on villeins were limited to certain occasions, very much like the feudal aids due from vassals. On the relation between the two, see *infra*, n. 35.

³² Cf. *supra*, p. 188.

³³ See Haskins, *Norman Institutions*, pp. 21-22; cf. pp. 19-20.

³⁴ Luchaire, *Manuel*, pp. 206-7.

Again, it is possible to show a more general connection between the Danegeld and the feudal aids. The latter, it is well known, in many cases were developed from the *taille*; they represent the regulation and limitation of what was once a wholly arbitrary exaction.³⁵ Therefore, on the basis of a relation between the local abuses of the Danegeld and the origin of the *taille*,³⁶ it may be asserted that the influence of the Danegeld is traceable in the development of the earlier feudal aids. Between the Danegeld, regarded as a money payment substituted for military service, and some of these feudal aids there was, in principle, little difference. This is true particularly of the *aide de l'ost*, which toward the close of the reign of Philip Augustus became an important source of royal revenue.³⁷

In an illuminating article on the commerce of France in the ninth century, Professor Thompson has called attention to the influence of the Danegeld on trade and exchange: "The immense sums of money which the Northmen extorted . . . in the form of Danegeld must sometimes have had a tonic effect upon trade. Since the decline of the Roman Empire Gaul, in common with all the West, had experienced an enormous reduction in the amount of currency in circulation. Most of it had been drawn off to the East, or else hoarded. Now it was forcibly brought into the light of day. Clipped or counterfeited as much of the coin was, it yet seems to have stimulated exchange, and Charles's (Charles the Bald is meant) endeavors to purify and to regulate the coinage and to establish a uniform system of weights and measures may reasonably be taken as the symptoms of an awakening trade."³⁸ "The Norse armies were dogged by adventurous peddlers and merchants, and much of their booty must have been disposed of soon after its taking."³⁹ "Evidently commerce could not have suffered everywhere, but on the other hand in many places must have been stimulated. The Northmen undoubtedly disturbed things seriously, but often sold their booty in the land."⁴⁰ New markets must have arisen through the decay

35 Luchaire, *loc. cit.*

36 Cf. *supra*, pp. 206-10.

37 Luchaire, *Manuel*, pp. 579-80, 597-98; Sée, *op. cit.*, 593 ff.

38 Thompson, "The Commerce of France in the Ninth Century," *Journal of Political Economy*, 1915, XXIII, p. 867.

39 *Ibid.*, pp. 865-66.

40 An excellent example of this is given in *Ann. Fuld.*, III, 882, ed. Kurze, p. 98. During a truce between the Franks and the Northmen at Elsloo (see

of the old ones or by the change of location in the case of established places too greatly exposed."⁴¹

To this general estimate of the effect of the Danegeld on commerce perhaps only a few particulars need be added.⁴²

So far as we know, the Vikings, while they were sojourning in France, engaged neither in agriculture nor the industrial arts; and it is difficult to see how they could have found time for such pursuits, since they were almost constantly occupied in raiding, plundering, and devastating. They could hardly have brought with them from Scandinavia either food or military equipment in any very large quantities. This consideration must be kept constantly in mind if one wishes to gain anything like a correct appreciation of the volume of trade between the Vikings and the Franks. It lends an added significance to the evidences of exchange between the two peoples.⁴³ It indicates that the Vikings *needed* to purchase and did purchase, with the money which came into their possession through tribute and plunder, not only weapons, armor (*bruniae*), horses, and other necessities of war,⁴⁴ but also large quantities of foodstuffs, wine, cattle, etc.⁴⁵ The

infra, appendix iv), the latter opened the gates of their camp and permitted the Franks to enter: "Nostrates autem calliditatis illorum expertes eandem munitionem ingressi sunt, alii quidem causa negotiandi, alii vero pro loci firmitate consideranda." See also *infra*, n. 45.

41 Thompson, *op. cit.*, 866-67. Cf. v. Kalkstein, *Robert d. Tapferc*, p. 93. For the new markets, see *M.G.H., LL.* Sectio II, t. 2, p. 318, c. 19. In 873 the Northmen requested from Charles the Bald the privilege of having a market during the winter (see *infra*, n. 45).

42 On the Vikings as traders, see also Bugge, "Die nordeuropäischen Verkehrswege im frühen Mittelalter und die Bedeutung der Wikinger für die Entwicklung des europäischen Handels und der europäischen Schifffahrt," *Vierteljahrschrift f. Sozial- u. Wirtschaftsgesch.*, IV, 1906, 227 ff.; Vogel, 417-18, is of the opinion that, in general, Bugge has overestimated the stimulating influence of the Vikings on the commerce and trade of the Frankish realm. See also Bugge's *Vestertandenes Indflydelse paa Nordboernes og saerlig Nordmaendenes ydre Kultur, Levesaet og Samfundsforhold i Vikingetiden* (*Skrifter udgivne af Videnskabs-Selskabet i Christiania*, II, Historisk-filosofisk Klasse, 1904, No. 1), chap. iv; Vogel, 206, 233, 243, 293, 294, 314, 376; Steenstrup, *Normannerne*, I, 367; II, 367; Weinhold, *Altnordisches Leben*, 104-5, 114-17.

43 Not only laymen, but even the clergy, monks and nuns, seem to have traded with the Northmen. *Edictum Pistense*, c. 25, *M.G.H., LL.* Sectio II, t. 2, p. 325; see the varying manuscript (Cod. 3), printed in a note at the bottom of p. 325.

44 *Ibid.*, p. 321, c. 25. Cf. Thompson, *op. cit.*, 866 and n. 1; Vogel, 233.

45 The following may serve to illustrate the point referred to in the text. *Ann. Bert.* 869, p. 107: "Karolus vero civitates trans Sequanam ab incolis firmari rogavit, Cynomannis scilicet ac Turonis, ut praesidio contra Nortmannos populis esse possent. Nortmanni autem hoc audientes, multam summam argenti, frumenti quoque et vini ac animalium ab incolis terrae

fact is that the Vikings did not always evacuate the realm as soon as they had received the Danegeld. Ordinarily they simply proceeded to some other region,⁴⁶ and after the payment of 861 they were permitted to spend the winter in various encampments along the Seine.⁴⁷ It seems obvious, therefore, that all the money paid to the Vikings in the form of Danegeld did not leave France; some part of it must have been used to purchase the necessities of life and of war. But the benefits derived from this temporary stimulation of trade must not be overestimated. As will be shown later, they were more than counterbalanced by the direct economic losses suffered as a result of the payment of tribute.⁴⁸

The Danegeld must have intensified to some extent the labors of those engaged in agriculture and industry; for they produced or manufactured most of the things wanted by the Vikings.⁴⁹ Peasants, artisans, and seigniors now found opportunities to dispose of more than was required for their own needs and for the ordinary market demand.⁵⁰ This is not merely additional evidence that the landed estate of the later Carolingian period was less "self-sufficient" and independent of the outside world than was formerly believed, and that the money economy of the ninth and early tenth centuries was considerable;⁵¹ it also indicates that production for the market, in some places at least, must have been directly stimulated by the payments of Danegeld.

Since huge payments of tribute and an increased volume of trade call for a larger supply of money, there can be little doubt — though direct evidence is wanting — that the mining of the precious metals, particularly of silver, had to be increased in

ipsius quaesierunt, ut cum eis pacem facerent." *Ibid.*, 873, p. 124: "Petierunt autem [Nortmanni], ut eis in quadam insula Ligeris fluvii usque in mense Februario residere et mercatum habere liceret, etc." See also *supra*, p. 189, n. 4.

46 *Supra*, pp. 44, 61, 91, 108-9, 136 ff., 152.

47 *Supra*, pp. 55-56.

48 See *infra*, pp. 216 ff.

49 On this and the following, cf. *supra*, pp. 56-58 and notes. It is an interesting fact, though without any necessary relation to the Danegeld, that Frisian or North French cloth was used at the royal courts of Scandinavia in the ninth century, and that swords made in France by Frankish or Flemish artisans have been found in the Scandinavian lands (Bugge, "Die nord-europäischen Verkehrswege, etc.," *loc. cit.*, p. 254).

50 That there was throughout the Carolingian period a production for the market, in agriculture as well as in manufactured articles, has been abundantly demonstrated by Dopsch, *op. cit.*, I, 262 ff., 296 ff.; II, 155-79.

51 See Dopsch, *op. cit.*, II, 234-77; Thompson, *op. cit.*, 872-73, 887.

order to keep a sufficient number of coins in circulation.⁵² Doubtless the plate of the churches was sometimes used in the payment of the Danegeld.⁵³ Yet most of the tribute probably was paid in specie,⁵⁴ ordinarily silver, though on a few occasions part may have been in gold.⁵⁵

The steady and continued improvement in the quality of the West Frankish coinage during the latter half of the ninth century must be ascribed in part to the influence of the Danegeld.⁵⁶ It would seem that the invaders accepted tribute money only after they had first counted and then weighed it;⁵⁷ the weighing being done either by the Vikings on their own scales,⁵⁸ or by the

52 See Soetbeer's article on Carolingian coinage in *Forsch., z. d. Gesch.*, VI, 8-9, 53-54, 56. This scholar presumed (p. 54) that most of the silver in the West Frankish realm was mined at Melle in southern Poitou (now Melle-sur-Béronne in the département Deux-Sèvres—see Vogel, 123).

53 *Supra*, chap. vi, n. 114; chap. xvi, n. 11. When it is said that drafts were made on the church treasuries for the Danegelds of 860, 877, and 884, this does not necessarily mean that the contribution consisted of plate.

54 *Supra*, p. 58 and nn. 77, 78. Cf. Dopsch, *op. cit.*, II, 305.

55 In 845 and in 861 part of the Danegeld may have been paid in gold (see *supra*, pp. 34-35 and n. 45, p. 37 and n. 55, pp. 52-53 and n. 54). The annalist of Fulda is probably inaccurate when he states that the Danegeld of 884 was paid in gold and silver (*supra*, p. 132, n. 76). On the other occasions the evidence indicates that the payments were made in silver. Though the later Carolingians appear to have retained the system of bimetallism (Dopsch, *op. cit.*, II, 279), it is probably true that by far the larger part of the money in circulation consisted of silver coins (*ibid.*, 306). Still there was undeniably a large supply of gold in the Frankish realm (*ibid.*, 138, 173-74, 256-57, 306-8.) A very large monastic treasure of exclusively Arabic gold is mentioned in the *Sermo de relatione corporis beati Vedasti*, c. 4 *M.G.H.*, *SS.*, XV, p. 402, lines 40-41). The Vikings doubtless secured through plunder and trade a considerable part of this supply of gold (*supra*, p. 55 and n. 63; cf. Soetbeer, *op. cit.*, VI, 22). For purposes of transportation gold, by reason of its lesser bulk and weight, must have been preferred to silver.

56 That the quality of the West Frankish coinage was improved during the ninth century is well known (see Dopsch, *op. cit.*, II, 303 ff.; Soetbeer, *op. cit.*, VI, 9, 10, 13-14). I do not wish to deny that there were other reasons for this besides the Danegeld. My contention is simply that the Danegeld was one of several factors making for an improved coinage. The old theory of Dümmler (I, 470, 548), Steenstrup (*op. cit.*, II, 367), and others, that the Danegeld led to counterfeiting and depreciation of the coinage, is no longer tenable.

57 At least that inference may be drawn from the following statement of Regino (*Chron.* 884, ed. Kurze, p. 122; cf. *supra*, p. 137, n. 105): "[Nortmanni] respondent se cum Carlomanno rege, non cum alio aliquo foedus pepigisse; quisquis ille esset, qui ei in regnum succederet, eiusdem numeri et quantitatis pecuniam daret, etc."

58 *Supra*, p. 71, n. 60, p. 132, n. 76. Cf. Montelius, *Kulturgeschichte Schwedens*, p. 277. According to Soetbeer (*op. cit.*, VI, 55-56), the Scandinavian weights were four per cent. heavier than the Frankish. But Montelius (*op. cit.*, 193, 278) believes that, in Sweden at least, the Roman *libra* of 327.5

Franks on Frankish scales under the careful supervision of the Vikings.⁵⁹ Moreover, on one occasion the latter are said to have demanded silver of pure and tested quality;⁶⁰ which probably means that they would accept only such coins as were of proper fineness. In any case these are indications that bad money could seldom if ever be pawned off on the Northmen. Accordingly, all coins that were clipped, or for other reasons below weight, or that contained too much alloy, must have tended to drop out of circulation, since they could not be used in the payment of the Danegeld.⁶¹ Indeed, the latter must have been a very important factor in the development of a general demand for money of proper weight and fineness.

Did the Danegeld have any effect on the coinage *system* of the West Frankish kingdom? It is a significant fact that in the time of Charles the Bald many persons, even among the lower classes, refused to accept in trade and otherwise coins that did not bear the stamp of the local mint. Evidently this fact reflects another, and preceding, fact; namely that the *ministeriales* of the local authorities had been instructed by their superiors to accept in the payment of redevances and taxes — the Danegeld in particular — only money whose weight and fineness could not be questioned, that is to say, locally coined money. Doubtless the desire to avoid the task of having to weigh and test each coin might have prompted such an instruction; but probably it was dictated also, and in larger measure, by the economic interests of those seigniors who controlled or possessed the mints — some of which had never been authorized by the king and were illegal — and who wished to enrich themselves by the profits accruing to them from the process of recoinage.⁶² The Danegeld, therefore, so far from having aided Charles the Bald in his efforts to control and unify the coinage of the realm,⁶³ on the contrary must have tended to frustrate those efforts. On the increasing tendency of the seigniors to establish private mints, sometimes with and some-

grams had by this time been superseded by the medieval *mark* (= 200 grams). In the last named work there is an illustration (p. 278) of a bronze scale found in Sweden and presumably of the type ordinarily used by the Vikings. See also Bugge, *Vesterlandenes Indflydelse*, loc. cit., p. 306.

⁵⁹ *Supra*, p. 49, n. 32, p. 54, n. 61; cf. p. 95, n. 17, p. 147, n. 46.

⁶⁰ In 884; see *supra*, p. 132, n. 76.

⁶¹ Cf. Soetbeer, *op. cit.*, VI, 8-11.

⁶² See *supra*, p. 54, n. 62. Cf. Soetbeer, *op. cit.*, VI, 8-10.

⁶³ *Edictum Pistense*, cc. 8-24, *M.G.H., LL.*, Sectio II, t. 2, pp. 314-20. Cf. Soetbeer, *op. cit.*, VI, 9-22; *supra*, p. 54, n. 62.

times without royal sanction — a very noticeable feature of the later ninth and especially of the tenth century⁶⁴ — the Danegeld must have had, if any, a stimulating effect.

Finally it should be said that the Danegeld led to a very serious impoverishment of the West Frankish realm.⁶⁵ Between 845 and 926, i. e. within a period of about eighty years, we have recorded twelve or possibly thirteen payments of general Danegeld.⁶⁶ The total sum of money represented by those payments cannot be determined, since on only seven occasions are we informed of the amounts paid. For the Danegeld of 853, and for the payments made by Odo and by Rudolph, we have no figures whatever, and we do not know how much was paid to the Vikings of the Loire in 877. The total of the seven known amounts aggregates the sum of 39,700 pounds of silver;⁶⁷ perhaps the remaining payments would at least double that figure and possibly triple it.⁶⁸ In the latter case, the general Danegeld alone would represent a loss to the Western Franks of over 100,000 pounds of silver⁶⁹ or its equivalent in other commodities.⁷⁰ The amount of money paid to the Northmen in the form of ransom, or local Danegeld,

64 On this see Flach, *op. cit.*, III, 345-48 and notes; Sée, *op. cit.*, 421-22. Cf. Soetbeer, *op. cit.*, VI, 23-37; Fustel de Coulanges, *op. cit.*, 663 and n. 1; Viollet, *Les inst. polit. de la France*, I, 331-33; v. Kalckstein, *Gesch. d. franz. Königtums*, I, 165 and n. 2.

65 Cf. *supra*, pp. 109-10, nn. 112, 114, p. 138 and n. 114.

66 *Supra*, p. 189 and n. 3.

67	7,000	pounds in 845	
	5,000	"	" 861
	6,000	"	" 862
	4,000	"	" 866
	5,000	"	" 877 (to the Seine Vikings)
	12,000	"	" 884
	700	"	" 886 (furnished by Charles the Fat from Germany)

Total 39,700 pounds.

68 In England each successive payment of tribute was as a rule larger than the preceding one (cf. *supra*, pp. 17-18 and notes). On this basis it may be conjectured that the Frankish Danegelds in the time of Odo and Rudolph were heavier than the payments made by Charles the Bald. I doubt, however, for the reasons stated *supra*, p. 133, n. 77, that a Danegeld larger than that of 884 was ever paid by the Franks.

69 Cf. Soetbeer, *op. cit.*, VI, 56; Vogel, 216. According to Prou (*Les monnaies carolingiennes*, Introd., p. XLV), the intrinsic value of the Carolingian *denarius* was about .45 modern French *francs*. One hundred thousand Carolingian pounds would then be equal to nearly eleven million *francs*, or more than two million dollars in American money. Such calculations, however, are of almost no value, for it has proved impossible to determine in any accurate way the purchasing power of money in the Carolingian period (Dopsch, *op. cit.*, II, 299 ff.).

70 Those commodities for which some part of the Danegeld had been the purchase price (see *supra*, pp. 211-13).

it is impossible even to conjecture. Of course, it must be admitted that the Danegeld, general and local, does not represent by far all the treasure secured by the Vikings. There can scarcely be any doubt that the invaders secured more treasure through plunder than through the payment of tribute;⁷¹ and in the impoverishment of the realm the Danegeld was certainly a less important factor than the destruction of property and the devastation of the land. None the less, the Danegeld does represent a very serious economic loss to the Western Franks. We know that *all* the money secured by the Vikings was not used up by them while they sojourned in France.⁷² A considerable part of the supply of money and precious metals must have been drained off to Scandinavia or England.⁷³ Furthermore, even if it is admitted that the huge payments to the Vikings tended temporarily to stimulate trade and to encourage a somewhat larger output in agriculture, industry, and mining, the fact remains that the Vikings themselves produced little or nothing, that they were parasites on the native population in the West Frankish kingdom, and, as such, only used up the fruits of the labor of others. It is true that all parts of the kingdom did not suffer equally. Francia and Neustria probably were most affected, for the population there always was required to contribute toward the Danegeld. Burgundy, too, was taxed on most occasions; but it was less often subjected to devastation and pillage than Francia and Neustria. As for Aquitaine, we do not know with certainty whether the general Danegeld ever was levied in that country, but there probably were frequent payments of ransom.⁷⁴

71 Cf. *supra*, p. 55 and n. 63, p. 57, n. 73.

72 See *supra*, p. 37 and nn. 55, 56, p. 55 and n. 63, p. 57, n. 73, p. 91 and n. 163, p. 108 and n. 105, pp. 136 ff., p. 157 and n. 38; cf. appendix iv. See also *Chronicon Britannicum*, 873, Bouquet, VII, p. 222; *Chronicon Monasterii S. Sergii Andegav.*, *ibid.*, p. 53; *Ann. Fuld.* 873, *loc. cit.*, pp. 80-81.

73 The fact that only a few—less than fifty—Frankish coins dating from the eighth or ninth century have been found in the three Scandinavian countries (Montelius, *op. cit.*, p. 269) does not, of course, prove the contrary. In any case, no inference could be drawn from such finds as regards the influence of the Danegeld either on France or Scandinavia, since it would be impossible to distinguish the coins that reached Scandinavia through the ordinary channels of trade from those that were brought there as part of the Danegeld. It is an interesting fact that a very large amount of silver in the form of ornaments and also in bars and ingots, and dating from the Viking period, has been found in Scandinavia. On this see Sophus Müller, *Nordische Altertumskunde* (German translation by O. L. Jiriczek), II, 285 ff.; Montelius, *op. cit.*, 273, 276, 285-88.

74 *Supra*, p. 198.

The Danegeld involved an inestimable economic loss to the church in the western kingdom.⁷⁵ The treasures of churches and monasteries⁷⁶ were frequently drawn upon to furnish what could not be raised by taxation. At the end of the reign of Charles the Bald many formerly wealthy ecclesiastical establishments had been completely exhausted, and this, according to Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims, was due to the deplorable policy of paying tribute to the Vikings.⁷⁷ Probably many more churches had been forced to give up their treasures before the last Danegeld was paid in 926.⁷⁸ In this connection we should remember also that priests were not exempt from the Danegeld;⁷⁹ and that those peasants who were settled on the lands of the church were probably required to contribute more regularly than other peasants. A monarch like Charles the Bald, who pursued a policy of favoritism toward the higher clergy,⁸⁰ doubtless relied on the church to furnish the financial aid which, at critical moments, was often refused him by the lay magnates.⁸¹ In this way the Danegeld must have served to increase the antagonism of the clergy toward the lay seigniors;⁸² the latter, as has been noted,⁸³ usually preferred the policy of paying tribute; and their recreancy in the matter of defending the land against the pagan enemy is constantly, and very bitterly, emphasized by the contemporary chroniclers and hagiographers,⁸⁴ all of whom were ecclesiastics.

We may agree with Dümmler⁸⁵ that if any direct public benefit was derived from the policy of paying Danegeld, it was a wholly negative one; the Danegeld served only to distribute over large portions of the West Frankish kingdom the burdens and losses

75 It is also true, of course, that the church suffered more from the plundering raids of the Vikings than did the lay seigniors (cf. *supra*, p. 47 and n. 18).

76 For an interesting catalogue and description of the treasure of a monastery, see Hariulf, *Chronique de l'abbaye de Saint-Riquier*, II, c. 10, ed. Lot, pp. 67 ff.; III, c. 3, pp. 86 ff.

77 *Supra*, pp. 109-10 and n. 114; cf. p. 138, n. 114.

78 By the middle of the tenth century most of the bishoprics in western France were without any appreciable resources (Lot, *Etudes sur la règne de Hugues Capet*, pp. 217, 232 and n. 3).

79 *Supra*, p. 192.

80 *Supra*, p. 42 and n. 19, pp. 46-47 and n. 17, p. 105 and n. 85.

81 Cf. *supra*, p. 43 and n. 25.

82 Cf. *supra*, p. 47 and n. 18, p. 100, n. 47, pp. 109-10 and n. 114, pp. 116-17, p. 129, n. 61, p. 130, n. 67.

83 *Supra*, pp. 205-6 and notes.

84 See for example *supra*, pp. 26-27, nn. 6, 8, pp. 109-10, n. 114, p. 115, n. 20, p. 129, n. 61.

85 *Op. cit.*, III, 42.

which the regions directly exposed to the Viking raids would otherwise have had to bear alone. The study of the Danegeld is a study of what in the economic sense must be regarded as a non-productive factor. The importance of such factors, however, is not always wholly negligible. Their effect on contemporary institutions and conditions may often be at least a partial explanation of why those conditions and institutions disappear, or are metamorphosed into something that seems entirely new. Perhaps the following may be said as regards the importance of the subject that has been studied in the preceding pages: it would be impossible thoroughly to understand the general political and economic development of France during the transition period of the ninth and tenth centuries, if the influence of the Danegeld were left totally out of consideration.

APPENDIX I.

WHEN AND WHERE WAS THE ASSESSMENT FOR THE DANEGELD PAID TO THE VIKINGS OF THE SEINE IN 877 PREPARED?

Most scholars who have touched upon the subject of the tribute promised the Northmen of the Seine in 877, are agreed that an assessment for this Danegeld was prepared at Compiègne on May 7.¹ The sole basis for this is the superscription of a document which gives the rates of the assessment.² Since, however, this superscription does not agree with the *Annals of St. Bertin*, which state that the assessment was made at Kiersy on June 14,³

1 See the following: Bouquet, VII, 123, note (e); Pertz in *M.G.H., SS.*, I, 503, n. 94; Dehaisnes, ed. *Ann. Bert.*, p. 255, note (c); Waitz, ed. *Ann. Bert.*, p. 135, n. 4; Krause in *M.G.H., LL.* Sectio II, t. ii, p. 353, lines 28 ff.; Gfrörer, *Gesch. d. ost- u. westfränk. Carolinger*, II, 142; von Kalckstein, *Abt Hugo in Forsch. z. d. Gesch.*, XIV, pp. 73-74; Dümmler, III, 42, n. 1; Steenstrup, *Normannerne*, II, 185; Bourgeois, *Le capitulaire de Kiersy-sur-Oise*, 81 (last two lines), 82 and n. 1; *id.*, *L'assemblée de Querzy-sur-Oise*, in *Etudes d'histoire du moyen âge dédiées à Gabriel Monod*, 139, n. 1; Lot, "Le pont de Pitres," *Le Moyen Age*, 1905, IX, 14, 15 and n. 2; Vogel, 253-54.

2 *Edictum Compendiense de tributo Nordmannico*, *B. M.G.H., LL.*, Sectio II, t. ii, p. 354: "Anno incarnationis dominicæ DCCCLXXVII, Nonis Maii in Compendio palatio de aliqua, sed non de tota parte regni, quod dominus imperator Karolus habuit, antequam iunior Hlotharius defunctus fuisset, hæc constituta est exactio Nortmannis, qui erant in Sequana, tribuenda, ut a regno eius recederent." Another and similar document, for the same year and the same purpose (*A, ibid.*), has the following superscription: "Hæc exactio a Nortmannis, qui erant in Sequana tempore Karoli regis, de suo regno fuit facta, ut ab ipsius regno recederent." In this appendix we shall be concerned primarily with document B. But see *infra*, p. 229.

3 *Ann. Bert.*, 877, ed. Waitz, p. 135: "Inde [Karolus] placitum suum generale Kalendis Iulii [i. e. June 14 (see below)] habuit, ubi per capitula, qualiter regnum Franciæ filius suus Hludowicus cum fidelibus eius et regni primoribus regeret, usque dum ipse Roma rediret, ordinavit, et quomodo tributum de parte regni Franciæ quam ante mortem Lotharii habuit, sed et de Burgundia exigeretur, disposuit, . . . Dominus autem imperator Karolus de Carisiaco Compendium, indeque per Suessionis ad Remum civitatem . . . peragens, etc." Bouquet—VII, 123, note (c)—believing that Hincmar had committed an error, suggested that the date *Kalendis Iulii* (Bouquet has *Kalendas Iulii*), in the above quotation, ought to be corrected to *XVIII Kal Jul.* Pertz (*M.G.H., SS.*, I, 502, n. 92) was of a different

some students have assumed that Hincmar, the author of this portion of the *Annals of St. Bertin*, confused, in so far as the levy of the Danegeld was concerned, the proceedings of the assembly at Kiersy on June 14 with those of the assembly at Compiègne on May 7.⁴ M. Bourgeois, on the other hand, unwilling to believe that Hincmar could have erred so grossly in matters on which he was so well informed as the levy of the Danegeld and the Assembly of Kiersy, has endeavored to reconcile the superscription of the tax document with the statements of Hincmar, by arguing that there were two distinct assessments: the first at Compiègne on May 7, and the second at Kiersy on June 14.⁵

opinion. He had observed that when in the manuscript calendars the words *Kalendae*, *Nonae*, and *Idus* were written in majuscules they signified, not those days in each month which were specifically known as the calends, the nones, or the ides; but the first day of those periods in each month during which the days were numbered with reference to the calends, the nones, and the ides, respectively. Thus KALEND. IUL. meant, not July 1 (the day of the calends of July), but June 14 (the eighteenth day before the calends of July), the whole period from June 14 to July 1 being designated as (the period of) the calends of July. Hincmar, accordingly, when he wrote KALEND. IUL., evidently meant the beginning (first day) of the period of the calends of July, which is June 14, precisely the day on which the Assembly of Kiersy convened. Fustel de Coulanges (*Nouvelles recherches*, p. 417, n. 1), who is of the same opinion as Pertz, calls attention to another sentence of Hincmar which may illustrate how this manner of reckoning time originated (*Schedula*, t. II, c. 17, Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, CXXXVI, 587): "Plures kalendae mensis augusti pertransierunt, etc."

4 The assumption seems to have originated with Bouquet, whose dictum was accepted by Pertz, Dehaisnes, Waitz, Dümmler, and Krause; and apparently also by Gfrörer, von Kalckstein, and Steenstrup. See the references cited for these *supra*, n. 1. That Hincmar should have been so misjudged is all the more striking, in view of the fact that a specific reference to the Danegeld in the *Capitulary of Kiersy* (cf. *infra*, n. 16), proves that the raising of this tribute was one of the important matters arranged at the assembly of June 14.

5 This argument of Bourgeois (*L'assemblée de Quierzy-sur-Oise*, *loc. cit.*), though evidently accepted by Lot and Vogel (see the references given *supra*, n. 1) is, in my opinion, not convincing. The superscription of the tax document (cf. *supra*, n. 2) says that at Compiègne the tax was levied on part, but not on the whole, of the kingdom of Charles such as it was before the death of Lothaire II. This, it will be noted, is a very indefinite statement; one which really does not convey any information as to exactly what part of the realm of Charles was or was not taxed. According to Bourgeois' interpretation, the statement means the entire kingdom of Charles the Bald as it was in 870 with exception of Burgundy. That is, to be sure, the only interpretation which the principal hypothesis of Bourgeois will permit. But it is obviously not the only interpretation possible. When it is said that only part of the realm of 870 was taxed, it does not necessarily follow that Burgundy was not taxed. It is quite possible that the writer meant to include Burgundy and to exclude some other division of the kingdom of Charles the Bald, as for example Neustria, where another Danegeld was being raised at the same time for the Vikings of the Loire (see *supra*, pp. 95-

Both views, it will be noted, rest in last analysis on the assumption that the superscription of the tax document is a thoroughly reliable source of information. One group of scholars regards the authority of the superscription sufficient to controvert the evidence furnished by Hincmar in the *Annals of St. Bertin*; while Bourgeois and his followers, though they are not disposed to rule Hincmar out of court, none the less retain their confidence in the truth of what is said in the superscription. It is clear, therefore, that both views will be rendered untenable if it can be shown that the superscription is a less trustworthy source of information than Hincmar. And if it can be established that the evidence of the superscription is utterly unreliable, we must perforce fall back upon the *Annals of St. Bertin* and the *Capitulary of Kiersy* as our only trustworthy sources of information on this point.⁶

That an authentic document has higher testimonial value than a narrative account, is in historical science a canon which it would be stupid to challenge. What we are now concerned with, however, is, not a document proper, but the superscription of a document. Was this superscription originally part of the document at the head of which it now appears; or was it placed there by a later hand?

To me it seems that the latter view must be adopted, and for several reasons. A careful study of the body of the document, i. e. the provisions of the assessment, reveals the fact that there the present and future tenses are used exclusively:⁷ an indication

96, 108). The fact is that this statement is too indefinite to admit of any conclusions as to its exact meaning. Again, Bourgeois asserts that according to Hincmar, the tax at Kiersy was levied on the whole kingdom of Charles the Bald as it was in 870 and also on Burgundy. But this is not accurate. Hincmar does say that at Kiersy a tax was levied on that part of the kingdom of *Francia* which Charles had before 870 and also on Burgundy. The words of Hincmar certainly do not imply a previous assessment, from which Burgundy had been exempted, nor do they necessarily indicate a larger tax area than that referred to in the superscription. We may note, finally, that the superscription, whatever may be its meaning, has practically no historical value if it was, as I will attempt to show in the following, added to the tax document by a later hand.

6 Cf. *supra*, nn. 3, 4; *infra*, n. 16. The later compilations, such as the *Continuation of Aimoin* (*Historiae Francorum*, V, [ed. Nicot, Paris, 1567]) and the *Grandes chroniques de St. Denis* (Bouquet, VII, 146), are, of course, not reliable; the latter, in particular, are very inaccurate and confused. Cf. *infra*, pp. 226 ff.

7 *Edictum . . . de tributo Nordmannico*, B, *loc. cit.*: "donent . . . sint . . . accipiant . . . sunt . . . pergent . . . remanserint . . . consistunt . . . accipiat . . . commanent . . . habuerint . . . exigatur."

that it was written *before* the actual collection of the Danegeld. Hincmar, on the other hand, in giving the substance of the document in the *Annals of St. Bertin*, used the past tense:⁸ an indication that he wrote *after* the Danegeld had been collected. The same holds true of the superscription, where the tenses (past and pluperfect) of the verbs are so employed as to prove beyond peradventure that it was not written until after the death of Charles the Bald and the departure of the Northmen.⁹ Again, a comparison of the vague denotation, in the superscription, of the territory in which the Danegeld was to be levied — “*de aliqua, sed non de tota parte regni, quod domnus imperator Karolus habuit, antequam iunior Hlotharius defunctus fuisset*” — with the very specific statement of Hincmar — “*de parte regni Franciae quam ante mortem Lotharii habuit, sed et de Burgundia*” — shows unmistakably that Hincmar, who was a contemporary, had much more accurate information on this point than the writer of the superscription, who for all we know may not have lived until long, possibly centuries, after the events he referred to.¹⁰

Moreover, while it may be true that Hincmar is not always an infallible authority on the events and conditions of his time, yet what he says in this connection must be given considerable weight.¹¹ He was himself present at the Assembly of Kiersy,¹² and therefore may be presumed to have known what was decided there. Another indication that he was particularly well informed as regards the levy of the Danegeld, is the fact that he wrote a letter on that subject to Louis the Stammerer.¹³ Also, it is very significant that his statements in the *Annals of St. Bertin* relative to the apportionment of the taxes levied at Kiersy, in the

8 *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*: “*habuit . . . exigeretur, disposuit . . . erat . . . acciperent . . . redderent . . . extitit . . . acceptum fuit . . . fuerunt.*”

9 See *supra*, n. 2.

10 Cf. *supra*, nn. 2, 3, 5.

11 Cf. Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, 139.

12 See the letter to Louis the Stammerer written shortly after the death of Charles the Bald (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, CXXV, 988).

13 Flodoard, *Historia Remensis ecclesiae*, III, c. 19, *M.G.H.*, *SS.*, XIII, p. 510. Evidently this letter (which is not the same as the one to which reference was made in the preceding note) was written while Charles the Bald was in Italy, and certainly before the emperor's death, for the latter event is mentioned by Flodoard a little farther on in the same chapter; the letter probably was composed during the collection of the Danegeld, and may have contained advice on that subject (cf. *supra*, chap. vi, n. 99).

main agree with the provisions given in the body of the tax document.¹⁴

These various considerations lead me to believe (1) that the superscription was not part of the original document; (2) that the superscription was added to the document by some scribe of a much later period; (3) that the scribe in question did not possess accurate information concerning the territorial limits within which the Danegeld was levied; and, consequently, (4) that the statements of Hincmar in the *Annals of St. Bertin* are a much more trustworthy source of information than those of the scribe in the superscription, both as regards the territory in which the taxes for the Danegeld were levied and also with reference to the time and place at which the assessment of these taxes was prepared.

From what has been said above it follows that if the *Annals of St. Bertin* and the superscription of the tax document disagree as to the time and place at which the taxes were assessed, the statements of Hincmar ought to be given greater credence. Now Hincmar, though he does speak of an assembly of bishops at Compiègne on May 1, fails to mention any meeting there on May 7. According to Hincmar, there was but one assessment for this Danegeld and it was prepared at the Assembly of Kiersy on June 14.¹⁵ And belief in Hincmar's accuracy here, far from

¹⁴ Hincmar omits certain details given in the documents, regarding the levy of the taxes on the *mansî* and the resources of the priests; and he does not say anything about the taxation of the merchants, which is mentioned in document B and in chapter 31 of the *Capitulary of Kiersy*, but not in document A (cf. *supra*, n. 2). On the other hand, Hincmar speaks of a contribution from the church treasuries, which is not referred to in either of the tax documents (cf. *supra*, chap. vi, n. 99); and he alone informs us that the bishops after collecting the money from the priests were to pay it over to the *missi dominici*. The documents, of course, were drawn up for the specific purpose of furnishing official instruction as to where, how, and by whom, the Danegeld was to be collected. Hincmar wrote his account after the Danegeld had been collected, and for historical purposes only; therefore, he did not consider it necessary to give all the details that appeared in the official documents, though he did think it worth while to give some additional information as to how the required sum was finally obtained. See also appendix ii.

¹⁵ *Ann. Bert.*, 877, p. 135: "Kalendis Mai episcopus Remensis provinciae, sed et aliarum provinciarum Compendio convocavit, et ecclesiam quam in eodem oratorio construxerat cum multo apparatu in sua et nunciorum apostolicae sedis praesentia ab eisdem episcopis consecrari fecit. Inde placitum suum generale Kalendis Iulii habuit, etc." (cf. *supra*, n. 3). Evidently all the bishops did not reach Compiègne at the appointed time; in any case the church was not dedicated until May 5 (Bouquet, VIII, 660; Böhmer-Mühlbacher, *Die Regesten d. Kaiserreichs u. d. Karolingern*, no. 1809; cf. Dümmler, III, 41, n. 1).

being undermined, is strengthened by the additional evidence furnished by chapter 30 of the *Capitulary of Kiersy*.¹⁶ For while this does not give the details of the assessment, it proves none the less that the levying of the Danegeld was one of the important matters taken up at the Assembly of Kiersy. Nor may we overlook the significance of that clause in both of the tax documents which distinguishes those counts and royal vassals who were to accompany Charles to Italy from those who were to remain in France. Such a distinction would hardly have been made until *after* it had been arranged that some of the *fideles* were to go with the emperor, while others were to remain at home. And this we know was one of the arrangements made at the Assembly of Kiersy.¹⁷ It is also worth noting that the collection of the Danegeld evidently did not begin until after the Assembly of Kiersy;¹⁸ which would be very strange if the assessment had been prepared and the levy ordered fully six weeks before. Surely this evidence, direct and indirect, outweighs the very questionable testimony of the superscription.^{18a} Indeed it seems there can be no room for doubt that this Danegeld was assessed at Kiersy on June 14; and that the old view of an assessment at Compiègne on May 7, must be discarded.

But, it may be asked, how was the writer of the superscription led, or rather misled, to believe that the assessment took place at Compiègne on May 7? My present answer to this question, and particularly to the last part of it — i. e. the question of how the date May 7 was obtained — can be only hypothetical and tentative. There were produced during the middle ages a large number of historical compilations based more or less remotely on the *Annals of St. Bertin*,¹⁹ all of which must be studied and

16 *M.G.H., LL.*, Sectio II, t. ii, 361: "Qualter hoc perficiatur et ad effectum perveniat, quod Nortmannis dari debet de coniecto."

17 *Edictum . . . de tributo Nordmannico*, A, *loc. cit.*: "De ecclesiis vero, quas comites et vassalli dominici habent, seu de illis, qui cum seniore nostro pergere debent, sive qui remanserint, etc." B, *ibid.*: "De ecclesiis vero imperatoris et imperatricis et comitum ac vassallorum imperialium, tam de illis, qui cum imperatore pergunt, quam et illis, qui remanserint, etc." *Capitulare Carisiacense*, c. 7, *ibid.*, pp. 357-58: "[This is the reply of the assembled *fideles* to a point raised by the emperor] in vestra dispositione erit, qui in isto regno remaneant, vel qui post vos in vestrum adiutorium pergant." Those whom Charles selected to follow him to Italy are named in chapter 25 (p. 360). The question of the Danegeld evidently was not discussed at the assembly until after these other matters had been settled; it is the subject with which chapter 30 (p. 361) of the capitulary deals.

18 Cf. *supra*, p. 107 and n. 97.

19 A very good catalogue, and critical account, of these compilations is given by Bourgeois in his *Le capit. de Kiersy-sur-Oise*, pp. 155 ff.

collated before anything like a final opinion on this subject can be formulated. To some of these works I have not yet been able to obtain access. I venture to believe, however, that careful examination of these various compilations will eventually establish the correctness of at least the fundamental part of what is here set forth.

An erroneous impression as regards the place and date at which the tribute for the Vikings of the Seine in 877 was assessed, may easily be acquired from a cursory, uncritical reading of the *Annals of St. Bertin*. In these annals Hincmar fails, it is true, to mention any meeting whatsoever on May 7. But he does state that for May 1 Charles the Bald had summoned an assembly of bishops to Compiègne, where a church recently constructed was then to be dedicated. After having described this dedication ceremony at Compiègne on the calends of May, Hincmar proceeds at once to speak of the other assembly on June 14, but without indicating here in any way that this later assembly met at Kiersy.²⁰ Not until after he has related what took place at the assembly of June 14, does he give even the slightest intimation that this assembly met at a place other than that at which (Compiègne) the assembly of the calends of May had met. Indeed, all he says is that Charles now — i. e. after the assembly of June 14 — proceeded from Kiersy to Compiègne, and thence to Soissons, etc.²¹ Hincmar, accordingly, does not expressly state that the assembly of June 14 met at Kiersy; this is a fact which must be *inferred* from what follows in his narrative. Even a careful reader of this passage in the *Annals of St. Bertin* is likely to gain from it the (erroneous) impression that two assemblies were held at Compiègne, one on May 1 and the other on June 14.

It must be remembered, moreover, that until the eighteenth century, the "famous" *Capitulary of Kiersy* was practically unknown, and that during the middle ages most of the information, or rather misinformation, that was current concerning the reign of Charles the Bald, was obtained, not from the *Annals of St. Bertin*, but from either the *Continuation of Aimoin* or, more often, the *Grandes chroniques de St. Denis*.²² The *Continuation of Aimoin*, though often inaccurate, is, so far as that portion of it which has to do with the dedication of the church

²⁰ See *supra*, n. 15.

²¹ See *supra*, n. 3; cf. Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

²² For a good discussion of this whole subject, see *ibid.*, 155 ff.; cf. 4 ff.

at Compiègne and the Assembly of Kiersy is concerned, on the whole a fairly accurate reproduction of the *Annals of St. Bertin*.²³ But the *Grandes chroniques de St. Denis*, on the other hand, are very misleading, as will appear from the following quotation: "Es Kalendes de May fist assembler concile à Compiègne des evesques de la province de Rains et des autres provinces: si fist dedier l'eglise de S. Cornile, que il avait fondée en son propre palais, en la presence des prelaz et des messages l'apostole. Là meismes [i. e. at Compiègne] fist-il parlement de barons; et fu ordené comment Looyz ses fiuz gouvereroit le roiaume par le conseil des barons jusques à tant que il fust retornez de Rome; et puis comment il recevroit le treu de l'une des parties du roiaume de France, qui estoit accostuméz à rendre avant la mort le roi Lothaire, et du roiaume de Borgoigne. . . . Ces choses ensi ordenées, li empereres se parti de Compiègne²⁴ et s'en ala à Soissons, de Soissons à Rains, etc."²⁵

When one stops to reflect upon the meager facilities which the writer of the superscription had to learn the truth — and his abundant opportunity to secure misinformation — with reference to the occasion at which the assessment of the Danegeld was prepared, the wonder is, not that this well-intentioned individual committed the errors he did, but that he failed to commit more. Knowledge of the fact that an important assembly had convened at Kiersy in the year 877 could never have been gained from a reading of the *Grandes chroniques de St. Denis*, where it is not even hinted at. And it will perhaps be agreed that even the most lynx-eyed of modern scholars would hardly be able to detect either in the *Continuation of Aimoin* or in the *Annals of St. Bertin* the obscure implication that the assembly of June 14 met at Kiersy, *unless he were already acquainted with that fact*. The scholar with a previous knowledge of the Assembly of Kiersy will doubtless find both in the *Annals of St. Bertin* and in the *Continuation of Aimoin* confirmation of what he already knows. But it may be safely

23 The *Continuation of Aimoin*, it is true, has *Kal. Junii* where the *Annals of St. Bertin* have *Kal. Iulii*. See *supra*, n. 3, and cf. Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, 158. One manuscript, however, of the *Annals of St. Bertin* (see ed. Waitz, p. 135, note b; ed. Dehaisnes, p. 255, note 1) also has *Kal. Iuntis* (or *Junii*).

24 Here the redactor, by omitting Kiersy (cf. *supra*, n. 3), perhaps attempted to rectify what he may have regarded as an error in the *Annals of St. Bertin* or in the *Continuation of Aimoin*.

25 Bouquet, VII, 146. Cf. Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, 159.

asserted that a person not in possession of this information would never, by reading any or all of these narrative accounts, become aware that the assembly at which the Danegeld was assessed met at Kiersy; such a reader would, like the redactor of the *Grandes chroniques de St. Denis* and the writer of the superscription, inevitably draw the conclusion that this assembly had met at Compiègne.

With reference to the date of the assembly at which the Danegeld was assessed, the three narratives vary widely: according to the *Grandes chroniques* it was *es Kalendes de May*;²⁶ according to the *Continuation of Aimoin*, *Kalendas Junii*; and according to the *Annals of St. Bertin*, *Kalendis Iulii*.²⁷ Yet none of these dates agree with that given in the superscription: *Nonis Maii*.²⁸ Whence or how the latter date was obtained, can for the present be only conjectured. So far as my observations go, the nones of May (May 7) are not given, as the date of the preparation of the assessment, in any source except the superscription of the tax document.²⁹ If the writer of the superscription, like the redactor of the *Grandes chroniques de St. Denis*, was under the impression that the tribute was assessed at Compiègne on the calends of May,³⁰ then obviously the word *Nonis* in the superscription is simply a clerical error — committed either by the original writer or by some later copyist — for *Kalendis*. It is also possible, though in my opinion unlikely, that the author of the superscription, in writing *Nonis*, was attempting to rectify what he may have regarded as a mistake on the part of the Continuator of Aimoin. According to the latter, as we have seen, the taxes were assessed, not *Kalendis*

26 That must have been the belief of the redactor of the *Grandes chroniques de St. Denis*, for he does not indicate that there was any interval between the dedication of the church and the *parlement de barons* (see the quotation on the preceding page). Bourgeois (*op. cit.*, 159) is not quite accurate when he says that this redactor (a monk of St. Denis) confused the assembly held at Kiersy in June with that held at Compiègne in April; he did not confuse it with an assembly held at Compiègne in April, but with the one which met there on May 1, or rather, May 5 (cf. *supra*, n. 15).

27 See *supra*, n. 23.

28 See *supra*, n. 2.

29 Nor have I, as yet, found it applied anywhere to the dedication of the church at Compiègne (which really took place on May 5; see *supra*, n. 15), or to the Assembly of Kiersy. It is not impossible, however, that further research on this point, in the sources referred to *supra*, p. 225 and n. 19, may yield results.

30 Cf. *supra*, n. 26.

Iulii as Hincmar says, but *Kalendas Junii*: i. e., if we accept the interpretations of Pertz and Fustel de Coulanges — *mutatis mutandis* — May 14.³¹ But two weeks — from the dedication of the church on May 1 to the preparation of the assessment on May 14 — may have seemed to the writer of the superscription too long a time for a *placitum* to be in session; and, accordingly, he may have substituted, as the date of the assessment, *Nonis Maii* for *Kalendas Junii*, since the first of these dates would better comport with the usual duration of an assembly.

To conclude: If Hincmar is right in indicating that the assessment of the tribute for the Vikings of the Seine was prepared at Kiersy on June 14 — and if what has been above set forth be accepted as a sound argument, there remains no valid reason for doubting the truth of Hincmar's testimony on this point — then it follows that the two tax documents which heretofore have been referred to as the *Edict of Compiègne Concerning the Tribute to the Northmen*,³² must in the future be regarded as part of, or at least as having a close connection with chapter 30 of the *Capitulary of Kiersy*.³³ Moreover, the fact that the details of the assessment as given in the two tax documents essentially agree with the details as given by Hincmar in the *Annals of St. Bertin*,³⁴ is a further indication that these documents in their original form were drawn up at the Assembly of Kiersy on June 14, and, consequently, that the assessment of this Danegeld took place there and then,³⁵ but not at Compiègne on May 7.

31 Cf. *supra*, nn. 23, 3.

32 See *M.G.H., LL.* Sectio II, t. II, 353–54, where the two documents are classified respectively as A and B (cf. *supra*, n. 2).

33 Cf. *supra*, n. 16, and see appendix II. Though no longer extant, there were doubtless many other documents which, like the two tax documents above referred to, served to fill out such chapters in the *Capitulary of Kiersy* as have come down to us only in the form of a title or a summary (cf. Halphen, "A propos du capitulaire de Quierzy-sur-Oise," *Rev. Hist.*, 1911, CVI, 288, 294).

34 Cf. *supra*, n. 14.

35 The preamble of the document known as *Capitula excerpta in conventu Carisiacensi coram populo lecta* (*M.G.H., LL.* Sectio II, t. II, 361) is in accord with the view presented above: "XVI Kalendas praedicti mensis, d. imperator Karolus adnuntiavit generaliter in populam de suo itinere Roman et . . . quia ordinatum habebat, quomodo Nortmanni de isto regno expellantur et postea defendantur, etc." This announcement referred, of course, to the measures just completed at Kiersy.

APPENDIX II.

THE TWO TAX DOCUMENTS OF 877 AND THE CAPITULARY OF KIERSY.

Attention has been directed several times in the preceding pages to two tax documents, designated respectively as *A* and *B*, and containing provisions for the assessment of the Danegeld due the Vikings of the Seine in 877.¹ These documents were, so far as I can tell, first published by Sirmond in 1623.² Unfortunately, however, Sirmond did not indicate whence he had obtained them. The manuscript to which he presumably had access is now probably lost; in any case it has escaped the exploratory efforts of all later editors, including Krause.³ These have, consequently, been obliged simply to reprint the documents in the form in which they were originally published by Sirmond.⁴ Obviously, therefore, textual criticism is here out of question; we must be content to study these documents in the only form in which they now exist or are accessible.

Concerning the date of the two documents little need be said here. The error of Sirmond, Pertz, and others, in referring document *A* to the Danegeld of 861,⁵ was long ago made evident.⁶

1 Cf. *supra*, p. 97 and n. 33; and see appendix I.

2 Sirmond, *Capitula Caroli Calvi et successorum aliquot Franciae regum*, pp. 421 ff.

3 See *M.G.H., LL.* Sectio II, t. II, p. 353, lines 14-15.

4 The text of the documents as given by Krause, the latest editor, is quoted *infra*, n. 9. Cf. Duchesne, *Historiae Francorum scriptores* [1636], II, pp. 460-61; Baluze, *Capitularia regum Francorum* [1677; ed. de Chiniac, 1780], II, pp. 257-58; Bouquet, VII, 697; Pertz, *M.G.H., LL.*, I, 476, 536. In all these editions the text of the documents is identical, save for certain variations in punctuation and capitalization.

5 Dümmler (III, 42, n. 1) and Krause (*M.G.H., LL.*, Sectio II, t. II, 353, lines 16 ff.) are unquestionably wrong in making Pertz (*M.G.H., LL.*, I, 476) the author of this error. It was Sirmond who, in a note to his edition of the *Capitula* (cf. *supra*, n. 2), first ascribed document *A* to the year 861. Sirmond's note was quoted by Baluze (II, p. 806) and Bouquet (VII, 697, note a); a fact which makes the oversight on the part of Dümmler and Krause the more surprising.

6 See the references to Dümmler and Krause in the preceding note.

Perhaps no scholar familiar with the history of the ninth century would now venture to deny that each of the documents contains a draft of an assessment drawn up in 877 for the purpose of raising the tribute then due the Northmen of the Seine.⁷ But unless the argument which I have set forth in the preceding appendix is utterly false and misleading, this assessment was prepared, not at Compiègne on May 7 as most recent scholars have concluded, but at the Assembly of Kiersy on June 14. Accordingly there must have been a very close connection between the two tax documents and that part (chapter 30) of the *Capitulary of Kiersy* which has to do with the Danegeld.⁸

But what is the relation of these two tax documents to each other?⁹ Comparing them, we note at once that the language

⁷ von Noorden (*Hinkmar*, 334, n. 6, 335) argued that document A contained the assessment levied in Neustria (in 877) to raise the Danegeld for the Northmen of the Loire (cf. *supra*, pp. 67, 71). But Dümmler (*loc. cit.*) correctly signaled this as an unwarranted assumption.

⁸ Cf. *supra*, p. 229 and n. 33. The question as to whether chapter 31 of the *Capitulary of Kiersy* has reference to the Danegeld is discussed *infra*, pp. 233 ff.

⁹ For the superscriptions of the documents, see *supra*, appendix 1, n. 2. These superscriptions, which differ on several points, are of no value in attempting to establish the relations of the documents to each other. It has already been pointed out (cf. *supra*, appendix 1) that the superscription of B was added at a later period, and that it is inaccurate and misleading. The superscription of A, while correct so far as it goes, is very vague; the tenses of its verbs clearly indicate that it was written long after the document proper (cf. *supra*, p. 222 f.). The following is the text of the documents as given by Krause. A (*M.G.H.*, LL. Sectio II, t. ii, p. 354): "Unusquisque episcopus, qui habet abbatiam, aut abbas, qui similiter habet abbatiam, aut comes, qui aequae habet abbatiam, de suo manso indominicato similiterque et de vassallorum accipiat de manso indominicato denarios duodecim, de manso ingenuilli quatuor denarios de censu dominicato et quatuor de sua facultate, de servilli vero duos denarios de censu et de sua facultate duos. De omnibus vero ecclesiis unusquisque episcopus vel abbas de sua solummodo potestate accipiant de presbyteris a quocumque plurimum solidos quinque et de unoquoque iuxta quod possibile fuerit, ita ut a quo plurimum quinque solidos, a quo minimum quatuor denarios. De ecclesiis vero, quas comites et vassalli dominici habent, seu de illis, qui cum seniore nostro pergere debent, sive qui remanserint, episcopus, in cuius parrochia consistunt, secundum praetaxatum modum accipere procurabit. De ecclesiis vero imperatricis episcopus similiter accipiet praetaxato modo." B (*ibid.*): "Episcopi, abbates, comites ac vassi dominici ex suis honoribus de unoquoque manso indominicato donent denarios duodecim, de manso ingenuilli quatuor denarios. De ecclesiis vero imperatoris et imperatricis et comitum ac vassalorum manso duos denarios de censu indominicato et duos de facultate mansuarum. De omnibus vero ecclesiis unusquisque episcopus de suo episcopatu vel abbas de sua solummodo abbatia, in cuiuscumque episcopi sint parrochia, accipiant cum misso episcopi, in cuius parrochia sunt, de presbyteris secundum possibilitatem quinque solidos vel quatuor vel tres vel duos vel unum solidum; a quo plurimum quinque solidos, a quo minimum quatuor denarios. De ecclesiis vero imperatoris et imperatricis et comitum ac vassalorum imperialium, tam de illis, qui cum imperatore pergunt, quam et illis,

of *B* is somewhat clearer and more concise than that of *A*. And while the provisions of the one in the main coincide with those of the other, yet they are not identical. The taxation provided for in *B* is more comprehensive than that contemplated in *A*. According to *A*, only *mansi* appertaining to monasteries were taxed, and apparently not all of these, for the document mentions only the monasteries held by bishops, abbots, and counts, but not those held by royal vassals; while according to *B* taxes were due from royal vassals as well as bishops, abbots, and counts, and they were due for the *mansi* of all their *honores*, which included not only monastery lands but all lands given by the king in benefice.¹⁰ *B* requires all priests, including those attached to churches held by the emperor, to pay a tax; and it has a clause (at the very end) which prescribes a contribution from merchants and townsmen. In *A* there is no mention either of the priests of imperial churches or of merchants and townsmen. The provision in *B*, that when an abbot collects the taxes from the priests under his jurisdiction he must do so in conjunction with the *missus* of the bishop of the diocese, is also lacking in *A*.

It would be very anomalous if the more comprehensive and more detailed document (*B*) had preceded the other (*A*). We must assume, on the contrary, that *B* is a revised version of *A*. This, it may be noted, was also the view of Dümmler, who characterized *A* as "nur ein Entwurf, der, als nicht umfassend genug, dem andern weichen musste."¹¹ Krause, though he accepts this view, adds that the words "*cum seniore nostro*" indicate, in his opinion, that this document was drawn up by the magnates.¹² I cannot convince myself of that. Royal officials may very well, in drawing up a preliminary draft, have used such an expression. Moreover, it must be remembered that chapter 30 of the *Capitulary of Kiersy* — to which, in my opinion, both documents owe their origin¹³ — dealt with one of those

qui remanserint, episcopus, in cuius parrochia consistunt, secundum praedictum modum coniectum accipiat. De negotiatoribus autem vel qui in civitatibus commanent iuxta possibilitatem, secundum quod habuerint de facultatibus, coniectus exigatur."

10 Cf. *supra*, chap. v, n. 138.

11 Dümmler, *loc. cit.*

12 *M.G.H., LL.* Sectio II, t. II, p. 353, lines 22 ff.

13 See the preceding page and n. 8.

questions on which the assembled *fideles* did not give their opinion.¹⁴

These various facts and considerations appear from my point of view to justify the following hypothesis: (1) both tax documents were drawn up by the king's officials at the Assembly of Kiersy on June 14, and were intended to be inserted into chapter 30 of the *Capitulary of Kiersy* — a chapter which, in the version we have, consists merely of the following topical statement: "Qualiter hoc perficiatur et ad effectum perveniat, quod Nortmannis dari debet de coniecto";¹⁵ (2) document A was written first, but was, after some deliberation by the king and his officials, declared inadequate and therefore discarded; (3) a new document, B, more comprehensive in scope, was then drawn up; this was regarded as sufficient for the purpose, and therefore became part of the *Capitulary of Kiersy* in its final and completed form.

Something remains to be said with reference to the second clause in chapter 31 of the *Capitulary of Kiersy*: "Et de cappis et aliis negotiatoribus, videlicet ut Iudaei dent decimam et negotiatores christiani undecimam."¹⁶ It is of considerable importance to determine whether this clause deals with the same subject and the same persons as the following sentence at the end of document B: "De negotiatoribus autem vel qui in civitatibus commanent iuxta possibilitatem, secundum quod habuerint de facultatibus, coniectus exigitur."¹⁷ We know that document B refers to the Danegeld, but does chapter 31 of the *Capitulary of Kiersy* also refer to the Danegeld? That we do not know. Chapter 31 of the *Capitulary* contains two clauses, the first of which is concerned with the *honores* of Boso and others, the second with a tax on merchants.¹⁸ Bourgeois¹⁹ assumes that the tax on the merchants must have been for the purposes of the Danegeld, and then concludes that the first clause, which refers

14 *M.G.H., LL.* Sectio II, t. ii, p. 358, lines 30–31. Cf. Bourgeois, *Le capit. de Kiersy-sur-Oise*, 27–68; Halphen, "A propos du capitulaire de Quierzy-sur-Oise," *Rev. Hist.*, 1911, CVI, 287–88, 294.

15 *M.G.H., LL.* Sectio II, t. ii, p. 361. See *supra*, appendix i, n. 33, and cf. Fustel de Coulanges, *Nouvelles recherches*, 434–35.

16 *Capitulare Carisiacense*, c. 31 (*M.G.H., LL.* Sectio II, t. ii, p. 361): "De honoribus Bosonis, Bernardi et Widonis et aliorum illarum partium. Et de cappis et aliis negotiatoribus, videlicet ut Iudaei dent decimam et negotiatores christiani undecimam."

17 Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

18 Cf. *supra*, n. 16.

19 *Op. cit.*, p. 82.

to the *honores* of Boso *et al.*, must have had a similar purport. The correctness of this conclusion may be questioned. In the first place, it need not be assumed that there was any connection between the raising of the Danegeld and the question of the *honores* of Boso and his associates. Charles may well have had other reasons for considering the latter question, reasons that grew out of the mounting ambition and the recent activities of Boso; he may have wished to take precautions against the accumulation of too much power in the hands of vassals whose good faith there was reason to suspect.²⁰ In the second place, it is very strange that the clause concerning the merchants, if it really refers to the Danegeld, was not included in chapter 30, which was devoted to that subject. We cannot suppose that in the case of Boso and his associates there was a closer connection with merchants than there was in the case of the other magnates. These considerations lead me to believe (1) that there is no connection whatever between the first and second clauses in chapter 31 of the *Capitulary of Kiersy*; and (2) that the second clause, which refers to a tax on merchants, was not originally part of chapter 31, but was wrongly inserted there by some scribe at a later time. Whether or not this second clause refers to the Danegeld, cannot be definitely determined. If it does, then it certainly belongs with chapter 30, just as the two tax documents above referred to. In that case, furthermore, this clause must be regarded as a revision and amendment of the last sentence in document *B*, for that does not specify the exact rate of taxation in the case of the merchants; it merely

²⁰ Cf. Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, pp. 83 ff. The fact that Boso is referred to as *carissimus Dux noster* in a diploma issued by Charles at Besançon on August 11 (Bouquet, VIII, 672-3), does not necessarily invalidate the assumption that at the Assembly of Kiersy Charles had considered the advisability of reducing the number of *honores* held by Boso and some other powerful vassals. We know that soon after Charles had reached Italy, Boso and his associates entered into open revolt against the emperor (*Ann. Bert.*, 877, p. 136). Boso was not present at the Assembly of Kiersy, (Bouquet, IX, 255), and very likely his relations with Charles had been strained since the spring. At most, the mention of Boso in the diploma of August 11 indicates a temporary, and probably only an apparent, reconciliation. Seeman (*Boso von Niederburgund*, 37-43) apparently takes the view that Charles the Bald did not surmise any danger of revolt on the part of Boso until after he had reached Italy, and after the vassals had refused to come to his aid against Karlmann. In that case, it must be assumed that Charles at the Assembly of Kiersy raised the question of Boso's *honores* for other reasons than those suggested above. Even so, however, there is nothing which proves a connection between that question and the levy of the Danegeld; it seems to me that the reasoning which leads Bourgeois to this conclusion really has for its principal basis the rather dangerous argument *post ergo propter*.

provides for a tax according to fortune. But no positive statement can be made on this point. The clause may not refer to the Danegeld at all. The taxation of merchants, Christian as well as Jewish, was certainly not limited to occasions when Danegeld had to be raised.²¹ It is even possible that originally this clause had no relation whatever to the *Capitulary of Kiersy*.

But how did the clause in question come to find a place in chapter 31 of the *Capitulary*? To this only a hypothetical answer can be suggested, for the original manuscript of the *Capitulary of Kiersy* is no longer in existence.²² In medieval manuscripts marginal notes, or glosses, are matters of very frequent occurrence. It is not at all impossible that what now constitutes the second clause in chapter 31, was originally only a marginal gloss inserted by some scribe who knew or assumed that what he wrote pertained to the assessment of the Danegeld.²³ Now, it is well known that in the process of copying manuscripts scribes often incorporated glosses into the body of the text to which the glosses referred.²⁴ In this case, a gloss, applying to chapter 30, and written in the margin opposite that chapter, which is very brief, would probably have extended far enough down the page so as to be opposite chapter 31 as well as chapter 30.²⁵ A later scribe may, out of ignorance or carelessness or both, easily have incorporated with chapter 31 what originally was a gloss applying to chapter 30.²⁶

21 See Waitz, *D. Verfassungsgesch.*, IV, 44-45.

22 Bourgeois, *op. cit.*, p. 11. At least that part of the manuscript which contained the text of the *Capitulary* has been lost.

23 According to Falke (*Die Geschichte des deutschen Handels*, p. 36), merchants were taxed regularly, and not only for the Danegeld, at the rate of one tenth for Jews and one eleventh for Christians. He seems to indicate that these rates of assessment had applied at least as early as the reign of Louis the Pious. If this opinion were correct, any official would have known the rates at which merchants were taxed, and the clause in document B covering this point would have been quite sufficient for its purpose, even though it did not give the specific rates. Unfortunately, Falke does not support his statement by any reference to the sources, and it is probably an unwarranted generalization based only on the arrangement for 877. Cf. Waitz, *op. cit.*, IV, 120, n. 1.

24 Cf. Bernheim, *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode*, ed. 1903, p. 343.

25 This was called to my attention by Professor J. W. Thompson, of the University of Chicago.

26 For a somewhat similar hypothesis, applying to chapter 25 of the *Capitulary of Kiersy*, see Halphen, *op. cit.*, p. 293, n. 3.

APPENDIX III.

THE DANEGELD IN FRISIA.

The payment of tribute to the Vikings, which is a characteristic feature of the history of the ninth and tenth centuries both in the West Frankish kingdom and in England, appears to have had its origin in Frisia during the later period of the reign of Charlemagne. Between the years 810 and 852, there have been recorded five different instances of the exaction of Danegeld from the Frisians.

In 810, while Charlemagne was tarrying at Aachen meditating on an expedition against King Godfrey of Denmark, news was brought him that a Danish fleet numbering two hundred vessels had landed in Frisia. The report went on to state that the Vikings, after having ravaged all the islands adjacent to the Frisian coast, had transported themselves over to the mainland, where they had defeated the Frisians in three successive engagements. Complete masters of the situation, the Vikings had then imposed a tribute on the conquered. Concerning the amount of this tribute we know only that when Charles was informed of the Viking raid, the Frisians had already liquidated the sum of 100 pounds of silver.¹ This amount they had raised apparently by taxation.²

The next levies of Danegeld in Frisia took place during the later years of the reign of Louis the Pious, in 836 and 837 respectively. In the former year the Northmen are said, after having set fire to Antwerp and the emporium of Witla, to have

¹ Einhard, *Annales*, 810, *M.G.H.*, *SS.*, I, 197; *Annales Maximiniani*, 810, *ibid.*, XIII, 24; *Annales Mettenses*, 810, Duchesne, *Hist. Franc. scriptores*, III, 295; Poeta Saxo, V, lines 403-4, *M.G.H.*, *SS.*, I, 274; Einhard, *Vita Karoli*, cc. 14, 17, ed. Garrod and Mowat, pp. 16, 20.

² Einhard, *Ann.*, *loc. cit.*: "Danosque victores tributum victis inposuisse, et vectigalis nomine centum libras argenti a Frisionibus iam esse solutas."

accepted tribute from the Frisians. The amount of this tribute is not indicated.³

In 837 Vikings were able, by reason of the unpreparedness or disloyalty of the Frisians, to effect a landing on the island of Walcheren. Several counts and other magnates were put to death, while others were taken prisoner and held for ransom. Then the invaders exacted tribute, or *census*, as they pleased; they are said to have obtained an infinite amount of money of diverse kinds. Proceeding on to the mainland, the Vikings devastated Dorstadt in the same year, and received more tribute from the Frisians of that region.⁴

In 846 — the year following that in which Ragnar secured the first Danegeld in the West Frankish kingdom — when Frisia was included in the realm of Lothaire I, the Northmen, we are informed, made themselves masters of almost the entire province and collected as much *census* there as they desired. Lothaire, though fully aware of the outrage, was powerless either to prevent or to avenge it; and so the Vikings, having filled their vessels with booty and with captives, sailed away unmolested.⁵

The last Danegeld recorded for Frisia was exacted in 852.⁶ In that year the Northmen arrived in a fleet numbering 252 ships. Large demands were made on the Frisians, who evidently paid or produced what was required of them. Whereupon the invaders lifted anchor and proceeded elsewhere.⁷

None of these payments, it will be noted, had been sanctioned by the ruler who at the time was vested with sovereign authority in Frisia. In that respect the Frisian Danegeld differs both from the West Frankish and the English Danegelds, which, whether tributary or stipendiary, were always paid by, or in

³ *Ann. Fuldenses*, 836, ed. Kurze, p. 27. For the location of Witla, see Vogel, 70, n. 4.

⁴ *Ann. Fuld.*, 837, p. 28; *Ann. Bert.*, 837, p. 13; *Ann. Xantenses*, 837, *M.G.H.*, SS., II, 226; Thegan, *Vita Hludovici imperatoris*, *ibid.*, 604.

⁵ *Ann. Bert.*, 846, p. 33; *Ann. Xant.*, 846, *loc. cit.*, 228.

⁶ In 873 the Viking leader Rodulf, through his envoys, demanded tribute from the population of the Ostergau. The demand, however, was refused by the Frisians, who declared they paid taxes only to their king, Louis the German, and his sons. In the hostilities which followed, Rodulf was killed and his forces were defeated. See *Ann. Fuld.*, 873, *loc. cit.*, p. 80; *Ann. Xant.*, 873, *loc. cit.*, 219; *Ann. Bert.*, 873, p. 124. Cf. Vogel, 244 ff. On Dudo's improbable statement (*De moribus et actis primorum Normanniae ducum*, II, cc. 8-10, ed. Lair, pp. 148-50) that Frisia was by Rollo subjected to payment of tribute, see Vogel, p. 279.

⁷ *Ann. Bert.*, 852, p. 41; cf. *Miracula sancti Bavonis*, Bouquet, VII, p. 153, note a.

the name of, the monarch. Except for the payment of 810 there is, unfortunately, no evidence which throws any light on the method by which the Frisian Danegeld was raised. Nor is it possible to determine, in any instance, the limits of the region whence the tribute came; it is improbable, however, that any of these tributes was raised throughout all of Frisia.

APPENDIX IV.

THE DANEGELD IN LORRAINE AND THE EAST FRANKISH KINGDOM.

Only one Danegeld has been recorded for the kingdom of Lorraine as such. It was raised in the year 864 by Lothaire II, who for this purpose exacted 4 *denarii* from every *mansus* in his whole realm. The entire sum of *denarii* (what this amounted to is not indicated) was paid, as a stipendiary Danegeld it is said, to the Northman Rodulf and his men.¹ In addition to the money, the Vikings received also a number of cattle and large quantities of flour, wine, and beer.²

Doubtless Lothaire was here following the example set by Charles the Bald,³ who, it will be remembered, in 860 had for a similar consideration engaged the Vikings under Weland to expel another group of Northmen established on the island of Ocellus in the Seine.⁴ But why Lothaire had found it necessary to resort to this measure is not made clear; nor do we learn of any services rendered by the Vikings in return for the stipend they had received.⁵

* * * *

In 882, several years after eastern Lorraine had by the treaty of Mersen been annexed to the East Frankish kingdom, Emperor Charles the Fat paid Danegeld to the Vikings encamped at Elsloo

¹ *Ann. Bert.*, 864, p. 67: "Hlotharius, Hlotharii filius, de omni regno suo quattuor denarios ex omni manso colligens, summam denariorum cum multa pensione farinae atque pecorum necnon vini ac sicerae Rodulfo Normanno, Heroldi filio, ac suis locarii nomine tribuit."

² The word *sicera* (see the preceding note) is by Richter (*Annalen des fränkischen Reichs im Zeitalter der Karolinger*, II, 398, note a) said to mean "beer"; Vogel, p. 196, translates it "sherbet" (an intoxicating drink); Duncange (*Glossarium*, s. v.), after indicating that the term, which is of Hebrew origin, was applied to any intoxicating drink except wine, explains how *sicera* was brewed.

³ Cf. Dümmler, II, 76.

⁴ See *supra*, pp. 48 ff.

⁵ Vogel (*loc. cit.*) scouts the idea that this payment was a stipend and maintains it was pure tribute.

on the Meuse. The circumstances leading up to this payment are of sufficient interest and importance to be set forth in some detail.⁶

The first half of the year 882 was, with respect to the incursions of the Northmen, undoubtedly one of the most critical periods in the history of the East Frankish kingdom. Under the leadership of the two "kings" Godfrey and Siegfried, and of the two princes Vurm and Hals, the Scandinavian invaders had plundered, burned, and laid waste virtually every place of importance in the territory comprising the valleys of the lower Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt. From the entire region most of the inhabitants, and in particular the monks and the clergy, had fled before the devastation of the Northmen.⁷

Though several attempts were made by the East Franks to check the enemy, they were all unsuccessful. To cap the climax, Louis the Younger, who was the stronger and abler of the two surviving sons of Louis the German, passed away on January 20, 882. The news of his death served only to increase the audacity of the pagans, who now ascended the Rhine to plunder Coblenz, and made a feint on Mainz. They proceeded still

6 The principal sources for the events to be here described are the third and fourth portions of the *Annals of Fulda*, *Regino's Chronicle*, the *Annals of St. Bertin*, and the *Annals of St. Vaast*, to which may be added Helmold's *Chronicles of the Slavs*, though the latter is not contemporary. The third part of the *Annals of Fulda (Mogontiaccensis)*, written by Meginhard, breathes hostility not only to Charles the Fat, but also to the principal advisers of the latter, in particular to Liutward, the archchaplain of the emperor and bishop of Vercellae, and to Count Wigbert, of whose position and career we know very little. (He may have been a vassal of Hugo, the son of Lothaire II. Hugo certainly had a vassal by that name, whom he later put to death.—Regino, ed. Kurze, pp. 120-21; cf. Dümmler, III, 202, n. 2.) Perhaps partly on account of hostility to the emperor and the latter's entourage, and partly for other reasons, Meginhard expresses a very strong disapproval of the manner in which Charles dealt with the Northmen. The *Continuatio Ratisbonensis* of the *Annals of Fulda* seems to have been written by a supporter of Charles and his policy. The value of each of these narratives, therefore, must be discounted in proportion to its author's antipathies or sympathies. Regino does not attempt to pass judgment on Charles the Fat and his policy, but it is clear that he was not satisfied with the results of that policy ("conatus eius parum effectum obtinuit"—882, p. 119). Hincmar, the author of that part of the *Annals of St. Bertin* with which we are here concerned, may have lacked complete information on what was actually done at this time; he is inclined to regard Charles as a coward. The author of the *Annals of St. Vaast* gives merely the main facts in the case and does not in any way reveal his own attitude toward the emperor and his policy. Helmold, writing almost three centuries after the events he describes, is somewhat inaccurate, and wishes to emphasize the inertia and foolishness of Charles.

7 On this and the following, cf. Vogel, 281 ff.

farther up the Moselle, attacked Treves, and even threatened Metz, in the heart of upper Lorraine.

The only remaining son of Louis the German, Charles the Fat, was absent in Italy, whither he had gone to accept from the pope the imperial crown. Messengers despatched to Charles apprised him of the danger to which his realm was exposed, and urged him to hasten northward to defend his German subjects against the ravages of the Vikings. The emperor, indeed, lost no time in returning. In May he held a general assembly at Worms, where all the vassals of the East Frankish realm swore him allegiance. At the same assembly measures were devised for the expulsion of the Northmen, who in the meantime had established themselves in a fortified camp at Elsloo on the Meuse, just below Maastricht.

In June or early in July was mobilized an immense army, including contingents from all the German stems within the realm of Charles. This force proceeded northward in two columns, one on each side of the Rhine, to Andernach, where the columns were united. From Andernach a detachment of Bavarians and Franks, under Arnulf of Carinthia and Henry of Saxony respectively, was sent forward to attack, and to capture if possible, those Northmen who might be found outside the fortifications of Elsloo. Though this preliminary maneuver was for some reason unsuccessful, the men engaged in it were able to rejoin the main army without having suffered serious losses.⁸

Thereupon Charles at once advanced with his entire army to Elsloo, laid siege to the Viking camp, and invested it for a period of twelve days in the month of July. On July 21 a very severe hailstorm wrought havoc among both besiegers and besieged, causing the death of many men and animals in both camps. This may have discouraged the emperor and some of the Franks, who very probably regarded the storm as evidence of divine wrath — God would punish the sins of his people

⁸ This episode is mentioned only in the *Cont. Ratisb. of the Annals of Fulda*, the author of which attributes the failure of the movement to treachery on the part of certain Franks who, according to current rumor, had been bribed. Vogel (p. 289, p. 290, n. 1; cf. pp. 293, 294) brands this rumor as false and ascribes the failure to the watchfulness of the Scandinavian spies.

by refusing to grant them victory over their enemies.⁹ At all events Charles was induced to enter into negotiations with the Northmen immediately or soon after the storm.

The initiative to these negotiations had, I believe, been taken by the Northmen, and in particular by Godfrey, their most distinguished and most powerful leader.¹⁰ It was certainly an opportune moment for a move of this kind, in view of the prevailing discouragement among the Franks, resulting from the effects of the storm. But Godfrey was probably too sagacious to rely exclusively on his opponents' dejected state of mind for the success of his enterprise. He seems to have secured the intervention in his behalf of at least two men who stood close to the emperor, namely Bishop Liutward and Count Wigbert. In any case, these men were later accused by their enemies of having accepted bribes from the Northmen; an accusation the truth of which may of course be challenged, but which cannot be definitely proved false.

After it had been arranged that the Franks were to furnish

9 Though the storm is mentioned only by the author of the *Cont. Ratisb.*, p. 108, there is no reason to doubt the truth of his statement. Regino tells us (p. 119) that the great effort of Charles to expel the Northmen met with little success, "indignatione caelesti super populum christianam religionem profanantem deseiviente." Hincmar, after having mentioned the arrival of Charles before the Viking camp, says significantly (*Ann. Bert.*, p. 153): "conclidit cor eius." What we know in general of the character and courage of Charles the Fat, certainly lends color to the theory that it was this storm and its results, interpreted as an adverse sign from heaven, which, in part at least, undermined the earlier confidence of the emperor in the ability of his army to overcome the Northmen (cf. Dümmler, III, 201, n. 6). Besides it must be remembered that the statement in Part III of the *Annals of Fulda* (p. 98) to the effect that the Northmen were at their last gasp, terror stricken, and despairing of their lives, is no doubt an exaggeration, the purpose of which was to belittle Charles and to emphasize his cowardice. In any case, Charles had at the time no means of ascertaining actual conditions among the Northmen. The Viking army was perhaps numerically inferior to the Frankish, but still it was a very large army. On its fighting qualities it is not necessary again to expatiate. On the other hand, it is very doubtful that the Frankish investment of Elsløo was complete; the Vikings may have been able to avail themselves of their ships on the Meuse. On this see Vogel, p. 290, n. 3, p. 291, n. 3.

10 The *Annals of St. Bertin*, Regino, and the *Cont. Ratisb.* give no definite information as to whether it was the Northmen or the Franks that first suggested negotiation. But Part III of the *Annals of Fulda* gives us to understand that the initiative came from the Vikings, who had bribed Bishop Liutward and Count Wigbert to suggest to the emperor that he desist from the siege and enter into negotiations with Godfrey. The *Annals of St. Vaast* also indicate that it was Godfrey who first began to negotiate.

hostages to the Northmen, Godfrey¹¹ went to meet the emperor at a place some six miles distant from Elslou. The Viking leader offered to cease plundering the East Frankish kingdom during the lifetime of Charles, and to become a Christian and accept baptism,¹² on condition (1) that he be invested with the counties and fiefs in Frisia which had formerly been held by his countryman Rorich; (2) that Gisla, the daughter of Lothaire II, be given him in marriage;¹³ and (3) that his fellow Norseman Siegfried (and also Vurm and Hals?) be paid a sum of money amounting to 2,412 or 2,080 pounds of gold and silver. These terms were accepted by Charles, probably at the suggestion of his advisers, Liutward and Wigbert in particular.

Charles the Fat has been severely criticized, by his contemporaries and by modern historians alike, for what they call his pusillanimity in dealing with the Northmen on this occasion.¹⁴ Almost all those who have written on the subject are of the opinion that it was the manifest duty of Charles to annihilate the invaders by pressing the siege operations, or by forcing them to engage in a battle the outcome of which, it is assumed, could

11 The statement in the *Cont. Ratisb.* that it was Siegfried, not Godfrey, who went to confer with Charles, appears to be an error (Dümmler, III, 203, n. 2; Vogel, 291, n. 6, 292, n. 2). I believe the error should be attributed to the original annalist rather than some later copyist; for in the enumeration of the various Viking leaders a few lines before, Siegfried is mentioned first and Godfrey second, which almost proves that in the mind of the annalist Siegfried was *manu validior*. But since all the other sources agree in stating that the treaty was made with Godfrey, not with Siegfried, we must conclude that the author of the *Cont. Ratisb.* was misinformed on this point.

12 On the baptism of Godfrey, see Dümmler, III, 203, n. 1.

13 This marriage alliance is not mentioned at all by Hincmar (Vogel's assertion, p. 292, n. 2, to the contrary notwithstanding) nor in Part III of the *Annals of Fulda*. The author of the *Cont. Ratisb.* states that it took place in the following year. Regino and the author of the *Annals of St. Vaast*, however, give it as one of the conditions on which Godfrey agreed to become a Christian in 882. Dümmler and Vogel, using the argument *ex silentio*, conclude that Regino and the author of the *Annals of St. Vaast* in some inexplicable way got the marriage alliance mixed up with the treaty of 882, that in reality this marriage was not agreed upon until the following year, and that it had nothing to do with the treaty of 882. But it seems preferable to avoid the argument from silence and to attempt to reconcile the statements of Regino and the author of the *Annals of St. Vaast* with those of the *Cont. Ratisb.* It is quite possible that the marriage had been agreed upon in connection with the treaty of 882, but was not consummated until the following year. Cf. Vogel, 292, n. 2; Dümmler, III, 203, n. 1. Vogel admits, p. 299, n. 4, that Charles the Fat may have proposed the marriage.

14 Cf. Dümmler, III, 202 and n. 1; Böhmer-Mühlbacher, *Regesten*, no. 1639b. Vogel, p. 291, refers to the negotiations as "das jammervollste Schauspiel, das sich überhaupt in der Geschichte der normannischen Einfälle den Blicken bietet." Cf. *supra*, p. 147.

not have been doubtful; he should never have consented to enter into negotiations with the enemy at all, and the fact that he did so at a time when he might have destroyed them, is but too convincing proof of his cowardice.¹⁵

It may be admitted that Charles was lacking in valor and resoluteness. Yet, before passing too severe judgment on what he did at this time, we shall do well to reflect that Frankish victory need not necessarily have followed an armed conflict at Elslöo.¹⁶ Moreover, was not the policy of converting the Northmen and of granting fiefs to one of their strongest leaders, precisely the method whereby the Viking problem in the West Frankish realm in the end was solved?¹⁷

The money consideration received by the Northmen was, we may note, comparatively small. It could not possibly have had the same importance as the other provisions of the treaty. That treaty itself was, so far as we can judge, a contract between Charles on the one hand and Godfrey on the other, as principals.¹⁸ There is no evidence to show that the other Viking leaders, such as Siegfried, Vurm, or Hals, engaged themselves to the emperor¹⁹ in any way whatsoever.²⁰ The *quid pro quo* demanded and received by Godfrey for *himself* was (1) the counties and fiefs in Frisia, and (2) the marriage alliance with Gisla, daughter

15 Cf. Dümmler, III, 202, 203.

16 See *supra*, n. 9. Cf. the defeat of the Saxons under Duke Brun (Vogel, 276 ff.) and the failure of the Franks under Louis the Younger to force the Northmen at Nimwegen to capitulate (*ibid.*, 278 ff.).

17 That Charles and his counsellors, especially Liutward, really intended to follow a policy of conciliation with the Northmen by which the latter might be brought under the softening influences of the Christian religion, may be gathered even from a source so hostile to Charles as Part III of the *Annals of Fulda*. Meginhard there tells us that Godfrey had been introduced to Charles by Liutward, and that the emperor, after the manner of Ahab, received the Norseman as a friend and himself raised him from the baptismal font. Later he tells us, in a very indignant tone, how Charles refused to take revenge or to break off negotiations with Godfrey on account of some insults heaped on the Franks by the other Northmen in the meantime; and how severely Charles punished anyone of his soldiers who killed a Northman while the negotiations were pending, even if the Northman in question had tried to enter the Frankish camp; all of which seems to indicate that Charles had had in mind a *rapprochement* with the pagans. Whether this was a wise policy, and whether it was likely to bring the desired results, are other matters which do not concern us for the moment. On the possibility of a "German Normandy," see Vogel, p. 295.

18 See *supra*, n. 11.

19 This does not, of course, preclude an arrangement between Godfrey on the one hand and his fellow Northmen on the other.

20 Dümmler's assertion (III, 203 and n. 1) to the contrary notwithstanding. The "Klausel" referred to by Dümmler in the note contains the promise, not of Siegfried, but of Godfrey (see *supra*, n. 11).

of Lothaire II. It is true that Godfrey also accepted money, but this he used as a means of inducing the other Vikings to quit the territories subject to Charles the Fat.²¹ Accordingly, the money payment must be regarded as the least important part of the treaty.²² Undoubtedly Godfrey realized that the other Northmen would not have been content to see him in exclusive possession of all the fruits of the treaty; therefore, after a general understanding had been arrived at, he persuaded the emperor to grant him this "subsidy" in order that with it he might secure the retreat of his fellow warriors.

The exact amount of money received by Godfrey is somewhat doubtful. Some of our sources refer to it very indefinitely or say nothing about it.²³ Two sources are more specific, but do not agree. According to one of these it was 2,412 pounds of gold and silver;²⁴ according to the other, 2,080 pounds or a little more.²⁵ The latter figure, it is said, was based on reckoning a pound as being worth 20 *solidi*.

This Danegeld was not raised by taxation. Charles appears to have secured the entire amount by drawing on the treasuries of those churches which had escaped being plundered by the

21 The author of the *Cont. Ratisb.* makes clear that the money was first paid to Godfrey, but gives no information as to how he used it. Meginhard (in Part III of the *Annals of Fulda*), speaking of Charles's relations with Godfrey, says the money was paid to *inimicis*. Regino and Hincmar state explicitly that the fiefs were given to Godfrey, and the money to Siegfried. From these statements I draw the conclusion expressed above in the text.

22 The money is referred to in *Cont. Ratisb.* as gifts (*munera*) presented by Charles to Godfrey just before the latter was about to return to the Viking camp, and two days after the treaty proper had been concluded. In fact this writer gives the impression that the money payment was not really required by the terms of the treaty; that rather it was gratuitous on the part of Charles, who thereby wished to strengthen the bonds of friendship with Godfrey. Even Meginhard (Part III of the *Annals of Fulda*), who strongly disapproves of the treaty, does not speak of the money payment until after he has made clear the other and principal features of the treaty; he declares that the payment of the money was a greater crime than the handing over of the counties and benefices, since the money was taken from the church treasuries; to this writer it was tantamount to paying tribute, yet he explains that Charles in paying over the money, did so on the advice of some scoundrels—which seems to imply that it was not really necessary or required by the terms of the treaty. Regino and Hincmar do not speak of the money until after they have discussed the terms made with Godfrey, and then state that it was paid to Siegfried and the other Northmen. The *Annals of St. Vaast* do not mention the money at all.

23 Regino, p. 120, says quite indefinitely: "immensum pondus auri et argenti"; *Ann. Bert.*, p. 153: "plura milia argenti et auri."

24 *Ann. Fuld.*, Part III, p. 99.

25 *Ibid.*, *Cont. Ratisb.*, p. 108.

Northmen in the preceding months.²⁶ The treasury of the church of Metz in particular seems to have been drawn upon.²⁷ This was perhaps because at the time that see was vacant.²⁸

The major part of the army of Charles had no doubt disapproved of the policy of treating with the pagan Northmen, whose promises and pledges, it was felt, could not be trusted.²⁹ The ecclesiastics naturally were indignant to see what remained of the church treasures presented as a gift to those who had but recently been plundering and destroying their property.³⁰ However good the intentions of the emperor and his advisers may have been in concluding the treaty of 882, it is certain that Charles gained neither prestige nor popularity thereby.³¹

Again fortune had favored the Vikings. So far from having been forced to give up any part of the immense booty which they had gathered together in the past months, the freebooters were now furnished with more money or plate. A large part of this plunder, together with a number of captives, was by the Vikings sent off to Scandinavia on two hundred heavily laden vessels.³² Godfrey and his men probably withdrew to their newly granted fiefs in Frisia;³³ while Siegfried, Vurm, and Hals, with their followers, repaired — after they had set fire to Deventer, a Frisian port, and had made some attempts at plundering along the lower Rhine — to the West Frankish realm, to commence fresh plundering operations.³⁴

* * * *

26 *Ann. Fuld.*, III, p. 99.

27 *Ann. Bert.*, p. 153.

28 The bishop had been killed earlier in the same year in a hostile encounter with the Northmen. The revenues of the see during the period of the vacancy were by Charles the Fat allowed to Hugo, the son of Lothaire II—much to the disgust of Hincmar (*Ann. Bert.*, p. 153). This fact taken together with the marriage of Godfrey to Hugo's sister Gisla (cf. *supra*, p. 243 and n. 13) leads one to suspect that Hugo had possibly been one of the intermediaries between the Northmen and Charles the Fat. The treaty of 882 certainly redounded to the advantage of Hugo.

29 Cf. *Ann. Fuld.*, III, *loc. cit.*

30 Cf. *ibid.*; *Ann. Bert.*, *loc. cit.*

31 See Regino, *loc. cit.*; Helmold, *Chronica Slavorum*, I, 7, *M.G.H.*, SS., XXI, p. 17. Cf. Dümmler, III, 204.

32 *Ann. Fuld.*, III, p. 99.

33 *Ibid.* In the following year (883) Godfrey entered into a close alliance with Hugo, whose sister he married about the same time (*ibid.*, p. 100).

34 See Vogel, p. 294.

That there were both in Lorraine and in the East Frankish kingdom numerous payments of local Danegeld, i. e. ransom payments for persons and places, can not be doubted. But only one instance thereof has, so far as my observations go, been chronicled. It is that of Count Eberhard, who in the year 880 was ransomed at a "very great price" by his mother Evesa. How Evesa obtained this ransom money is not indicated.³⁵ Dudo's story of the ransom of Reginar Langhals of Hainaut by his wife in the same year, in return for all the gold in the duchy, is probably legendary.³⁶

³⁵ Regino, 881, p. 117; cf. Vogel, p. 278.

³⁶ See Dudo, *De moribus et actis primorum Normanniae ducum*. II, c. 10, ed. Lair, p. 150; cf. Vogel, pp. 279-80.

APPENDIX V.

THE DANEGELD IN BRITTANY.

Whether a general Danegeld was ever paid to the Northmen in Brittany, must be regarded as doubtful. It is true, however, that in 847 the Breton duke Nominoë, after he had been thrice defeated by the Vikings and finally put to flight, opened negotiations with the invaders and was able, by the presentation of "gifts," to induce them to evacuate his territory.¹ These gifts may or may not have consisted of money. That the Northmen were willing, on occasion, to accept considerations other than money, is certain. For in the year 869 Solomon, the second successor of Nominoë, could make peace with the pagans by furnishing them with five hundred cows.²

Local Danegeld was doubtless paid in Brittany, as elsewhere, on many occasions. But the recorded instances thereof are but few in number. Bishop Courantgenus of Vannes was in all probability ransomed from Viking captivity in the year 854.³ In the following year the monks of St. Sauveur de Redon ransomed Count Pascwet of Vannes, by handing over to the Northmen a chalice and a paten, both of gold, and weighing together as much as 67 *solili*.⁴ Later, however, this same Pascwet did not hesitate to pay a stipendiary Danegeld — the amount of which is not indicated — to a group of Vikings whom he engaged to aid him as mercenaries against his rival Vurfand, count of Rennes.⁵

1 *Ann. Bert.*, 847, p. 35: "Dani partem inferioris Galliae quam Brittones incolunt adeuntes, ter cum eisdem bellantes, superant; Nomenogiusque victus cum suis fugit, dein [per] legatos muneribus a suis eos sedibus amovit."

2 Regino, 874, ed. Kurze, p. 108; cf. *Ann. Bert.*, 869, p. 107. See Vogel, p. 232.

3 See *Cartulaire de Saint-Sauveur de Redon*, ed. de Courson, XL, p. 369, and XXII, p. 19; cf. Vogel, p. 145.

4 The sacred vessels were later redeemed from the pagans by Pascwet. *Cart. de Saint-Sauveur de Redon*, XXVI, p. 21; cf. Vogel, p. 150.

5 Regino, 874, p. 107.